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11 INTRODUCTION
This dissertation aims to examine Japanese MNEs’ activities and their FDI strategies in
European transition economies, where the economic and institutional conditions have
rapidly been changing through transition from state socialism to a market economy and
integration into the regional and global markets through trade and capital flows. While a
number of Western companies rushed into the transitional markets to gain first-mover
advantages subjecting them to numerous threats and uncertainties in the CEE region
from the fall of state socialism onwards, Japanese MNEs had a minimal presence or
were totally absent for a long period of time. However, the number of Japanese MNEs
has increased at a gradual pace in recent years. According to JETRO (2007), the number
of Japanese manufacturing MNEs in the European transition economies reached 206 as
the end of 2006, while in the year 1990 there was only one. This equals to the number of
Japanese manufacturing MNEs in the UK (210). Faced with rapid changes in locational
advantages in Europe, Japanese manufacturing MNEs have been under pressure to
reorganise their value-creating networks of sales, distribution and production in
response to emerging demands spurred by the completion of the Single European
Market (SEM) in an enlarged Europe.
To date, rich empirical evidence exists on the characteristics and market entry
strategies (i.e., entry mode and management policies) of transnational activities of
Western multinationals in the east of Europe through qualitative and quantitative
methods (Brouthers, 2002; Brouthers and Nakos, 2004; Brouthers et al., 1999; Meyer,
1998, 2001). Most of the prior studies on this subject, however, have shown greater
reliance on economic theories of international production (e.g., Hymer’s monopolistic
advantages, Williamson’s transaction cost theory, Casson’s internalisation approach, and
Dunning’s eclectic paradigm). It should be kept in mind that Western-centric theoretical
interpretations cannot sufficiently explain the investment behaviours of Japanese MNEs
in European transition economies. It is because differences between Japanese and
Western companies are substantial in cultural values, social organization of individual
networks, corporate governance and business mindsets1.
The main purpose of this thesis is to provide systematic and rigorous research into
the patterns, processes and corporate strategies of Japanese MNEs in the CEE region.
Understanding why Japanese MNEs decided to initiate production in or to relocate
existing factories from Western Europe to CEE at a particular time constitutes our first
1 For example, against Japan’s structural character of permanent employment practices, job promotion
proportional to age, and keiretsu networks, Japanese firms have traditionally emphasized long-term
stability over short-term profitability. In addition, ‘consensus’ and ‘continuity’ in the decision-making
processes have been prioritized among Japanese firms, as compared to Western firms with emphasis on
‘initiative’ and ‘change’.
2significant concern. The subject of the examination to follow is to scrutinise local
market environments in the CEE region. The quality of both economic and institutional
forces embedded in national business environments is clearly paramount importance. In
order to determine the appropriate FDI strategy in terms of competitiveness, efficiency,
control over vital resources and legitimacy, firms should keep their eyes on the host
country’s transition environment. This thesis will also aim to investigate what
determines investment decisions by Japanese multinationals at the subnational level and
what variables are most important to operating successfully in the CEE region based on
a combination of theories. 2 The results will help make crucial practice-oriented
implications both for prospective investors and for host-based policy developers.
Sections 1.1 and 1.2 discuss research questions and the methodology issues addressed in
the thesis. The organisation of this thesis is presented in Section 1.3.
1.1 Research Questions
CEECs in the post-socialist era remain in transformation. For foreign MNEs, economic
and non-economic circumstances in the CEE region are more complex and difficult to
manage. Thus the CEE region is a vital ground for an empirical investigation of foreign
MNEs and their investment strategy since, in particular, the institutional infrastructure is
different from and incomparable to those in less developed countries, for instance. I
attempt to pay particular attention to systematically analysing the investment strategy of
Japanese manufacturing MNEs in the European transition economies from the time of
the collapse of state socialism to the present. A multi-method approach toward this goal
is applied through the presentation of both descriptive studies and empirical analyses
that enable us to test the explanatory power of a broad set of theoretical contributions.
The central objective of this dissertation is to answer the following general questions:
 What is the state of FDI inflows in CEECs?
 What are the basic characteristics of Japanese FDI in CEECs in terms of the actual
volume, destination, industrial distribution, motives, entry mode, ownership and
operational experience?
 How do institution-based location advantages or disadvantages condition the overall
trends and geographical scope of MNE activity in CEECs?
 What determines Japanese manufacturing MNEs’ location choices at the sub-national
regional level?
 What are the effects of changing environmental and institutional conditions of the host
economy and firm-based advantages on the performance consequence of Japanese
manufacturing MNEs? How do social networks, human resource management and the
2 Transaction cost theory, resource-based theory of the firm, industrial location theories and network
theory are extended and advanced to probe the characteristics of Japanese FDI.
3delegation of autonomy to the subsidiaries contribute to improving performance?
 How do the location strategy and performance outcome of Japanese manufacturing
MNEs in CEE differ at the company level?
In particular, I concentrate on testing the postulation that not only economic factors (e.g.
production cost advantages) but also non-economic factors in the CEE region are of
significant importance in affecting the FDI strategy of foreign multinational
organisations.
1.2 Methodology
The main question of this dissertation – whether corporate strategies of Japanese
manufacturing MNEs have been determined not only by economic factors (e.g., low
production cost advantages: cheap but skillful human capital, transportation costs,
inexpensive land costs, agglomeration economies and the like) but also by
non-economic factors (e.g., economic institutions, social networks and the like) – is
explored by applying quantitative and quantitative methods: (1) the statistical analysis
of existing data; (2) the statistical analysis of a questionnaire survey; and (3) case
studies/in-depth interviews with open-ended questions.
(1) To identify the characteristics of host-based locational advantages and the historical
development of inward FDI into the CEECs, this thesis used the UNCTAD ‘World
Investment Report’; ‘Economic Statistics and Forecasts’ from the EBRD; ‘World
Development Indicators’ published by the World Bank. Data on the pattern of inward
Japanese FDI and the locational and industrial distribution of Japanese manufacturing
MNEs in the CEECs were collected from the JETRO ‘Zai Ōshū Toruko Nikkei Seizōgyō
no Keiei Jittai’ (in Japanese); ‘Gyōshubetsu Taigai Chokusetsu Tōshi Jisseki’ (in
Japanese) from Japan’s Ministry of Finance; ‘Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyō Sōran:
Kunibetsu’ published by Tōyō Keizai (in Japanese); the Chubu Industrial Advancement
Centre ‘Chūtōōshokoku e no Kigyō Shinshutsu no Genjyō to Kongo no Tenbō’ (in
Japanese).
(2) To assess the Central and Eastern European strategy of Japanese manufacturing MNEs
quantitatively, STATA 9, a statistical computer software package, was employed to
determine which explanatory variables account for different aspects of corporate
strategies (e.g., industrial location and business performance). Giroud (2003: 149)
argues the strength of quantitative methodology as follows: “a clear advantage of the
quantitative design is that of credibility of results through a large number of responses
organised in a structured way”. The quantitative approach also empowers researchers to
statistically test causal relationships between variables and thus verify the validity of
existing theories.
4(3) A case study approach helps to understand the significance of non-quantifiable
determinants of the actions and behaviour of Japanese MNEs at a corporate-level by
supplementing evidence found in quantitative methods. The case studies are based on a
series of interviews with management from Japanese manufacturing MNEs operating in
CEE and local government officials. The in-depth interviews were carried out on the
basis of open-ended questions so that the interviewees can feel free to discuss company
history, European strategy and operational experience. The case study method based on
the interviews is helpful to advance our understanding of the decision-making and
manufacturing activities of Japanese MNEs in CEE because of the following reasons:
(1) detailed information about hidden, complicated and non-quantifiable factors; (2) the
explication of cause-effect relationships; and (3) reliability. I also contacted the
interviewees by email to obtain follow-up information. To support the information
obtained from the interviews, secondary data from newspapers, a series of annual
reports, company brochures, and magazines are utilised. The combination of primary
and secondary data enriches the quality of the analysis.
1.3 Organisation of the Dissertation
This thesis contains 9 chapters, organised as explained below. The introductory part
covers the background and purpose of the study, research questions, methodology and
the organisation of this dissertation. Chapter 2 sketches out various FDI-related
theoretical contributions for comparison. I introduce an extensive range of theoretical
contributions to the FDI strategies of foreign multinational organisations (e.g., the
characteristics and motivations of foreign investors, the dynamics of MNEs’ location
patterns and the consequence of MNE activity). First, I present theoretical insights into
the underlying rationale behind MNCs’ preference for foreign production over domestic
production with special attention to Hymer’s monopolistic advantage argument,
Rugman’s internalisation theory and Dunning’s OLI configuration. Secondly, given the
ownership advantages and internalisation advantages, this thesis also attaches
importance to location advantages such as market- and non-market related causes that
determine FDI. Along with L-type advantages, particular emphasis is placed on the
general role of agglomeration economies. Thirdly, the chapter delineates the potential
effect of non-market factors such as network relations and institutional changes on the
attraction of FDI and its consequence. I investigate how sufficient an answer these
theoretical contributions can offer to the question of FDI and MNE activity, and what
limitations are inherent in them.
Chapter 3 describes the variations of market characteristics of the European transition
economies and the general state of cross-border capital movement into the transition
countries of CEE. It is intended to present the sequential development of inbound FDI
5in the CEE region not only in absolute values, but also in population-adjusted terms.
This chapter provides a comprehensive description of the pattern and trends of FDI
transactions based on the countries of origin and industrial heterogeneity.
Chapter 4 summarises the characteristics, patterns and prima facie evidence of the
motivations of Japanese FDI in CEE. The use of both FDI statistics and firm-level data
help not only to characterise the recent trend of Japanese FDI but also to interpret
corporate strategy and the motives of Japanese firms. This chapter shows that the whole
history of Japanese investment in the CEE region is relatively short and that the
geographical scope of Japanese firms is shifting gradually from the old western
periphery of the EU (Spain and Portugal) to the eastern periphery. The chapter also
discusses that both investment motivations and relocation determinants vary
substantially by country. The descriptive part of the study ends with this chapter.
Chapter 5 concentrates on the extent and method of institutional development in order
to attract foreign investors’ attention to the European transition economies by relying on
the combination of a variety of internationally recognised statistical sources and the
prior relevant scholarship. This chapter views and scrutinises the cross-country variation
on microeconomic restructuring and the institutionalisation of FDI practices. I
empirically test how these institutional variables affect FDI inflows by virtue of
comparison with market-related factors. The aim is to verify how the dynamic
behaviour of profit-maximising multinational organisations is framed into a context of
institutional transformation by utilising a dynamic panel data approach.
Chapter 6 is dedicated to examining how influential market and non-market factors are
in determining Japanese multinational organisations’ location choices in CEE at the
sub-national regional level, utilising McFadden’s conditional logit model. The data set
contains 205 Japanese manufacturing firms operating in 20 NUTS-1 regions during the
years 1991-2006. With particular attention on agglomeration economies in conventional
economic and institutional considerations, I discuss exactly how spatial concentration
contributes to shaping Japanese manufacturing firms’ location strategy in the CEE
region. I also aim to identify the industrial location contributions from institutional
development, an ownership-type advantage of local operational experience and business
groupings. Finally, the chapter discusses sequential shifts in the effect of industrial
agglomeration on location choice. The limitations of this chapter and future suggestions
are discussed.
Chapter 7 sheds special light on the question of how economic and non-economic
factors, as well as firm-specific competitive advantage, determine performance
heterogeneity. Additionally, in this chapter I also take a closer look at the nexus of
6network relations (e.g., parent-subsidiary relations, ties with home-based business
groups and ties with local political and social actors). The data set covers the primary
data of 55 Japanese manufacturing affiliates in CEECs. This primary data was collected
by the author in January 2008. This survey analysis shows the extent of managers’
perception of firm performance as well as shifts in environmental and institutional
conditions. I perform multiple regressions on the basis of multidimensional performance
measures (1. overall operational satisfaction; 2. profitability; 3. sales growth; and 4. cost
reduction) as dependent variables. The very uniqueness of this study with the use of the
econometric tool is to empirically identify the determinants of the performance
outcomes of Japanese manufacturing firms in the European transition economies that
have been disregarded by scholars of international economics and business. The
limitations of this chapter and future suggestions are discussed.
Chapter 8 analyses the actual variation in investment strategies of four Japanese
manufacturing MNEs by using the case study method. This chapter focuses on
complementing evidence presented in the previous chapters. An in-depth case approach
on the basis of a series of semi-structured interviews is adopted to scrutinize the
variation of four case firms’ (NSK-ISKRA, Denso Hungary, Sanyo Hungary and
TMMP/TPCA) FDI strategies in terms of primary motivations for investing in CEE,
economic and institutional factors affecting FDI strategy, current operational experience,
and corporate performance. One of the greatest advantages of the case study approach is
the ability to explicate complicated, non-quantifiable and hidden factors that influence
the strategies and actions of MNEs. Hence, the case study approach is suitable for
describing and interpreting the process as well as the consequences of FDI strategy of
the four case study firms more appropriately relative to the survey approach and the
econometric approach. The case study approach draws on semi-structured interviews
with management of a number of Japanese manufacturing firms operating in countries
in CEE and Western Europe. With the purpose of supporting the validation of the
information gathered during the interviews, I adopt secondary data from media reports,
companies’ corporate websites, and newspapers.
Chapter 9 presents a summary of the empirical findings and provides concluding
remarks. This chapter also presents policy and managerial implications for host
governments in CEECs to win in the international competition for inbound foreign
capital and to become an attractive destination not only for labour-intensive FDI but
also for capital-intensive FDI.
For purposes of this thesis, CEE includes 16 countries: Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia.
7Figure 1-1: Map of Central and Eastern Europe
Source: United Nations
http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/easteuro.pdf (accessed on 9 October, 2008).
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92 THEORETICAL DISCUSSION OF MNE ACTIVITY
2.1 Introduction
This chapter lays out a theoretical framework within which FDI strategies of Japanese
manufacturing firms in the European emerging economies are analysed and interpreted.
The market penetration of Japanese manufacturing FDI in the European emerging
economies has intensified in recent years. Which theoretical assumptions can be utilised
to understand this salient trend in line with the geographical, political and economic
expansion of the EU? To what extent do existing FDI theoretical perspectives have
explanatory power in examining the internationalisation of Japanese manufacturing
firms in an enlarged Europe? This field of study has been underdeveloped with the
exception of a few Asian scholars (e.g., Hwang, 2007, 2008; Hwang et al., 2008; Lim,
2003).
To date, significant weight has been placed on firm-specific characteristics and
internalisation attributes affecting cross-border MNE operations in economic and
business perspectives of international production. Hymer’s (1960) industrial economics
hypothesis embraces the importance of firm-specific advantages to outperform local
firms when venturing into foreign markets, while internalisation theory (Buckley and
Casson, 1976; Casson, 1987) considers the MNE as the formation of an internal market
to avoid transaction costs in arm’s length markets.
However, few previous studies have integrated aspects of location, institutional
change and network development into the investment strategy of Asian MNEs in the
European transitional economies. To build a dynamic and sequential model to explore
and explain the establishment of multinational organisations beyond national boundaries
in economies in transition, I review various FDI-related theories with special emphasis
on these overlooked theoretical perspectives. The FDI theories I analyse in this chapter
stem from five streams of theorising: (1) MNE-based; (2) economic geography; (3)
strategic management; (4) network; and (5) institution-specific. Along with the key
notion of each theory, the strengths and weaknesses of each theoretical work will also
be explained. Theories I present in this chapter include:
1. MNE-based theories (e.g., Vernon’s product life cycle argument, Hymer’s
monopolistic advantage hypothesis, internalisation theory and OLI configuration in
hierarchical capitalism);
2. Spatial analysis of MNE activity (e.g., Marshall’s localisation hypothesis,
Krugman’s economic geography approach, Porter’s industrial cluster model);
3. Strategic perspective (e.g., resource-based view);
4. Network-based theories (e.g., network-based OLI configuration in alliance
capitalism and keiretsu organisation hypothesis); and
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5. Institution-specific theories (e.g., institution-based OLI configuration).
First, I begin with Vernon’s product life cycle theory, Hymer’s industrial organisation
economics, Rugman’s internalisation theory and Dunning’s OLI configuration of
international production. Second, within the economic geography context, the spatial
dynamics of MNEs is theoretically scrutinised. Third, the strategic management
perspective (i.e., the resource-based view of the firm) is introduced to supplement the
theoretical notion of ownership advantages from the industrial organisation hypothesis.
Fourth, the logic of network-based approaches to FDI (e.g., business groups,
assembler-supplier relations, customer-seller relations, intra-firm networks, external
networks) is examined, followed by institution-specific theories. The analysis of these
various existing theories helps us to build an integrative conceptual model for the
examination of MNEs’ investment strategies in the European transition economies.
Moreover, the rationale for these diverse theoretical explanations is supported by the
fact that the concept of FDI per se has become more complicated and intertwined with
theoretical perspectives based on the disciplines of international business, strategic
management, economic geography, networks and institutions. These theories share
common economic and institutional perspectives.
I pay special attention to the following questions in order to construct a theoretical
framework for the investment strategies of Japanese manufacturing MNEs in the
European transition economies:
 What kind of theoretical frameworks can be persuasive in explaining the motives,
conditions and types of MNE activity in general?
 To what extent can the conventional FDI theories and other relevant theoretical
approaches provide sufficient and reliable accounts of the investment strategy of
Japanese manufacturing firms in an enlarged EU?
 Can conventional economic factors (i.e., cheap labour costs, supplies of non-skilled
and experienced workers, transport infrastructure) satisfactorily explain the nature
and determinants of Japanese manufacturing FDI?
 To what extent do nonmarket factors (i.e., social organisation of Japanese keiretsu
systems, institutional changes of European transition economies) play a critical role
in influencing the pattern and location choice of Japanese manufacturing firms in
CEE?
2.2 Approaches Related to MNE-Based Theories
2.2.1 Product Life Cycle Theory
With special emphasis on international diversification, Vernon (1966, 1979) theorised
the transfer of production sites by US firms from the domestic market to less-developed
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countries (LDCs) in response to the maturing and standardisation of products. The
prism of the product life cycle hypothesis builds on the postulation that a firm innovates
in its home-country market, especially in an advanced economy such as the United
States. Emerging demand for new products in foreign countries validates the reasoning
for venturing in foreign markets, especially to discourage foreign rivals. According to
Vernon, the major incentive for firms to explore international diversification is to extend
a product’s life cycle and respond to shifts in comparative advantage. Vernon termed
this sequential and dynamic model as product life cycle theory.
First, production activity is implemented inside the US market in the initial phase
because of the specificity of new products (e.g., low price elasticity) and the presence of
external economies (e.g., flexibility and swiftness in communication). In the second
phase, firms start exporting their products in pursuit of scale economies through
expanding markets in other advanced economies. However, other advanced economies
may begin with imposing import restrictions to regulate the volume of exports from the
US over time. In order to circumvent such restrictive trade policies, US firms set up
their production factories in other advanced economies in order to secure or sustain their
market share. More importantly, since production cost differentials between the
domestic and foreign markets turn out to be disappearing over time, US firms are forced
to seek other countries with greater comparative advantages. In the third phase,
intensified competition for production costs turn out to be very threatening because
production processes are more standardised and the need for communication and
external economies declines more quickly. As a result, US firms are forced to start
closing down their existing production factories in other advanced economies and then
produce their products in LDCs where even economic uncertainty and FDI regulations
do not cancel out cheap labour costs yet. These sequential production relocation
processes turn out to cause the hollowing-out problems in the US market. Special
attention is paid to changes in the intensity of competition between rivals, FDI motives,
and dynamics of environmental changes in host economies (e.g., labour costs) in
Vernon’s product cycle theory.
However, the explanatory power of Vernon’s product life cycle theory is sufficient
only in the manufacturing sector. Gordon and Lees (1986: 49-50) highlight several
critical drawbacks underlying the product life cycle hypothesis. First, Vernon’s theory
postulates that only US MNEs play a leading role in the international expansion of
production activities. Thus, his theory lacks the reliability of explaining the relevance of
international businesses of Japanese and European MNEs. Second, MNEs have the
ability to engage in manufacturing various types of products ranging from standardised
to mature at the same time and to rapidly differentiate their products at present. Third,
some variations in FDI objectives are neglected in Vernon’s product life cycle theory.
Horaguchi (1992: 119) also criticises Vernon’s hypothesis for its weak theoretical clarity
in the conception of product life cycles. As regards the actual product life cycles, the
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theory does not specify the length of a product’s maturity phase and the speed of its
product’s obsolescence (Horaguchi, 1992: 119). These issues have weakened the
explanatory power of the product life cycle theory as a theory to explain the actual
behavior of MNEs in the contemporary global economy. Nevertheless, Michalski (1995:
30) claims that the explanatory power of the product life cycle hypothesis remains valid
for the explanation of the foreign market operations of small-and-medium-sized
enterprises that have difficulty creating their own global value chain systems because of
limited sources of capital, weak ownership advantages and limited international
experience relative to large MNEs.
2.2.2 Industrial Organisation Economics
Monopolistic behaviour of multinational organisations, developed in Stephen Hymer’s
MIT doctoral dissertation, has thus far been the intellectual principle of international
business studies. Hymer’s initial puzzle was why firms go multinational to engage in
business operations in foreign markets (Yeung, 1997). According to Hymer (1960),
firm-specific assets are the central determinant of FDI. An attempt is made by Hymer to
detect how foreign firms transfer their own activities to and exploit them in foreign
markets to overcome unfavorable conditions relative to indigenous firms. In other
words, indigenous firms are strategically in an advantageous position for accessing
superior information on institutional changes, language, regulatory structures and
politics of their home country. On the other hand, foreign firms may have a high
possibility of facing a host government’s intervention and its discriminatory treatment
differently from indigenous firms who have rich localised networks of production, sales
and distribution. The issues of expropriation and exchange rate risks also inhibit MNE
activity and behavior (Hymer, 1960: 35). These barriers to entry are referred to as
‘liability of foreignness’ (Zaheer and Mosakowski, 1997). Given these disadvantageous
grounds, Hymer (1960: 41) argues that foreign firms aiming at entering foreign markets
have to possess monopolistic power to outperform indigenous firms when going
multinational. This concept of industrial organisation economics developed by Hymer
(1960) has its roots in Bain (1956) who stressed that the strength of a firm’s ownership
advantages determines returns on investment. Bain (1956: 15-16) suggests that a newly
established firm in a foreign market should have the ability to leverage cost
effectiveness, price discrimination, advertisement intensity and product differentiation
over indigenous firms.
Besides monopolistic advantages, Hymer (1960) highlights the motive for
engaging in international operations. Various transaction costs inherent in imperfect
markets induce a firm to go multinational in the form of direct investment. For example,
“a conflict of evaluations” (Hymer, 1960: 50) prevents investors from licensing their
advantages. Licensing ends up causing diverging interests between licensors and
licensees in achievement of objectives and performance. Additionally, a licensor has
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limited control over its advantage and is subject to the danger that his advantage may be
imitated, reproduced and transferred to its competitors. To avoid such transaction costs
arising from imperfect markets, an investing firm needs to choose FDI. Therefore, some
theoretical elements overlap between Hymer’s industrial organisation economics and
transaction cost theory.
Hymer’s industrial organisation hypothesis does not perfectly explain the
extent and direction of FDI. One of the major weaknesses is that his attention is skewed
towards the competitive advantages that the firm possesses relative to its rival firms in
another country, while scarce attention is paid to location-specific factors. Michalski
(1995: 49) also claims that the theory somewhat overlooks the industry structure of host
countries. For example, the initiation of discriminatory trade policies by the European
Community (EC) against Japanese products during the 1980s and 1990s motivated
Japanese MNEs to invest in the region. Thus, the theoretical application of Hymer’s
monopolistic advantages to this tariff-jumping FDI seems irrelevant. Hymer also makes
no mention about the determinants of the spatial organisation of MNE activity in his
theoretical work.
2.2.3 Transaction Cost Economics
Before starting the discussion on internalisation theory, it is necessary to look back on
the transaction cost theory (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975) that is known to be the
major root of internalisation theory. Williamson (1975) made contributions to enriching
the understanding of governance structures of a firm by emphasising the distinction
between hierarchies and markets. Transaction costs refer to the costs of conducting
economic exchange in a market exceeding the costs of organizing the exchange in a
firm (Kretzberg, 2007: 60) .
According to the transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1985), firms need to
overcome three transaction costs: (1) bounded rationality; (2) uncertainty in exchange;
and (3) opportunistic behaviour in the external market. Williamson (1985: 20-22)
emphasises that there are two types of transaction costs. One is ex-ante transaction costs
that occur when actors prepare, negotiate and sign a contract. Ex-ante transaction costs
include: (1) costs for searching information on the availability of potential partners; (2)
costs for legal consultation prior to the agreement of a contract; (3) costs for hedging
against a risk of investment failure. Ex-post transaction costs refers to: (1) costs for
ensuring the quality of goods or services; (2) costs to shape a contract partner’s behavior
in a desirable direction; and (3) costs for revising contractual agreements to adapt to
changes in market conditions.
Williamson (1975) details the three major attributes of a transaction: (1)
specificity, (2) uncertainty, and (3) frequency. Consideration of these thee attributes
provides us with the opportunity to understand how transaction costs affect actual
organisations and rules. Investment specificity of transactions concerns investment in
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the exclusive use of resources required by a transaction for a particular exchange
relationship. For example, firm-specific knowledge about technology and management
indicates asset specificity. It is assumed that the more opportunistically economic actors
tend to behave the more specific the state of transactions would be. As a result,
transactions with relevance to specific investments require an agreement or a means to
safeguard an investor from the opportunistic behavior of its transaction partner.
Otherwise, one party may threaten another to obtain more desired conditions relative to
the initial condition with the cancellation of the transaction (Williamson, 1975).
Uncertainty makes a transaction complex. Uncertainty is determined by the
degree of predictability and the number of shifts in the arrangement of a transaction in
goods and services. Uncertainty of a transaction concerns changes in product quality,
date of delivery, quantity and price. The more frequently transaction contracts need to
change the more difficulty parties have in conducting control over and in reaching the
optimal consensus of the exchange of goods and services.
Frequency of transaction refers to the number of times goods and services are
exchanged between parties during a given period (Teece, 1986; Williamson, 1975).
Specificity and firm strategy condition the frequency. For example, there are a number
of potential suppliers and customers in the case of standardised intermediate parts.
When transactions repeat themselves over a long-time period, certain rules and
standards seem likely to form in order to mitigate transaction costs. The organisation of
long-term transactional relationships reflects the control over the opportunistic behavior
of partners.
There are two types of governance forms to circumvent or minimise potential
transaction cost problems. One is vertical integration, while another is horizontal
integration. Vertical integration refers to the integrated form to lower the risk of price
fluctuations within the organisation. Transaction cost economics assumes that the
common governance of complex MNE activities in dispersed locations should be
internal to the firm. That is to say, the firms internalise transactions of intermediate
products to ensure the quality of the final product. Intra-firm trade is thus favored by the
firm.
Horizontal integration refers to the integrated form of MNE activities between
the headquarters and its subsidiaries across national borders. Managerial resources such
as product technologies, marketing, financial assets and management of human
resources are shared between the headquarters and its subsidiaries as horizontal
integration advances. Scope economies arising from information sharing within an
intra-firm trade gives rise to principal incentives necessary to the growth of the firm.
2.2.4 Internalisation Theory
Rugman’s (1975, 1980) internalisation approach builds on a synthesis of Hymer’s
industrial organisation theory and Williamson’s transaction cost economics (1985).
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Internalisation theory views that foreign firms tend to opt for direct investment, which
contributes to overcome market imperfections and reduce high transaction costs. The
internalisation hypothesis stipulates that a firm engages in FDI to internalise market or
contractual transactions within its influence as a result of governmental regulations and
market imperfections (i.e., asymmetrical information and scarce knowledge of local
market conditions vis-à-vis indigenous firms). Buckley et al. (1993: 276) also assume
“internalisation of markets across international frontiers allows the reduction of the
firm’s overall tax bill relative to firms that trade at the arm’s length”. Rugman (1975,
1980) argues that returns from FDI correspond to the amount of the difference between
the total sales from production costs involved in location-specific factors and special
costs involved in firm-specific factors. Internalisation of technology is a strategic option
for a firm to prevent other firms from entering the industry, enabling the firm to attain
price discrimination. Casson (1987) considers that contractual resource transfers are the
optimal option for MNEs when effective patent protection systems are well established
in a market.
The preference of FDI over exporting and licensing is explained by the
possession of monopolistic advantages that MNEs can exploit internally when
expanding across national boundaries due to market failure and uncertainties (Buckley
and Casson, 1976). MNEs may establish their subsidiaries (i.e., wholly owned
subsidiaries) in the form of complete ownership to ensure the quality of intermediate
products, finished products and after-service and to avoid arm’s-length price settings
(Buckley and Casson, 1976). In management studies, transaction cost economics has
often been applied to the choice of entry modes in manufacturing and
non-manufacturing. Scholars (e.g., Andersson, and Svensson, 1994; Brouthers, 2002;
Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Meyer, 1998; Meyer and Nguyen, 2005; Yiu, and
Makino, 2002) consider that organisational forms for market penetration depend on the
calculation of both benefits and costs of transactions either within or beyond the
boundary of the firm. Knowledge leakage and free-riding problems involve high
opportunistic costs in the formation of new joint ventures, while new ventures with
complete ownership fend off the potential dissemination and exploitation of
cutting-edge technological knowledge by others (Rhee, 2008). Hence, scholars of
internalisation deem efficient control as a key determinant for the behaviour of MNEs
and as a means of managing global strategies between the parent company and its
foreign subsidiaries.
However, several remarks need to be given. First, the internalisation model is
not aimed for describing processes (Johanson and Mattsson, 1993: 316), while it is
suitable only for explaining why MNE exists. Second, it should be noted that the
process of the internalisation of operations may give rise to efficiency, but entails more
costs when a firm expands in foreign markets that are characterised as different from its
home market in culture, social norms, market-supporting institutions and distance. Third,
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the internalisation theory overlooks strategic competitive motives and neglects
location-specific considerations (Michalski, 1995: 64).
2.2.5 Classic OLI Configuration in Hierarchical Capitalism
Dunning’s (1977, 1988, 1993) eclectic paradigm of international production has been a
conceptual foundation for analysing the processes and consequences of MNE activity
and FDI in the disciplines of international business and strategic management. This
eclectic paradigm stipulates that the configuration of three conditions: (1)
ownership-specific factors; (2) location-specific factors; and (3) internalisation incentive
factors affects the propensity of a firm to enter foreign markets by means of foreign
direct investment over exporting or licensing (see Figure 2-1). The initial motive to
establish this comprehensive and integrative model arises out of the argument that the
behaviour of MNEs is more complex as time goes by.
The first pillar of Dunning’s ownership-location-internalisation (OLI)
paradigm is ownership-specific advantages (O). This dimension refers to a firm’s
possession of superior managerial skills, production techniques and privileged access
to raw materials and components that enable it to outperform indigenous firms.
The second pillar of the eclectic paradigm, the location-specific attributes (L)
of countries, includes: (1) market size for goods or services; (2) infrastructure; (3) the
availability of labour at affordable costs; (4) government intervention in the form of
setting performance requirements and ownership control; (5) scale economies; (6) trade
barriers; and (7) transport costs. The L-specific advantages lead firms to generate and
develop the value of O-specific advantages.
Internalisation (I) is the third pillar of the OLI configuration. The more
superior ownership advantages a firm possesses, the higher the probability the firm
will internalise them rather than externalise and control its own market by hierarchical
governance. The holy trinity of Dunning’s OLI configuration can determine not only
whether FDI is preferred over exporting or licensing but also the structure and level of
foreign MNEs in foreign markets (Dunning, 1977, 1988, 1993). The OLI paradigm of
international production has been extended to an analysis of the characteristics and
consequences of international operations related to entry mode choice (Brouthers et al.,
1999; Hill et al., 1990; Luo, 2001; Nakos and Brouthers, 2002) and the location of
FDI (Meyer and Nguyen, 2005).
It is noteworthy to mention several theoretical weaknesses in the OLI
paradigm. First, the paradigm provides little or no analytical insight to explain a firm’s
acquisition of its rivals to enhance firm competitiveness (Michalski, 1995). Moreover,
FDI is not necessarily conditional on the possession and exploitation of ownership
advantages in the case of M&A-based FDI transactions because aggressive FDI
undertaken by firms with weak competitive resources may occur with the aim of
acquiring firms with strong competitive resources. Second, Dunning’s OLI framework
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is not a ‘theory’ but an ‘eclectic paradigm’ as it simply combines various theories
together.
Figure 2-1: OLI Configuration in Hierarchical Capitalism
2.3 Strategic Approach
2.3.1 The Resource-Based View of the Firm
The resource-based perspective attaches importance to the logic that a firm’s
competitive advantage lies in its internal organisation (Barney, 1986; Leonard-Barton,
1992; Wernerfelt, 1984). The well-established resource-based view, with its roots from
Penrose’s (1959) “Theory of the Growth of the Firm”, offers crucial insights into
corporate strategy. The evident assumption of this view is that different internal
resources in different firms shape their own capabilities that become competitive
advantages. The resource-based view stipulates that core capabilities that constitute a set
of distinguished R&D skills, managerial systems, values and norms are shaped by
resources (Leonard-Barton, 1992). Wernerfelt (1984) seeks to analyse the essence of
resources for the growth of the firm instead of highlighting that of products. Wernerfelt
(1984: 172) suggests that key issues of the growth of the firm are:
FDI
Ownership
advantage
Location
advantage
Internalisation
advantage
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 On which of the firm’s current resources should diversification be based?
 Which resources should be developed through diversification?
 In what sequence and into what markets should diversification take place?
 What types of firms will it be desirable for diversified firm to acquire?
In order to deal with these key issues, firms must formulate strategy to develop their
resources. Resources include brand name, technical knowledge accumulated internally,
talented labour, customer-supplier relations, machinery, financial channels and
administrative efficiency. Making good use of these resources may make it difficult for
other rivals to keep up with the firm. Wernerfelt (1984: 173) asserts that “what a firm
wants is to create a situation where its own resource position directly or indirectly
makes it more difficult for others to catch up”. Barney (1986: 1231) terms this as the
creation of “strategic factor market”. Collis and Montgomery’s (1998) approach is that
balancing the interplay between business, resources and organisations results in creating
competitive advantages. Collis and Montgomery (1995: 119) define firms as “different
collections of physical and intangible assets and capabilities”. This indicates that there
exist no two identical firms that possess the same resources, experience, skills and
organisational capabilities. Thus, firms compete in markets by business strategy based
on the practical application of their unique resources. To distinguish whether resources
give rise to competitive advantages, Collis and Montgomery (1995: 120-124) develop
five analytical indicators as follows:
 Inimitability: Is the resource hard to copy?
 Durability: How quickly does the resource depreciate?
 Appropriability: Who captures the value that the resource creates?
 Substitutability: Can a unique resource be trumped by a different resource?
 Competitive superiority: Whose resources are really better?
With these indicators, firms can evaluate their business strategy and reinforce
competitive advantages to overcome emerging competition.
When comparing the resource-based view of the firm with transaction cost
economics and industrial organisation economics, we find various aspects in common.
As stipulated by transaction cost theory, the resource-based view of the firm also
considers that a firm continues to regularly control its transactional efficiency and adapt
its business structure to changing environmental factors in order to reduce transaction
costs. The major difference between these two theoretical perspectives is that the
resource-based view is suitable not only for analysing any transactional relationships in
cost-economising considerations but also for creating the resources necessary for the
growth of the firm even at high costs involved. As Porter (1990) argues, the
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resource-based view also stipulates that business strategy should be shaped by
competition; firms thus seek to acquire new resources in their efforts to develop
competitive advantages. One major difference is that scholars of the resource-based
view highlight internal environments (i.e., firm heterogeneity) at the individual
company level, while scholars of corporate strategy (Porter, 1990) place more weight on
external environments such as industry structure and market position (Dyer and Singh,
1998). Dyer and Singh (1998: 675) argue that a one-sided theoretical focus on the firm
unit of analysis may be insufficient to explain the growth and survival of the firm in
domestic and international business environments.
2.4 Spatial Analysis of MNE Activity
2.4.1 Marshall’s (1920) Localisation
Marshall (1920) was among the first to attempt to conceptualise the relevance of
positive agglomeration economies originating in the spatial concentration of specialised
industries in particular localities. Marshall (1920: 225-27) argues as follows:
“When an industry has chosen a locality for itself, it is likely to stay there
long: so great are the advantages which people following the same skilled
trade get from near neighborhood to one another. If one man starts a new
idea, it is taken up by others and combined with suggestions of their own;
and thus it becomes the source of further new ideas. Every cheapening of
the means of communication, every new facility for the free interchange of
ideas between distance places alters the action of forces which tend to
localise industries”.
Accordingly, these aforementioned statements suggest that the effect of clusters of firms
competing in a particular place may contribute to lowering (in)tangible production costs
and obtaining higher productivity and return on investment. Agglomeration plays a role
in boosting business transactions and coordination, while in gathering information on
the dynamics and structure of indigenous markets. The information that firms have
acquired and shared with other competitors in clusters serves the objective of
developing a way of doing business in new markets and improving product quality and
production processes within their internal settings.
2.4.2 Krugman’s (1991) Industrial Agglomeration Theory
The purpose of Krugman’s (1991) Geography and Trade was to explicate geographic
concentration of industries from an economic perspective. Krugman stipulates that the
most critical essence of economic activities resides in spatial concentration. This
principle of the spatial concentration of economic activities is modeled by Krugman
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with focus on specialisation using the manufacturing belt in the United States as an
example. The spatial cluster model rests on the interplay between scale economies,
demand functions and reduction in transportation costs. Drawing on Marshall (1920),
Krugman (1991: 43-54) integrates the concept of agglomeration economies into the
patterns of firms’ location choices as follows:
 Additional thoughts on labour pooling: The concentration of industrial activities in
a specific location leads to an optimal balance between supply and demand in the
labour market;
 Intermediate inputs: The abundance of suppliers of specialised input and services
enhance specialisation. As a result, firms positioning themselves in industrial
clusters can produce intermediate products at inexpensive costs; and
 Technological spillovers: Agglomeration of firms with similar products creates the
development of technological knowledge.
These factors give rise to the incentive to promote the geographic concentration of
economic activities. Krugman’s theoretical weakness lies in the fact that spatial
dispersion of economic activities is overlooked. Additionally, although it is true that the
manufacturing belt has continuously sustained competitive advantages as an industrial
agglomeration district, the share of the US manufacturing industry that the
manufacturing belt possesses has dropped over time.
2.4.3 Porter’s (1990) Competitive Advantage of Nations
Michael Porter’s diamond model (1990) has provided useful analytical guidance for
understanding the impact of a nation’s location advantages on the competitiveness of a
firm. In other words, the main unit of analysis is not firms but countries (see Figure
2-2). In his paradigm, productivity, which is determined by product quality and
production efficiency, plays a central role in promoting the competitive advantage of
the nation. Porter’s model is based on four elements.
The first pillar in Porter’s diamond model is the factors of production. This first
dimension consists of various inputs required for competition: labour force, natural
resources, capital, knowledge and infrastructure. Moreover, the factors of production
are categorised into two distinct types: (1) basic factors of production (natural
resources, climate, inexperienced human capital etc.); (2) specialised factors of
production (advanced communication systems, human capital with highly specialised
skills). In order to upgrade competitive advantages, the latter factors are considered of
particular importance to serve the objective of engaging in product diversification and
innovation.
The second pillar in Porter’s diamond model is demand conditions that are made up
of the nature and size of buyers’ needs in the home market for the industry’s goods or
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services. Firms are forced to continue to upgrade their existing products and innovate
new products in response to high demands of buyers when these buyers’ ability to
distinguish the quality of products and services is highly sophisticated by global
standards (Porter, 1990:86-100).
The third pillar is related and supporting industries. Taking Italy as an example,
Porter attributes the leading role of the Italian shoe industry to related and supporting
industries that consist of a number of entrenched leather-processing and design
services firms. Porter points out that sustainable development of related and
supporting industries are based on the creation of industrial clusters (Porter’s
industrial clusters will be explained in more detail later.).
Lastly, firm strategy, structure and rivalry constitute the final pillar and are
considered to create the evolution of specific industries. The types of strategy, structure,
and rivalry among firms differ from nation to nation. The four key pillars of Porter’s
diamond model stress the environmental characteristics of a national economy that
contribute to upgrading competitive advantages of the nation. There are some variations
in terms of the role of the organisation in enhancing employees’ motivations to work as
social norms and work ethic greatly vary by nation. It indicates that the internal
structure of the organisation is likely to be developed by the strategic goal of a firm.
Porter postulates that innovation is created and promoted by a series of competitions
within the domestic market.
Thus, the creation of competitive advantages can be achieved only when a firm
enforces an adequate strategy in line with these four pillars of the model. In other
words, consideration must be given to the supportive interplay between these marked
country-specific attributes when making a strategic decision about timing, location
and measures to develop price discrimination and product differentiation in an
international business environment.
Furthermore, Porter states two additional elements that complement these four basic
dimensions: (1) chance and (2) the role of government. Chance (Porter, 1990: 124)
refers to:
 Acts of pure invention
 Major technological discontinuities
 Discontinuities in input costs such as the oil shocks
 Significant shifts in world financial markets or exchange rates
 Surges of world or regional demand
 Political decisions by foreign governments
 Wars
Government policy also makes significant contributions to the growth of many firms
and industries. At the same time, government policy also acts as a detrimental effect on
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the four determinants. Porter (1990: 127) explains how government policy affects each
condition of the diamond model:
 Subsidies, policies toward the capital markets, policies toward education and the
like all shape factor conditions.
 Demand conditions are affected by regulations and rules imposed by government
authorities on buyers.
 The characteristics and consequences of related and supporting industries are
determined by regulations of advertising media or supporting services.
 Antitrust laws and alternation in tax regulations exert an impact on firm strategy,
structure and rivalry.
Both chance and the role of government serve to influence the four pillars of the model
in positive and negative directions.
Figure 2-2: Determinants of National Competitive Advantage
Source: Portner (1990: 127).
Porter attaches importance to country borders since there are great variations in
factors of production, government policy (e.g., environmental policies, tax systems and
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property rights protection), and market conditions. Moreover, social norms of and
political values of a nation’s population are greatly influenced by the nation and its
history. Thus, competitive advantages of nations are created and strengthened by
combining conditions at the national level with those at the sub-national level.
Government policy based on close cooperation between national and sub-national
governments turns out to be effective in enhancing the competitive advantages of
nations (Porter, 1990).
2.4.4 Porter’s (1990) Industrial Cluster
Porter’s central assumption is that the strength of external economies is developed by
geographical proximity. Porter elaborates on the role and tasks of interaction within
clusters in The Competitive Advantage of Nations. According to Porter (1990: 152-153),
clusters meet two major tasks:
(1) Facilitators of information flow:
 Personal relationships due to schooling, military service
 Ties through the scientific community or professional associations
 Community ties due to geographic proximity
 Trade associations encompassing clusters
 Norms of behaviour such as a belief in continuity and long-term relationships
(2) Sources of goal congruence or compatibility within clusters:
 Family or quasi-family ties between firms
 Common ownership within an industrial group
 Ownership of partial equity stakes
 Interlocking directors
 National patriotism
Accordingly, Porter (1990) sheds light on the relevance of industrial agglomeration by
the regional scale. Industrial clusters are sources of bringing various externalities into
firms operating within the territories of the industrial clusters: low transaction and
coordination costs of markets, constraints on breach of contracts and a rise in price of
inputs by suppliers, stock reduction, low transportation costs, and creation of pressures
on trust-building with localities due to high degrees of transparency and continuity
(1990: 157). The incentives for suppliers to upgrade their products and develop
relational assets are stimulated by potential market opportunities because of a number of
clients within the industrial cluster. Moreover, the formation of industrial clusters urges
firms to cooperate with one another for revamping their products and production
processes. Industrial clusters also offer opportunities for taking advantage of
quasi-public goods including physical infrastructure systems and educational programs
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and for accessing resources that are not deployable in the outside of the cluster (Porter,
1990: 156-157). The presence of successful firms within the same clusters appears to be
a psychological stimulus for other firms to continue to upgrade product quality and to
implement an accurate measurement of business achievements.
2.4.5 Storper’s (1997) Relational Assets
Storper’s (1997) view of agglomeration shares some commonalities with Scott (1998)
who highlights the role of Williamson’s (1985) transaction cost economics of markets
with a focus on inter-firm relations. Storper (1997: 28) characterises the importance of
agglomeration “not simply as input-output relations or linkages, but as untraded
interdependencies subject to a high degree of reflexivity”. Storper’s view about
agglomeration builds on relational transactions structured by qualitative factors such as
individual ties, reputation, and norms. Storper terms these “relational assets” (1997: 28),
which are the central source for forming and developing agglomeration. Moreover,
firms and localities (e.g., regions, countries, cities and communities) can take advantage
of geographical proximity by developing relational assets because “these relations and
conventions - much more so that stocks of physical capital, codified knowledge, or
infrastructure - are difficult, slow and costly to reproduce, and sometimes they are
impossible to imitate” (Storper, 1997: 44). In short, Storper takes organisations as a
level of analysis and how network ties with localities contribute to the formation and
development of agglomeration economies in the institutional context.
To sum up, I reviewed various existing agglomeration-based theories through a
comparative lens and explored how these theories developed in sequence. Marshall took
up various advantages of external economies arising from the spatial concentration of
the same industry. Marshall’s approach to agglomeration is more skewed toward
economic benefits such as scale economies and cost reduction. In contrast, Porter’s
industrial cluster theory (1998) places particular importance to improvement in
productivity, innovation, and creation of potential entrepreneurial spirits as key sources
of enhancing agglomeration economies. Porter’s industrial cluster theory may be
applicable in detecting the impact of geographical proximity at the national level.
However, his major weakness is that he does not offer a clear definition of the
geographical extent of industrial clusters at the sub-national level. Apart from economic
arguments, Storper (1997) sheds light on inter-firm relations. While Porter argues that
agglomeration enables firms to economise on spatial transaction costs, attention has
been paid by Storper to the role of agglomeration in the institutional context. Storper’s
main idea is that relational assets govern productive efficiency in the regional economy.
These location-based theories may explain why a firm would want to utilise locational
attributes of host countries, where the firm tends to position itself and why the firm
specialises in some goods in specific locations. However, they do not explain how the
relationship between trade and FDI may evolve over time.
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2.5 Institution-Based Theoretical Approach to MNE Activity
2.5.1 Institutional Theory
The institutional aspects of the host economy have been neglected in international
business and strategic management literatures (Meyer, 2001; Meyer and Nguyen, 2005;
Yiu and Makino, 2002). Institutions serve to reduce transactional uncertainties and
minimise transaction costs (Meyer, 1998, 2001; North, 1990, 1991). Organisations
constituting groups of individuals who have common objectives and interests are shaped,
developed and recreated by institutions (North, 1990, 1991). The conventional wisdom
is that institutions facilitate social, political and economic interactions with multiple
actors participating in a search for their own interests and benefits.
According to North (1990), there are two types of institutions. One category
contains formal institutions, such as regime type, judicial independence, labour laws,
property rights protection and trade restriction, for instance. Another includes informal
institutions such as tradition, social organisation of individual networks, cultural values,
political preferences and religious beliefs. Informal institutional constraints are “much
less transparent and, therefore, a source of uncertainty” (Meyer and Nguyen, 2005: 67).
It has conceptually been argued that the logic of path dependency is also an
integral dimension of institutional economics. Current formal and informal institutions
determine the direction, structure and development of future economic processes
(Meyer and Jensen, 2005; North, 1990, 1991). Bandelj (2008: 78) noted that “previous
institutions structure the trajectory of future change”. Likewise, not only are the current
social behaviour and norms of multiple actors, such as the state, professional
organisations, and individuals structured by legacies of institutional development, but so
too are political interests. Path-dependence characterises the development of formal and
informal institutions in Eastern European economies (Stark, 1992).
A circle of scholars of neo-institutionalism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) and
economic sociologists (Granovetter, 1985; Scott, 1995) discuss the details of
institutional influences that shape social behaviour of organisations and individuals.
Institutions build on three pillars: (1) mimetic isomorphism, (2) normative isomorphism,
and (3) coercive isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995).
First, social behaviour is determined by isomorphic processes in the cognitive
context (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Imitating other individuals and organisations is
the way of avoiding uncertainties. Social actors take for granted shared identities or
similar cultural patterns (Scott, 1995). Second, institutional behaviour is shaped by
values, norms and morality prevailing in a society in the normative context. Third, the
structure of social interactions in which actors are involved is also established by
“regulative processes-rule-setting, monitoring, and sanctioning activities” (Scott, 1995:
35). This aspect of institutions entails coercion. In recent years, economic sociologists
(e.g., Bandelj, 2002, 2004, 2008; Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996, 1997) have extended
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these dimensions of institutional isomorphism to the impact of social networks of
relations on economic exchanges. The underlying nature of state action and human
behaviour is deemed, by economic sociologists and institutional economists, to be
governed by a desire to enhance “not efficiency but legitimacy” (Bandelj, 2004: 460). In
an extension of institutional theory, Yiu and Makino (2002: 667) also point to the
importance of legitimacy in MNE activity as follows: “the institutional theory posits
that firms choose organizational practices and structures such as entry mode primarily to
gain legitimacy from both internal and external claimants”.
Compared with economic sociologists (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Granovetter,
1985), international business scholars were relatively late to apply institutional theory to
the study of MNE activity. According to Slangen and Hennart (2008), Rosenzweig and
Singh (1991) were the pioneers in advancing the nexus between institutions and MNE
activity. International scholars (Rosenzweig and Singh, 1991; Slangen and Hennart,
2008) have argued that MNEs must deal not only with external conformity pressures
from their circumstances but also with internal conformity pressures from their
headquarters. These arguments based on institutional theory seem likely to share a
number of commonalities with Bartlett and Ghoshal (1991, 1998) who conceptualise the
strategic balance between global integration and local responsiveness.
In sum, institutions are a vital locational advantage. Foreign multinationals have
to adopt their strategies to different institutional forces embedded in the host country
since firm-specific resources and capabilities can be strengthened through the
interaction with progress in institutions.
2.5.2 Institution-Based OLI Configuration in Stakeholder Capitalism
Dunning and Lundan (2008) argue that the determinants of investment strategy cannot
be examined appropriately without an in-depth analysis of the interplay between formal
and informal institutions and organisations. Institutions represent the rules of the game
according to which organisations evolve (North, 1990). The institution-based theory
serves as an inevitable conceptual instrument in exploring how rapidly changing
environmental and institutional factors condition the determinants of cross-border MNE
activity, especially in transition economies such as China, CEE and Russia. At the same
time, organisations (e.g., MNEs) determine the characteristics of institutions. Since
institutions are of a very path-dependent nature, the direction of institutional
development is not progressive but unpredictable in individual countries. Particularly,
the transition experience of CEECs represents this special feature. Dunning and Lundan
(2008) have extended institutional theory with its roots in North (1990) to Dunning’s
(1981, 1988) eclectic paradigm and reconceptualised each advantage of the OLI
configuration (see Table 2-1).
As opposed to the ownership advantages (e.g., technological know-how,
patents and marketing skills) defined in the hierarchical form of the OLI paradigm, the
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institution-based ownership advantages considers “firm-specific norms, values and
enforcement mechanisms sometimes labelled “corporate culture” (Dunning and Lundan,
2008: 580). From the institutional perspective, the ownership advantages include, for
example, the ability to meet the standards of product quality and environmental
management control (ISO 9000 and ISO 14000) and the adoption of the Toyota
Production System (TPS) that rests on (1) kaizen, (2) zero-defect, (3) jidōka and (4)
just-in-time delivery. Additionally, one of the critical institution-based ownership
advantages concerns how firms respond strategically to stakeholder interests rather than
to shareholder interests in the contemporary global world. It is because the actions and
strategies of MNEs are constrained by meeting manifold political and societal goals that
stakeholders such as NGOs and governments seek to attain (Dunning and Lundan,
2008: 589).
As regards institution-based location advantages, little has been discussed
about the role of institutions of host and home countries as L-advantages over a long
period of time, while scholars have investigated FDI strategies from a classic economic
perspective with a focus on market size, economic growth, labour availability and wage
differentials. In recent years, scholars (e.g., Dunning, 2005; Dunning and Lundan, 2008;
Meyer, 1998, 2001; Meyer and Jensen, 2005; Meyer and Nguyen, 2005; Meyer and
Peng, 2005) have begun highlighting the effects of institutional changes and continuity
on foreign firms’ investment strategies. Hoskisson et al. (2000) also argue that
institutional economics should be integrated into the spirit of FDI and MNE activity,
particularly, in transitional economies. The institution-based location advantages explain
that institutions developed in home and host economies shape the geographical scope
and organisational effectiveness of MNEs (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). Dunning and
Lundan (2008: 588) note that “in a dynamic, complex and volatile global economy, the
role of both firm and location specific institutions in reducing transaction costs of
cross-border value added and exchange activities is becoming more important”.
The institution-based disadvantages at the national level include corruption,
political risks, weak systems of intellectual property rights, and arbitrary FDI
regulations (e.g., export performance requirements, local content rules and
technological transfer agreements, SEZ laws, financial and fiscal incentives). For
instance, Meyer and Nguyen (2005) find that the supportive interplay between
institutional changes and FDI investment strategies provide some bearings on both the
location choice and entry mode of foreign MNEs in Vietnam. In the case of European
emerging economies, scholars of transition economies draw on the role of EU
membership that is thought to revamp the functioning of institutional infrastructure. A
country characterised as lagging behind other countries in the creation of
economic-supporting institutions may be subject to the danger of discouraging inbound
FDI.
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Table 2-1: Institution-Based OLI Configuration in Stakeholder Capitalism
Ownership
Organizational/governance
Location
Social capital
Internalization
Relational
Formal Laws, regulations, conventions Laws, regulations, conventions Contracts (both inter-and intra-firm)
Discipline of economic markets Discipline of political markets
Informal Codes, norms Religion, social mores, traditions Covenants, codes, trust-based relations
(both inter-and intra-firm)
Country/corporate culture Civil society Institution-building through networks/
Moral ecology of individuals clusters of firms
Formal Sanctions, penalties Sanctions, penalties Penalties for breaking contracts
Taxes, incentives Quality of public organizations Strikes, lock-outs, high labour turnover
Stakeholder action (consumers, Education (in shaping and implementing Education, training
investors, labour unions) institutions)
Informal Moral suasion Guilt, shame Guilt, shame
Loss or gain of status/recognition Demonstrations, active participation in No repeat transactions
policy-making organizations (bottom-up
influence)
Retaliation Moral suasion (top-down influence on External economies/diseconomies arising
institutions, organizations and individuals) from networks/alliances, e.g. learning
benefits
Build-up/decline of trust Blackballing
Blackballing
Enforcement mechanism
Institutions
Source : Dunning and Lundan (2008: 583)
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2.6 Network-Based Theoretical Approach to MNE Activity
2.6.1 Network Theory
Throughout the 1990s, network theory received limited attention relative to industrial
organisation economics, internalisation theory, location theory and Dunning’s OLI
paradigm when analysing the dynamics of MNE investment strategy including location
choice, entry timing, entry mode and firm performance. However, scholars of
management have placed a growing weight on the causes and outcomes of taking
advantage of networks to advance the internationalisation strategy of firms (Chen, 2003;
Johanson and Mattsson, 1993; Johanson and Vahlne, 1990; Meyer, 2000; Meyer and
Skak, 2002). The dynamism of FDI resides in “specific inter-firm dependence relations”
(Johanson and Mattsson, 1993: 306), in “an effort by investors to forge linkages with
foreign networks by establishing a presence in the foreign country” (Chen, 2003: 1107),
and in “the co-evolution of the firm and its network” (Meyer and Skak, 2000: 179).
From the management perspective, corporate networks are rather competitive assets
created within and across the boundary of the firm as opposed to natural assets. Dyer
and Singh (1998: 661) note that “idiosyncratic inter-firm linkages may be a source of
relational rents and competitive advantage”. Networks provide actors with special
access to information which is not obtainable outside the boundary of the networks.
Drawing evidence from an analysis of 194 Austrian and Danish firms in Russia,
Meyer and Skak (2000) find that corporate and personal networks have significant
effects on MNEs’ investment strategies in country-specific institutional settings. Meyer
and Skak suggest that a key determinant for the firms to make their international
business operations profitable is the ability to accumulate not only formal knowledge
(e.g., market size, economic growth, tariff rates etc.) but also experiential knowledge
(e.g., institutional and cultural idiosyncrasies) to adapt to new business environments
both internally and in its network relations. Of particular importance is that the
accumulation of the experiential knowledge allows firms to minimise the costs of
designing, monitoring and executing exchange transactions in imperfect markets.
However, the accumulation of such knowledge is not easy to realise within the
organisation because of its tacit nature (Meyer and Skak, 2000). It can thus be managed,
exchanged and upgraded between the firm and its business networks.
Dunning (1992: 92) asserts that “the activities are coordinated neither by the market
nor by a central hierarchical plan, but by the establishment of a set of relationship
between the members of the network”. The network model is not completely distinct
from Dunning’s (1981) theory of ownership advantages. The network perspective
embraces the continued upgrading of trust and shared knowledge based on the active
interaction between the firm and its business partners, while recognition is given to
internal assets such as managerial expertise and organisational technological
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innovations as important determinants in investing abroad. Dyer and Singh (1998:
662-671) identify four factors of network advantages: (1) relation-specific assets; (2)
knowledge-sharing routines; (3) complementary resources and capabilities; and (4)
effective governance. Wu (2007: 125) places a great emphasis on the importance of a
firm’s network advantage and argues that “in today’s increasingly dynamic business
world, more and more firms are starting to find themselves trapped in the uninviting
situation that their existing firm-specific resources and competencies are no longer
sufficient to maintain their competitive advantages”.
As opposed to industrial organisation economics and internalisation theory, network
theory attaches importance to the role of mutual trust, bonds, interdependency,
reciprocity and cross-cultural cooperation in determining the location selection and
organisational modes of network MNEs. Particularly, investors must count on social
networks when environmental and institutional uncertainties are high in foreign markets
(Rhee, 2008). Moreover, the network perspective highlights that a firm’s ability to
mobilise, deploy and exploit proprietary and complementary assets in a foreign market
is conditioned by how the firm can make maximum use of the value of network ties
with other firms in the foreign market and by which strategic position the firm is within
the network (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Meyer, 2000; Meyer and Skak, 2002). Chen (2003:
1127-1128) presents five main features of the network model of understanding the
internationalisation process of firms:
 First, an investor is inclined to choose a country close to its home country. As a
consequence, geographical proximity enables the MNE to mitigate the liabilities of
foreignness and limited information channels vis-à-vis indigenous firms through
receiving organisational and administrative support from the headquarters and other
subsidiaries.
 Second, FDI location choice is determined not by low labour costs or easy access to
raw materials but by the wealth of network resources. The active interplay between
the investor and its business partners contributes to maximising agglomeration
effects.
 Third, international expansion and diversification is a dynamic process of MNE
activity. The firm internalises its own proprietary assets within its organization,
while also attaching weight on the creation of localised channels to extract
relational and innovative assets.
 Fourth, the primary motive of FDI is not to exploit privileged market access; rather,
the investor aims to strengthen its relative bargaining power vis-à-vis other rivals
through serving the customers in proximity.
 Fifth, the more formal and informal safeguards against business partners’
opportunistic behaviour that are created within the network, the more hazardous
business opportunities the firm seeks to exploit.
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In short, network relationships between firms serve as a conduit for forming
agglomeration economies, because network relations aid the firm in accessing
information on local capital and labour markets, the position of buyers, suppliers and
rivals and financial resources (Chen, 2003: 1111). The firm seeks to strategically
develop its relational assets in order to minimise high transaction costs, particularly in
deficient institutional settings. Overall average marketing and production costs can also
be reduced by the appropriate choice of network partners. Accordingly, network
resources creating competitive advantages are essential to the survival and growth of the
firm since these network-based assets are hardly imitable, re-deployable and
substitutable by rivals. Thus, firms are motivated to engage in FDI for the purpose of
cultivating existing network ties and pursuing the acquisition of new linkage assets. In
this light, the cheap factor endowment hypothesis (e.g., cheap labour costs) is just a
secondary motive for FDI. The unit of analysis of the network perspective has been
“pairs or a network of firms” (Dyer and Singh, 1998: 674).
2.6.2 Network-Based OLI Configuration in Alliance Capitalism
With intensified competition between ‘placeless’ MNEs, speedier product life cycles
and an emerging need for balance between global adaptation and local responsiveness,
MNEs are likely to develop their competitive advantages rather through taking
advantage of cooperation than through competition in recent years. In response to the
dynamic complexity of environmental and technological changes, Dunning (1997)
recognises the need to redefine his classic OLI configuration of international
production. Dunning (1997: 69) writes that “although the autonomous firm will
continue to be the unit of analysis for understanding the extent and pattern of
foreign-owned production, the OLI configuration determining cross-border activities
is being increasingly affected by the collaborative production and transactional
agreements between firms, and that these need to be more systematically incorporated
into the eclectic paradigm”. This statement is a manifestation of the departure from the
classic OLI perspective that market imperfections encourage firms to internalise
intermediate product markets and replace markets within their hierarchical control.
Dunning (1997, 1998) incorporates a network perspective (Gerlach, 1992) into the old
OLI paradigm and theorises a new framework. The definition of the three pillars that
the new OLI configuration builds on is as follows (Dunning, 1997: 80-84):
(1) Ownership (O) specific advantages that a firm possesses vis-à-vis other rivals in
serving a particular market comprise: (1) backward access to R&D, design
engineering and training facilities of suppliers in vertical alliances; (2) access to
complementary technologies and innovatory capacity in horizontal alliances; and
(3) access to embedded knowledge of networks members.
(2) A firm can gain advantages from participating in external alliances because of
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access to resources that are not available to the firm, while internalising certain
firm-specific assets within the hierarchy. Inter-firm alliances are complementary to
rather than a substitution for a hierarchy.
(3) Locational (L) advantages of host countries arise from: (1) the presence of a
portfolio of immobile local complementary assets, which produce a stimulating
and productive industrial atmosphere; and (2) the presence of localised networks
that help reduce the information asymmetries and the possibility of partners acting
opportunistically in spatially linked markets.
Taking Japan as an example, recognition is given to the fact that Japan is the country
where “there is less incentive by firms to internalise markets in order to avoid costs of
broken contracts, or to ensure the quality of subcontracted products. […] The keiretsu
network of inter-firm competition - sometimes between firms in the same sector and
sometimes across sectors - is perhaps one of the most frequently quoted alternatives to
hierarchical internalisation” (Dunning, 1997: 85). I will explain the keiretsu network
with greater detail in the following section. Dunning (1997: 85-87) points out that
there are two types of strategies to tackle market failure: (1) ‘exit’ strategy where the
market is replaced by internal administrative fiat; and (2) ‘voice’ strategy where two
or more firms cooperate together in the market to minimise the risk of market failure.
2.6.3 Theory of Japanese Business Groups
Dunning (1997) asserts the importance of alliance capitalism as follows:
“What is clear is that, as networks of alliances become more important, the composition
and behaviour of the group of firms becomes a more important determinant of the
foreign production of the individual firms comprising the network. Nowhere is this more
clearly seen than in the role played by the keiretsu in influencing both the competitive
advantages of its member firms, and in the way in which these advantages are created,
upgraded, and used” (Dunning 1997: 80).
Keiretsu networks stand at the heart of the social organisation of Japanese capitalism
(Gerlach, 1992; Lincoln and Gerlach, 2004). The social organisation of Japanese
inter-corporate relationships has been characterised as informal relationships stemming
from trust and mutual respect (Orrù et al., 1991), something in-between internal
organisation and external market (Fruin, 1992; Lincoln et al., 1992), or a sort of hybrid
governance (Dyer, 1996).
The broad concept of keiretsu consists of two distinctive forms, ‘horizontal’
keiretsu groups (‘financial’ keiretsu groups) and ‘vertical’ keiretsu groups
(‘non-financial’ keiretsu groups) (see Figure 2-3). The former - represented by the
so-called ‘Big Six’ financial keiretsu groups (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuyo,
Sanwa, and Ikkan) - have one enterprise in each business sector to maximise profits
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accruing from economies of scale, scope, and learning, and cooperative specialisation
(Dyer, 1996). Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo come from the early zaibatsu that can
be regarded as the major entrepreneurial conglomerates of the pre-war period.
Figure 2-3: Structure and Organisation of Horizontal and Vertical Keiretsu System
Source: Author’s modification on Dicken (1998: 224).
The ‘horizontal’ keiretsu groups consist of members from a wide range of
sectors such as food and beverages, textiles, chemicals, steel and real estate, linked, at
the same time, by power and obligations to the large banks, insurance companies and
general trading companies. Mitsui keiretsu thus consists of 25 firms, Mitsubishi 28,
Sumitomo 20, Fuyo 28, Sanwa 44 and Dai-Ichi 48 respectively (Kigyō Keiretsu Sōran,
2000). Each enterprise group has its own Presidents’ Club (Nimokukai for Mitsui,
Kinyō-kai for Mitsubishi, Hakusui-kai for Sumitomo, Fuyo-kai for Fuyo, Sansui-kai for
Sanwa, and Sankin-kai for Dai-ichi.). Although a Presidents’ Council (shachōkai) is an
informal opportunity to exchange information, it is also instrumental in promoting the
significance of membership identity and solidarity and in having discussions on
strategic interests and management concern group firms confront (Gerlach, 1992:
104-108).
Although the style and intensity of interdependence varies between them, the
‘vertical’ keiretsu and ‘horizontal’ keiretsu are not mutually exclusive industrial entities
but are compatible. Many members of ‘horizontal’ keiretsu groups act as leaders of
‘vertical’ keiretsu groups. Some of the best examples of this phenomenon are Toyota
Motor Corp. and Toshiba Corp. which are members of Mitsui keiretsu, while Nissan
Motor Corp. and Hitachi Ltd. are members of Fuyo keiretsu.
The characteristics of Japanese-specific network institutions (i.e., keiretsu) are:
(1) relational ties; (2) long-term relationships; (3) extended networks; and (4) symbolic
signification in the social context without legal commitments, while the form of
American corporate governance revolves around arm’s length relationships, and
Power is more symmetrical.
(e.g., Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Mitsui)
Power is more asymmetrical.
(e.g., Toyota, Nissan, Matsushita)
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competitive linkages (Dresmus, 1998; McGuire and Dow, 2005). With reliance on these
cooperative advantages, Japanese keiretsu member firms tend to internalise markets
within their coherent alliances to avoid uncertainties inherent in arm’s length market
transactions (e.g., Gerlach, 1992; Kensy, 2001; Lincoln and Gerlach, 2004; Lincoln et
al., 1992, 1996). As pointed out by Lincoln and Gerlach (2004), keiretsu groupings play
critical roles in pooling financial burdens in times of crisis and in merging the goals of
profit maximisation within the corporate community (Lincoln and Gerlach, 2004; Orrù
et al., 1991). In other words, this equalising function excludes the risks for uneven and
unbalanced economic improvements of the member firms within the keiretsu
infrastructure, with the benefits of an access to financial institutions (Dresmus et al.,
1998).
Drawing on the resource-based view of the firm, Japanese inter-firm
coordination mechanisms under Japanese market capitalism represent a source of
competitive relational advantages since keiretsu member firms can capitalise on
material and financial resources embedded in a web of keiretsu networks below market
rates (Buckley, 2004; Kim et al., 2004). Kim et al. (2004: 617) argue that keiretsu
member firms outperform independent firms because of “group-based resource
allocation advantages”. In return for access to financial, material and human resources,
the keiretsu leader frequently obtains its suppliers’ organisational transparency and
technological development. Strong equity control of the car manufacturer over its
suppliers in vertical production networks implies a guarantee of a stable demand for
parts supplies for a long time.
Transaction cost economics also assumes that the form of keiretsu organisation
is suitable for dealing with internal and external problems at the same time (Dyer, 1996;
Williamson, 1985): (1) reducing costs; (2) expansion of control costs; and (3)
information manipulation and exploitation of internal organisation. As a second set, it is
suitable for dealing with (1) bounded rationality; (2) uncertainty; and (3) opportunistic
behaviour in the external market. Hence, the creation of markets within the network
leads to more frequent business transactions and more investments in far-reaching
specialised assets relative to internal organisation and arm’s length markets.
As regards vertical keiretsu arrangements in emphasis, the ‘vertical’ keiretsu is
built upon a tight hierarchical relationship between the manufacturer and its suppliers,
or its wholesale distributors, dealers and retailers. In particular, the automobile keiretsu
network is asymmetric in power and legitimacy (Lincoln and Gerlach, 2004). As
compared to horizontal keiretsu networks within which financial commitments
determine the density, duration and intensity of organisational interdependence, Fruin
(1992: 291) argues that financial ties not only promote group interactions in vertical
keiretsu networks but also complement organisational learning processes among the
affiliates.
Reciprocal assembler-supplier relationships prosper by means of: (1) an upgrade
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of technical capabilities (Nishiguchi, 1994) and exchange of managerial know-how
(Buckley 2004; Sako 1996); (2) a high degree of sales and demand stability (Tabeta,
1998); (3) effective communication and coordination in product development; (4)
long-term contract (Tabeta, 1998); and (5) privileged access to financial sources
(Gerlach, 1992). From an organisational learning perspective, Fruin (1992: 198) stresses
that “brainstorming, clarification and verification of specifications, team-building, and
product-development deadlines, are accomplished within corporate boundaries”. Tabeta
(1998: 2) also argues that the formation of closer ties based on sales and equity sharing
facilitates the reduction of opportunistic hazards and enhances credible commitments
from its suppliers for the manufacturer.
The existing literature regarding keiretsu organisation has reported that such
organization exerts an influential impact on the pattern and consequence of the
internationalisation of keiretsu group firms. Dyer (1996) presents empirical evidence
that Japanese automotive value chains incur fewer transaction costs than US value
chains. In addition, the endurance of the hierarchical form of keiretsu ties enables the
keiretsu car assembler to lower transaction and coordination costs through capitalising
on flexibility in its parts suppliers’ production management process and through
enhancing its corporate identity to which their suppliers should conform. Keiretsu
membership may facilitate collective negotiations with the local government.
Comparing Toyota and GM with particular reference to the forging of supplier
networks, Dyer and Singh (1998: 666) argue that Toyota has ensured efficient supply
chain management systems through the transfer of new knowledge and personnel to the
suppliers, while GM has failed due to the lack of knowledge sharing between the firm
and its suppliers.
On the issue of the geographical development of keiretsu network alliance
structure in foreign markets, Gilttelman and Graham (1994) find that independent
keiretsu groups in the automobile industry form a collective economic group in North
America and Western Europe as many subcontractors tend to be located close to or near
their main assemblers.
The World Investment Report 2001 also revealed evidence of a strong presence
of vertical integration of Toyota’s group in Thailand. Out of the core component
vendors producing engines and body parts, 73 of 134 consist of Japanese companies and
Toyota group firms, with a product share value exceeding nearly 80 percent, although
the total number of Toyota Motor Thailand’s subcontractors reaches 575 (UNCTAD,
2001: 147). This outcome indicates explicitly that indigenous firms do not yet play a
central role in creating added-value goods in Thailand. Rather, the Toyota group
exercises a significant leverage over core components that serve as the main part of car
production in Asia.
In sum, contractual relations under the keiretsu form of organisation and
governance induces the keiretsu leader and its parts suppliers to have long-term
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investment goals (McGuire and Dow, 2005), long-term and sustainable growth
(Nishiguchi 1994), specific attention to quality development (Mori, 2006), and closer
communication. By and large, keiretsu firms continue to rely on their inter-firm
cooperation and reciprocal commitments within the network to achieve long-term
economic prosperity. The existing literature also has confirmed the importance of
keiretsu characteristics with relevance to production efficiency, geographical scope and
supply management in international expansion.
2.7 Four Types of FDI
2.7.1 Resource-Seeking FDI
The central motive of resource-seeking FDI is to capture rich natural resources in
foreign markets. Resource-seeking MNEs are induced to enter foreign markets to
obtain specific resources that are either not available or available at an unaffordable
cost in their home markets. The majority or all of the specific resources acquired by
MNEs are likely to be exported back to their home markets (Dunning, 1992: 57).
There are three groups of resource seekers. The first group includes those who seek to
acquire raw materials and agricultural products. This type of resource-seeking
investment requires capital expenditures to produce and process natural resources.
MNEs are often subject to high institutional uncertainties and poor transport
infrastructure in less developed or emerging countries with rich natural resources. The
second group of resource seekers includes MNEs venturing abroad seeking to access a
pool of inexpensive and inexperienced labour force. This group embraces firms who
intend to produce labour-intensive products for export. To lure these type of resource
seekers, host governments, especially in LCDs, have established special economies
areas such as export processing zones (Dunning, 1992: 57). The third group of
resource seekers is motivated to gain technology and managerial expertise, which are
new sources of competitive advantage (Gil et al., 2006).
2.7.2 Market-Seeking FDI
Market-seeking FDI refers to the FDI with the purpose of selling products or services
in foreign markets. Market seekers are characterised as either defensive or offensive.
The major motivation for defensive market-oriented FDI is to circumvent
discriminatory trade barriers such as anti-dumping rules and countervailing duties
imposed by host countries. Examples include the initiation of EU’s anti-dumping
cases against imported consumer electronics and automobile products from Japan.
Moreover, the ‘follow-my-leader’ or ‘band wagon’ form of market entry is also more
defensive oriented than offensive oriented (Dunning, 1992: 59). Evidence shows that a
group of Japanese and Korean suppliers tend to follow their leaders in foreign markets
(e.g., Belderbos and Carree, 2002; Chang and Park, 2005; Head and Mayer, 2004; Head
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et al, 1995). On the other hand, offensive market-oriented FDI is motivated to respond
to emerging demands or changes in consumer tastes. Recent major environmental
trends such as regionalisation are a key driver to increase offensive market-oriented
FDI due to the growing size of regional markets. Examples include the completion of
the Single European Market (SEM), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
and EU enlargement which affect the consequences of the international division of
labour. Apart from sustaining or enhancing market shares, a MNE feels crucial for
entering new markets dominated by competitors to acquire cutting-edge technological
skills and organisational expertise. Most or all the market-seekers supply their
products or services to the markets where their production units operate or in nearby
markets.
2.7.3 Efficiency-Seeking FDI
For efficiency-seeking investments, cheap production costs (e.g., labour, materials,
machinery, etc.) and well-developed export channels for locally produced intermediate
and final products to other lucrative markets are the crucial determinant of FDI.
Moreover, the presence of agglomerative economies and investment incentives are
decisive factors for this type of investment. In order to continue to have inbound FDI,
a host government plays a crucial role in creating the appropriate economic,
institutional and cultural environment for international business and in ensuring that
essential manpower and infrastructure services are available (Dunning, 1992: 144).
Efficiency-seeking FDI is undertaken when a firm attempts to streamline the function
and organisation of geographically dispersed MNE value-added activities through
making optimal use of factor endowments and deploying available intangible and
tangible assets within its integrated business network. This type of FDI is also
prompted by the need of firms to exploit and extract benefits arising from economies
of scale, scope and learning. Recognition is given to the evidence that
efficiency-seeking FDI is motivated not by demand conditions but by supply
conditions.
2.7.4 Strategic Asset-Seeking FDI
Strategic asset seekers are prompted by the need to acquire proprietary resources that
foreign rivals possess to rationalise the value and efficiency of geographically
dispersed MNE activities. This type of FDI is undertaken in two basic forms. One is
strategic alliance. A firm may build partnerships with its rival firms to share
complementary assets to enhance its international competitiveness essential to survival
in a more complex global market. The second type is cross-border M&A. A firm
directly purchases its rival firms to diversify the range of product lines and the scale of
value-added MNE activities. In this regard, objectives in both efficiency-seeking FDI
and strategic asset-seeking FDI overlap (Dunning, 1992: 61). Strategic considerations
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are turned to block competitors from buying a firm’s proprietary resources. MNE
activity is also revitalised by means of strengthening relational ties with local
market-supporting institutions such as universities and technology and industrial
parks.
2.8 Selection of International Entry Mode
Firms can advance their internationalisation process by undertaking the forms of
exporting, licensing, cross-border merger and acquisition (M&A), joint ventures (JVs)
and wholly owned subsidiaries (WOSs). Each means of entering international markets
has its advantages and disadvantages. Therefore, the actions and strategies of MNEs
(e.g., timing, location choice, organisational restructuring and firm performance) vary
depending on which mode a firm chooses and how the sequence of ownership modes
develops over time.
2.8.1 Exporting
Exporting goods or services is undertaken to enhance the degree of multi-nationality at
the initial stage of international expansion. By and large, firms engaging in exporting
are not deterred by the high costs of initiating operations in the host countries. However,
they are required to establish marketing and distributing channels to increase sales for
their products. The advancement of Internet-based technology enables exporters to
increase the capacities of critical knowledge acquisition of foreign markets and to
quickly contact potential customers. Especially, small- and -medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs) endowed with weak international experience and limited proprietary resources
can make maximum advantages of exporting mode of international expansion.
2.8.2 Licensing
Licensing is characterised as a low-risk entry mode of international expansion. In
addition to low risk, licensing also enjoys low cost and enables a firm in a host economy
to engage in reverse engineering and in upgrading its own proprietary assets through
being entitled to produce and market in the host country or neighboring countries. As
one argues that licensing is a suitable form of adjusting to rapid shifts in consumer
tastes and of producing products in foreign markets where human capital is inexpensive.
However, licensing makes it difficult for firms to sustain control over their own
production skills and product quality. The reason for low profitability involved in
licensing should be that gain has to be divided into and distributed to both the licensor
and the licensee. Last but not least, a licensor may experience the danger that a licensee
becomes a rival after their contractual agreements have expired because the latter has
taken advantage of learning economies during the contract period.
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2.8.3 Joint Ventures (JVs)
Among the positive aspects of JVs is that they facilitate the creation of strong formal
and informal connections with local regulators in order to get access to desired
resources, hence enabling an enterprise to overcome the liability of foreignness
(Gatignon and Anderson 1988). The positive impact of JVs on economic performance
may also be derived from sharing risk and good will. Once trust-building efforts made
by two or more actors lead to further cooperation and coordination, the form of JVs may
create great synergy effects on firm performance. Some scholars advocate that shared
ownership has a positive relationship on superior performance. Park and Kim (2005), in
a panel analysis of performance determinants for 205 Korean firms in China, conclude
that shared control structures help foreign investors enhance the ability to respond to
market barriers, protectionism and unique business relationships.
In contrast, numerous coordination problems may increase over time because
business interests of one partner in the joint venture may gradually diverge from those
of another (Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001; Palenzuela and Bobillo, 1999). Such
conflicting agendas become a potential cause for the dissolution of JVs because both
actors may suffer from the agency problem at a high cost. When foreign firms enter
local markets in the form of JVs, the transfer of asset specificity from the parent
company to the affiliate may be interrupted by the opportunistic behaviour of partners
such as the threat of a data leak of proprietary knowledge and broken contracts. Delios
and Beamish’s (2001) study confirms that JVs create difficulties achieving desired
strategic goals between partners and requires to a great extent unwilling compromises.
Moreover, of great importance is that there are costs involved in transferring production
technology and marketing skills and streamlining organisational structures between
companies. Shared ownership is also subject to the dynamic complexity of
organisational, managerial and operational coordination since host-based governmental
agencies often participate in joint ventures and constrain the effectiveness of shared
ownership arrangements with opportunistic behaviour, resource duplications and
asymmetrical information. MNEs have to ensure efficient organisational control
relationships with various foreign partners as well as their parent companies (Woodcock
and Beamish, 2001:86). According to Yiu and Makino (2002: 668-671), the cost of
integrating contributed assets by local partners into a new venture may exceed the
benefit from “a free ride on their reputational capital” when their assets are intangible.
In short, JVs provide firms with the opportunity to achieve multiple gains, while
creating inherent disadvantages such as knowledge leakage to and free-riding by
partners, and conflicting goals.
2.8.4 Merger & Acquisition (M&A)
The popularity of cross-border M&A has been on the increase, as MNEs have been
more ‘placeless’ and have been subject to intensified competition affecting their
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corporate performance in the contemporary world. According to the World Investment
Report (2007, 5), cross-border M&A increased by 23 percent to US$880 billion in 2006.
Cross-border M&A can aid firms in capturing untapped business opportunities without
time lags. Compared with other entry modes of international expansion, cross-border
M&A can be considered the fastest and possibly the largest strategic investment mode.
M&A is a useful strategic tool for alleviating location-specific costs (Anhand and
Delios, 2001) and is a possible option for quickly obtaining general and specific
knowledge about resource channels, supplier networks, and bureaucracy and culture in
local markets (Belderbos, 2003; Meyer et al., 2009). Given these advantages,
cross-border M&A are used with frequency to enter emerging markets such as CEE,
China, and Russia.
For firms aiming at becoming multinational, it is important to know the fact that
the possibility to quickly capture new markets hinges on the duration and type of
international negotiations for cross-border M&A. During the pre-acquisition period, a
firm involved in the M&A process has to pay enormous costs. International negotiation
for cross-border M&A in countries with both the lack of transparency and the persisting
culture of excessive bureaucracy are deemed to be risky. Moreover, transition
economies have lagged in the creation of market-supporting institutions. An acquiring
firm may also be interrupted by incompatible legal and regulatory constraints involved
in the negotiation process.
The ways of integrating the acquired firm into the acquiring firm often involve a
great deal of difficulties during the post-acquisition period. First, firms are likely to
incur substantial costs of restructuring the organisation of the acquired firm in terms of
marketing, sourcing and financial competence (Woodcock and Beamish, 2001). This
view is emphasised by Estrin and Meyer (1998: 224) stating that “the post-acquisition
costs of organisational restructuring and technological upgrading may exceed the price
originally paid for the acquisition”. The acquiring firm may experience difficulties in
aligning existing organisational culture, managerial behaviour, and social norms
embedded in local employees of the acquired firm in the host country with the overall
strategic objectives of the parent company. Discrepancies between the acquiring firm
and the acquired firm in corporate cultures, corporate identity, social norms and trust are
challenging and they cannot be resolved overnight. The greater the cultural differences
the longer it takes to integrate the two firms in the post-acquisition process. When the
post-acquisition process is unsuccessful, the two firms may not be able to effectively
make maximum use of scale and learning economies. Accordingly, their corporate
performance during the post-acquisition period may be affected by coordination costs of
integrating the acquired firm into the acquiring firm not only in organisational terms but
also in social terms.
Second, acquiring firms run counter to multiple political interferences. Aligning
divergent political and economic interests multiple stakeholders seek to achieve with
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strategic goals of the acquiring firm is a key factor in the success of the firm in the
post-acquisition process (Meyer and Jensen, 2005: 132). The acquiring firm should be
aware that host governments, political groups and labour unions involved in any
privatisation projects may be concerned not about financial profits but about social
consequences (Meyer and Jensen, 2005: 134). In addition, it should be important to note
that the probability that the host government might complicate the restructuring process
in transition economies, since host governmental agencies frequently participate in the
formation of joint ventures in the privatisation process as one of major stockholders.
Given these institutional barriers that cause organisational and managerial
conflicts, acquiring firms are exposed to the opportunistic behaviour of multiple actors
and peculiar requirements of managing businesses, which limit the growth of corporate
performance in the post-acquisition period. The transfer of effective organisational and
management systems developed by the parent company to the subsidiary may not take
place smoothly. Moreover, Woodcock and Beamish’s (2001) study on the relationship
between entry mode and performance finds that acquisition is the worst mode of entry
in terms of corporate performance.
2.8.5 Wholly Owned Subsidiaries (WOSs)
The establishment of a wholly owned enterprise in foreign markets is referred to as a
greenfield investment, which involves high costs of establishing, managing and
improving operations in the host countries. A firm must establish some means of
marketing and distributing their products, but the firm can completely take over the
reins of the local subsidiary and achieve higher returns on investment relative to other
entry modes. The advantages of undertaking greenfield investments are that a firm can
leverage proprietary assets within its organisation. This potential holds especially true
for firms with strong intangible capabilities that might be leveraged through setting up a
greenfield venture. In this regard, greenfield investments are more suitable for high
technology-intensive firms, while labour-intensive firms may better reap gains through
a M&A form of international investment strategies.
A great disadvantage is that greenfield investments require the investor to
invest a large amount of capital to set up a new factory from scratch. It is also costly to
have access to local market-specific knowledge and learn everything from the beginning.
Slangen and Hennart (2008) term this critical cost as the liability of newness. The
acquisition of qualified labour at the management level is one of the most challenging
tasks for the firm to overcome in LDCs and transition economies. Especially, feasibility
studies need to be appropriately structured and carried out in the WOS case. Previous
experience should play a crucial role in determining a firm’s market entry by means of
greenfield investments. It should also be noted that exit costs for greenfield investments
may be the highest among all entry modes in international expansion.
Figure
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developed by Dunning. This eclectic paradigm is acknowledged as dynamically
enhancing the in-depth understanding of MNE behavior and FDI strategy. From a
spatial analysis perspective, scholars (e.g., Disdier and Mayer, 2004; Head and Mayer,
2004; Head et al., 1995, 1996, 1999) integrate the role and function of agglomeration
economies into the realisation of FDI. In the mid-1990s, Dunning claimed that the
explanatory power of his OLI paradigm needs to be reappraised and should be modified
in line with emerging shifts in country- and industry-specific circumstances. Dunning
integrates the concept of alliance capitalism into his OLI configuration and stresses the
importance of the evolution of the firm based on the accumulation of network assets.
Dunning recognises the function of keiretsu systems as a hybrid form of transactional
relationships between hierarchy and market as the optimal alternative to MNEs. It
indicates that the creation of markets within the network leads to more active business
transactions and more investments in far-reaching specialised assets relative to internal
organisation and arm’s length markets. The OLI configuration has also evolved to adopt
the institutional economics that social, cultural and legal factors shape economic actors.
In sum, each theoretical perspective presented in this chapter provides us with
the opportunity to explore the determinants of FDI (see Figure 2-4). The meaning of the
OLI configuration has been in transition in recent years as the alliance capitalism and
institution-based hypotheses have been at the heart of the OLI paradigm. Therefore, our
conclusion emphasises the need to interpret the phenomenon of Japanese manufacturing
FDI in the European transition economies by examining the market (macroeconomic
conditions) and non-market (institutional change) characteristics of each individual
post-socialist nation state of CEE. Moreover, it deserves elaboration of network-based
and institution-based O-advantages of Japanese manufacturing firms in the enlarged EU.
In the following chapters, I try to fit the investment strategies and actions of MNEs into
the framework developed in this chapter with the use of primary data analysis at the
macro- and micro-level.
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3 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN EUROPEAN
TRANSITION ECONOMIES
3.1 Introduction
According to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), 16
former Soviet-type economies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have successfully
attracted inbound FDI totalling US$257 billion during the period from 2000 to 2007.
Although the early phase of radical economic transition resulted in negative growth
rates in some Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), the increased inflow of
foreign capital has been enabled by binding commitments made by central governments
of CEECs to upgrade economic and institutional infrastructure. It has been perceived
among host-based government officials of CEECs that foreign MNEs’ economic
activity yields manifold advantages3:
 Large cash revenues and financial assets for fixed investment (Meyer, 1995);
 Job creation (Domański, 2003; Parysek, 2004);
 Dissemination of superior technologies, organisational skills and marketing
know-how (Cieślik and Ryan, 2002; Wisniewski, 2005; Neuhaus, 2006);
 Introduction of new corporate governance (Bellak, 2004);
 Integration of local suppliers into MNEs’ global and regional value chains
3 In considering the effect of FDI on the transition economies, FDI also exerts a negative impact on the
microeconomic environment. At the same time, it is important to note that FDI creates disadvantages such
as (1) political resentment during the privatisation process (Sinn and Weichenrieder, 1996), (2) excessive
local dependency on decisions undertaken by foreign investors (Domański, 2003; Pavlínek, 2004), (3)
increased economic inequalities between regions and across countries (Domański, 2003) and (4) limited
roles of local firms as labour intensive-oriented production units in part of the value-added activities of
large MNEs (Domański, 2003). Empirically, numerous scholars present evidence that FDI creates
disadvantages in European transition economies (e.g., Bandelj, 2008; Djankov and Hoeckman, 2000;
Domański, 2003; Hardy, 1998; Pavlínek, 2002, 2006; Zemplinerová and Jarolím, 2001). Employing
firm-level data in the Czech Republic, Zemplinerová and Jarolím (2001) find that the intensity of foreign
capital penetration exerts a positive and significant impact on the rate of productivity growth. FDI is
characterised as the main reason for the widening of the performance gap in the region. Djankov and
Hoeckman’s study (2000) identifies that technology spillover from foreign-owned firms to local firms is
limited in the Czech Republic. Ferencikova (1997: 18) confirms in the joint venture VW-BAZ
(Bratislavske automobilove zavody) that integration of Slovak suppliers into VW’s international
production networks is limited. Hardy (1998) confirms that the extent and success of ‘local embeddedness’
of large MNEs has been negligible in the context of Poland, concluding that the critical phenomenon of
‘cathedral in the desert’ may deteriorate. Bandelj (2008) reports foreign capital penetration as detrimental
to the host country since state authorities carry out policies designed to favour foreign investors over local
firms and to reduce the bargaining power of labour. With an emphasis on the case of Daewoo Poland, the
existing literature on economies in transition (Domański, 2003; Pavlínek, 2002, 2006) proves that foreign
ownership may not necessarily contribute to the industrial upgrading and sustainable growth of Poland
and may rather ruin its economic development with the radical downsizing of local employment.
Accordingly, the interpretation of the effects of FDI on the local economy is not straightforward, but
complex.
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(Kaminski and Smarzynska, 2001; Pavlínek, 2004; Meyer, 2000);
 Improved competitiveness (Pavlínek, 2004);
 Growth of exports (Meyer, 1998; Pavlínek, 2006) and reduction in current account
deficits (Domański, 2003); and
 Increased labour productivity owing to enterprise restructuring (Barrell and
Holland, 2000).
Since the break-up of state socialism, a number of Western firms have started entering
the European emerging markets to gain market share or sustain their position through
various forms of market entry including exporting, licensing, and foreign investment.
The potential transitional markets have been exploited not only by large-sized firms but
also by small- and -medium-sized enterprises from Western Europe due to low cultural
barriers, close geography and special support from government authorities (Estrin and
Meyer, 1998: 217).
In order to determine the appropriate market entry strategy and to ensure high
profitability after the initial entry, the locational advantages of the targeted FDI
destination should be a crucial concern to many MNEs. In this chapter, I will attempt to
answer the following questions in detail:
1. Are local market conditions homogeneous or heterogeneous among CEECs?
2. What are the major destinations of foreign investors?
3. Are there any specific patterns of FDI inflows in CEECs when the origin of country
and industrial distribution are considered?
To respond to these questions, a brief picture of 16 European transition economies is
drawn to highlight the inherent advantages and disadvantages of local market conditions.
I use the data from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)’s
Transition Indicators, the Eurostat, World Bank’s World Development Indicator (WDI)
and Wienna Institut fuer Internationales Wirtschaftsvergleich (WIIW).
3.1 Varieties of Market Characteristics
Since the turn of the century in particular, scholars have observed that most of European
transition economies have experienced remarkable industrial development together with
steady economic growth. Yet, there are some variations on macroeconomic conditions,
the pace of institutional reforms and the degree of integration into the world economy at
the country and regional level in the European transition economies. As regards the
difference among the sub-regional groups, Visegrád-4 and the Baltic countries have
revived themselves by joining the old EU15 on the path of European integration. Most
of south-eastern European and Balkan countries with the exception of Slovenia have
been lagging behind the Visegrád-4 and Baltic countries in terms of economic and
political stability, and improvement of institutional infrastructure.
47
Table 3-1: Macroeconomic Conditions of the European Transition Economies
Year ALB BOS BUL CRO CZ EST HUN LAT LIT MAC MON POL ROM SER SLK SLV
GDP per capita (US$ 1,000) 2006 3.0 3.0 4.1 9.6 13.7 12.2 11.1 8.3 8.8 3.0 3.4 9.0 5.6 3.8 8.8(c) 18.6
Industry (as % of GDP) 2005 7.1 22.5(a) 26.1 20.7 40.4 25.1 25.8 19.1 30.2 17.0 NA 28.1 24.1 34.3(b) 23.9 29.3(d)
Agriculture (as % of GDP) 2005 26.3 16(a) 8.0 6.3 3.4 3.3 3.7 6.3 5.2 9.7 NA 2.5 8.5 19.3(b) 3.5 2.7(d)
Private sector (%) 2008 43 34 81 67 96 88 90 68 68 58 28 83 70 78 92 50
Foreign trade to GDP (%) 2006 42.3 86.6 121.3 74.2 131.7 138.6 134.1 87.8 112.3 99.1 97.4 69.8 68.6 61.3 159.1 127.0
Export (US$ billion) 2006 0.7 3.4 15.1 11.1 91.5 9.6 73.4 5.1 14.1 2.4 0.6 117.3 32.5 6.5 40.0 21.4
Imports (US$ billion) 2006 2.9 7.7 21.9 22.1 89.8 12.4 73.9 11.0 18.3 3.7 1.8 122.2 47.2 12.7 43.5 22.8
Average labour productivty
per person (EU27=100)
2000–
2008
NA NA 33.7 61.5 67.8 57.7 71.5 47.0 53.1 NA NA 60.8 36.2(e) NA 67.4 80.2
Wage differentials (in Euro) 2007 277 480 220 961 781 725 736 566 525 395 497 711 422 484 597 1285
∆ in wage differentials (%) 2000–
2005
13.2 7.4 9.7 5.4 6.8 10.5 12.8 9.1 6.9 4.6 -1.9 5.8 31.1 57.6 8.3 8.2
Unemployment rates (%) 2006 13.8 41.0 8.9 11.7 6.7 6.4 7.5 4.4 5.6 35.9 19.7 12.2 5.2 33.2 15.3(c) 6.0
Population (million) 2006 3.2 3.8 7.7 4.4 10.3 1.3 10.1 2.3 3.4 2 0.7 38.1 21.7 7.5 5.4 2
GDP (US$ billion) 2006 9.1 12.3 31.5 42.9 143.0 16.4 112.9 20.1 29.8 6.2 2.5 338.7 121.6 32.0 55.0 37.3
Inflation (%) 2006 2.0 6.5 8.1 3.4 2.0 6.1 3.7 11.1 6.6 2.7 2.6 1.0 10.1 15.6 2.7 2.3
Credit ratings 2008 NA NA BBB+ BBB A A BBB+ BBB+ A- BB+ BB+ A- BBB- BB- A AA
Soucre: Own illustration based EBRD, WDI, Eurostat, WIIW and Credit Suisse.
Note : (a) indicates data for 1998, (b) for 2002, (c) for 2005, (d) for 2004, (e) for 2002-2008. NA indicates not available. ALB: Albania, BOS: Bosnia and Herzegovina,
BUL: Bulgaria, CRO: Croatia, CZ: Czech Republic, EST: Estonia, HUN: Hungary, LAT: Latvia, LIT: Lithuania, MAC: Macedonoa, MON: Montenegro, POL: Poland,
ROM: Romania, SER: Serbia, SLK: Slovakia, SLV: Slovenia. The value of credit ratings originates in standard & poor’s.
Indicators
Development Level
International Trade
Labor Market Conditions
Market Size
Risk and Uncertainty
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Table 3-1 shows some selected macroeconomic features of the transition
economies. When consideration is given to the level of economic development, the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia have achieved a relatively high level of
economic development. Among them, Slovenia shows the highest GDP per capita of
US$18,600, followed by the Czech Republic (US$13,700), Estonia (US$12,200) and
Hungary (US$11,100). These countries have also cultivated trade ties with other
countries in the global economy. In sharp contrast, most Balkan nations (i.e., Albania,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia) have been in trouble with
a lower level of economic development with GDP per capita of below US$5,000. In
most Balkan countries, a relatively high portion of the GDP is due to the agriculture
sector (26.3 percent in Albania, 16 percent in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 19.3 percent
in Serbia), indicating that they continue to lag in industrialising their economic structure.
Moreover, the degree of integration into the world economy is seen as substantially low.
Serbia, with the lowest trade ratio of 61.3 percent in the GDP, has been far from
integrating itself into the era of globalisation.
The quality of the labour force has been a major factor for investors focused on
high-technology in CEE, while the availability of a cheap labour force has been among
the influential determinants for labour-intensive investors. Compared to other CEECs,
Slovenia has been the most advanced country. The level of labour productivity in
Hungary and the Czech Republic reached roughly 70 percent of the EU level although it
fell short of that accomplished in Slovenia. It is commonly seen that in the Baltic, the
Balkan and the Southeast European groups, their levels of labour productivity have been
substantially far below the EU level.
The wage level that constitutes cost competitiveness has been justified by Western
investors as a critical ingredient in the relative attractiveness of the European transition
economies. An impressive gap between the highest wage level in Slovenia (1,285 Euro)
and the lowest level in Bulgaria (220 Euro) was identified. Labour costs of Visegrád-4
countries are equivalent to those of Baltic countries. The former Yugoslav economies,
with the exception of Croatia and Slovenia, were countries characterised by
substantially cheap labour.
However, the concern that labour costs may in the near future cease to act as part
of competitive factor endowments, because a growing number of foreign firms seek to
expand their operations in CEE in the post EU enlargement era, has been discussed
intensely. The risk of strong upward pressure on wages will be increased in order to
prevent larger migration flows (Puga, 2002). In recent years, the growth rate of wage
levels has turned out to be significant due to the gradual convergence of the level of
economic development of European transition economies toward that of Western
European counterparts. A high average rate of wage increase for the period from 2000
and 2005 was recorded in Romania (31.1 percent) and Serbia (57.6 percent) despite
their comparative advantage of cheap labour costs. Should wage levels continue to grow
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with such high speeds, Romania and Serbia may no longer lure would-be
efficiency-inspired investors, even if labour costs remain cheaper than the Visegrad
countries. On the contrary, changes in labour costs in the Czech Republic (6.8 percent)
and Poland (5.8 percent) have not been as bad as in the aforementioned countries
although some investors have pessimistic views on the issue of rising labour costs.
Turning to unemployment rates, a discrepancy between the countries of the
former Yugoslavia and the rest has been remarkable. Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Macedonia and Serbia have faced critical unemployment problems, with rates of 41.1
percent, 35.9 percent and 33.2 percent, respectively, in 2006. These high unemployment
problems were mirrored by the persistence of a confounding mixture of political
disorder and economic fragility derived from the impact of ruthless ethnic conflicts such
as the Bosnia-Herzegovina War (1992-1995) and Kosovo War (1999). Thus, the speed
of economic transition remains sluggish.
Taking a close look at market potential, the total population size of 16 European
transition economies amounts is approximately 124 million, thus equivalent to that of
Japan (about 127 million). It is observed that Poland and Romania can be attractive
locations for market-seeking investors; Poland with a population of 38.1 million has the
sixth-largest population among the EU countries, after Germany, France, UK, Italy and
Spain. Romania, with a population of 21.7 million, ranks seventh in population as of
2008. As compared to Poland and Romania, the market potential of other CEECs is
likely to be very small. As far as economic risks and financial uncertainty are concerned,
some countries have become stable, while others have not yet gained financial stability.
Notably, according to Credit Suisse, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Slovakia and
Slovenia have achieved high levels of credibility from foreign capitalists, which is
consequently reflected in the large volume of FDI inflows. Among them, Slovenia has
been the most successful in this sense.
To sum up, there are significant variations regarding industrial development,
economic openness, human resource endowment and financial risk among the transition
economies. Poland and Romania appear to be favourable investment sites for
market-seeking investors in the region because of their market size. Some attention also
needs to be paid to labour conditions. It appears evident that cheap labour costs are
highly attractive in the European transition economies, but high growth rates of wage
levels as well as low labour productivity may pose some challenges to the
reorganisation of value-generating economic activity of multinational corporations in
the enlarged Europe, cancelling out the benefits from cheap labour costs in the
foreseeable future. In terms of economic and financial risks, the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Slovakia and Slovenia are judged as countries endowed with high certainty and
stability.
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3.2 The Regional Orientation of CEECs’ Foreign Trade
The collapse of Soviet communism triggered a major change in the trading structure of
CEECs, representing a great shift of their trade dependency away from the former
Soviet Union to the EU (Hardy, 2007). In particular, from the start of the Cold War until
the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, CEECs continued to rely heavily on
foreign trade with the former Soviet Union and other Council of Mutual Economic
Assistance (COMECON) countries, which accounted for most of their foreign trade.
As regards the regional orientation of CEECs’ foreign trade, we can identify some
clear features (Tables 3-2 and 3-3). First, most of the host European transition
economies tend to have built strong commercial ties with Germany. It appears obvious
that Italy and Russia are also important trade partners, of some of CEECs although
falling behind Germany.
Second, both geographical proximity and historical connections between CEECs
and their trading partners are likely to play a crucial role in structuring the trading
patterns. For instance, Nordic countries such as Sweden and Finland are the major
trading partners for Estonia. For the Czech Republic, Slovakia is ranked as one of three
main trading partners both on the export side and on the import side, even in the
aftermath of the break-up of Czechoslovakia.
Thirdly, it is somewhat surprising that two leading economic giants, such as the
United States and Japan, are not considered as major trading partners of the above-listed
CEECs. On the contrary, Western European countries account for a high concentration
of realised trade transactions with CEECs, suggesting that the degree of trade
interdependency between CEECs and Western Europe has been strong as a result of the
wider European integration. According to Tanaka (2007: 100), Hungary’s trade
dependency on EU15 was the highest among CEECs in 2004, with the EU15
accounting for 70.8 percent of Hungary’s total export share, followed by the Czech
Republic (68.3 percent) and Poland (67.4 percent).
Fourthly, Tables 3-2 and 3-3 show that Italy is the main export and import partner for
Albania and Romania. It reflects the fact that Western European MNEs operating in the
textile industry are likely to make maximum use of outward processing transactions or
trade (OPT) that is marked by ‘foreign trade without foreign investment’. OPT indicates
that the firms from the EU export raw materials for processing to CEE and re-import
goods processed in CEE duty free. Many Italian textile and footwear firms strive to
increase sales margins and to cut operational costs in the form of OPT.
Lastly, the eastward expansion of European integration has stimulated the advance
of intra-company trade between the parent company and its affiliated companies or
between their subcontractors within the EU in parallel with an increase in FDI. Take
Audi in Hungary as an example: a large amount of automobile components is shipped
from the parent company in Ingolstadt in Germany to its Hungarian factory in Györ.
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New cars manufactured in Hungary are imported back to Western European markets.
PSA in Slovakia and Fiat in Poland are also similar examples. Given these backgrounds,
the reorganisation of the European car production hierarchy also tends to structure the
trading patterns of CEECs.
Table 3-2: Export Partners as of the end of 2007 (Unit: percent)
Source: CIA World Fact Book.
Note: B&H indicates Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Table 3-3: Import Partners as of the end of 2007 (Unit: percent)
Source: CIA World Fact Book
Note: B&H indicates Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Country 1 2 3
Albania Italy (61.0) Greece (9.1) China (6.2)
B&H Croatia (21.0) Slovenia (16.5) Italy (16.1)
Bulgaria Turkey (11.5) Germany (10.3) Italy (10.2)
Croatia Italy (19.3) B&H (13.9) Germany (10.2)
Czech Republic Germany (30.9) Slovakia (8.8) Poland (6.0)
Estonia Finland (17.9) Sweden (13.2) Latvia (11.4)
Hungary Germany (28.1) Italy (5.6) France (4.7)
Latvia Lithuania (15.1) Estonia (13.7) Russia (12.9)
Lithuania Russia (15.0) Latvia (12.8) Germany (10.5)
Macedonia S&M (19.4) Germany (14.7) Greece (10.5)
Montenegro Switzerland (83.9) Italy (6.1) B&H (1.3)
Poland Germany (25.9) Italy (6.8) France (6.0)
Romania Italy (17.2) Germany (16.9) France (7.7)
Serbia N/A N/A N/A
Slovakia Germany (21.4) Czech Republic (12.6) France (6.7)
Slovenia Germany (18.8) Italy (12.5) Croatia (8.0)
Country 1 2 3
Albania Italy (33.0) Greece (18.3) Turkey (8.7)
B&H Croatia (24.7) Slovenia (13.3) Germany (13.1)
Bulgaria Russia (12.3) Germany (12.3) Italy (8.7)
Croatia Italy (16.1) Germany (14.4) Russia (10.1)
Czech Republic Germany (32.0) Netherlands (6.8) Slovakia (6.4)
Estonia Finland (15.9) Germany (12.8) Sweden (10.1)
Hungary Germany (26.6) China (7.8) Russia (6.9)
Latvia Germany (15.0) Lithuania (13.9) Russia (8.7)
Lithuania Russia (18.1) Germany (14.9) Poland (10.6)
Macedonia Germany (11.5) Greece (11.3) Russia (11.1)
Montenegro Greece (10.2) Italy (10.2) Germany (9.6)
Poland Germany (28.9) Russia (8.8) Italy (6.5)
Romania Germany (17.2) Italy (12.8) Hungary (6.9)
Serbia N/A N/A N/A
Slovakia Germany (22.1) Czech Republic (17.3) Russia (9.2)
Slovenia Germany (18.1) Italy (17.1) Austria (11.7)
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In short, the European transition economies have steadily re-orientated foreign
trade toward the EU, since the collapse of the COMECON countries in 1989. The main
trading partners of the transition economies of the CEE region are mainly from Western
European countries. North America and Asia play a negligible role in the trading
structure of CEECs. The manifold causes such as geographical proximity, cultural and
historical ties and the reorganisation of the European production system accompanied
by EU enlargement tend to determine the trade partners of CEECs in the 21st century.
Moreover, Western MNEs are motivated to exercise OPT with the desire to exploit the
comparative advantages of a pool of cheap, but well-disciplined workers in CEECs.
This close trade relationship between the two regions will be further strengthened since
EU enlargement has added more fuel to the EU15’s interdependence on the European
transition economies vice versa. Nevertheless, our quantitative data remains insufficient
in validating how far improved integration with the EU has helped the CEECs promote
their competitiveness of knowledge-based assets in the trade consideration. Now let us
turn to discussion of foreign direct investment.
3.3 Definition of FDI
What exactly is FDI? This is a starting point of understanding the functioning of
cross-border activities in which MNEs are engaged. In economics and international
management literatures, the definition of FDI is diverse and there is less clarity. To
begin with, I present diverse types of definition of FDI. UNCTAD provides an example
of a general definition of FDI as follows:
“FDI implies that the investor exerts a significant degree of influence on the
management of enterprise resident in the other economy. Such investment involves both
the initial transaction between the two entities and all subsequent transactions between
them and among affiliates, both incorporated and unincorporated. FDI may be
undertaken by individuals as well as entities” (UNCTAD, 2005: 297).
Hymer (1960: 1) points to the importance of control of assets such as factories and sales
offices when distinguishing a direct investment from a portfolio investment. This type
of definition of FDI is also shared by Dunning (1993: 5) as follows:
“The investment is made outside the home country of the investing company, but inside
the investing company. Control over the use of the resources transferred remains with
the investor. It consists of a ‘package’ of assets and intermediate products, such as
capital, technology, management skills, access to markets and entrepreneurship”
(Dunning, 1993: 5).
In the mainstream economic literature, FDI implies a product of an investor’s avoidance
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of risk and uncertainty in foreign activities. Minimising transaction costs and
maximizing profits are at the heart of economic theories of FDI.
In contrast with scholars of international business, economic sociologists (Bandelj,
2008) and economic geographers (Yeung, 1998) view that the key motivating factors
behind FDI are social networks and institutions. In an extension of the constructivist
perspective, Bandelj (2008: 7) conceptualizes FDI as “a socially constituted relational
process, negotiated by practical economic actors”. This thesis therefore aims to explain
the CEE operations of Japanese MNEs from both economic and non-economic
theoretical perspectives.
3.3.1 The Evaluation of the Method of Data Collection
Before proceeding to the statistical evaluation of the FDI transactions in economies in
transition, several points have to be taken into account. Meyer (1995: 302-303) draws
attention to the fact that statistical information on the flow of foreign capital in the
region and the data sources are subject to various drawbacks, as follows:
1. Small- and -medium-sized investors are unlikely to be covered in the balance of
payment data. Those data are thus biased toward large investment projects.
2. FDI stock statistics face long time lags.
3. Potential biases emerge in registration data. There is the possibility that additional
capital investments and the termination of projects are not included in the data on
the stock of FDI inflows.
4. High data reliability is not expected in journalistic sources because there is the
possibility that only well-known global corporations (in terms of size and
multi-nationality) are included in the data.
As suggested by Meyer and Pind (1999: 202), the balance of payment data that the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) publishes, although expected to be accurate, tends
to be incomplete because only the capital transfer composes this data and the provision
of machinery or technology is disregarded. Given these potential shortcomings of the
sources of FDI data, one should keep in mind that there is the possibility that the actual
FDI is not always correctly reported. In other words, the size of foreign capital in given
countries tends to be overestimated. Hence, the quality of data has to be carefully
judged and understood.
3.1 Foreign Direct Investment in CEECs
3.1.1 Cumulative FDI
This section reviews the evolution of foreign direct investment in CEE. I try to delineate
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Table 3-4: The Evolution of Inbound FDI flows in the European Transitional Economies (Unit: US$ million)
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1989-2007
Central eastern Europe and the Baltic states
Czech Republic 2,531 1,280 1,259 3,575 6,220 4,942 5,474 8,282 1,814 3,941 11,630 4,667 63,122
Estonia 199 111 130 574 222 324 343 153 763 703 2,252 569 7,741
Hungary 4,723 3,292 3,703 3,082 3,059 2,151 3,576 2,721 479 3,405 5,463 3,145 49,480
Latvia 245 379 515 303 331 400 114 250 254 528 584 1,493 7,860
Lithuania 72 152 328 921 478 375 439 715 142 510 689 1,551 7,766
Poland 3,617 4,445 4,863 6,049 7,239 9,327 5,804 3,901 4,284 12,259 7,013 10,037 97,734
Slovak Republic 194 199 84 374 701 1,897 1,520 4,130 1,913 3,052 2,279 3,797 23,357
Slovenia 161 167 303 221 59 71 226 1,508 -174 281 -67 -257 2,762
Total 11,741 10,024 11,183 15,099 18,309 19,486 17,495 21,659 9,475 24,679 29,843 25,001 259,822
South-eastern Europe
SEE-3
Bulgaria 98 138 507 537 802 998 803 876 2,070 2,879 4,003 7,333 29,444
Croatia 101 466 348 842 1,393 1,075 1,188 580 1,932 732 1,551 3,170 17,467
Romania 417 415 1,267 2,079 1,025 1,051 1,154 1,080 2,156 6,368 6,587 11,430 43,050
SEE-5
Albania 89 97 42 45 51 143 207 135 178 341 263 325 2,669
Bosnia and
Herzegovina 0 0 0 100 90 146 119 266 381 666 520 423 4,311
FYR Macedonia 10 11 30 128 32 175 441 78 118 322 94 424 2,207
Montenegro NA NA NA NA NA NA 10 84 44 63 482 650 2,333
Serbia NA 0 740 113 112 50 165 475 1,365 966 1,550 4,264 11,995
Total 715 1,127 2,933 3,844 3,505 3,639 4,088 3,574 8,244 12,338 15,049 28,019 113,477
Source : EBRD
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not only the size of FDI but also have a preliminary look at the rationale behind
decisions on where to invest in a given country in the post-socialist region. Since 2000,
FDI inflows have been recognised as a vital vehicle for achieving the rapid economic
growth. The advance of IT industries enabled multinational corporations to benefit from
lower communication costs and stimulated the proliferation of FDI inflows in the region.
What is remarkable about the pattern of foreign capital penetration in CEE is the
unprecedented growth of the inward FDI stock. According to UNCTAD’s World
Investment Report (2007), the actual stock of inward FDI in the 16 transition economies
in 1990 represented only US$3.1 million yet and it however soared to US$440.1 billion
in 2006, which exceed US$420.2 billion in Southeast Asia consisting of 11 countries
(Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Vietnam). This size, however, accounts for less
than one-tenth of the EU’s inward FDI stock, which amounts to over US$5 trillion. Now
let us turn to briefly reviewing the intensity of foreign capital penetration of each
country.
Czech Republic
At the end of 1990, the Czech Republic received inward FDI of only US$1.36 billion.
The disintegration of Czechoslovakia turned out to exert a negative effect on the FDI
inflow. Among the European transition economies, the Czech Republic attracted more
than US$11 billion worth of investment in 2005. The FDI inward stock of US$77.5
billion in the Czech Republic at the end of 2006 was roughly the same as that in Austria
(US$77.7 billion) and South Africa (US$77 billion) (UNCTAD, 2007: 255-258).
UNCTAD (2006: 263) reported that the number of foreign affiliates recorded 71,385 in
1999, which indicates more than 30 percent of all foreign affiliates operating in the EU
were operational in the Czech Republic.
Hungary
In 1988, Hungary was the first country in the region to permit foreign investors to form
a JV, in the form of majority ownership, before the collapse of the former Soviet-type
command economy (Meyer, 1995: 305). Hungary remained one of the frontrunners that
attract a large amount of FDI inflows among the former Soviet type countries until the
mid-1990s. The major reason why Hungary was attractive to foreign investors in the
early phase of economic transformation lies in the presence of “a small private sector
with business contacts and a reputation for entrepreneurship” (Meyer, 1995: 307).
However, in the aftermath of the completion of the privatisation process in the
mid-1990s, the relative growth of FDI inflows in Hungary appears to have slowed. In
Hungary, the inward FDI stock was US$81.8 billion in 2006, about the same as the FDI
stock in Turkey (US$79.1 billion) and Chile (US$80.7) and about twice as much as
Nigeria (US$40.3 billion) (UNCTAD, 2007: 255-258). According to UNCTAD (2006),
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the number of foreign affiliates totaled 26,793 in 2003. This means that more than 10
percent of all foreign affiliates operating in the EU were concentrated in Hungary.
Poland
Poland received a FDI inflow stock of US$103.6 billion at the end of 2006. Somewhat
surprisingly, this value represents about the same as that in Japan (US$107.6 billion)
and roughly one third of the inward FDI stock of US$292.6 billion in China. (UNCTAD,
2007: 255-258). In 2005, the number of greenfield FDI projects was 234, which
exceeded 212 in Germany and was 10 times greater than in Portugal (UNCTAD, 2006:
263). Poland was ranked as the third most attractive destination for greenfield FDI
projects after the UK and France. Given the emerging presence of Poland as part of the
European division of labour with large stocks of FDI, Hardy (2007: 761) calls Poland as
“a glowing example of market success”.
Slovakia
Following the collapse of state socialism, it took many years for Slovakia to regain the
confidence of foreign investors, because of political risks. The amount of cumulative
FDI inflows into Slovakia skyrocketed from US$701 million in 1999 to US$1.897
billion in 2000. This rapid increase in FDI initiatives was driven by the overthrow of the
Mečiar nationalist government and better economic performance vis-à-vis other CEECs
(Brada et al., 2006). At the end of 2006, the inward FDI stock of US$30.3 billion in
Slovakia was roughly the same as that in Vietnam (US$33.5 billion) and Morocco
(US$29.8 billion) (UNCTAD, 2007: 255-258).
Slovenia
The former Yugoslavia had permitted foreign investment enterprises to enter its local
market through the formation of JVs with local firms since 1967 (Stefancic, 2005: 46).
At the end of 1993, 3,300 enterprises were recorded with foreign investment of US$1.2
billion (Meyer, 1995: 308). Despite the fact that Slovenia seems to provide a positive
investment environment with high GDP per capita and close distance to Western
markets, Slovenia’s economic performance in terms of FDI inflows has been very
disappointing. As seen in Table, the FDI outflows exceeded the FDI inflows in 2003,
2005 and 2006. Stefancic (2005) argues that these unsatisfactory results might have
been attributable to Slovenia’s small-sized economy and two major civil wars. In 2002,
US$1.508 billion was recorded as the peak of FDI inflows in Slovenia owing to the
enforcement of large-scale privatisation projects. Renault’s investment was considered a
driving force for modernising the Slovene automobile industry. Even with its superior
economic development and institutional stability among the European transition
economies, the FDI inflow stock in Slovenia was limited to US$7.5 billion, which was
roughly the same as the inward FDI stock of US$7.3 billion in Jamaica (UNCTAD,
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2007: 255-258).
Table 3-5: The Evolution of FDI Stock in European Transition Economies
(Unit: US$ million)
Romania
The FDI inflow stock jumped from US$6.95 billion in 2000 to US$41.0 billion in 2006.
The latter figure was more than twice that in Indonesia (US$19.1 billion) and Chile
(US$80.7) and about twice as large as that in Nigeria (US$40.3 billion) (UNCTAD,
2007: 255-258).
Bulgaria
In Bulgaria, the inward FDI stock was US$20.7 billion in 2006, about equivalent to the
FDI inflow stock in Peru (US$19.4 billion) and one fourth of the FDI inflow stock in
Portugal (US$85.5 billion) and Chile (US$80.7) (UNCTAD, 2007: 255-258).
Baltic countries
The sum of the FDI inflow stock of three Baltic countries amounted to US$31.1 billion
1990 2000 2006 1990 2000 2006
3,100 109,495 440,124 1,053 5,674 42,201
2,323 83,487 293,163 605 3,410 29,738
Albania – 568 1,284 – 82 110
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
– 756 4,748 – 40 43
Bulgaria 112 2,704 20,707 124 85 343
Croatia – 3,518 26,812 – 825 2,407
Czech Republic 1,363 21,644 77,460 – 738 5,058
Estonia – 2,645 12,664 – 259 3,613
Hungary 569 22,870 81,760 197 1,280 12,693
Latvia – 2,084 7,532 – 24 447
Lithuania – 2,334 10,939 – 29 1,183
Macedonia – 540 2,437 – 16 62
Montenegro – – 1,291 – – 35
Poland 109 34,227 103,616 408 1,018 10,705
Romania – 6,951 41,001 66 136 278
Serbia – 1,015 10,094 – – –
Slovakia 282 4,746 30,327 – 374 1,282
Slovenia 665 2,893 7,452 258 768 3,942
747,186 2,081,979 5,086,710 807,143 3,045,103 6,384,839
63,165 263,421 420,192 9,220 84,045 171,396
20,691 193,348 292,559 4,455 27,768 73,330
Source : UNCTAD (2007)
Note : (a) excludes Hong Kong, China.
Country FDI inward stock FDI outward stock
CEE
Visegrád-4
EU15
Southeast Asia
China(a)
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in 2006, which was roughly the same as the FDI inflow stock in Slovakia (UNCTAD,
2007: 255-258).
Balkan countries
The former Yugoslav republics had - due to their enactment of joint venture laws -
traditionally benefited from FDI inflows due to Yugoslavia’s lenient FDI policy even
before the break-up of the nation. However, ethnic conflicts became the main reason
discouraging FDI inflows until the second half of the 1990s. In Albania, the shortfall of
the financial pyramid schemes over the course of the 1990s also inhibited FDI inflows
(Brada et al., 2006). Among the Balkan countries (excluding Slovenia), Croatia received
the highest FDI inflow stock of US$26.8 billion in 2006, followed by Serbia (US$10.1
billion) (UNCTAD, 2007: 255-258). Brada et al. (2006) assess that the Dayton Peace
Accords were a significant factor encouraging FDI initiatives in Croatia.
3.1.2 Size-Adjusted FDI Inflows
When controlling for the size of the local economy, the country variation in terms of the
scale of FDI inflows is more remarkable than the absolute value. Two size-adjusted FDI
indicators are presented as follows: FDI per capita in value and FDI relative to GDP in
percent. These indicators take the average data to avoid the large fluctuation of FDI
inflows in the four different time periods (1992-1994, 1995-1998, 1999-2002,
2003-2006) as pointed out by Meyer and Pind (1999: 205).
First, focus will be placed on the average FDI in percent of GDP. Bulgaria and
Estonia show steady growth of FDI over GDP ratio over the four periods. Poland and
Romania follow these two countries. Serbia’s FDI performance skyrocketed from 0.9 in
percent over the years 1999-2002 to 8.1 percent over the years 2003-2006 in terms of
average FDI in percent of GDP. Conversely, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia
slightly dropped during those last two periods (1999-2002 and 2003-2006), although
their FDI performance remained relatively high compared to other transitional
economies.
Table 3-6 also reveals population-adjusted FDI figures. Overall, all the listed
countries except for the Czech Republic and Macedonia have shown a great leap
forward in FDI per capita over time. Similar to the average FDI in percent of GDP,
Estonia ranks as the highest with US$1,235.10 during the period 2003-2006. The
country has successfully established its credible reputation in encouraging FDI inflows
in recent years. The Czech Republic (US$602) and Slovakia (US$530.7) follow Estonia.
The FDI performance of some of the former Yugoslav countries (e.g., Albania and
Macedonia) remains considerably disappointing, with FDI per capita of less than
US$10. Particularly surprising is that the average FDI per capita of Poland and
Romania is relatively poor (US$309.5 and US$302.4, respectively), notwithstanding
their large local markets. Similar to the actual value of FDI inflows, the average FDI per
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capita of Slovenia has been continuously one of the smallest over the four time periods.
Estonia has been much ahead of other Baltic countries, having established itself to
attract FDI inflows in per capita terms. The country has reached one of the highest
levels among the CEECs. Even in the early phase of transition (1992-1994), the country
was second to Hungary. On the other hand, despite the similar historical backgrounds,
population and GDP, Lithuania and Latvia received moderate levels of FDI inflows.
Moreover, it is noteworthy to point out that Estonia and Slovenia experience contrasting
levels of FDI inflows despite their similarities in terms of market size and ethnic
diversity (Bandelj, 2008).
Table 3-6: Size-Adjusted FDI Inflows to European Transition Economies
Moreover, taking Croatia as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina as an example, there
is a marked discrepancy between these countries (US$471.5 and US$127.9) in FDI per
capita although economic stabilisation of both countries were discouraged by two
ethnic conflicts. Of notable interest is that Serbia’s FDI performance in per capita terms
increased to US$300.8 over the years 2003-2006, while it used to be substantially lower
than other Balkan countries. According to the Serbia Investment and Export Promotion
Agency (http://www.siepa.sr.gov), Serbia received the investment inflow of 1.51 billion
Euros in 2006 as a result of the privatisation of formerly state-owned enterprises. One of
these examples is the purchase of the Serbian mobile phone operator by a Norwegian
conglomerate, Telenor.
92–94 95–98 99–02 03–06 92–94 95–98 99–02 03–06
Albania 3.4 2.4 3.3 3.6 13.6 20.4 42.4 87.7
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
N/A 0.4 3.1 4.9 N/A 4.6 46.5 127.9
Bulgaria 0.6 2.7 6.5 13.3 7.4 37.3 110.3 458.5
Croatia N/A 2.5 6.2 5.6 N/A 115.2 280.0 471.5
Czech Republic N/A 3.8 9.9 5.1 N/A 218.2 620.8 602.0
Estonia 3.9 5.9 6.3 12.4 101.8 213.9 271.3 1235.1
Hungary 4.3 8.6 6.1 4.8 159.7 378.4 319.5 503.3
Latvia 1.9 6.0 3.6 5.0 38.0 147.7 120.5 362.6
Lithuania 0.3 3.7 4.1 3.6 6.4 104.6 144.5 278.7
Macedonia, FYR 0.2 1.1 5.2 3.1 4.0 20.5 91.0 88.0
Montenegro N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Poland 1.6 3.1 3.7 4.1 37.0 125.7 172.0 309.5
Romania 0.6 2.5 2.8 6.9 7.5 43.5 49.3 302.4
Serbia N/A N/A 0.9 8.1 12.4 29.5 14.6 300.8
Slovak Republic 1.3 1.5 8.9 6.4 35.8 61.3 369.7 530.7
Slovenia 0.9 1.1 2.8 1.7 56.8 109.1 300.8 290.3
Country Average FDI per capita in US$Average FDI in percent of GDP
Source : Own calculation based on World Bank’s World Development Indicator .
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In short, I found no evidence that there are simple, linear and definitive
relationships of FDI inflows to CEECs and the level of economic development,
geographical proximity to Western European markets or the degree of progress in
institution-building when the size of the local economy is adjusted.
3.1.3 Countries of Origin
This section reviews the pattern and trends of FDI transactions based on the countries of
origin. I also investigate whether there is a special linear association between FDI
transactions and the origin of FDI (Tables 3-7 and 3-8). Hunya (2000a) suggests that the
characteristics of foreign multinationals can be better understood through a comparison
between countries of origin. The previous literature also sheds light on the importance
of both national ideology (Dresmus et al., 1998) and social networks (Bandelj, 2002,
2004) which tend to shape the actions of foreign multinationals irrespective of the
dynamic complexity of globalisation. Additionally, cultural ties (Bandelj, 2008) and
geographic proximity to neighbouring countries (Hunya, 2000a) have a defining effect
on the patterns of foreign capital inflows. The time-series data is more appropriate, but
the limitation of data availability deters detailed analysis of the interaction of the
country of origin with recipient countries. Tables 3-7 and 3-8 describe the variation
between home countries with respect to the intensity of foreign direct investment stocks
in European transition economies. Data for 10 countries (the Czech Republic, Bulgaria,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia), except
for the Balkan countries were presented. The data were collected by the author from the
central bank or statistical office of each host country.
Investments from Germany, Austria and the Netherlands have been of great
relevance for most CEECs. Foreign investors from North America, Asia and old EU
periphery countries such as Spain and Portugal have had a minor presence in the local
markets of the region. Accordingly, it seems that geographical proximity is a critical
predictor in the explanation of the intensity of FDI.
Austria
Austria has traditionally been considered to be the critical intersection between Western
Europe and CEE in geographical terms. Austrian investors are active in Hungary and
the Czech Republic, notably in the manufacturing sector, while their economic
involvement is relatively weak in Poland (Hunya, 2000c: 100-101). Austrian investors
made maximum use of the first mover advantage in the early phase of economic
transition (Hunya, 2000c: 93) because of the country’s geographical centrality, cultural
ties and human networks in the region. As already confirmed by Hunya (2000c) in a
study of the FDI characteristics of countries of origin in CEE during the second half of
the 1990s, our data also reveals that the intensity of the stock of Austrian FDI has been
extensively high in the neighboring transition countries such as the Czech Republic
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(10.2 percent), Hungary (11.1 percent), Slovakia (32.3 percent), Slovenia (14.8 percent),
Bulgaria (21.3 percent), Romania (23 percent) and Slovenia (32.3 percent). The
underlying motive of Austrian FDI has been to aim at serving emerging local demand
(Hunya, 2000c).
Table 3-7: FDI Inflows by Country of Origin in CEECs (Unit: million Euro)
Germany
Germany has been the leading source of foreign investment in many CEE countries.
Particularly notable is that German FDI has been dispersed across the region. German
investors established themselves in various former command-type economies in the
Czech Republic (24.9 percent), Hungary (27.8 percent), Poland (16.4 percent) and
Slovakia (18.2 percent). The strong presence of German investors in these Visegrád-4
countries was attributed not only to their geographical proximity but also to their
historical involvement. As a matter of fact, the economic system and institutional
infrastructure of many of European transition economies have been influenced by
Germany. CEECs usually follow the German legal framework in terms of corporate and
competition laws. According to Hunya (2000c: 103), CEEC’s economic growth is
dependent on the state of the German economy; a decline of the German economy in
1998 exerted a more detrimental effect on CEECs trade performance than did the
Russian financial crisis. It should be noted that German car producers have strengthened
their economic involvement in CEE. VW’s acquisition of Skoda in the Czech Republic
has been considered as an encouraging role in revitalising the Czech automobile
industry (Meyer, 2000). Besides large multinational firms such as VW, Siemens and
Region Origin CZ EST HUN (a) LAT LIT (b) POL (a) SLK (a) SLV BUL ROM (a)
Austria 6,377 41 5,184 170 97 3,462 1,693 2,188 5,268 7,942
Belgium 2,347 -30 886 40 36 3,002 – 249 559 –
Denmark 594 256 181 641 949 2,365 – 95 193 –
Finland – 1,889 966 447 495 940 – 0 6 –
France 4,500 62 2,175 30 126 10,822 – 588 341 2,766
Germany 15,470 169 12,959 624 642 15,508 2,082 537 1,058 3,473
Italy 418 -57 746 22 8 4,122 1,413 374 347 2,322
Netherlands 9,623 30 6,950 420 279 18,836 2,221 619 4,088 5,887
Portugal – 22 32 0 0 467 – – 28 –
Spain – 13 826 3 24 2,560 – 7 644 –
Sweden 932 4,225 680 1,008 1,137 3,636 – 29 60 –
UK 2,234 221 3,181 224 129 3,792 602 127 1,962 –
Europe Switzerland 2,943 69 834 – 244 2,450 – 933 673 2,372
CIS Russia – 165 -5 340 998 502 – 2 448 –
USA 3,318 -63 1,824 347 164 6,889 380 147 897 628
Canada – 53 118 3 34 184 – 0 34 –
Asia Japan 951 6 723 0 0 808 – 20 79 –
Korea – – 257 6 10 940 409 – 16 –
China – -3 19 – 3 69 – 0 3 –
62,242 8,199 46,670 7,226 5,393 94,472 11,406 6,775 24,743 34,512
EU
North
America
Total
Source : Own calculation based on national statistics.
Note : (a) indicates data for 2006. (b) inicates data for 2008.
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Bosch, German medium-sized firms have also been active in order to capitalise on
cheap factor endowments such as labour and real estate (Cieślik and Ryan, 2002).
German investors have been extensively involved in various industries such as
manufacturing sectors, retailing, and financial intermediation in Poland (Wada, 2005).
With the use of the ordered probit model to explore the association between proximity
and involvement in West-East business, Meyer (1998) presents evidence that German
multinationals are relatively active in the neighbouring countries such as the Czech
Republic and Hungary compared to British counterparts. The strong presence of
German capitalists appears to be an indication of the emergence of Germany’s new
imperialism in the eastern periphery of the EU territory.
Table 3-8: FDI Inflows by Country of Origin in CEECs (Unit: percent)
France
France has also been one of the leading sources of FDI inflows in some CEE countries
although its involvement is not as strong as that of its German and Austrian counterparts.
French investors comprised only the third-largest group of investors in Poland, Romania
and Slovenia at the end of 2006. French FDI accounted for 11 percent of the total
foreign capital in Poland. One of the reasons for the significant involvement of French
investors lies in the fact that French Telecom invested US$450 million to buy a local
telecommunication company in Poland in 2004. This investment value was the second
largest recorded, after the US$800 million invested by an American real estate company,
Apollo Rida (Karpińska-Mizielińska and Smuga, 2005: 68).
Region Origin CZ EST HUN (a) LAT LIT (b) POL (a) SLK (a) SLV BUL ROM (a)
Austria 10.2 0.5 11.1 2.3 1.8 3.7 14.8 32.3 21.3 23.0
Belgium 3.8 – 1.9 0.6 0.7 3.2 – 3.7 2.3 –
Denmark 1.0 3.1 0.4 8.9 17.6 2.5 – 1.4 0.8 –
Finland – 23.0 2.1 6.2 9.2 1.0 – 0.0 0.0 –
France 7.2 0.8 4.7 0.4 2.3 11.5 – 8.7 1.4 8.0
Germany 24.9 2.1 27.8 8.6 11.9 16.4 18.2 7.9 4.3 10.1
Italy 0.7 – 1.6 0.3 0.1 4.4 12.4 5.5 1.4 6.7
Netherlands 15.5 0.4 14.9 5.8 5.2 19.9 19.5 9.1 16.5 17.1
Portugal – 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 – – 0.1 –
Spain – 0.2 1.8 0.0 0.4 2.7 – 0.1 2.6 –
Sweden 1.5 51.5 1.5 13.9 21.1 3.8 – 0.4 0.2 –
UK 3.6 2.7 6.8 3.1 2.4 4.0 5.3 1.9 7.9 –
Europe Switzerland 4.7 0.8 1.8 – 4.5 2.6 – 13.8 2.7 6.9
CIS Russia – 2.0 0.0 4.7 18.5 0.5 – 0.0 1.8 –
USA 5.3 – 3.9 4.8 3.0 7.3 3.3 2.2 3.6 1.8
Canada – 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.6 0.2 – 0.0 0.1 –
Asia Japan 1.5 0.1 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.9 – 0.3 0.3 –
Korea – – 0.6 0.1 0.2 1.0 3.6 – 0.1 –
China – 0.0 0.0 – 0.1 0.1 – 0.0 0.0 –
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
North
America
Total
Source: Own calculation based on national statistics.
Note : (a) indicates data for 2006. (b) inicates data for 2008.
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Netherlands
Dutch firms have also established themselves in almost all local markets, other than
those in the Baltic countries. Among the European transition economies, the proportion
of Dutch FDI relative to the total FDI in Poland and Slovakia accounted for roughly 20
percent. In particular, the value of 18,836 million Euros in Poland was remarkable.
Nordic countries
The Baltic countries are generally targeted by neighbouring Western European countries
such as Sweden and Finland. The FDI stock of Sweden in Estonia and Lithuania
accounts for 51.5 percent and 21.1 percent, respectively. Likewise, Finland has
strengthened its presence in Estonia (23 percent).
Russia
The value and share presented in Table 3-7 and 3-8 do not demonstrate the importance
of the potential performance by Russian-based enterprises in the CEE region. The
market presence and strategic investing patterns of Russian multinational firms are
substantially prominent in the natural resource sector including natural gas and crude oil.
Three major Russian-based multinationals - such as Gazprom, Rosneft, Yukos and
Lukoil – have made resource-seeking and strategic asset-seeking FDI frequently in the
form of cross-border M&A deals. The central intention of entering the market is
explained by the desire to build a foothold to access US and EU markets and for
diversifying the range of production (Weiner, 2006: 7). Interestingly, it appears evident
that the geographical distribution of Russian capital has been concentrated in certain
CEE countries, rather than dispersed. The Baltic nations have succeeded in luring
Russian-based multinationals, while the presence of those same multinationals has been
marginal in Visegrád-4 countries. The reason for this geographical asymmetry may lie
in historical and cultural ties, and memories of these two sub-groups. According to CIA
World Factbook (http://www.cia.gov), there is the large population of Russian speaking
citizens (Estonia: 29.7 percent; Latvia: 37.5 percent; Lithuania: 8 percent) and of
Russian ethnicity (Estonia: 25.6 percent; Latvia: 29.6 percent; Lithuania: 6.3 percent) in
the three Baltic nations. According to Weiner’s study (2006: 21-23), the absence of
favouring Russian capital by Visegrád-4 countries and other CEE economies can be
attributed to seven underlying factors: (1) memories of Soviet politics; (2) fear of losing
control over strategic industries; (3) lack of transparency; (4) radical and strong
pressures on host governments of CEE countries in the cross-border M&A negotiation
procedure; (5) high uncertainties and risks involved (e.g., potential violation of property
rights); (6) bribery and corruption; and (7) potential decline in productivity and
efficiency in the post-M&A period. Despite these discouraging grounds, the roles and
tasks played by Russian-based multinationals are estimated to become more crucial in
the future (Weiner, 2006: 25).
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North America
North American investors have been an insignificant source of foreign investment in the
region. US FDI was relatively dispersed and its presence was not as crucial as inbound
FDI from other European countries. The reason for the high intensity of American FDI
in Poland is related to the presence of large Polish communities in the United States
(Bandelj, 2008). Food processing, financial intermediation and chemical-related
investments accounted for the majority of the US investment in Poland (Wada, 2005:
47). Major US firms such as GE, GM, McDonalds, and Coca-Cola have promoted their
market presence in the region to target the local and EU markets. Shama (1995) presents
evidence that US investors have a strong tendency to form joint ventures with local
firms when entering emerging markets in the former Soviet bloc. This suggests that
entry strategies of US MNEs are characterised as more risk-averse than risk-preferring.
The proportion of Canadian FDI in each host economy accounted for less than 1 percent.
Their underrepresentation can be explained by geographical distance.
Asian countries
Asian investors did not account for a large proportion of the FDI inflow to each country
in the former Soviet-type economic bloc as of 2006, compared with Western European
investors (Cieślik and Ryan, 2002; Meyer, 1995, 1998).
In the above listed CEECs, the stock of inward Japanese FDI did not exceed even
two percent. This minor presence of Japanese multinationals is somewhat surprising
despite their established global and European business networks. Although the tables
capture weak economic involvement of Japanese multinationals in the form of foreign
investment, Japanese FDI has been perceived among host governments of CEEs as
important investors in recent years. One major reason is that various forms of Japanese
lean and flexible production strategies and their cutting-edge technologies are expected
to contribute to boosting industrial modernisation of the local economy. Another is that
Japanese FDI is thought to stimulate a reduced dependency on capital imports from
certain countries (Bakos, 1992).
Korean firms were considered as “outliers to the gravity rule” (Hunya, 2000c: 92)
during the 1990s due to their first-mover advantages (Linden, 1998; Ruigrok et al.,
2004). Korean investors were surprisingly active in the region despite the lack of
historical ties, large geographic distance and linguistic obstacles. Since the mid-1990s
Daewoo Motors, a pioneer of Asian FDI in CEE, has invested heavily in the automotive
sector and has developed its own overarching sourcing linkages with local suppliers in
CEE (Pavlínek, 2006). Daewoo also acquired 51.0 percent of a Romania car producer,
RODAE, in November 1994 and 50.2 percent of a Czech truck maker, AVIA, in August
1995 (Hyun, 2003) aiming to produce relatively cheap products for the local and the
European markets” (Hunya, 2000c: 103).
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As of December 1994, the stock of Korean FDI in Romania became higher than
Western European FDI because of a large-scale investment by a Korean chaebol,
Daewoo, to set up an automobile joint venture firm with Craiova (Nishimura et al.,
1998). Of significant relevance is that the value of Korean FDI in CEE was rather large,
while the number of projects was quite limited. For instance, only 33 investment
projects were carried out by Korean investors, while the value was 573 million Zloty.
The investment size per project of 17.4 million Zloty for Korean firms was much
greater than that of 0.5 million Zloty for German firms as of 1996 (Nishimura et al.,
1998: 348). Contrasting the stock of German FDI in Romania with that of Korean FDI
in Romania as of February 1998, the former amounted to US$353.4 million in value and
a total of 7,045 projects, while the latter US$234 million in value and a total of 45
projects (Nishimura et al., 1998: 356).
As of the mid-1990s, Chinese investors were seen in Hungary and Romania but it
in rather small numbers and their investing motives may have been driven by “political
reasons escaping the home environment” (Meyer, 1995: 312). Chinese multinationals
are more active in Russia and Central Asia due to geographic proximity and historical
and cultural ties. Asian firms are generally in favour of establishing wholly owned
enterprises over joint ventures with local partners.
According to the CzechInvest, Japanese manufacturing FDI amounted to US$3.219
billion and created 23,420 job opportunities at the end of March 2007. In Slovakia, four
Japanese manufacturing firms (e.g., Yazaki, Sumitomo, Matsushita and Sony) and three
Korean manufacturing firms (e.g., Samsung, Kia Motors and Hyundai Mobis) were
ranked within the top 20 foreign investors in terms of job creation (SARIO, 2007: 16).
Encouraging signs and binding commitments by some CEE investment promotion
agencies such as CzechInvest and PAIiIZ to attract more Asian investors are reflected in
the availability of their websites in Japanese and Korean versions. Moreover, a Japanese
investment advisor has been hired in each IPA (the CzechInvest, PAIiIZ, and Hungarian
Investment Promotion Agency). In order to contribute to attracting more investment
projects from Korea, the Korea Exchange Bank promised to dispatch a Korean advisor
to the Czech Republic in 2006 in line with a partnership with CzechInvest (CzechInvest,
November 2, 2006).
To sum up, our descriptive statistics confirm a high concentration of investment by
Western European investors in the former Soviet-type economies. Geographical and
cultural proximity between an invested country and an investing country seems likely to
determine the size and destination of foreign capital. Neither U.S. nor Asian investors
have established themselves yet at least from the perspective of FDI distribution by the
nationality of origin. Nevertheless, it is important to note that scholars of economics in
transition are inclined to reappraise the dynamic trend of Asian FDI and its role in
modernising the local economy.
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3.2 The Industrial Distribution of Foreign Direct Investments
This section looks at the industrial composition of foreign capital in selected CEECs.
The data for the industrial distribution of FDI transactions was collected by the author
from the national statistical office or the central bank of each recipient country. Less
than 1 percent of the stock of FDI was concentrated in the agricultural industry as well
as the mining industry, suggesting that multinationals’ investments are not motivated by
the desire to exploit resource-based assets in CEE in contrast to those in CIS (Meyer
and Pind, 1999).
Table 3-9 reveals that the manufacturing sector has predominantly attracted the
large share of foreign investment projects in most selected countries with the exception
of Estonia, Latvia and Bulgaria. Notably, Hungary and Poland have been the leading
recipients of investments by foreign-owned manufacturers, with the share of over 40
percent of all FDI inflows. Foreign multinational firms appear to play a crucial role in
the financial intermediation sector in the Baltic countries.
Particularly notable is the great transformation from the non-service sector to the
service sector that took place between the mid-1990s and the early 2000s. Taking
Poland as an example, the share of the manufacturing sector used to be more than
two-thirds of all FDI projects in value (Meyer, 1995: 313) as of the mid-1990s, but it
dropped sharply to 41.3 percent as of the end of 2006. In contrast, the share of the
financial intermediation sector jumped dramatically from 0.3 percent (Meyer, 1995:
313) to 21.4 percent. To some extent, these changes also hold true for other countries in
the region.
Within the manufacturing industry, the transportation and electrical and
electronics sub-sectors received the large share of FDI in the Czech Republic (11.6
percent), Hungary (21.5 percent) and Poland (10.6 percent). This is because of the
realisation of a large number of greenfield and brownfield projects undertaken in these
sub-sectors. For instance, the Toyota-PSA consortium in Kolín, and VW’s acquisition of
Škoda in Mladá Boeslav have made significant contributions to revitalising the Czech
automobile industry (Pavlínek, 2005). Hungary attracted Magyar Suzuki in Esztergom,
Ford in Székesfehévár, and Audi in Györ. These investors have helped to transplant new
technical know-how and organisational expertise to the local economies (Meyer, 1995;
Sadler and Swain, 1994; Swain, 1998).
The Polish passenger car industry has prospered due to the presence of Opel in
Gliwice, Fiat in Tychy, Toyota in Wałbrzych, VW in Poznań and Daewoo-FSO in
Warsaw (Pavlínek, 2006). A probable cause of stimulating these foreign car assemblers
to relocate their production lines to the region could be the “strong comparative
advantages within intermediate-level technical skills” (Meyer, 1998: 25). In contrast, the
food, beverage and tobacco industry in the table, in which foreign entrants require
access to local distributors to gain profits, accounts for less than 10 percent.
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Table 3-9: Cross-Country Sectoral Distribution (Unit: percent of total FDI)
3.3 Conclusions
This chapter revealed the scale, scope and characteristics of foreign direct investment in
CEE. Similarities and dissimilarities on these issues among the transition economies are
confirmed. CEECs used to be far less appealing before the disintegration of the former
Soviet Union. In the aftermath of the fall of the Communist regime in the late 1980s,
improved economic conditions in labour and capital markets were observed in most
ISIC code Sector CZ EST HUN LAT LIT
1 Agriculture 0.3 0.5 0.4 1.0 0.8
14 Mining and quarrying 1.2 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.5
15-37 Manufacturingof which:
30.0 14.8 41.4 6.8 30.6
15, 16 food, beverage, tobacco 3.5 – 4.2 – 5.6
23-25 chemicals, petroleum 4.9 – 3.0 – 13.6
29-35 Machinery, vehicles 11.6 – 21.5 – 1.7
40, 41 Electricity, gas supply 4.5 2.8 4.2 3.3 8.4
45 Construction 2.0 1.9 0.9 2.6 1.6
50-52 Wholesale and retail trade 12.1 12.6 11.7 12.0 12.8
65-67 Financial intermediation 19.9 32.5 8.0 37.2 23.5
70-74 Real estate, renting 13.2 28.0 17.9 10.4 10.7
60-64 Transport, communication 15.3 4.7 10.1 4.9 8.9
Others 1.5 1.8 5.4 21.3 2.2
100 100 100 100 100
ISIC code Sector POL SLK SLV BUL ROM
1 Agriculture 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.4 –
14 Mining and quarrying 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.5 6.1
15-37 Manufacturingof which:
41.3 39.1 37.1 17.9 34.2
15, 16 food, beverage, tobacco 5.5 – 0.5 – –
23-25 chemicals, petroleum 4.8 – 18.2 – –
29-35 Machinery, vehicles 10.6 – 5.5 – –
40, 41 Electricity, gas supply 2.7 13.9 3.9 – 3.7
45 Construction 1.7 – 0.1 6.5 – (a)
50-52 Wholesale and retail trade 14.1 11.5 16.5 – 12.2
65-67 Financial intermediation 21.4 19.2 20.7 18.4 22.2
70-74 Real estate, renting 11.7 5.0 15.7 19.4 – (a)
60-64 Transport, communication 6.0 8.4 4.5 17.7 8.2
Others 0.7 1.9 1.3 19.2 13.4
100 100 100 100 100
Total
Total
Note : Bulgaria (BUL): - 2007, Czech Republic (CZ): 1993-2007, Estonia (EST): -2008,
Hungary (HUN): -2006, Latvia (LAT): 2000-2007, Lithuania (LIT): 1997-2008. Poland: - 2006,
Romania (ROM): -2006, Slovakia (SLK): - 2006, Slovenia (SLV): - 2006. (a) indicates that only
the sum of construction and real estate is available, accounting for 6.4 percent.
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countries but there are great variations in the speed and extent of the transition from a
command economy to a free market economy among the CEECs. By and large,
Visegrád-4, Estonia and Slovenia are the forerunners in achieving steady economic
development, moving toward the standards of Western European countries, while most
former Yugoslav countries have lagged behind. Many CEECs experienced a dramatic
change in their regional orientation of trade and foreign capital transactions from former
COMECON partners during the era of the Cold War towards Western Europe during the
post-socialist era. As for the trade relationship, Germany has been the primary trading
partner for most CEECs. CEE has been considered not simply the backyard of Western
Europe, but also as the crucial source of opportunities for European multinationals to
produce products at affordable costs and capture local markets.
In reflecting on the scale of the FDI inflow stock, the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Poland have been the three largest recipient countries, while most of the Balkan
countries have failed to accumulate foreign capital due to the outbreak of two ethnic
conflicts. When consideration is given to the adjusted volume of FDI in percent of GDP
and in population, a systemic relation between FDI and economic and political factors is
hard to capture. Surprisingly, Estonia ranks as the highest when the scale of FDI
penetration in a given country was calculated in percentage of GDP. Bulgaria and
Slovakia are also outstanding during the period 1999-2002 and the period 2003-2006
next to Estonia. Estonia also achieved the highest FDI per capita, followed by the
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. The distribution of FDI in CEE varies by
country of origin. The size of FDI transactions tends to be determined by geographical
distance and historical ties. Similar to foreign trade, the German FDI position has been
remarkable in most of CEECs, followed by Austrian FDI and Dutch FDI. Somewhat
surprising is that Austria plays a marginal role in foreign trade, while at the same time
its presence is remarkable with regard to the intensity of FDI. Russian investors have
not been active in CEECs with the exception of Lithuania, while Russia has still had
traditional trade connections with most of CEECs on the import side in particular. North
American and Asian counterparts with the exception of Korean firms have shown their
limited presence in the region. However, the growing number of Japanese
manufacturing firms is expected by local policy makers to play a positive role in
encouraging the economic development of the region. Descriptive statistical evidence
also suggests that the high FDI intensity in the machinery and vehicle sector in the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland reflect their relatively strong engineering tradition,
but it requires further analysis in quantitative and qualitative terms.
This chapter has clarified the evolution of FDI in European transition
economies with a focus on individual recipient and source countries. In the next chapter,
I aim to drill down further recent trends in Japanese FDI in different European transition
countries and the key dimension of transnational operations of Japanese MNEs, namely
investment motives, entry modes, and operational experience.
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4 JAPANESE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN
EUROPEAN TRANSITION ECONOMIES
4.1 Introduction
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is one of the regions that Japanese investors
neglected for a long time. The degree of Japanese business involvement in CEE in the
form of foreign trade and foreign direct investment has been marginal relative to
Western European firms and US firms. According to JETRO (http://www.jetro.go.jp),
the post-socialist economies have attracted the Japanese FDI of US$2.5 billion at the
end of 2007. This actual value of Japanese capital is considerably marginal as compared
to that of Western European FDI. However, certain policy makers in host governments
of CEECs have begun re-evaluating the importance of Japanese capital penetration in
CEE, especially in the manufacturing sector. From the perspective of the host
governments, the increasing importance of Japanese MNEs is expected to serve as a
conduit for modernising the local economies of CEE. From the point of view of
Japanese MNEs, the strengthening of Japanese involvement is undoubtedly associated
with the expansion of EU boundaries, which stimulates more supply and demand effects
as a result of the completion of the Single European Market. One would argue that this
regional integration forces Japanese investors to reconfigure the spatial organisation of
their industrial activities in the enlarged Europe.
In general, Japanese firms have shown a particular preference for the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland, in the CEE region. These three countries have received
the lion’s share of Japanese FDI, while other countries such as Slovakia and Romania
have been minor FDI destinations. There have been few or no investment projects
undertaken by Japanese firms in Baltic and Balkan countries. Japanese MNEs in the
CEE market tend to concentrate in the manufacturing sector and notably, in the
electronics and automobile sectors.
A lack of relevant publications limits our exploration of the strategic nature of
Japanese FDI sectors in CEE, requiring scrutiny of the motives for making investment
decisions. Dynamic configurations of the value-added supply chain by Japanese firms
are now starting to become apparent in the region although Japanese capital penetration
is too new for us to generalise.
The organisation of this chapter is arranged as follows. I analyse the degree of
Japanese economic involvement in CEE in terms of trade, FDI and the geographical and
sectoral distribution of Japanese FDI. I present an examination of the motives of
Japanese FDI. This article gives concluding remarks in the end. The data used is based
on interviews, secondary literature and statistical data sources including JETRO, Japans
Ministry of Finance, Japans Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Toyo Keizai (2007).
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4.2 Japan’s Trade Relations with CEECs
This section reviews the factors that characterise commercial ties between Japan and
CEE and how the trade relations have developed over time. This thesis also directs
attention to the question of whether trade relations have been reciprocal.
The Japan-CEE trade relationship has a history of over forty years. Trade
agreements between Japan and CEE countries were made in succession, after the open
conflicts between Japan and the USSR in connection with the immediate consequences
of the Second World War were relaxed in 1956 by a Japan-Soviet common declaration
on the ending of the war (Stankovsky, 1974: 61-63). Until the 1970s, the trading scale
between Japan and CEE was limited to less than US$10 million (Bakos, 1992: 150).
The 1970s witnessed CEECs begin to make efforts to achieve modernisation in their
pursuit of foreign capital, but their development plan was hit by the second oil shock
and, thus, interrupted, falling into a prolonged economic recession. From that time, the
trading volume did not grow for more than two decades (Bakos, 1992: 150). The fall of
state socialism in 1989 turned out to be a great incentive for consolidating mutual trade.
In 1990, Japan’s exports to five COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance) nations totalled US$888 million, with imports of US$654 million (Bakos,
1992: 150; Berény, 1996: 232). Trade between Japan and CEECs was of only limited
relevance for the both sides. Trade between Japan and CEE was characterised by a
strong complementary nature before and after the end of the Cold War. Natural
resources such as steel, iron, coal, and petroleum products were imported by Japan,
while Japanese machinery exports to CEE took a significantly large share in the 1960s
and 1970s. Eighty percent of Japan’s exports to the eastern periphery were general
machinery, electrical and electronics products and cars, while imports are dominated by
chemicals, agricultural products and ferrous and non-ferrous metal products (Bakos,
1992: 150; Berény, 1996: 232). Japan specialises in exporting car components and
electrical parts to the European transition economies. This background may imply that
the role played by exports seems to be complementary to FDI since local
Japanese-affiliated companies still rely in part on imported goods from Japan to satisfy
demand for procurement.
As indicated by Table 4-1, the CEE shares of Japan’s world exports and imports
account for only 1.1 percent and 0.4 percent, respectively, at the end of 2007, while Asia
and North America were of greater importance to Japan. It confirms that the trade aspect
of the economic partnership between Japan, on the one side, and the eastern European
periphery, on the other side, seems to be underdeveloped. The Japanese trading intensity
has been primarily dominated by Asia and North America. Although most European
transition countries have implemented institutional restructuring and economic
adjustment policies ranging from price and trade liberalisation to bank reforms since the
end of command type economies, Japan’s trading ties with them have not yet grown.
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Table 4-1: Japan’s Foreign Trade with CEE in 2007
4.3 Nature of Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in CEECs
4.3.1 The Location of Japanese Investment
The nature of Japanese FDI in European transitional economies has been disregarded
for a long time. However, the influx of Japanese FDI to the new markets has been rising
at a very gradual pace. One major explanation is that Japanese investors try to adapt to
emerging competition as a result of increasing regionalism in the EU and hence
reorganise their market strategy with plant diversification and product specialisation.
The expansion of the EU’s boundaries, which stimulates more supply and demand
effects in the Single European Market (SEM), requires Japanese investors to reshape the
spatial organisation of their profit-driven industrial activities.
Table 4-2 indicates that the FDI inflow stock of Japanese firms in the world
reached US$812.1 billion in 2004, twice as much as US$379.1 billion in 1995. It is
worth noting that the size and share of the stock of the Japanese FDI differ from region
to region. When looking at Japanese FDI in Asia, the share of Japanese FDI continued
Export Import Balance Export Import
712,735 621,084 91,651 100.0 100.0
343,113 267,926 75,187 48.1 43.1
86,990 86,898 92 12.2 14.0
159,581 55,541 104,040 22.4 8.9
153,903 80,857 73,046 21.6 13.0
35,063 24,117 10,946 4.9 3.9
112,492 72,510 39,982 15.8 11.7
105,270 65,009 40,261 14.8 10.5
96,355 62,745 33,610 13.5 10.1
8,043 2,248 5,795 1.1 0.4
Poland 1,637 379 1,258 0.2 0.1
Czech Republic 2,618 479 2,139 0.4 0.1
Slovakia 437 204 233 0.1 0.0
Hungary 2,380 620 1,760 0.3 0.1
Estonia 133 77 56 0.0 0.0
Latvia 93 44 49 0.0 0.0
Lithuania 109 22 87 0.0 0.0
Slovenia 198 50 148 0.0 0.0
Bulgaria 134 53 81 0.0 0.0
Romania 256 223 33 0.0 0.0
Croatia 46 97 -51 0.0 0.0
12,482 11,514 968 1.8 1.9
26,184 113,824 -87,640 3.7 18.3
11,602 14,770 -3,168 1.6 2.4Africa
Source : JETRO
Europe
EU27
EU15
CEE
Russia and CIS
Middle East
Asian NIES
North America
South America
Value (US$ million) Share (%)
World
Asia
ASEAN
Country
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to drop significantly from 1998 to 2001. A probable cause of this phenomenon relates to
the Asian monetary crisis in 1997 as well as slow-down in the world economy and the
SARS problem in the early 2000s. When analysing Japanese FDI in North America, it
appears evident that the amount of FDI inflow stock of Japanese firms at the end of
2004 doubled compared to that in 1992 but the share in North America continued to
drop over the period from 1989-2004.
On the contrary, Europe’s share of Japanese FDI stock has shown a phenomenal
expansion. At the end of 2004, its share represents about 27.8 percent of all Japanese
worldwide FDI. There has been a steady increase in Europe’s share of the Japanese FDI
inflow stock, especially, since the beginning of the new century. The cumulative
Japanese FDI of US$225.5 billion in Europe at the end of 2004 tripled compared with
that of US$80.4 billion at the end of 1995.
Table 4-2: The Evolution of the Cumulative FDI Inflow of Japanese Firms in the
World over the Period from 1989-2004
Table 4-2 demonstrates that the total amount of Japanese FDI inflows over the
period 1989-2004 by region and sector (manufacturing or non-manufacturing) in value
and share. As regards the scale of Japanese FDI in value, the size invested by Japanese
firms in North America is the highest among the regions in both the manufacturing and
non-manufacturing industries. The former amounts to US$115,793 million, while the
1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004
10,201 35,018 62,534 96,462 117,918 140,387
42,172 120,697 174,946 236,434 282,567 308,128
6,482 18,869 31,042 50,636 72,986 91,345
18,291 58,143 80,405 117,649 181,901 225,487
CEE 0.1 283.1 506.2 884.7 1,555.5 2,632.6
79 1,061 1,712 2,669 2,829 2,893
826 2,798 4,062 5,429 6,278 6,723
Others 5,708 18,513 24,447 30,372 32,696 37,121
83,759 255,099 379,148 539,651 697,175 812,084
1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004
12.2 13.7 16.5 17.9 16.9 17.3
50.3 47.3 46.1 43.8 40.5 37.9
7.7 7.4 8.2 9.4 10.5 11.2
21.8 22.8 21.2 21.8 26.1 27.8
CEE 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3
0.1 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4
1.0 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8
Others 6.8 7.3 6.4 5.6 4.7 4.6
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Middle East
Africa
World
Share (%)
Value (US$ million)
Asia
North America
South America
Western Europe
World
Source : Own calculation based on Japan’s Ministry of Finance. (US$1=107.85 on 24 July, 2008)
Middle East
Asia
North America
South America
Western Europe
Africa
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latter US$191,424 million. The Asian manufacturing sector (US$79,829 million) is
relatively larger than that invested in EU15 (US$66,482 million.) The scale invested in
CEE is exceedingly small, especially, in the non-manufacturing sector (US$254
million).
Table 4-3: Japanese FDI in CEE and EU15 by Sector, 1989-2004 (Unit: US$ million)
Japanese FDI in North America and the EU15 is lower in the manufacturing
sector but greater in the non-manufacturing sector when compared to Japanese FDI in
Asia and CEE (see Table 4-3). The non-manufacturing sector accounts for more than
two-thirds of the overall scale of Japanese FDI in North America and EU15. The sum
invested by Japanese investors in the EU15 non-manufacturing sector is slightly greater
than that in the North American non-manufacturing sector. From this statistical data, it
is possible to conjecture that the general trend of Japanese FDI in North America
resembles that in EU15. It is hard to conclude that the pattern of Japanese FDI in CEE
replicates the Asian model. It is interesting to note that the CEE manufacturing sector
has the highest concentration of Japanese FDI with over 90 percent among the four
selected regions.
4.4 Japanese Manufacturing Investment by Region and Industry
Table 4-4 shows the general pattern of Japanese FDI in the manufacturing industry
across the four regional blocs. It is quite obvious that Japanese FDI is concentrated in
two major industrial sectors: (1) transportation equipment (63.2 percent) and (2)
electronics components (12.8 percent). These industries are, to a large extent, also
important for Japanese FDI in North America, Asia and EU15. When consideration is
given to the scale of Japanese FDI in North America, the chemical industry (14.9
percent) follows the electric/electronics sector (39.2 percent). The degree of
concentration of Japanese FDI in the North American electric and electronics sector is
the highest among the four regional blocs. As for Japanese manufacturing FDI in Asia,
the chemical sector accounts for 14.5 percent, second to electric and electronics (25.3
percent) and transportation (15.2 percent). As for Japanese manufacturing FDI in EU15,
both the electric/electronics and transportation sectors account for 23.3 percent and 22.5
percent, respectively.
Value % Value % Value % Value %
Manufacturing 115,793 37.7 79,829 58.7 66,482 32.6 2,379 90.3
Non-manufacturing 191,424 62.3 56,218 41.3 137,232 67.4 254 9.7
Total 307,217 100 136,047 100 203,713 100 2,633 100
North
America Asia EU-15 CEE
Source : Own calculation based on Japan’s Ministry of Finance
Specification
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Table 4-4: Japanese Manufacturing Investment in North America, Asia, EU15 and
CEE by Sector (Unit: percentage in inward FDI stock from 1989 to 2004)
Interestingly, a relatively high share of 18.2 percent in the food sector is remarkable as
opposed to the low degree of concentration in North America (6.3 percent), Asia (5.3
percent) and CEE (0.8 percent). The textile sector is the least favoured sector for
investment by Japanese firms in North America. As a whole, the industrial patterns of
Japanese manufacturing FDI do not greatly differ from one regional bloc to another,
with the exception of CEE. It is worth commenting that the degree of industrial
diversification by Japanese firms in North America, Asia and EU15 is very high, while
the CEE induces Japanese investors to invest in the transportation equipment sector.
In short, the data confirms the high degree of concentration of Japanese capital in
the transportation equipment sector and the electronics component sector in the four
regional blocs, it is reasonable to assume that Japanese manufacturing firms possess
strong competitive ownership advantages such as product innovation, production
methods, quality control systems, procurement systems, financial resources and
managerial expertise in these aforementioned sectors. Japanese firms could achieve
above-average returns on investment through exploiting firm-specific competitiveness
with various types of location-based advantages. Given these backgrounds of Japanese
manufacturing FDI by regional distribution, one has to address the following questions:
1. Are there any similarities and differences in Japanese FDI strategies and sectoral
composition among CEECs?
2. Are Japanese firms more concentrated in sub-regional groups within CEE (e.g., the
Visegrád-4 group, the South-eastern European group and the Baltic group)?
3. Why have Japanese investors been concentrated in the transportation equipment
sector and the electronics components sector in CEE?
4. What are the motives of Japanese manufacturing FDI in CEE?
North
America
Asia EU-15 CEE
Food 6.3 5.3 18.2 0.8
Textile 1.5 5.9 2.8 1.5
Timber and pulp 2.5 1.9 0.7 0.2
Chemical 14.9 14.5 15.2 1.3
Metals and non-metals 6.5 10.3 1.7 2.6
Machinery 7.4 8.4 10.1 8.5
Electric/electronics 39.2 25.3 23.3 12.8
Transportation equipment 10.8 15.2 22.5 63.2
Others 11.0 13.3 5.5 9.0
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source : Own calculation based on Japan’s Ministry of Finance.
Total in manufacturing
Specification
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Table 4-5: Japanese FDI in the Eastern Periphery and the Southern Periphery in the EU (Unit: US$ million)
Value % Value % Value % Value % Value % Value % Value %
Food 0.0 0.0 11.2 1.0 8.7 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.02 3.0 0.8
Textile 35.5 4.7 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 43.7 1.1 74.2 20.1
Timber and pulp 5.7 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.8 0.2 0.0 0.0
Chemical 2.6 0.3 28.0 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 297.3 7.3 3.8 1.0
Metals and non-metals 27.4 3.6 11.8 1.0 12.0 2.0 10.5 56.5 0.0 0.0 333.7 8.2 63.8 17.3
Machinery 79.2 10.4 1.0 0.1 84.5 14.2 0.0 0.0 36.2 59.8 238.4 5.8 0.0 0.0
Electric/electronics 134.9 17.7 139.2 11.8 26.7 4.5 0.0 0.0 2.8 4.6 413.8 10.1 8.6 2.3
Transportation equipment 389.7 51.2 882.8 75.0 230.1 38.6 1.2 6.5 0.0 0.0 684.5 16.7 29.4 8.0
Others 29.3 3.8 13.2 1.1 171.4 28.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 204.2 5.0 40.4 10.9
704.3 92.5 1,087.2 92.4 534.0 89.7 11.8 63.4 39.0 64.4 2,226.5 54.4 223.2 60.4
Agriculture 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.2 0.2 0.0 0.0
Fishing 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.5
Mining 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
Construction 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.7 4.4 5.3 0.1 0.5 0.1
Trade 57.4 7.5 30.7 2.6 37.1 6.2 5.2 28.0 2.6 4.3 848.1 20.7 36.9 10.0
Financial intermediation 0.0 0.0 24.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 8.6 0.0 0.0 66.6 1.6 5.3 1.4
Service 0.0 0.0 28.8 2.4 9.1 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 447.9 10.9 21.5 5.8
Transport 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 15.2 2.6 0.0 0.0 16.2 26.8 13.4 0.3 0.0 0.0
Real estate 0.0 0.0 5.6 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 194.4 4.8 51.3 13.9
Others 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
57.4 7.5 89.4 7.6 61.5 10.3 6.9 37.1 21.5 35.6 1,582.8 38.7 117.2 31.7
Branches 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 281.5 6.9 29.0 7.9
761.8 100 1,176.6 100 595.5 100 18.6 100 60.5 100 4,090.8 100 369.4 100
Total in manufacturing
sector (A)
Total in non-manufacturing
sector (B)
Total (A+B)
Source : Own calculation based on the Ministry of Finance, Japan. (US$1=107.85 on the 24th of July in 2008)
Specification Romania PortugalSpainPoland
Czech
Republic
Hungary Slovakia
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4.5 Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in the Eastern EU
Periphery and the Southern EU Periphery
The objective of this section is to enrich our understanding of the general patterns of
Japanese capital invested in CEE with greater details. I contrast FDI in CEE with that in
the southern EU periphery (e.g., Spain and Portugal). Table 4-5 shows the scale of
Japanese FDI in the eastern EU periphery and the southern EU periphery in value and
share. The descriptive statistics articulates that the market penetration of Japanese FDI
differs widely between the eastern EU periphery group and the southern EU periphery
group. The Japanese FDI stock in the Czech Republic was the second largest among the
European transition economies, as the Ministry of Finance of Japanese reported that it
amounted to US$761.8 million as compared to US$1,176.6 million invested in Hungary
(see Table 4-5). Overall, roughly 90 percent of the total amount of Japanese FDI inflow
into the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland has been directed at manufacturing
sectors, while non-manufacturing sectors have received little more than 5 percent. As
for Slovakia and Romania, the manufacturing share of Japanese FDI is substantially
larger than that in the southern EU periphery.
Among the manufacturing sectors, the transportation equipment sector accounted
for the large share of Japanese FDI (51.2 percent in the Czech Republic, 75 percent in
Hungary and 38.6 percent in Poland) yet accounted for less than 20 percent in Spain and
Portugal. As for the industrial composition of Japanese manufacturing FDI in Portugal,
focus was placed on the textile industry (20.1 percent) and the metals and non-metals
industry (17.3 percent).
In contrast, the share of Japanese non-manufacturing FDI entering the southern
EU periphery countries is much higher than that in the European transition economies.
The trade-related industry represents over 20 percent of the total value of Japanese FDI
in Spain, while the real estate sector accounts for roughly 14 percent in Portugal.
Among the non-manufacturing sectors in CEE, Japanese firms have engaged actively in
wholesale and retail trade activities. This is indicative of the important role of Japanese
general trading companies (GTCs). Many GTCs set up their representative offices or
subsidiaries in the eastern periphery. GTCs tend to enter the CEE market ahead of
Japanese firms with manufacturing operations to serve local demand and search actively
for business opportunities. They are also likely to possess equity shares of some
Japanese manufacturing firms entering the region. According to the Toyo Keizai’s
Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyō Sōran (2007), there are a number of JVs with GTCs in the
region (see Table 4-5). For example, Itochu participates in the equity of Magyar Suzuki;
Sojitz involves the equity participation of NSK Iskra S.A. in Poland (5 percent); Toyota
Tsusho possesses 20 percent of the total equity share of Toyoda Gosei Safety Systems
Czech; Mitsubishi Corporation controls 20 percent of the equity share of KYB in the
Czech Republic.
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Although the high degree of concentration of Japanese FDI in the CEE
manufacturing sector obscures the presence of Japanese FDI in the financial sector,
some important cases should not be overlooked. Since 2001, the Bank of
Tokyo-Mitsubishi-UFJ (BTMUFJ) in Warsaw has been serving Polish affiliates of
Japanese companies. BTMUFJ also opened a branch office in Prague in April 2006 in
response to the presence of a growing number of Japanese manufacturing multinationals.
Mitsui-Sumitomo Bank followed BTMUFJ and opened the first Central European
representative office in Prague in 2008. The Sumitomo-Mitsui Banking Corporation
(SMBC) also entered into a cooperation agreement with the CzechInvest in October
2007 and the Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency (PAIiIZ) in November
2007. It is hoped that this agreement can facilitate an exchange of information on the
foreign investment of Japanese firms in Poland. Although Mizuho Corporate Bank has
signed a cooperation agreement with PAIiIZ at the end of 2006 ahead of SMBC, no
service offices have been opened in the eastern periphery yet. However, Mizuho
Corporate Banking had a partnership contract with a leading Austrian bank, Raiffeisen
Zentralbank Oesterreich AG, which has established itself in the CEE financial markets.
Suzuki Financial Services in Hungary was jointly set up in 2003 by Merkantil Bank (a
member of the OTP Group), Magyar Suzuki and a Japanese general trading company,
Itochu Corporation, to provide loans and other financial services for Suzuki dealers.
The internationalisation of many Japanese financial firms has not expanded
noticeably in the European transition economies yet, despite the presence of a growing
number of Japanese manufacturing firms. There are two main reasons for the weak
presence of Japanese financial institutions in the region. The first is a direct
consequence of the bursting of the bubble economy. Japanese banks had to deal with
huge non-performing loans during the 1990s. Another lies in the fact that many Central
European affiliates of Japanese firms are inclined to rely on either German branches of
Japanese banks or financial resources of their own parent companies for financing
because the governments in the eastern periphery have not imposed any strict legal
restrictions on the source of financing and loans.4
As regards the future trend of Japanese non-manufacturing firms in CEE, the
number of Japanese firms in the service sector will continue to rise to serve emerging
local demand. This is a result of an expectation of continually increasing income levels
in the European emerging economies, in particular, the CEEC-10, due to EU
membership and the gradual convergence of their institutional infrastructure and
economic development towards the Western European standards.
4 Interview by the author with a Japanese senior manager in a German branch of a Japanese bank in April
2005 in Düsseldorf, Germany.
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4.6 The Impact of the Eastward European Integration Process on
Japanese Foreign Direct Investment
This section scrutinises how the enlargement process has changed the industrial and
geographical configurations of Japanese FDI in CEE over time. I will compare the share
of Japanese capital over the first time period (1989-1997) with that over the second one
(1998-2004). There are three reasons for this cut-off point. First, the EU entry
negotiation talks between EU and EU member candidate countries became a part of the
official enlargement plan after 1998. The negotiation talks for accession started with a
first wave of CEE aspirants (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia) in
1998 and a second wave of CEE aspirants (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and
Slovakia) in 2000. Second, the year 1998 proved to be a watershed with the EU starting
to provide the former Soviet satellite countries with structural assistance, after
initiatives for institutional reforms in those nations shifted from the IMF to the EU.
Third, FDI inflows in many transforming economies of the CEECs have been increasing
since 1998 due to progress in institutional reforms, financial liberalisation, and mass
privatisation. CEECs will be compared with the southern EU periphery countries such
as Spain and Portugal.
Table 4-6 shows that the general pattern of Japanese FDI also diverges over time.
One can observe that the share of the manufacturing sector declined in the southern EU
periphery over these two periods. The Spanish share of Japanese capital invested in the
transportation equipment sector has dropped by 8 percentage points from 18.9 percent
to 10.9 percent. In Portugal, two manufacturing sectors such as metals/non-metals and
transportation equipment have increased their share by 17.5 percent and 13.7 percent,
respectively, across the two periods, while the overall share of manufacturing sector has
declined by about 10 percentage points from 62.6 percent to 51.7 percent. The increase
in the share of the transportation equipment sector and the decrease in the share of the
textile sector suggest that Japanese FDI in Portugal has been moving away from
labour-intensive oriented towards middle technology-intensive oriented.
On the other hand, the percentage of investment in non-manufacturing has
increased dramatically both in Spain and in Portugal. In particular, the share of the trade
sector has risen from 9.3 percent to 52.3 percent in Spain. The real estate sector in
Portugal has experienced a phenomenal achievement with a 40 percentage point
increase across the two time periods. One intriguing phenomenon to emerge is that the
industrial focus of Japanese FDI in Portugal has shifted towards the non-manufacturing
sector.
Overall, the degree of industrial concentration was reinforced in CEECs except
for in Slovakia. Slovakia is somewhat an outlier since the rate of the non-manufacturing
sector increased from 0 percent to 79.2 percent. The share of Japanese FDI in the
transportation equipment sector increased sharply from 0 percent to 57.4 percent in the
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Czech Republic and from 0 percent to 47 percent in Poland over the two periods. On the
contrary, a 6.5 percentage point decrease was recorded in the transportation equipment
industry across these two periods in Hungary, but the share remains over 70 percent.
Romania has experienced a dramatic increase in foreign capital investment by Japanese
firms in the general machinery industry across the two periods. A high concentration of
Japanese FDI in the machinery sector occurred in Poland during the period from 1991
to 1997. Nevertheless, a great transformation of Japanese FDI in Poland from the
machinery to the transportation equipment sector occurred over the two periods. This
major shift could be explained by the localisation of production in southern Poland by
Western automobile producers such as Fiat and GM-Opel and by Toyota and its vertical
keiretsu members. The occurrence of a similar phenomenon in the Czech Republic can
also be confirmed.
In sum, there are some unique variations among the geographical and sectoral
composition of Japanese FDI between the southern and eastern EU periphery groups
and within each group. The share of Japanese manufacturing FDI over the period
1998-2004 was reinforced in the eastern EU periphery relative to that during the period
from 1989 to 1997, while the reverse structural change in Japanese FDI distribution is
observed in Spain and Portugal. Japanese FDI in transport-related equipment comprised
roughly 50 percent, or more than 50 percent, of the total amount of Japanese FDI in the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland over the period 1998-2004.
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Table 4-6: Japanese Investments in CEE by Sector: Before 1997 and After 1998 (Unit: percent)
89–97 98–04 89–97 98–04 89–97 98–04 89–97 98–04 89–97 98–04 89–97 98–04 89–97 98–04
Food 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.0 0.0
Textile 21.7 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 24.8 1.5
Timber and pulp 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Chemical 3.1 0.0 5.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.1 5.0 1.3 0.0
Metals and non-metals 0.0 4.0 0.9 1.1 4.4 1.5 87.8 20.8 0.0 0.0 3.0 22.3 13.7 31.2
Machinery 2.9 11.3 0.0 0.2 62.2 3.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 77.0 7.9 0.1 0.0 0.0
Electric/electronics 60.7 12.5 2.7 19.4 5.9 4.2 0.0 0.0 20.6 0.0 13.0 2.1 2.9 0.0
Transportation equipment 0.0 57.4 78.6 72.1 0.0 47.0 12.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.9 10.9 5.2 18.9
Others 4.1 3.8 1.0 1.2 0.0 35.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.5 0.7 13.7 0.0
92.5 92.5 88.2 95.9 73.0 93.3 100 20.8 20.6 77.0 59.2 41.2 62.6 51.7
Agriculture 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Fishing 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2
Mining 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Construction 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.7 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0
Trade 7.5 7.5 1.2 3.8 11.2 5.2 0.0 60.5 19.2 0.0 9.3 52.3 12.5 0.0
Financial intermediation 0.0 0.0 4.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.7 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.5 1.8 0.0
Service 0.0 0.0 5.4 0.0 1.4 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.0 5.2 7.3 0.0
Transport 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 14.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 60.0 17.2 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.0
Real estate 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.4 0.3 5.7 46.1
Others 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
7.5 7.5 11.8 4.1 27.0 6.7 0.0 79.2 79.2 23.0 31.4 58.8 27.5 48.3
Branches 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.4 0.0 9.8 0.0
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Total in manufacturing
sector (A)
Total in non-manufacturing
sector (B)
Total (A+B)
Source : Own calculation based on the Ministry of Finance, Japan.
Specification
Czech
Republic
Hungary Poland Slovakia Romania Spain Portugal
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Table 4-7: The Evolution of Japanese Manufacturing Investments in the Enlarged Europe as of 2006
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Austria 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 10 10
Belgium 25 27 30 31 32 33 34 35 35 38 38 38 38 38 39 40 40
Denmark 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 7 8 10 10
Finland 0 0 1 1 2 2 3 4 4 4 4 5 6 7 7 7 8
France 57 63 65 69 72 79 89 91 97 99 106 117 122 124 128 132 136
Germany 53 63 70 74 76 79 81 82 86 91 92 96 103 107 111 114 129
Greece 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3
Ireland 4 4 5 6 6 9 9 10 11 11 11 11 13 13 13 15 15
Italy 27 30 30 31 32 35 39 43 44 46 47 50 51 52 56 58 59
Luxembourg 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Netherlands 25 30 32 34 36 38 42 45 48 50 51 51 51 51 51 53 53
Portugal 7 7 9 10 10 12 13 13 15 15 15 17 17 17 17 17 17
Spain 32 36 37 38 39 41 42 43 44 46 46 49 51 52 54 55 59
Sweden 5 6 7 10 10 10 10 10 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
UK 92 104 113 120 127 132 143 155 166 177 191 193 195 200 203 209 210
Total in EU15 337 381 411 436 454 483 518 544 573 601 627 656 678 695 715 741 768
Czech Republic 1 2 6 7 7 8 11 14 14 16 20 32 44 51 61 64 68
Hungary 0 2 2 4 6 8 9 13 16 21 29 32 36 39 43 45 48
Poland 0 0 0 2 2 5 6 9 11 14 14 18 24 32 38 44 58
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 4 4 4 6 8 8 8 9 11 12
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 2
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Romania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 5 7 9 9 11 13
Serbia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Montenegro 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
Total in CEE 1 4 8 13 16 22 29 41 47 57 73 97 122 142 164 179 206
Total 338 385 419 449 470 505 547 585 620 658 700 753 800 837 879 920 974
Source : JETRO (2007)
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4.7 Cross-Country Difference in Sectors of Investment
Table 4-8: The Sectoral Distribution of Japanese Manufacturing Firms in CEECs
Czech Republic
Since the start of the 21st century, Japanese multinationals have been relatively active in
the Czech Republic compared to other foreign multinationals. The Czech Republic
received over one-fourth of all Japanese direct investment in CEE, about 10 times as
much as Slovakia and Romania combined. Moreover, as seen in Table 4-7, the number
of Japanese manufacturing MNEs totaled to 68 at the end of 2006, of which 35 firms are
engaged in the automobile components sector. The first Japanese FDI in the Czech
Republic can be traced back to Asahi Glass, which invested to produce sheet glasses in
1991. A Kyocera’s US-subsidiary, AVX, also entered the Czech market in 1992 to
supply capacitors to Tesla Lanskroun (Linden, 1998: 23). In 1993, Japan Metals &
Chemicals Co., Ltd. also invested and set up Nikom a.s. with equity participation by a
Japanese sogo shosha, Nissho Iwai, to engage in the production of ferro-vanadium and
Specification A B C D E F G H I J K L
Automobile components 123 86 35 19 22 3 1 0 0 5 0 1
Electric components 62 36 11 8 7 7 0 1 0 2 0 0
General machinery 88 10 3 1 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chemical and petroleum 84 5 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Others 61 12 4 2 3 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
Electronics products 49 15 5 3 4 2 0 0 0 1 0 0
Food processing 47 5 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
Plastic 45 4 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Precise machinery 39 3 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Metal 35 7 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
Pharmaceutical 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rubber 14 7 0 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Automobiles 20 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ceramics 19 4 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Footwear 13 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Non-metal 7 3 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Textile 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pulp 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Medical appratus 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Timber 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Steel 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Printing and publishing 3 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Furniture 3 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 773 206 68 48 58 12 2 1 2 13 1 1
Source : JETRO (2007)
Note : A: EU15, B: Central and Eastern Europe, C: Czech Republic, D: Hungary, E: Poland, F:
Slovakia, G: Lithuania, H: Slovenia, I: Bulgaria, J: Romania, K: Serbia, L: Montenegro.
83
corundum stones. In the late 1990s, a series of investment projects undertaken by
Matsushita was remarkable. Despite the presence of this major Japanese consumer
electronics company, the stock of Japanese FDI in the country at the end of 2002
accounted for only 0.8 percent (Wada, 2005: 53). However, the launch by Toyota and
PSA (TPCA) of a new just-in-time production facility at Kolín (60 kilometers east of
Prague) in November 2001 became a major turnaround for the evolution of Japanese
FDI in the Czech Republic. Since that official announcement, many automobile-related
companies entered and set up their production factories near the Japanese-French
consortium. In 2006, a series of large LCD-related investments by Japanese firms took
place in response to the emerging demand for high quality flat-panel TVs in the EU
market. Hitachi invested in the Triangle Strategic Industrial Zone at the Usti region with
an estimated employee size of about 1,500 persons.
Table 4-9: Major Japanese Manufacturing Investors in CEECs
Location Employment Est. Year
Suzuki Esztergom, Hungary 4,500 1990
Isuzu Tychy, Poland 1,030 1997
Bridgestone Poznań, Poland 300 1998
Toyota/Peugeot Kolín, Czech Republic 3,000 2001
Toyota Wałbrzych, Poland 1,500 2002
Toyota Jekz-Laskowice, Poland 670 2002
Bridgestone Tatabánya, Hungary N/A 2005
Calsonic Kansei Ploiesti, Romania 1,000 2006
Sony Árpád Fejedelem Utja, Hungary 700 1994
Matsushita Battery Gniezno, Poland 500 1995
Sony Bratislava, Slovakia 3,000 1996
Panasonic AVC Networks Plzen, Czech Republic 1,440 1996
Matsushita Trstená, Slovakia 1,007 1997
Matsushita Electric Works Prumyslova, Czech Republic 900 1998
Sanyo Electronics Dorog, Hungary 1,800 1999
Panasonic Mobile Pardubice, Czech Republic 1,182 2001
Panasonic Krompachy, Slovakia 1,300 2002
Hitachi Usti Region, Czech Republic 1,500 2006
Toshiba Kobierzyce, Poland 1,000 2006
Sharp Lysomice, Poland 800 2006
Funai Electric Nova Sól, Poland 1,000 2006
Source : Own illustration based on Pavlinek (2002a, 2005), Deroitte (2006), Linden (1998) and
company reports in various years.
Automobile industry
Consumer electronics industry
Company name
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Three major consumer electronics firms, Hitachi, Matsushita and Toshiba, also teamed
up and together set up IPS Alpha Technology Europe to pool the supply of LCD
modules near the Hitachi factory. Investment strategies by most Japanese manufacturers
operating in the Czech Republic are aimed at reorganising their global and regional
production networks.
Hungary
In a review of the behaviour of Japanese investors in Hungary, Kyowa Hakko already
invested before the fall of state socialism in 1987. Large Japanese greenfield investment
projects were not realised in Hungary until Suzuki Motors set up a car-manufacturing
facility in Esztergom in 1991. The underlying motive of Suzuki’s sizable entry in
Hungary is explained by various aspects such as the country’s good geographical
location, more advanced financial arrangements, the lifting of Communist rule
(Hutchings, 1999: 144) and peaceful labour relations (Toyama, 2005: 155). Only US$10
million worth of investment had been outside Hungary by 1992, whereas US$342
million were directed at the Magyar Suzuki project (Bakos, 1996: 244). In Hungary
Japanese FDI reached a peak in both 1991 and 2000, accounting for US$218 million
(23.5 billion yen) and US$239.8 million (25.8 billion yen), respectively. Manufacturing
investment by Suzuki Motors has generated a band wagon effect, with its Japanese
car-parts subcontractors such as EXEDY, Sumitomo Electric Industries and Diamond
Electric following suit, after Suzuki’s success in Hungary. Berényi (1996: 240) argues
that Suzuki’s production activity in Hungary represents “something of a test case for the
future of Japanese manufacturing investment in Central Europe”. The advancement of
economic and structural reforms in Hungary encouraged Japanese manufacturing firms
to choose the country as a favourable production site compared to other European
transition economies.
The number of Japanese manufacturing projects in Hungary totaled to 48 at the
end of 2006, next to the Czech Republic (68) and Poland (58), although Hungary was
seen as the most attractive FDI destination among CEECs until 2000 (see Table 4-7).
The probable cause is the intensification of FDI tournaments for large-scale FDI
projects among CEE nation states. It has been said that the Czech Republic and Poland
have become more successful in promoting the relative attractiveness of their business
and institutional conditions through the provision of financial and fiscal incentives as
well as the hospitable attitude of local population towards foreign investors in recent
years (e.g., Bandelj, 2008; Mallya et al., 2004; Werner, 2004). As regards a unique
feature of Japanese manufacturing FDI in Hungary, many Japanese multinationals
invested not through their parent companies but through their European subsidiaries,
suggesting that the production units seem to be transferred from Western Europe to
Central and Eastern Europe (Wada, 2005: 57). Alpine and Clarion invested in Hungary
with the purpose of circumventing the EU’s antidumping initiative with regard to audio
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visual equipment before 2000 (Wada, 2005: 58). The automobile components sector is a
major sector that attracts Japanese FDI in Hungary, followed by the electrical
components sector.
In sharp contrast to Japanese multinationals with manufacturing operations,
only two companies engage in R&D-specific investment activity. Furukawa Electric
Institute of Technology has been at work to research composite (silicon) insulators since
1991. Tateyama Laboratory Hungary has engaged in the development of software
products since 1997.
Poland
Poland has been a successful destination for Western European FDI transactions since
the early 1990s, but has failed to attract Japanese investors. At the end of 2000, the
amount of cumulative Japanese FDI in Poland was one-seventeenth of German FDI,
one-eleventh of French FDI, and one-nineth of Dutch FDI (Marinov et al., 2003: 160).
When considering the sequence and development of Japanese multinationals’ entry in
Poland chronologically, the first major FDI project was Panasonic Battery Poland,
which was established in cooperation with Philips in 1993 in Gniezno. The second
major investor was Sumitomo Electric of Japan, which has engaged in the production of
wiring harness since 1995. Besides these two major investments, Poland continued to
fail - when compared to the Czech Republic and Hungary - in attracting Japanese
investors until the mid-1990s. Marinov et al. (2003: 167) note two unsuccessful cases of
Japanese FDI during the 1990s: (1) Daihatsu’s failure in investing in FSO and (2) Asahi
Glass’s failure in acquiring Sandomierz factory.
Isuzu’s investment in Tychy in the southern Poland in 1997 became the start of
Japanese FDI inflows in the Polish automobile industry. Since then, major Japanese
multinational corporations such as Toyota, Bridgestone, NSK and Calsonic Kansei
followed Isuzu. In recent years, the new wave of Japanese investments specialising in
the production of LCD TVs has been remarkable. Sharp has been in operation since
2007, creating a bandwagon effect. Sumitomo Chemical, Orion Electric, Sohbi Craft
and Tensho Electric followed Sharp and set up their production plants in proximity to
the Kujawsko-Pomorskie voivodship. Another major LCD-related investor to enter
Poland was Toshiba. Toshiba’s investment in the Dolnoslaskie voivodship over the next
five years is estimated to be 6 billion yen (Toshiba Press Release, September 13, 2006).
Toshiba also made a capital participation in LG Philips LCD in the same voivodship by
investing 5.5 billion yen for a nearly 20 percent stake (Japan Times Online, October 11,
2006). Toshiba’s participation in this strategic alliance with LG and Philips is aimed at
ensuring a stable pool of LCD panels at competitive prices. Funai Electric also set up an
assembly line in the form of OEM in the Lubuskie voivodship. Their central motivation
for entering Poland was not to target the wealth of the Polish market but to facilitate
access to the core EU market. On the contrary, Ajinomoto and YKK were attracted to
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the market of 38 million people.
As of March 2008, the inbound Japanese FDI stock in Poland amounts to
US$1.29 billion. The presence of large-scale investment projects notwithstanding, the
size of Japanese FDI seems relatively limited compared to that of Western counterparts.
According to the Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency (PAIiIZ), no
Japanese multinationals are ranked within the top 20 companies on the list of
accumulated value of FDI in Poland at the end of 2003. Toyota is ranked 78th, followed
by Bridgestone Corporation (93rd), NSK Europe Ltd. (149th) and Matsushita Electric
Europe Ltd. (185th). With a large pool of cheap but skilled labour and the availability of
land in contrast to the Czech Republic and Hungary in particular, Poland may have the
potential to become one of the leading FDI destinations among the emerging European
economies in the foreseeable future.
Slovakia
As of 2006, only 12 manufacturing operations took place in Slovakia. The Slovak
automobile and consumer electronics sectors encouraged Japanese multinationals to
establish their production plants there. In Slovakia, the speed of investments by
Japanese multinationals has lagged behind investments by Western multinationals who
have actively participated in the privatisation process. Exploring the evolution of
Japanese FDI in Slovakia chronologically, the initial investment by Japanese firms can
be traced back to 1994 when Yazaki Corporation formed a joint venture with a local TV
manufacturing company, Debnar, to produce wiring harnesses for Ford. Yazaki
Corporation has strengthened its market position through plant expansion and customer
diversification in the enlarged Europe. Sumitomo Electric also followed Yazaki
Corporation to produce wiring harnesses by means of entering the local market in the
form of shared ownership with a British firm, Lukas. Two leading consumer electronics
firms have also been active despite the fact that institutional uncertainties were high due
to the Mečiar nationalist government, which was characterised as ultra-nationalistic.
The first major consumer electronics maker to arrive in Slovakia was Sony in 1996.
Sony transferred some of its Western production lines from Spain to Slovakia. The
factory in Spain specialises in the manufacturing of color TVs, while the factory in
Slovakia specialises in the manufacture of LCD TVs. Panasonic also established two
plants in Slovakia.
Romania
As of 2004, foreign capital from Japan to Romania was US$60.5 million (6.53 billion
yen) according to the Ministry of Finance of Japan. Compared to the three major
Visegrád-4 countries, the stock of Japanese FDI in Romania is marginal. The total
number of Japanese manufacturing operations was only 13, indicating that Romania has
lagged behind Visegrád-4 countries in terms of the upgrading of its competitive
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advantages. The first Japanese investor to arrive in Romania was JTEKT in 1998. The
company was influenced in its decision by the intensification of competition in the
worldwide bearing industry. To remain competitive in cost dimensions, JTEKT had to
seek a location where the company would be able to exploit a pool of cheap labour
within the enlarged Europe. As was the case with JTEKT, Sumitomo Electric, Yazaki
Corporation and YKK were also characterised by efficiency-seeking FDI, indicating
that labour-intensive products such as wiring harness and fasteners require the
abundance of inexpensive human capital with less education. In 2006, a new factory to
produce air conditioners and heat exchange products was set up by a Nissan’s tier 1
supplier, Calsonic Kansei. To remain cost competitive, Calsonic Kansei liquidated its
factory in Poland in 2008 and transferred its production unit to the Romanian subsidiary
in Ploiesti.
Baltic countries
The MOF data does not report any FDI transactions involving Japanese firms.
According to JETRO (2007), two Japanese firms have been in operation in Lithuania.
One is Yazaki Corporation that established a production facility for wiring harnesses in
2001. Another case is Koei that has engaged in not only the manufacture of
entertainment software but also in R&D operations since 2004. Especially, the absence
of Japanese manufacturing investors in Estonia seems to cast some doubts on the causal
mechanism between Japanese FDI and economic development and stability.
Balkan countries
The former Yugoslav republics have been rather undesired destinations for Japanese
production investors. Three manufacturing investments took place following the turn of
the century. One common feature is that these investment projects were undertaken in
the form of merger and acquisition. The earliest investment undertaken in the Balkan
region is Daido Metal Kotor established in 2002. Its strategic intent was to have access
to the cheap labour force. In 2006 Sumida Corporation entered the Slovene electrical
industry by purchasing a German firm, Vogt electronic GmbH. At the same year, JT also
entered the Serbian market through participating in the privatisation process. According
to Serbia Investment and Export Promotion Agency (http://www.siepa.sr.gov), the size
of investment undertaken by JT amounted to 100 million Euros and ranks as the 23rd
largest in Serbia. However, due to persisting institutional uncertainties and pessimistic
impression of the region created by two ethnic conflicts the confidence of Japanese
investors must still be gained.
4.8 Obstacles to Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in CEE during
the 1990s
In this section, I try to review the factors of the passive Japanese attitudes toward CEE
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in the post-socialist period during the 1990s. Contrasting with Western counterparts,
Japanese multinationals were minor investors in the early phase of the transition. There
are a few relevant factors. First, in the past Japan put much more weight on political and
security considerations than on economic considerations in the region, in line with US
foreign policy abroad. Even in the aftermath of the end of political hostility between the
two superpowers in the Cold War, Japanese multinationals had shown their reluctance to
invest in the European transition economies because the negative historical image of the
region persisted in the minds of Japanese people. Moreover, the outbreak of two cruel
ethnic wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-1995) and Kosovo (1999), within the CEE
territory, discouraged Japanese firms from investing in the region. Rather, Japan has
provided official development aid (ODA) to help promote stable democratic governance,
upgrade a wide range of human resources and induce technological catch-ups and
institution-building. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) database, the
Japanese government provided financial assistance of US$809.9 million, US$587.8
million, US$0.9 million and US$666.9 million to the Visegrád-4 countries, the SEE
countries, the Baltic countries and the Balkan countries, respectively, as of 2005 (see
Table 4-10). Among the new EU-CEE countries, Poland received the largest amount of
ODAs, while the Czech Republic was a minor recipient country. Of great relevance is
that the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland received less ODA due to their high level
of economic development after 2000, while it was the opposite around for the rest.
Second, one would argue that the presence of cultural and geographic distance
might have prevented Japanese investors from actively seeking potential business
opportunities in the region (Bakos, 1992: 165; Bearmish and Delios, 1997: 11).
Third, the meagre presence of Japanese investors in macroeconomic dimensions
could be attributable to the weak purchasing power and volatile economic and
institutional conditions of the European transition economies. Beamish and Delios
(1997: 7) posited that “prices are much less stable in the high inflation environment
found in CEE countries in the early and mid-1990s”.
Fourth, the wait-and-see attitude of Japanese investors in the European emerging
economies seems to be related to the economic situation at home (Cieślik and Ryan,
2002). The Japanese economy plummeted sharply after the burst of the bubble economy
in the very early 1990s, accompanied by an unanticipated drop of both land and stock
prices. The prolonged economic stagnation caused Japanese firms to face credit crunch
problems and led to the adoption of massive restructuring by cutting down the
inefficient size of workforces.
Fifth, Japanese firms’ slow and long decision-making procedures may have kept
Japanese investors from active involvement or caused them to miss business
opportunities in CEE because, at the same time, Western European firms and US firms
were exploiting opportunities for the privatisation of state-owned enterprises, owing to
their quick decisions and rich managerial experience of the region (Bakos, 1992). In
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addition to the slow decision-making process, Berényi (1996) argues that Japanese
investors also showed their pessimistic and unfavourable view of participation in the
process of privatisation of state-owned firms. This may lie in the fact that Japanese
firms are likely to prefer greenfield investments and training local employees without
experience.
Table 4-10: Japanese Official Development Aid to CEECs (Unit: US$ million)
Lastly, Europe as a whole is essentially deemed - among Japanese businessmen
contemplating plant diversification abroad - as the least profitable region of the globe,
especially compared to the United States and Asia. This biased mindset is built on the
fact that Europe is a heterogeneous, fragmented and idiosyncratic market (Munday,
1990; Belderbos, 1997) and its domestic industries are protected by the supranational
EU institutions. In the context of cultural dimensions, language and mentality broadly
differ from country to country.
These specific economic circumstances precluded Japanese MNEs from
implementing the plant diversification strategy in the European transition economies.
Instead, Japanese multinationals sought to enhance their influence in the blooming
Chinese markets through taking advantage of low transportation costs, cheap human
capital, a degree of cultural affinity and geographic proximity. In sum, Japan’s active
economic engagement in the European emerging economies could be constrained by the
Year CZ HUN POL SLK ROM BUL BALT (a) BALK (b)
1990 – 2.0 149.9 – 0.3 0.6 – 0.1
1991 – 2.8 3.2 – 0.8 1.3 – 0.2
1992 – 6.2 83.5 – 1.8 3.5 – 0.4
1993 1.5 10.7 94.9 1.2 4.1 6.2 – 0.4
1994 3.3 7.8 92.9 1.9 6.6 7.7 – 8.9
1995 2.6 11.4 103.2 1.2 8.3 10.1 – 11.3
1996 1.9 17.5 89.2 1.2 6.2 13.0 – 35.2
1997 2.2 24.2 4.8 1.7 5.9 14.3 – 55.1
1998 1.9 20.1 2.5 2.1 9.3 11.3 – 72.2
1999 1.7 -33.6 -2.6 2.5 18.3 30.6 – 74.2
2000 1.8 6.6 -3.4 3.0 19.5 20.7 – 46.5
2001 1.2 7.4 -3.9 2.4 9.7 48.4 – 40.3
2002 1.6 6.9 -3.8 3.6 29.6 36.7 – 23.7
2003 1.8 6.6 -3.6 11.1 70.9 25.2 – 82.7
2004 1.7 4.7 -4.0 22.8 34.2 28.7 – 48.4
2005 0.8 3.7 -5.0 28.7 61.4 42.8 0.9 167.9
Total 23.9 104.8 597.6 83.5 286.8 301.0 0.9 666.9
Total in 90–99 15.0 68.9 621.3 11.8 61.5 98.5 – 258.0
Total in 00–05 7.1 35.9 -23.8 71.7 225.3 202.5 0.9 409.5
Source : Author’s illustration based on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.
Note : (a) includes data for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. (b) includes data for Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Slovenia.
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lack of a stable business climate, immature institutional infrastructure and the persisting
domestic economic slump as well as by its focus on the Chinese markets.
4.9 Market Entry Strategies
Table 4-11: Modes of Entry in Manufacturing
Table 4-11 shows that roughly 149 (72.3 percent) of 206 Japanese manufacturing MNEs
penetrated the CEE markets in the form of wholly owned subsidiaries (WOSs). The
underlying rationale for choosing WOS in CEE may be derived from the clear strategic
intention of Japanese manufacturing MNEs to maintain financial independence and
hierarchical control over production processes, product quality and technological assets.
Another is that the establishment of greenfield plants in the form of complete ownership
leads Japanese firms to implement effective training programs to develop corporate
identity. Hence, Japanese firms can facilitate the smooth transfer of their own
production systems to the local production. The recent trend of investment from Japan is
dominated by WOSs, while JVs and M&A are losing their significance over time. This
overwhelming preference for WOSs may be in part explained by the accumulation of
local experience by Japanese manufacturing MNEs.
Shared ownership mode has been the second most popular among entry modes
in Japanese manufacturing investment. JVs account for 17.5 percent. Among 36 cases,
Japanese firms undertaking partial equity ownership can be divided into three groups.
One is to form JVs with Japanese firms, such as keiretsu group companies and sogo
shosha. The second form of shared ownership is to team up with locally-owned firms in
CEE, although this form has been rare. For example, Bridgestone set up a joint venture
with a Polish company in 1998 in Poznán and bought up the remaining equity shares to
WOSs JVs M&As Ownershipin 2007
Czech Republic (68) 79.4% (54) 17.6% (12) 2.9% (2) 96.1%
Hungary (48) 77.1% (37) 10.4% (5) 12.5% (6) 95.6%
Poland (58) 65.5% (38) 24.1% (14) 10.3% (6) 91.9%*
Slovakia (12) 66.7% (8) 33.3% (4) 0.0% (0) 95.8%
Others (20) 60.0% (12) 5.0% (1) 35.0% (7) 99.6%
Total (206) 72.3% (149) 17.5% (36) 10.2% (21) 93.5%
1990-1994 (15) 53.3% (8) 33.3% (5) 13.3% (2) 98.7%
1995-1999 (41) 68.3% (28) 19.5% (8) 12.2% (5) 96.4%*
2000-2006 (150) 75.3% (113) 15.3% (23) 9.3% (14) 95.0%
Country
Timing
Entry Mode
Source : Own calculation based on Toyo Keizai (2007) and individual company websites.
Note : WOSs indicate wholly owned subsidiaries, JVs inidcate joint ventures and M&As indicate
merger and acquisitions. * indicates that the ownership level of one company is not identifiable.
The parentheses indicate the number of affiliates.
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take full control by degrees. Lastly, it is to create new ventures with Western firms
which are familiar with local market conditions and have already developed the
extensive supply chain across CEECs. As mentioned above, the Toyota-PSA alliance is
one of the remarkable examples. During the period 1991-1994, Japanese manufacturers
preferred forming joint ventures with Western European firms due to the lack of local
market experience. The major cases during this early transition period were SWES
Polska (with Lukas), Panasonic Battery Poland (with Philips), Yazaki Czech (with
Siemens) and Yazaki Slovakia (with Siemens).
M&A is the third popular form of entry mode, accounting for 10.2 percent of the
total. Ajinomoto, Ushio Denki and NSK in Poland, and Meiji Rubber Industrial
Products, Hoya Lens and Tsubaki Hoover in Hungary are exemplary firms that
undertook brownfield investments. It is said in general that M&A render acquiring firms
capable of starting production relatively quicker than WOSs, which require the
establishment of production factories from scratch. Particularly notable is that 35
percent of the Japanese manufacturing MNEs undertook M&A in other CEECs other
than Visegrád-4.
4.10 Preliminary Findings of Japanese FDI Motivations
This section sheds more light on the motivations of Japanese FDI in the European
transition economies. For Japanese firms, CEE provides not only chances to capitalise
on cheap factor endowments and geographical proximity to Western Europe but also
challenges to compete with Western rivals who have already established themselves to
capture a business potential in the CEE market. In reality, the region has functioned as
part of the European production hierarchy of leading Western producers in the
automobile industry (van Tulder and Ruigrok, 1998) and in the electronics industry
(Linden, 1998). It is because Western firms reap profits by enjoying inherent advantages,
such as historical ties and regional collective identity developed by the dynamism of
European integration, which neutralise institutional uncertainties and economic
volatility. Accordingly, Japanese multinationals that possess relatively weaker network
ties with the local market and poor managerial experience of economies in transition are
bound to incur more expensive entry and exit costs compared to Western rivals. To
capture the factors behind the motivations of Japanese investors, we will draw on the
results of two surveys conducted by Toyo Keizai (2007) and Kawai (2006).
Table 4-12 demonstrates the determinants of Japanese FDI in CEE compared to
Japanese FDI in Europe as a whole. Most of the Japanese stressed their interest in the
rationalisation of international production and distribution networks as the most
important motive for investing in CEE with the exception that most of Japanese FDI in
Poland is undertaken to acquire local market share. It implies that Japanese firms are
aiming at integrating CEE production units with their global value chain systems. This
spearhead FDI by Japanese firms may be driven forward by the dynamism of European
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integration. It also reflects that Japanese firms have demonstrated their concern about
the unintended situation that excessive reliance on Western Europe may make them
vulnerable in cost competitiveness.
Table 4-12: Determinants of Japanese MNEs’ Entry Motives in CEECs (Part 1)
As a consequence, Japanese firms have devoted themselves to diversifying the
geographical scope of their operational units within the enlarged Europe. The extinction
of national borders within an enlarged EU has pushed European affiliates to redefine the
role of the spatial organisation of Japanese MNEs in the enlarged Europe. Moreover, the
eroding comparative advantages of the Western European economy slashed the cost
competitiveness of European affiliates of Japanese firms, spurring them to relocate their
production from Western Europe to the European emerging economies. Accordingly,
Japanese investors can sustain the price of their products at a competitive level or
improve prices. Based on the rationalisation of extensive production networks
CZ HU PL SK MON Europe
N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%)
1 Exploitation of local
resources and materials
– – – – – 8
(1.0)
2 Labor force – 1
(12.5)
2
(12.5)
– – 21
(2.7)
3 Financial and fiscal
incentives granted by the host
– – 1
(6.3)
– – 10
(1.3)
4 International production and
distribution networks
9
(37.5)
4
(50.0)
4
(25.0)
4
(66.7)
1
(100.0)
196
(25.4)
5 Acquiring local markets 8
(33.3)
3
(37.5)
7
(43.8)
2
(33.3)
– 296
(38.3)
6 Export to third countries 1
(4.2)
– 1
(6.3)
– – 39
(5.1)
7 Re-import to Japan – – – – – 10
(1.3)
8 Following expansion of
competitors
3
(12.5)
– – – – 12
(1.6)
9 Countermeasure to
exchange rate risks
– – – – – 10
(1.3)
10 Information collection 1
(4.2)
– 1
(6.3)
– – 87
(11.3)
11 R&D 1
(4.2)
– – – – 34
(4.4)
12 Expanding into new activities 1
(4.2)
– – – – 7
(0.9)
13 Integrating regional
activity
– – – – – 29
(3.8)
14 Circumventing trade conflicts – – – – – –
Source : Toyo Keizai (2007) Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyō Sōran Kaishabetsu hen.
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throughout Europe, Japanese investors can economise on location-based assets in
different European economies
Serving customer demand in local markets also seems to be a critical factor
behind the decisions whether to invest in the region. This is the most significant
incentive for Japanese investors in Poland due to its large market size relative to other
CEECs. It appears evident that Japanese FDI is not intended to acquire
knowledge-specific assets as only 4.2 percent of the Japanese MNEs in the Czech
Republic cited R&D to be a driving factor. The speed with which more Japanese
manufacturers set up production facilities in CEE may accelerate further, while
establishing regional headquarters and R&D facilities in the core markets such as
Germany, the UK and France.
Table 4-13: Determinants of Japanese MNEs’ Entry Motives in CEECs (Part 2)
Contrary to our expectation, neither the cheap labour force nor natural resources
were rated as primary factors. This observation indicates that the primary investment
Total A B C D E
1 Cultivation of network
relations with Western clients
24
(53.3)
10
(52.6)
7
(58.3)
3
(42.9)
1
(33.3)
3
(75.0)
2 Cultivation of network
relations with Japanese clients
20
(44.4)
11
(57.9)
5
(41.7)
3
(42.9)
0
(0.0)
1
(25.0)
3 Strong requests from
Japanese clients
16
(35.6)
9
(47.4)
5
(41.7)
1
(14.3)
0
(0.0)
1
(25.0)
4 Cost advantages (e.g. cheap
labour costs, transportation
16
(35.6)
6
(31.6)
7
(58.3)
2
(28.6)
1
(33.3)
0
(0.0)
5 Access to new markets 12
(26.7)
6
(31.6)
2
(16.7)
3
(42.9)
0
(0.0)
1
(25.0)
6 EU’s economic potential 6
(13.3)
2
(10.5)
2
(16.7)
1
(14.3)
0
(0.0)
1
(25.0)
7 Strong requests from
keiretsu firms
6
(13.3)
2
(10.5)
3
(25.0)
1
(14.3)
0
(0.0)
0
(0.0)
8 Circumventing trade barriers 5
(11.1)
2
(10.5)
2
(16.7)
1
(14.3)
0
(0.0)
0
(0.0)
9 Euro 4
(8.9)
1
(5.3)
0
(0.0)
1
(14.3)
1
(33.3)
1
(25.0)
10 Strong requests from host
governments in CEE
2
(4.4)
1
(5.3)
0
(0.0)
1
(14.3)
0
(0.0)
0
(0.0)
11 Establishment of a foothold
for entering Russia
1
(2.2)
0
(0.0)
0
(0.0)
0
(0.0)
0
(0.0)
1
(25.0)
12 Technological transfer
from EU firms
1
(2.2)
1
(5.3)
0
(0.0)
0
(0.0)
0
(0.0)
0
(0.0)
Total 45 19 12 7 (100) 3 (100) 4 (100)
Original motives
Source : Kawai (2006); N=45; multiple responses allowed.
Note : Parentheses indicate shares in percentage. A: Czech Republic, B: Hungary, C: Poland, D:
Slovakia, E: Others.
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motive of Japanese firms is not explained by the desire to take advantage of a pool of
cheap labour and abundant natural resources. Although, the survey presented above
provided analytical insights into motives for investing in CEE, there is a critical
drawback involved in this survey procedure that Japanese multinationals were not
clearly distinguished between the manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries in
the survey evidence.
Drawing on a firm-level examination of stylised information from a survey
undertaken by me in 2006 (see Table 4-13), it is noteworthy that cheap factor
endowments were not dominating determinants for MNE entry as our inference,
representing that only 16 out of 45 sample firms (35.6 percent) cited cost advantages as
a primary motive for entering the CEE markets. The forging of network relations with
Western clients as well as with Japanese clients in Europe was of great importance for
market entry in CEE. It may mirror the intention of Japanese manufacturing MNEs to
reorganise their value-chain supporting activities and strengthen extra-firm relations,
thus leading to an increase in sales and market share in Europe. It is also no wonder that
Japanese multinational firms are aiming to respond to changes in customer demand for
design and quality control as quickly as possible. At the aggregate level, strong requests
and pressures from Japanese customers also seem to be influential in entering the CEE
market (N=16, 35.6 percent). This result presents evidence that the replication of the
hierarchical assembler-supplier relationship of Japanese firms is pronounced in the
enlarged Europe. 26.7 percent of the respondents cited that access to new markets,
which has yet to be completely mature was attractive. In sharp contrast, it is significant
that EU’s trade discrimination (11.1 percent), the introduction of Euro (8.9 percent),
technological transfer from EU firms (2.2 percent), and the establishment of footholds
for tapping into Russian markets (2.2 percent) have not received significant relevance.
Namely, the nature of Japanese manufacturing FDI in European transition economies
seems to be characterised by network-seeking FDI and efficiency-seeking FDI.
In terms of the variations in entry motives by country, the majority of sample
firms in the Czech Republic reported that the cultivation of network relations with
Japanese customers (57.9 percent) and western customers (52.6 percent) in CEE is
important, followed by strong requests and pressures from Japanese customers (47.4
percent). The most important determinants for entering CEE markets for the sample
firm in Hungary were said to be the cultivation of network relations with Western
customers (58.3 percent) and reduction in input costs (58.3 percent). It is notable that
over 40 percent of the sample firms in Poland reported that they were attracted to the
potential access to new markets that have not yet been fully exploited. A major
implication for this may be derived from the size of the Polish market in relation to
other CEE counterparts. Poland has more than 40 million inhabitants; its size is almost
equivalent to that of Spain. The strengthening of network relations with western
customers provides a strong impetus for investment decisions of three out of four
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sample firms in others (including Romania, Lithuania and Serbia and Montenegro). In
sum, these survey results are consistent with Meyer (1995) and Hwang (2007) who
argue that factor costs advocated by conventional economists are insufficient to explain
the investment decisions of foreign MNEs in the post-Soviet type economies.
4.11 Location Decisions
Table 4-14 demonstrates the factors behind the Japanese manufacturing firms’ location
choices. Cheap labour costs (51.1 percent) dominate substantially, followed by
geographical proximity to Japanese clients (44.4 percent) and geographical proximity to
Western clients (44.4 percent) at the aggregate level. Excellent road networks (40.0
percent) and the active governmental support (including FDI incentives) (37.8 percent)
also play a supporting role in Japanese subsidiaries’ location choices. It is plausible that
the geographical proximity to customers is mirrored by the crucial importance of
shortened lead time to customers in line with the implementation of flexible production
systems in response to demand fluctuations in the expansion of the single common
market with free movement of capital, service, labour and goods. It is worth noting that
33.3 percent of all sample firms cited a low crime rate as a key site selection factor in
the region. This outcome implies that sound living environments matter to Japanese
expatriates who live with their family in CEE. On the other hand, purchasing power of
local people (2.2 percent) was not a major incentive for locating at the aggregate level.
The insignificance of relations between site selection for Japanese manufacturing firms
and local market power lends support to the conjecture that the objective of Japanese
manufacturing firms may be aimed at targeting more Western European markets than
local markets.
The major determinants of location selection by Japanese MNEs vary among
host countries. The major cited reason for site selection in the Czech Republic was said
to be geographical proximity to major Japanese customers (57.9 percent) and active
governmental support at the state level (47.4 percent), followed by excellent
infrastructure systems (42.1 percent), low crime rate (42.1 percent) and cheap labour
costs (36.8 percent). Moreover, six out of 19 firms (31.6 percent) which invested in the
Czech Republic reported that enthusiastic working attitudes were the sixth crucial
reason for location selection. This result indicates that labour quality is also one of the
key determinants of FDI. It could also be related to a high proportion of Japanese FDI in
the automobile sector, which is characterised by middle-technology-oriented and which
requires skilled workers. The major determinants of locating in Hungary were said to be
excellent transport networks (75 percent) and geographical proximity to major Western
customers (75 percent), followed by access to cheap labour capital (50 percent), active
governmental support at the state level (41.7 percent) and geographical proximity to
major Japanese customers (41.7 percent). Both low crime rate (33.3 percent) and high
unemployment rates (33.3 percent) also proved moderately important for site selection.
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Table 4-14: Determinants of Japanese MNEs’ Site Selection in CEECs
On the contrary, it is clearly observed that locational selection patterns of
Japanese manufacturing firms in Poland, Slovakia and others differ from those in the
Czech Republic and Hungary. Cheap labour force was considered the most dominant
Total A B C D E
1 Cheap labor costs 23
(51.1)
7
(36.8)
6
(50.0)
4
(57.1)
2
(66.7)
4
(100.0)
2 Geographical proximity to
Japanese clients
20
(44.4)
11
(57.9)
5
(41.7)
3
(42.9)
0
(0.0)
1
(25.0)
3 Geographical proximity to
Western clients
20
(44.4)
6
(31.6)
9
(75.0)
2
(28.6)
1
(33.3)
2
(50.0)
4 Well-developed
infrastructure systems
18
(40.0)
8
(42.1)
9
(75.0)
0
(0.0)
1
(33.3)
0
(0.0)
5 Active support from the
central government*
17
(37.8)
9
(47.4)
5
(41.7)
1
(14.3)
1
(33.3)
1
(25.0)
6 Saftey climate
(low crime rates)
15
(33.3)
8
(42.1)
4
(33.3)
2
(28.6)
1
(33.3)
0
(0.0)
7 Enthusiastic working
attitude
8
(17.8)
6
(31.6)
0
(0.0)
2
(28.6)
0
(0.0)
0
(0.0)
8 No competitors within
30 km
6
(13.3)
1
(5.3)
1
(6.7)
0
(0.0)
1
(33.3)
3
(75.0)
9 Active support from the
local government*
5
(11.1)
2
(10.5)
1
(8.3)
1
(14.3)
0
(0.0)
1
(25.0)
10 High unemployment
rates
5
(11.1)
0
(0.0)
4
(33.3)
0
(0.0)
1
(33.3)
0
(0.0)
11 Availability of engineers 4
(8.9)
1
(5.3)
2
(16.7)
1
(14.3)
0
(0.0)
0
(0.0)
12 Pool of well-experienced
workforce
4
(8.9)
4
(21.1)
0
(0.0)
0
(0.0)
0
(0.0)
0
(0.0)
13 Low rate of increased wages 3
(6.7)
1
(5.3)
1
(8.3)
1
(14.3)
0
(0.0)
0
(0.0)
14 Workforce who can speak
English
3
(6.7)
2
(10.5)
0
(0.0)
1
(14.3)
0
(0.0)
0
(0.0)
15 Low corruption rate 3
(6.7)
1
(5.3)
1
(6.7)
1
(14.3)
0
(0.0)
0
(0.0)
16 Possibility to procure parts
and materials locally
3
(6.7)
2
(10.5)
1
(6.7)
0
(0.0)
0
(0.0)
0
(0.0)
17 Purchasing power of local
consumers
1
(2.2)
0
(0.0)
0
(0.0)
1
(14.3)
0
(0.0)
0
(0.0)
45
(100)
19
(100)
12
(100)
7
(100)
3
(100)
4
(100)
Location selectin factors
Source : Kawai (2006); N=45; Based on multiple choice question.
Note: Parentheses indicate shares in percentage. * includes FDI incentives. A: Czech Republic, B:
Hungary, C: Poland, D: Slovakia, E: Others.
Total
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location factor by most respondents of these three subpopulation groups (Poland,
Slovakia and others), accounting for 57.1 percent, 66.7 percent and 100 percent,
respectively. Apart from the importance of cheap labour costs, geographical proximity
to major Japanese customers (42.9 percent) had a robust influence on the dynamic
location behaviour of Japanese subsidiaries in Poland. This result may reflect the
emergence of a cluster of foreign-owned automobile makers and suppliers in southern
Poland. Of great interest is that three of four sample firms (75 percent) said that the
absence of competitors within a 30 km radius was ranked as the second most important
reason for location selection next to cheap labour force.
4.12 Information Networks of Japanese Investors in CEECs
Tables 4-15 and 4-16 show which professional organisations were contacted by
Japanese manufacturing firms in order to acquire information on local market
conditions and to discuss their investment opportunities in the pre- and post-entry
periods, a total of 36 Japanese manufacturing firms provided answers.
Table 4-15: Information Sources in the Pre-Entry Period in CEECs
In considering only the pre-investment period, the most useful information source was
Total A B C D E
1 Local IPAs 24
(66.7)
13
(81.3)
4
(36.4)
4
(57.1)
1
(50.0)
2
(50.0)
2 Sogo shosha 19
(52.8)
7
(43.8)
9
(81.8)
2
(28.6)
0
(0.0)
1
(25.0)
3 Japanese firms
operating in CEE
18
(50.0)
9
(56.3)
6
(54.5)
2
(28.6)
0
(0.0)
1
(25.0)
4 JETRO 17
(47.2)
10
(62.5)
4
(36.4)
1
(14.3)
0
(0.0)
2
(50.0)
5 Own European
subsidiaries
9
(25.0)
4
(25.0)
1
(9.1)
1
(14.3)
1
(50.0)
2
(50.0)
6 Western firms
operating in CEE
7
(19.4)
2
(12.5)
1
(9.1)
1
(14.3)
1
(50.0)
2
(50.0)
7 Indigenous firms 6
(16.7)
3
(18.8)
0
(0.0)
0
(0.0)
1
(50.0)
2
(50.0)
8 Keiretsu firms 5
(13.9)
1
(6.3)
1
(9.1)
3
(42.9)
0
(0.0)
0
(0.0)
9 Others 4
(11.1)
1
(6.3)
1
(9.1)
1
(14.3)
0
(0.0)
1
(25.0)
36
(100)
16
(100)
11
(100)
7
(100)
2
(100)
4
(100)
Source : Kawai (2006); N=36; multiple responses allowed
Note : Parentheses indicate shares in percentage. A: Czech Republic, B: Hungary,
C: Poland, D: Slovakia, E: Others.
Information networks
Total
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said to be local IPAs (66.7 percent), followed by sogo shosha (52.8 percent), Japanese
firms operating in CEE (50 percent) and JETRO (47.2 percent) as a whole. It shows that
the great variation on information sources exists depending on the host country. More
than 80 percent of the firms in the Czech Republic answered that CzechInvest was a
helpful information mediator, followed by JETRO (62.5 percent) and Japanese firms
operating in the Czech Republic (56.3 percent). On the contrary, more than 80 percent
of the sample firms in Hungary cited that sogo shosha was contacted to obtain the
aforementioned information. Roughly 60 percent of the sample firms in Poland relied
on the Polish Investment Promotion Agency (PAIiIZ).
Table 4-16: Information Sources in the Post-Entry Period in CEECs
With regard to information sources in the post-investment period, the role of
IPAs lost their significance compared to the pre-entry period; rather, the role of network
relations with Japanese firms operating in CEE gained more importance. Likewise, it
proved that 62.5 percent and 72.7 percent of the companies cited that a circle of
Japanese firms operating in the Czech Republic and Hungary, respectively, were crucial
information provider in supplying information on local markets. This phenomenon may
also allow us to infer that Japanese chambers of commerce in both countries function as
Total A B C D E
1 Japanese firms
operating in CEE
22
(61.1)
10
(62.5)
8
(72.7)
2
(28.6)
0
(0.0)
2
(50.0)
2 Own European
subsidiaries
14
(38.9)
8
(50.9)
1
(9.1)
1
(14.3)
1
(50.0)
3
(75.0)
3 JETRO 11
(30.6)
5
(31.3)
4
(36.4)
1
(14.3)
0
(0.0)
1
(25.0)
4 Sogo shosha 11
(30.6)
3
(18.8)
5
(45.5)
2
(28.6)
0
(0.0)
1
(25.0)
5 Keiretsu firms 9
(25.0)
1
(6.3)
4
(36.4)
3
(42.9)
0
(0.0)
1
(25.0)
6 Indigenous firms 7
(19.4)
3
(18.8)
0
(0.0)
1
(14.3)
2
(100.0)
1
(25.0)
7 Western firms
operating in CEE
6
(16.7)
2
(12.5)
1
(9.1)
0
(0.0)
1
(50.0)
2
(50.0)
8 Others 6
(16.7)
2
(12.5)
2
(18.2)
0
(0.0)
0
(0.0)
2
(50.0)
9 Local IPAs 5
(13.9)
4
(25.0)
1
(9.1)
0
(0.0)
0
(0.0)
0
(0.0)
36
(100)
16
(100)
11
(100)
7
(100)
2
(100)
4
(100)
Source : Kawai (2006); N=36; multiple responses allowed
Note : Parentheses indicate shares in percentage. A: Czech Republic, B: Hungary,
C: Poland, D: Slovakia, E: Others.
Information networks
Total
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an information facilitator. Of interest is that sogo shosha and JETRO served as a less
crucial information source, notably in the Czech Republic and Hungary. Few changes in
the information source between the pre- and post-entry of the sample firms in Poland
were identified. In the case of Slovakia, it is significant that interactions with local firms
turned out to be more active in relation to the pre-entry period. This unique feature may
be mirrored by the small population of Japanese manufacturing firms and the absence of
a JETRO office and sogo shosha in Slovakia compared to the Czech Republic and
Hungary.
4.13 Operational Problems Faced by Japanese Investors in CEECs
This section considers obstacles experienced by Japanese subsidiaries based on the
survey conducted by JETRO (2007). A total of 61 sample firms participated in the
JETRO survey. Table 4-17 presents the variations on impediments to local operations at
the country level and at the regional level (i.e., Western Europe vs. Central and Eastern
Europe). First, 43 companies (70.5 percent) cited that labour availability was the most
serious impediment to their local operations at the aggregate. This result implies that the
local competition for labour has been intensified. In sharp contrast, labour availability
accounts for only 40.8 percent in Western Europe. Second, roughly 60 percent of the
respondents reported that work and visa permission was problematic because of
excessive bureaucracy, while managers’ perception of this issue is not a serious concern
in Western Europe. Labour cost ranks as the third most critical impediment to the local
operations in CEE (54.1 percent), while it ranks as the most serious problem in Western
Europe (69.7 percent). Relating to the problem of labour shortage, rising labour costs
were likely to be caused by the intensified competition in CEE. Of great importance is
that rigid labour markets and institutional deficiencies dominate in the above 18
criterion in CEE, as opposed to those in Western Europe. As a result, Japanese firms
must strategically counter these challenging obstacles to their local operations through a
variety of institutional and political forces such as negotiation, political bargains and
lobbying.
With respect to the country variations on the obstacles to local operations,
similarities and differences were observed. The sample firms in Hungary (73.7 percent)
and Lithuania (100 percent) are concerned about rising labour costs, while managers
deem this issue less problematic in the Czech Republic (25 percent). The most serious
problem facing the sample firms in the Czech Republic was labour availability (100
percent) and CE (Conformité Européene) marks (87.5 percent). Additionally, work and
visa permission (75 percent) and frequent shifts in regulations (62.5 percent) were also
considered to be critical problems. 72.2 percent (13 firms) in Poland cited that poor road
infrastructure disturbed local operations. Managers in Slovakia perceived labour
availability (85.7 percent) and exchange rate fluctuation (85.7 percent) as having the
negative impact on their production activities.
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Table 4-17: Obstacles to Sample Japanese MNEs’ Local Operations by Country
N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N %
1 Labour availability 97 40.8 43 70.5 8 100 13 68.4 12 66.7 6 85.7 2 33.3 1 50.0 1 100
2 Work and visa permission 87 36.6 36 59.0 6 75.0 11 57.9 10 55.6 4 57.1 4 66.7 1 50.0 – –
3 Labour cost 166 69.7 33 54.1 2 25.0 14 73.7 8 44.4 4 57.1 3 50.0 2 100 – –
4 CE mark 87 36.6 30 49.2 7 87.5 8 42.1 9 50.0 3 42.9 3 50.0 – – – –
5 Exchange rate fluctuation 108 45.4 29 47.5 5 62.5 7 36.8 9 50.0 6 85.7 2 33.3 – – – –
6 Road infrastructure 15 6.3 29 47.5 4 50.0 3 15.8 13 72.2 3 42.9 6 100 – – – –
7 Tax rates 74 31.1 28 45.9 2 25.0 13 68.4 7 38.9 2 28.6 3 50.0 1 50.0 – –
8 Product quality 67 28.2 27 44.3 5 62.5 10 52.6 7 38.9 2 28.6 2 33.3 – – 1 100
9 Delivery of products 92 38.7 26 42.6 3 37.5 10 52.6 8 44.4 3 42.9 2 33.3 – – – –
10 Frequent changes in
regulations
20 8.4 24 39.3 5 62.5 10 52.6 4 22.2 1 14.3 4 66.7 – – – –
11 Procurement costs 131 55.0 24 39.3 3 37.5 9 47.4 7 38.9 3 42.9 2 33.3 – – – –
12 Tariffs 68 28.6 19 31.1 2 25.0 6 31.6 4 22.2 4 57.1 2 33.3 – – 1 100
13 Complicated administrative
procedures (trade)
29 12.2 19 31.1 3 37.5 5 26.3 6 33.3 2 28.6 2 33.3 – – 1 100
14 Supply of electricity 18 7.6 18 29.5 2 25.0 8 42.1 6 33.3 – – 1 16.7 – – 1 100
15 Social welfare systems 44 18.5 17 27.9 5 62.5 5 26.3 4 22.2 – – 2 33.3 1 50.0 – –
16 Labour quality 93 39.1 16 26.2 3 37.5 7 36.8 5 27.8 1 14.3 – – – – – –
17 Complicated administrative
procedures (investment)
9 3.8 14 23.0 2 25.0 3 15.8 4 22.2 2 28.6 3 50.0 – – – –
18 Complicated administrative
procedures (tax)
16 6.7 14 23.0 2 25.0 3 15.8 7 38.9 – – 2 33.3 – – – –
Source : JETRO (2007)
SLK
(7)
ROM
(6)
LIT
(2)
MON
(1)Criterion
WE
(238)
CEE
(61)
CZ
(8)
HUN
(19)
POL
(18)
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In Romania, managers showed their concern about institutional deficiencies such
as frequent changes in regulations (66.7 percent) and visa and work permission (66.7
percent). As regards the variations on local hazards at the sectoral level (see Table
4-18), managers in the transportation equipment sector were concerned about labour
availability (81 percent), followed by the CE mark (57.1 percent) and product quality
(57.1 percent). Roughly 50 percent of managers in the transportation equipment sector
showed their significant concern about poor road infrastructure. Managers’ perception
of work and visa permission (71.4 percent) and labour cost (71.4 percent) was relatively
high in the electronics/electric sector.
Table 4-18: Obstacles to Sample Japanese MNEs’ Local Operations by Sector
4.14 Conclusions
The objective of this chapter was to provide a review of the patterns, characteristics and
motivations of investments from Japan and the geographical scope of Japanese
multinational organisations with manufacturing operations. Moreover, the use of both
FDI statistics and firm level data enables us not only to characterise the recent trend of
Japanese FDI but also to interpret corporate strategy and the motives of Japanese firms.
N % N % N %
1 Labour availability 17 81.0 12 57.1 2 66.7
2 Work and visa permission 8 38.1 15 71.4 3 100
3 Labour cost 7 33.3 15 71.4 3 100
4 CE mark 12 57.1 11 52.4 – –
5 Exchange rate fluctuation 11 52.4 12 57.1 – –
6 Road infrastructure 10 47.6 8 38.1 2 66.7
7 Tax rates 8 38.1 11 52.4 1 33.3
8 Product quality 12 57.1 9 42.9 1 33.3
9 Delivery of products 9 42.9 11 52.4 1 33.3
10 Frequent changes in regulations 11 52.4 5 23.8 1 33.3
11 Procurement costs 9 42.9 9 42.9 1 33.3
12 Tariffs 7 33.3 9 42.9 – –
13 Complicated administrative
procedures (trade)
4 19.0 6 28.6 – –
14 Supply of electricity 6 28.6 6 28.6 – –
15 Social welfare systems 7 33.3 2 9.5 2 66.7
16 Labour quality 3 14.3 7 33.3 1 33.3
17 Complicated administrative
procedures (investment)
11 52.4 2 9.5 1 33.3
18 Complicated administrative
procedures (tax)
8 38.1 1 4.8 1 33.3
Source : JETRO (2007)
Criterion
TRANS
(21)
ELEC
(21)
MACHIN
(3)
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The Japanese position in foreign trade and foreign capital in CEE has been considerably
negligible in number and value as compared with EU counterparts. This
underrepresentation is accounted for by geographical and cultural distance as well as
inherent institutional disadvantages in the region. Additionally, Japanese investors’
market entry was delayed by the prolonged Japanese economic recession throughout the
1990s. However, the evident importance is that the number of Japanese FDI flows
heading for CEECs has been slowly on increase in recent years. Faced with emerging
competition under the deepening and widening of European integration, Japanese firms
have felt compelled to reassess and reformulate their FDI strategies in Europe.
Accordingly, their attitudes toward profit opportunities in the European transition
economies have gradually turned to be more positive with improved democratic and
industrial structure.
As regards the geographical scope, Japanese firms are shifting their interest from
the old western periphery of the EU (Spain and Portugal) to the eastern periphery.
Particularly, Japanese manufacturing-oriented investments have been skewed toward
three Visegrád countries (e.g., the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland). It should also
be noted that the geographical distribution of Japanese FDI has been highly unbalanced
across the European transition economies. According to statistical evidence on the
sectoral composition of Japanese FDI suggests that the Japanese FDI intensity in the
manufacturing sector has been increased as the European enlargement process advances.
The automobile sector that requires human capital with intermediate-level technical
skills and knowledge tend to induce Japanese investors.
The surveys about the motives of Japanese FDI conducted by Toyo Keizai
(2007) and Kawai (2006) have supported the view that cost considerations remain in
part crucial but insufficient to explicate the factor behind the market entry of Japanese
MNEs. More importantly, focus has been on the creation of new network values at the
arm’s-length market and customer and product diversification. The globalisation forces
have urged Japanese MNEs to secure market presence through the strengthening of
network relations with existing domestic and foreign clients. Networks tend to have
power over the FDI decision process of Japanese firms.
As regards location decisions made by Japanese MNEs, the survey conducted by
Kawai (2006) has provided the evidence that cheap labour costs play a critical role in
determining the geographic scope of FDI transactions at the aggregate. However, it is
particularly notable that Japanese investors in the Czech Republic and Hungary, which
have strong engineering tradition and institutional stability, are motivated by the desire
to position themselves near their customers as their top priority. FDI policies and
infrastructure development are also the critical factors behind the location strategy. The
post-EU enlargement era has seen the dramatic shift of Japanese investment toward
more advanced technology-specific production activity. The recent trend of sequential
investments related to high value-added digital electronics items (e.g., LCD and Plasma
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TVs) by Sharp, Hitachi, Toshiba, Sony, Matsushita and Funai Electric in the European
transition economies reflects the fact that Japanese firms look for the location of
production where highly skilled workforces are available. The criteria for location
selection have shifted from low production cost advantages to specialised technical
knowledge in the local economy.
The prior survey by JETRO (2007) has shown that manager’s perception of
location-advantages in CEE is inclined to be considerably pessimistic about rigid local
labour markets and institutional deficiencies. Potentially, these threats may inhibit the
future development and proliferation of Japanese FDI which helps transfer cutting-edge
production systems and technological skills to the recipient economies. It should not be
reasonable to say that CEE economies must continue to offer a secure business
environment to attract FDI. Predictably, it may still take Japanese firms with
manufacturing operations some more years to develop their status as compared to
European and US firms in the enlarged EU and to adapt to an idiosyncratic set of
location-based requirements in the European transition economies.
Although I discussed the general background of Japanese FDI in CEE, some
critical questions remain unanswered or could only be approached in a preliminary way.
Thus, I will try to tackle the following questions in the following chapters:
1. How do dynamic effects of institutional continuity and transformation affect the
pattern of foreign capital movement in the CEE region?
2. What are the location strategies and the operational experience of Japanese
manufacturing MNEs in CEE?
3. What factors have a bearing on the location decisions of Japanese manufacturing
MNEs in CEE at the sub-national level? Are factor-cost endowments available in
CEECs that classic economic theory addresses sufficient to explain the location
strategy than firm-specific factors as well as institutional factors?
4. Is the local production of Japanese manufacturing MNEs as successful as it was
expected before entering the transition economies? To which extent can existing
theories (e.g., Dunning’s OLI paradigm, Porter’s industrial cluster theory, and
institutional theory) be extended and applied to firm performance?
104
5 COMPARISON OF EUROPEAN TRANSITION
ECONOMIES’ INSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS
Corporate strategies in transition economies and other emerging markets can be
explained only by incorporating the specific institutional context in the analysis.
Meyer, 2002: 266
Building an efficient and socially acceptable institutional infrastructure is likely
to be particularly challenging in the case of transition economies’ unused as they
are to market-based institutions; and the speed with which and to what extent this
can be efficiently achieved with minimum social disruption is likely to be a
critical factor in influencing the capacity of a country to adjust to the demands of
global capitalism and to attract inbound FDI.
Dunning, 2005: 53
5.1 Introduction
The gradual convergence of legal, economic and political structures of CEECs toward
the Western European standards in recent years notwithstanding, becoming involved in
transnational business transactions in the European emerging market economies
involves inherent uncertainties and risks that distract the interests and goals of MNEs.
Besides the functioning of a market-led economy, it has been viewed broadly among
profit-driven multinationals that the upgrading of economic and non-economic
institutions serves as a hedge against reversible paths toward centrally planned
economies and hence facilitates economic transactions (e.g., Meyer, 1998, 2001, 2002;
Meyer and Jensen, 2005; Meyer and Nguyen, 2005). Corporate success is dependent on
the way of balancing the interplay between MNE activity and institutional forces
(Meyer and Nguyen, 2005). Meyer (1998: 4) also strikes the crucial note that “FDI
interacts with many aspects of the transition process and vice versa”. With a decade of
transition efforts made by governments of CEECs, variations in the consequence of
institutional reforms have turned out to be threats that deter MNE activity. Some former
communist countries have succeeded in instituting sound market-based systems, while
others are still struggling with the past. Along with the advance of microeconomic
restructuring (e.g., smooth stabilisation, effective privatisation of state-controlled
enterprises and the speedy liberalisation of prices), the reception of foreign capital has
been important for raising the economic, political, and institutional standard of
transition economies of CEE to that of Western European nations. The thrust of this
chapter is to explicate systematically the following issues:
 Is institutional development homogeneous or heterogeneous among CEECs?
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 To which extent do institutional reforms determine the proliferation of FDI as
compared with economic factors and how governmental policies designed to
advance institutions shape investors’ corporate strategies in CEECs?
 How does the transformation and continuity of economic and political institutions
in CEE affect the evolution of FDI?
 Does the market environment have a greater effect than the institutional setting on
firms’ willingness to invest in a given country in CEE?
To date, increasing scholarly attention has been directed to extensively investigate the
pattern of business activity from various perspectives of institutional economics (Bevan
et al., 2004), economic sociology (e.g., Bandelj, 2002, 2004, 2008; Granovetter, 1985;
Scott, 1995; Uzzi, 1996, 1997, 1999) and neo-institutionalism (DiMaggio and Powell,
1991). However, North (1990: 3) claims that the perceived significance of institutional
building has been overlooked until now because there is “no analytical framework to
integrate institutional analysis into economics and economic history”. According to
Rudinelli (2005), this issue also derives from the complex definition of institutional
quality and from the difficulty of quantifying the concept sufficiently.
To date, emphasis has been given to various economic factors (e.g., market
potentia land costs, labour wages, economic agglomeration, labour availability,
economic growth potential, exchange rate fluctuation and trade barriers) in international
business literatures when assessing the relative attraction of a country or a region.
Among these influential factors, market potential is known to be one of the most crucial
determinants of inducing FDI inflows in the economies in transition (Pournarakis and
Varsakelis, 2004).
However, an examination of how market-supporting institutions emerge raises the
understanding of the effectiveness of economic exchange systems that enhance a
nation’s ability to attract foreign capital in the institutional context. Polanyi (1957) who
placed particular emphasis on embeddedness put forward the assumption that the
market would be framed into the dynamics of institutional infrastructure. Dunning
(2005) underscores that the quality of institutional infrastructure is likely to determine
the quality of business environments. The issue of whether profit-seeking investors are
capable of maintaining and upgrading their ownership advantage hinges upon the
degree of institutional-building in a given country. Dunning (2005: 55) stresses the need
to regard the role of institutions as pivotal “location-bound competitive advantages” in
his own ownership-location-internalisation (OLI) paradigm. Bevan, Estrin and Meyer
(2004) also point out that progress in institutional arrangements is important
location-specific variables and they promote the relations between ownership-specific
variables and location-specific variables.
Furthermore, North (1990) and Scott (1995) acknowledge that institutions also
contribute to either promoting economic performance or turning it in an undesired
106
direction. Accordingly, I argue that our interpretation of the overall set of FDI
determinants in the European transition economies will be unsatisfactory without
considerations of how a transformation from a centralised planning system to a
market-driven economy occurred and the extent to which this transformation is
successful from country to country in the level of speed and efficiency.
This chapter makes the following contributions. First, I lay out the extent and
speed of progress in institutional reforms for each ex-Soviet type economy based on
historical context together with published data from the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Second, I will review institutional
arrangements structured by the EU, institutionalisation of FDI policies and informal
institutional particularities (i.e., inherited political ideology and enduring informal
society). It is valuable to incorporate national and supranational institution-specific
variables into this study since the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern
Europe have been undergoing two types of transition, in parallel: (1) from a
commanding economy toward a market-supporting economy and (2) from non-EU
membership toward EU membership (En, 2006). Third, I will construct an econometric
model to test the relationship between FDI and institutional change. Based on a panel
data set covering 14 countries for the period 1991-2006 and the use of an appropriate
panel data econometric technique, this chapter provides a set of new empirical insights
into the interplay between organisations and institutions in the post-communist region.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 provides a conceptual framework by
drawing on the institutional perspective. Section 5.3 reveals relationships between
various types of institutions and FDI capital. Section 5.4 provides an overview of
empirical evidence of the prior literature. After specifying a econometric model in
Section 5.5, Section 5.6 presents the empirical results. Descriptive data the impact of
institutions on Japanese manufacturing firms’ investment strategies in CEE are
illustrated. Section 5.7 presents concluding remarks.
5.2 Analytical Framework
5.2.1 Institutional Change and FDI in CEECs
First I look further into the association between institutions and cross-border
transactions in economies in transition. Why is it so important for FDI strategies to pay
attention to institutions in the post-communist region? It is because the rapid
transformation of institutions is an exceptional and unique issue that foreign investors
have to deal with when investing in transition economies (Kornai; 1992; Kornai, 2006;
Meyer and Jensen, 2005). Meyer and Jensen (2005: 127) also argue that CEE has faced
an unprecedented experimental process of institutional evolution since the fall of the
Iron Curtain in 1989. It has been generally argued that foreign firms investing in
transition economies have to suffer from high transaction costs due to the absence of
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sound market-supporting institutions (Meyer, 2001).
What makes transition economies unique, as compared with advanced economies,
is the presence of informal institutional constraints that endanger efficient enforcement
of a variety of macroeconomic reforms, such as price liberalisation, open trade,
privatisation, and abolition of soft budget constraints of firms in transition (Maruyama,
1993). Even if the post-communist countries are converging toward a functioning
market economy, informal institutions are unlikely to disappear completely (Maruyama,
1993). Rather, “the development of informal institutions may co-evolve with the
establishment of formal institutions” (Meyer and Jensen, 2005: 130) and they may
continue to exist in different forms. Moreover, Armingeon and Careja (2008: 441) also
vindicate this argument by emphasising that “the core of an institution is hardly
amenable to reform, but actors may successively add new elements to this unchangeable
core”. Scholars of international business (Peng, 2000, 2003; Peng and Heath, 1996) also
argue that access to social networks of relations leverages the scale and process of
economic exchanges in transition economies. Peng (2003) conceptualises a two-phase
model of institutional transition and considers that the propensity for firms to shift from
a network-based strategy to a market-based strategy rises over time.
In transition economies, governments and profit-driven multinationals act as
social forces to reshape institutional infrastructure. In particular, governments are
deemed to play a central role in creating, monitoring and controlling institutions
(Rondinelli, 2005). International organisations, such as the EU and NATO, also
contribute to institutional development in the post-communist region (Bandelj, 2008;
Armingeon and Careja, 2008). An example of this would be some Asian countries
(Thailand and Korea) that faced financial disruption in 1997 were obliged to enforce
IMF-stabilisation package (Peng, 2003). To date, CEECs are subject to institutional
arrangements or pressures from the EU since they are embedded in a web of economic,
political and social networks of relations at the inter-governmental, supranational and
national level (Bandelj, 2002, 2008). Similarly, the behaviour of individuals and
organisations is governed by “the region’s struggle to shed legacies of central planning,
and create prosperous market-supporting economies” (Meyer and Jensen, 2005: 121).
Scholars of ex-Soviet-type economies in the CEE region suggest that institutional
forces, such as inherent network relations, would be competitive advantages in making
market entry more efficient and in rationalising the internal structure of organisations
with a long time horizon in the post-entry period (Meyer and Peng, 2005).
Inconsistencies and uncertainties of institutional infrastructure prevailing in civil society
in CEE often hamper not only foreign firms’ location choices and timing, but also
national policy designed to induce FDI inflows (Meyer and Jensen, 2005; Meyer and
Peng, 2005). Scholars of post-communist economies (Bandelj, 2002, 2004, 2008) and a
pionner of the OLI paradigm in the discipline of international business (Dunning, 1981,
1988, 1993, 2005; Dunning and Lundan, 2008) have shown doubts about the
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conventional wisdom that economic factors are the main magnet for FDI transactions.
Emphasis has been given to the assumption that FDI would proliferate as institutions
grow in the post-communist region.
In this chapter, I attempt to contrast the impact of formal and informal institutions
on FDI inflows with that of economic conditions in the empirical part. Two types of
institutions are carefully tested. One is formal institutions including progress in
institution-building, institutionalisation of FDI policies and institutional arrangements
with and pressures from the EU, while another is informal institutions including
inherited political ideology from past state socialism and corruption (See Figure 5-1). I
utilize OLS with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) to test the effect of institutional
factors on FDI flows to the CEE region.
Figure 5-1: Proposed Model
Source: Own illustration.
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Table 5-1: Transition Indicator by Country and Field in 1989
Country Large scaleprivatisation
Small scale
privatisation
Enterprise
restructuring
Price
liberalisation
Competition
Policy
Banking
reform
Securities
markets
Overall
infrastructure
reform
Albania 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
B&H 1.00 3.00 1.00 2.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Bulgaria 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Croatia 1.00 3.00 1.00 2.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.33
Czech republic 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Estonia 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Macedonia 1.00 3.00 1.00 2.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Hungary 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.33
Lativia 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Lithuania 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Montenegro 1.00 3.00 1.00 2.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Poland 1.00 2.00 1.00 2.33 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Romania 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Serbia 1.00 3.00 1.00 2.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Slovakia 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Slovenia 1.00 3.00 1.00 2.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Source : EBRD
Note : B&H indicates Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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Table 5-2: Transition Indicator by Country and Field in 2006
Country Large scaleprivatisation
Small scale
privatisation
Enterprise
restructuring
Price
liberalisation
Competition
Policy
Banking
reform
Securities
markets
Overall
infrastructure
reform
Albania 3.00 4.00 2.33 4.33 2.00 2.67 1.67 2.00
B&H 2.67 3.00 2.00 4.00 1.67 2.67 1.67 2.33
Bulgaria 4.00 4.00 2.67 4.33 2.67 3.67 2.67 3.00
Croatia 3.33 4.33 3.00 4.00 2.33 4.00 3.00 3.00
Czech republic 4.00 4.33 3.33 4.33 3.00 4.00 3.67 3.33
Estonia 4.00 4.33 3.67 4.33 3.67 4.00 3.67 3.33
Macedonia 3.33 4.00 2.67 4.33 2.00 2.67 2.33 2.33
Hungary 4.00 4.33 3.67 4.33 3.33 4.00 4.00 3.67
Lativia 3.67 4.33 3.00 4.33 3.00 3.67 3.00 3.00
Lithuania 4.00 4.33 3.00 4.33 3.33 3.67 3.00 3.00
Montenegro 3.33 3.00 2.00 4.00 1.00 2.67 1.67 2.00
Poland 3.33 4.33 3.67 4.33 3.00 3.67 3.67 3.33
Romania 3.67 3.67 2.67 4.33 2.67 3.00 2.00 3.33
Serbia 2.67 3.67 2.33 4.00 1.67 2.67 2.00 2.00
Slovakia 4.00 4.33 3.67 4.33 3.33 3.67 3.00 3.00
Slovenia 3.00 4.33 3.00 4.00 2.67 3.33 2.67 3.00
Source : EBRD
Note : B&H indicates Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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In the following sections, the institutional change of each CEE state will be traced
with a special focus on the privatisation process as an example since privatisation is a
crucial source of connecting a local economy with foreign investors and encompasses
overarching institutional constraints. Then, I will review other institutional forces
influencing FDI inflows. They include (1) path dependence of political ideology and
cultural struggle, (2) institutionalisation of FDI policies, and (3) institutional
arrangements developed through the process of European integration (see Figure 5-1).
5.3 Progress in Transition
The EBRD offers a transition index of the extent of institutional-building of CEECs.
The indicators have been viewed as one of the most appropriate data with which to
evaluate reform progress of transition economies toward the standards of advanced
economies (Meyer and Jensen, 2005). Progress in transition is assessed in a wide range
of nine fields from privatisation to overall infrastructure. These fields are made up of
four major categories essential for the transition toward a market-based economy: (1)
enterprise reform; (2) market and economic transaction reform; (3) financial reform; (4)
infrastructure reform. The scale for each indicator ranges from 1 to 4+ (4.33), with 1
indicating little or no change from a centrally planning regime, while 4+ refers to the
stage that a nation has realised a functioning market-based economy.
Looking at eight selected fields, it is clear that CEECs have made great strides
since 1989 (see Tables 5-1 and 5-2). According to EBRD transition indices that
represent progress in transition over 18 years, the biggest difference in transition
performance by country is between ten new EU-member countries and non EU-member
countries. Especially, some countries of the former Yugoslavia, such as Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia, have made the least progress as compared to
other CEECs. Price liberalisation in the European transition economies at the aggregate
is rapidly converging toward the standards of industrialised countries, followed by
small-scale privatisation.
On the other hand, convergence of competition policy has been laggard, followed
by reform in securities markets and non-bank financial institutions, as the average
values for these indicators are 2.6 and 2.7, respectively. In sum, the overall institutional
infrastructure of the European transition economies has been developed, shifting
steadily from the old system to a functioning market-based economy. However, it is
observed that the speed and extent of institutional reforms vary largely by country. One
explanation for this divergence is different governmental commitments to reform.
Second, history may be a source of obstacles to the advance of the institution-building
process in some countries. For instance, a typical case for this can be the enduring
problem of soft budget constraints of firms in Romania and Bulgaria and ideological
legacies.
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5.3.1 Varieties of Institutional and Structural Development
In retrospect, economic, political and social institutions were divergent among CEECs
since some ex-socialist economies (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia)
sought to experiment with their own economic systems based on labour participation in
management and removal of collective farming in the 1950s and 1960s, while others
remained good students of communism under the order of the Soviet Union. Moreover,
the quality, complexity and speed of progress in institution-building have not been
homogeneous but considerably heterogeneous, according to country, in the
post-communist period (Bandelj, 2008; Kornai, 2006; Meyer, 2001; Meyer and Jensen,
2005; Peng, 2003). Concrete structural reforms and privatisation of former state-owned
enterprises are regarded as a precondition for the establishment of a functioning
market-based economy (Estrin, 2002). Hence, I will present a brief history of
institutional reforms of CEE nation states at the disaggregate level.
5.3.2 Structural Constraints by Country
Table 5-3: Methods of Privatisation Used in Selected CEECs
In the early start of transition, the ways of managing and implementing
privatisation in CEE were dissimilar to those experienced in Western Europe (Meyer,
1998). Table 5-3 demonstrates the types of privatisation of state-owned assets across the
ex-Soviet type economies of the region. It proved evident that different countries
exercised different privatisation methods. It seems difficult to detect the defining
patterns of privatisation even according to regional blocs (Visegrád, Baltic, and Balkan).
Out of 13 transition economies, most transition economies listed used either direct sales
Country DirectSales
Management-
Employment
Buyouts
Vouchers DirectSales
Management-
Employment
Buyouts
Vouchers
Albania + +
Bulgaria + +
Croatia + +
Czech + +
Estonia + +
Hungary + +
Latvia + +
Lithuania + +
Macedonia + +
Poland + +
Romania + +
Slovakia + +
Slovenia + +
Primary Method Secondary Methods
Source : Estrin (2002: 109)
Original source : EBRD (1998)
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or management-employment buy-outs as the primary methods. Only three transition
economies - the Czech Republic, Latvia and Lithuania - relied on a form of voucher
privatisation as the primary method. The primary reason for this preference for
privatisation without foreign participation lies in the two fears (Meyer, 1998: 18). One is
that a direct sale of formerly state owned firms to foreign entities or individuals may
inhibit the creation of local ownership and another is that the sales price of firms may be
underestimated during the bidding procedure. Privatisation refers to a vital policy
instrument in ensuring “a separation between the state and the enterprise sector” (Estrin,
2002: 107). Many observers of transition economies see privatisation as the heart of
facilitating a transfer of state assets into private hands and institutionalising legal
frameworks for competition and corporate governance (Bandelj, 2008; Estrin, 2002;
Meyer, 2002). Despite this important element of privatisation for transformation, a shift
from collective ownership to private ownership was slow with the exception of some
countries. As a whole, private sector shares in most countries did not go beyond 50
percent of GDP by 2000 (Estrin, 2000: 110). As with the impact of formal institutional
infrastructure on the direct investment of Western firms, Meyer (1995: 308) points out
that “the privatisation policy adopted appears to be the major cause of the variation of
quantity and pattern of FDI among the leaders” (Figure 5-2). Now let us turn to describe
the privatisation story of each selected country in CEE.
Czech Republic
The Czech government relied on a combination of shock therapy and mass privatisation
of state-owned enterprises. Its transformation process was not seriously hampered by
the divorce of two countries constituting Czechoslovakia. However, deficient structural
reforms and high current account deficits (Hunya, 2000a) decelerated the Czech
economy. Privatisation of large-state banks and the bankruptcy of major former SOEs
were blocked by the interplay of inward-looking cooperative social and political ties
between major domestic banks, investment funds and ill-performing major former SOEs.
These mismanaged reforms resulted in an increase in soft loans. The voucher scheme
without sound fiscal discipline generated a number of newly local privatised enterprises
who possessed poor managerial capacity. The lack of corporate governance drove
indigenous private firms out of market competition. Consequently, this scenario ended
up with a large amount of non-performing loans and the weakening of investors’
confidence. Moreover, the Czech currency crisis in 1997 shattered the Czech economy.
The Czech Republic adopted voucher privatisation in 1990 (Pavlínek, 2002a).
Eighty percent of the Czech assets were privatised by the end of 1994 (Klipper, 1998:
103). Investment funds owned by national enterprises played a central role in instituting
voucher privatisation. They accumulated the large number of vouchers and leveraged
strong control over the transfer of assets from state property into private hands, thus
leading to poor progress in enterprise restructuring (Estrin and Meyer, 1998). It was
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determined that voucher privatisation would educate people about investment choice in
a market economy and contributes to the development of a capital market (Bornstein,
1997: 331). Mass privatisation through auctions, excluding foreign investors, was
conceived of as a political instrument for the incumbent government in obtaining public
support for the next election (Bornstein, 1997: 331). Bornstein (1997: 331) points out
three major problems involved in voucher privatisation: (1) weak corporate governance;
(2) high administrative and operational costs; and (3) no financial gains from the
property sold by mass privatisation.
Figure 5-2: Foreign Direct Investment per capita and Share in Private Sector in
CEECs in 2008
Source: Own illustration based on EBRD’s Country Factsheet of each country (2008)
Note: The abbreviation of each country name is as follows: ALB: Albania; BOS (Bosnia and
Herzegovina); BUL: Bulgaria; CRO: Croatia; CZ: Czech Republic; EST: Estonia; HUN: Hungary; LAT:
Latvia; LIT: Lithuania; MAC: Macedonia; MON: Montenegro; POL: Poland; ROM: Romania; SER:
Serbia; SLK: Slovakia; SLV: Slovenia. The slope coefficient of the OLS regression for 16 CEECs is
significant at the 1% level (t-statistics=3.26). The slope coefficient of the OLS regression for Balkan-6 is
not significant (t-statistics=0.04). The slope coefficient of the OLS regression for CEE-10 is significant at
the 1% level (t-statistics=4.61).
The Czech Republic continued to implement restrictive policies towards FDI in
European transition economies until the late 1990s. All operations were subject to
ubiquitous corruption. The privatisation process was politically manipulated and guided,
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resulting in the exclusion of foreign investors. In the Czech form of privatisation, major
Czech enterprises were controlled by state-controlled banks, indicating that
opportunities to merge local firms were limited in real terms (Estrin and Meyer, 1998).
“Czech Prime Minister Václav Klaus asked foreign investors to wait until privatisation
was finished; his government has explicitly warned against selling the ‘family silver’”
(Sinn and Weichenrieder, 1997: 182). Václav Klaus was strongly against foreign capital
and exercise the privatisation policy without foreign entrepreneurship, which was
believed to have caused huge lay-offs. In fact, “the Klaus government interrupted
Western multinationals such as Siemens, ABB, GEC Alstom, Framatom and others
when they attempted to participate in the privatisation of such Czech engineering giants
as ČKD and Škoda Plzeň” (Pavlínek 2002a: 364). This mismanaged privatisation policy
retarded the Czech Republic’s industrial restructuring and economic growth. The
problem of soft budget constraints of firms in transition remained the impediment to the
transition process as the governments continued to provide uncompetitive indigenous
firms with generous subsidies in order to keep unemployment rates low (Estrin and
Meyer, 1998; Tanaka, 2007). After Václav Klaus stepped down in 1998, a large amount
of assets of domestic banks were sold to foreign investors.
Hungary
Hungary has been one of the most gradualist models of economic transition among CEE
countries (Nuti and Portes, 1993). Hungary had already shown an explicit strong
intention to enforce the swift liberalisation of prices and to restructure domestic
manufacturing industry in line with the growth of FDI inflows in Hungary even before
the post-socialist period. Despite “continuing subsidies, rent-seeking, and avoidance of
serious restructuring” (Nuti and Portes, 1993: 12), there has been a consensus that
economic development based on favourable FDI policy and structural reforms had also
given rise to the large number of private capitalists with long-time horizons. In
particular, foreign investors are concerned with the completion of price liberalisation
since “prices determined by the interplay of supply and demand are the essence of a
market economy” (Meyer, 1998: 13). The first quarter of 1993 witnessed the formation
of 1069 international joint ventures or wholly foreign-owned firms in Hungary (Fahy et
al., 1998: 157). Hunya (2000a: 11), in an analysis of the sequence of structural reforms
in industry for CEE during the period from 1994-1998, also reported that Hungary
achieved over 10 percent annual growth in labour productivity.
In considering the transition of assets from state ownership to private ownership
in more detail, Hungary enforced privatisation with a considerable reliance on direct
sales of state-owned firms to foreign capitalists in the early 1990s but this privatisation
scheme complicated negotiation procedures due to lack of property rights protection as
well as institutional inconsistency (Estrin and Meyer, 1998). “The ruling political party
from 1990 to 1994, the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), was quite favourable to
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FDI” (Brandelj, 2008, 76) although some opposition groups showed their political
resentment to FDI (Sinn and Weichenrieder, 1997: 182). It is worth noting that Hungary
had already started small-scale privatisation prior to the collapse of state socialism
(Somogyi, 1993).
Besides trade liberalisation, mass privatisation was viewed as an inevitable
condition to enhance productivity and make resource allocation more effective (Nuti,
1993). A sale of a stake in the Matav Telecommunication monopoly to a consortium of
German and American investors in 1993 illustrates Hungary’s keenness on shifting
toward a functioning market-based economy (Brandelj, 2008). “Hungary has taken a
gradual approach to privatisation and, with serious deficits in the budget and the balance
of payments, has preferred to sell state assets including to foreign investors rather than
distribute them free” (Bornstein, 1997: 335). On these grounds, foreign-owned
enterprises showed their strong commitments to participate in the mass privatisation
process in Hungary. Approximately 70 percent of privatised assets were held by
foreign-owned enterprises in Hungary during the period from 1990-91 (Bornstein, 1997:
331). Mass privatisation with foreign ownership enabled the government to receive
US$1.3 billion in proceeds (Bornstein, 1997: 334). It was perceived that “broad
participation in the privatisation process would build public confidence in and support
for privatisation” (Bornstein, 1997: 331). Privatisation also took place actively in the
banking sector. The share of foreign banks in total banking assets increased from 65.3
percent in 1999 to 81.9 percent in 2003 (Barisitz, 2005: 60).
Poland
Poland adopted a laissez-faire approach to economic transition in the early phase of
transition. The Polish government showed its commitment to enforcing structural
reforms and strove to create favourable business climate privileged to the proliferation
of small-and-medium-sized enterprises. Moreover, external financial support from the
World Bank and Western countries permitted the Polish government to enforce a
structural reform for partial recapitalisation of the banks and reduction of enterprise
debts (Nuti and Portes, 1993: 17-18).
Privatisation was conducted on a large-scale. However, the start of transition
witnessed neither a rise of FDI inflows nor high economic growth until 1998 due to the
presence of non-transparent and inconsistent legal structure (Wisniewski, 2005). In
parallel with the stagnant growth of FDI inflows, high unemployment problems and
skyrocketing inflation spirals dominated the state of the Polish economy. The
unemployment rate in Poland soared from 6.3 percent in 1990 to 16.4 percent in 1993
(Raiser, 1997: 544). More surprisingly, the average rate of unemployment reached 20
percent by 2004, reflecting that this structural constraint on the labour market has not
been removed even as of today (Hardy, 2007: 765). According to Sachs (1994), one
major explanation for this was that the focus was placed only on market liberalisation
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and stabilisation of the Polish economy. In a similar vein to other European transition
economies, such as Romania and Bulgaria, soft budget constraints also inhibited
efficiency of the transition process in Poland. However, a circle of scholars and
practitioners insisted that prospective EU membership should encourage Poland to
undergo the significant transformation of its economic, political and legal structure.
The privatisation scheme enforced in Poland was called as “nomenklatura
privatisation” (Shields, 2004). An effort was made by the Polish government to
implement the privatisation of the economy in the early phase of transformation.
However, this process was slow. The privatisation of over 3,000 formerly state-owned
enterprises and many major monopoly firms, which suffered from huge debt problems,
was an unprecedented, challenging task in the start of transition (Sachs, 1994: 56).
Political volatility deterred Poland from implementing large-scale privatisation projects
(Bornstein, 1997; Estrin and Meyer, 1998). “Hundreds of larger SOEs should be
corporatised and their shares allocated in three ways: 15 percent given free to
employees; 60 percent transferred free to 15 investment trusts called National
Investment Funds (NIFs); and 25 percent retained by the State Treasury” (Bornstein,
1997: 332). At the beginning of transition, mass privatisation with the participation of
foreign investors was restricted due to political resentment of foreign capital. Various
domestic actors (e.g., Polish privatisation minister Gruszecki, former prime minister
Pawlak and Polish trade unions) showed their strong resistance to a wave of
profit-seeking multinationals coming into Poland who might treat the Polish as “slave
labour” (Sinn and Weichenrieder, 1997: 182). Nevertheless, privatisation, notably in the
banking sector took a great leap forward at the turn of the century. The share of total
banking assets held by foreign banks increased from 49.3 percent in 1999 to 75 percent
in 2004 (Barisitz, 2005: 62).
Slovakia
Slovakia shares some similarities with the Czech Republic in the features of its
economic transition. After the break-up of Czechoslovakia in 1993, the Slovak economy
was in a poor condition since the country had committed itself to instituting hard budget
constraints that were in practice until the mid-1990s. Ferencikova (1997) attributes the
low level of Slovak FDI performance in the early 1990s to four critical factors: (1)
unstable investment sites; (2) slow economic reform; (3) strong governmental
intervention in acquisition of indigenous firms by foreign capital; and (4) economic
policy in favour of domestic investors and owners during the privatisation period of the
1990s. However, Djankov and Pohl (1998) document that sales of national assets by
insiders (e.g., management-employee buy-outs) in Slovakia did not exert a negative
impact on enterprise restructuring. Rather, operating profitability as well as labour
productivity grew steadily for the period 1991-1996. After the break-up of
Czechoslovakia, Slovakia constantly faced high unemployment rates in 1993, 1994 and
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1995, of 12.2 percent, 13.7 percent and 13.1 percent, respectively (Raiser, 1997: 546).
Moreover, this unemployment problem has been worsening over time; Slovakia reached
an unemployment rate of 15.3 percent in 2005 (EBRD, 2008).
The first phase indicates the period from the break-up of Czechoslovakia to 1995.
The second phase from 1995 to 1998 marks that foreign investors started purchasing
equity shares of privatised firms in Slovakia. Following suit, local investors in the
Czech Republic were prioritised to participate in the privatisation scheme in Slovakia
(Djankov and Pohl, 1998) since the Slovak government wanted to create “strong
domestic entrepreneurs” (Ferencikova, 1997: 26). Disfavouring the appointment of new
managers to privatised firms in Slovakia, most pre-1991 managers were reinstituted as
general managers by 1996 (Djankov and Pohl, 1998: 74). The pace of the privatisation
process was relatively slow in Slovakia as compared with its neighbours in the start of
economic transition. In contrast to the Czech Republic where approximately 80 percent
of the national assets were transferred to private hands, Slovakia privatised only 44.6
percent of its property by the end of 1994 (Autner, 2006: 17-21). The privatisation
process can be summarised in two phases. The market penetration of foreign owners in
the banking sector has been remarkable since the beginning of the new century. The
share of total banking assets held by foreign banks increased from 37.8 percent in 1999
to 98 percent in 2004 (Barisitz, 2005: 65). Deutsche Telekom’s purchase of 51 percent
of the shares of Slovak Telekom in 2000 is evidence that privatisation in the
telecommunication sector occurred very late due to the presence of the Mečiar
nationalistic government (Brandelj, 2008).
Slovenia
Slovenia took a cautious approach to the performance of microeconomic reforms and
striving to circumvent internal and external imbalances in focus (Hunya, 2000a: 11).
According to the World Bank’s World Development Indicator, GDP per capita in
Slovenia was US$10,860 in 2004, followed by US$6,120 in the Czech Republic and
US$5,410 in Hungary. The most serious problem Slovenia has been facing in recent
years is its relatively higher external debt, as compared to other CEE states.
The adoption of a gradual approach to privatisation was advocated by the
government (Bandelj, 2008: 48) as taken in Hungary and Romania. Slovenia took the
same method as the Czech Republic to allow domestic owners to dominate the
privatisation process (Meyer and Jensen, 2005). “Slovenian policy encouraged
management and employees to invest their ownership certificates in the companies they
worked for” (Bandelj, 2008: 49). The enforcement of this privatisation method without
capitalists resulted in leaving the country in isolation. In contrast to other CEECs,
Slovenia has been lagging in direct sales of privatised banks to foreign banks.
Romania
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Romania attached importance to a gradual macroeconomic reform since the introduction
of shock therapy was perceived as not acceptable. Price liberalisation began in
November 1991 and was completed in 1995. It has been argued that inefficient bank
reforms essentially turned out to be impediments to the transition process in Romania.
The enduring inheritance of the tripartite relations between formerly state-owned
enterprises, banks and government also kept soft budget constraints from being
completely removed (Kornai, 1992). Romania experienced high inflation rates and low
economic growth during the 1990s. Until today, black market trade remains highly
problematic in Romania (De Melo et al., 2001).
Neither small-scale privatisation nor large-scale privatisation was efficiently
carried out in Romania despite new laws relating to privatisation enacted during the
early phase of transition. By 1997, most small-scale privatisation projects were
completed. Only 5.5 percent of the total formerly state-owned enterprise assets inherited
from the old system of state socialism was transferred to individuals through the mass
privatisation process (Earle and Telegdy, 1998: 328). One of the most serious problems
involved in the post-privatisation period was that many privatised companies suffered
from weak corporate governance resulting from the reinstitution of pre-1991 managers
as general managers. As seen during the 1990s in Slovakia, this institutional constraint
led the country to achieve capitalism without capitalists. On these grounds, Romania
received marginal interests from foreign investors as compared to other European
transition countries. Despite Romania’s slow transition, the dawn of the new century
saw that the majority of equity shares of Romanian oil giant Petrom was acquired by
Austria’s oil and gas firm, OMV. The structure of the domestic banking industry
changed coupled with FDI inflows. The share of foreign banks in total banking assets
jumped from 47.8 percent in 1999 to 62.0 percent in 2004 (Barisitz, 2005: 69).
Bulgaria
Bulgaria adopted a shock therapy at the start of transition. This structural adjustment
plan forced Bulgaria to conduct price liberalisation, strict monetary policy and trade
liberalisation. Similar to Romania, soft budget constraints were not eliminated overnight.
Moreover, the domestic banking sector was considerably fragile during the 1990s
because of a substantial amount of non-performing loans. While mass privatisation was
conducted, six state-owned banks accounting for 70.7 percent and 72.6 percent of the
total bank capital and total bank assets respectively continued to exist in 1995 (Budina
et al., 2000: 458). The size of real GDP in Bulgaria was only 63 percent in 1997 relative
to the level of 1989 (Raiser, 1997: 530) and the inflation rate of 948.53 percent was of
paramount concern (World Development Indicator, 2006).
The Bulgarian mass privatisation program was classified into two distinctive
periods. The first wave of the program ended in 1997. The second period started a year
and a half after the first wave. As of the completion of the first wave, only one-fourth of
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Bulgaria’s formerly state-enterprises were privatised (Miller and Petranov, 2000: 225).
Although voucher privatisation in Bulgaria shares many similar features to those in the
Czech Republic, differences dominate. Learning from the Czech case and the first wave
of mass privatisation in Bulgaria, the government conditioned vouchers gained in the
second wave of the mass privatisation programs to be sold through the capital market
only. The central government of Bulgaria placed an institutional constraint on the
privatisation funds so as not to make the same mistake as the Czech Republic. “Bulgaria
created an extensive regulatory structure including a Securities and Stock Exchange
Commission which granted licences and regulated the activity of the funds” (Miller and
Petranov, 2000: 229). Major mass privatisation in the energy and telecommunication
sector took place after 2000. Seventy-five percent and 65 percent of total equity shares
of Varna Shipyard and Bulgaria Telecom (BTC), respectively, were sold, ending up in
private hands (Tanaka, 2005: 33). The share of total banking assets held by foreign
banks increased from 28.4 percent in 1999 to 82.5 percent in 2004 (Barisitz, 2005: 67).
Baltic countries
The method of industrial restructuring and privatisation differed among three Baltic
countries. In the aftermath of the dismantling of the central planning system, Estonia
took the most radical approach to industrial restructuring by introducing direct sales to
foreign investors and management-employee buyouts. In addition, rapid decisions were
also meant to shut down former state-owned factories once restructuring was likely to
be impossible or hopeless (Von Hirschhausen and Hui, 1995: 22). On the other hand,
foreign investors played a marginal role in the privatisation process in both Latvia and
Lithuania. These two countries took gradual steps, making voucher strategies a first
priority. In Latvia, poor institutions such as political uncertainties and the lack of
government competence in managing an appropriate privatisation program impeded
effective industrial restructuring (Von Hirschhausen and Hui, 1995). Lithuania was the
first country in CEE to implement a mass privatisation program that distributed
vouchers to the employees and the population in 1991. Notwithstanding these different
approaches, according to Estrin (2002: 110), the private sector contribution to GDP had
already accounted for more than 50 percent by the end of 1994. As a result of later
structural reforms led by governments of the Baltic countries, they achieved
approximately 7 percent average growth in labour productivity in the years from 1995
to 2003 (Kornai, 2006: 214).
Balkan countries
Balkan countries were lagging behind other CEECs in privatisation due to their political
instability and continuing inter-ethnic conflicts. Moreover, Brada et al. (2006: 657)
argue that disappointing privatisation processes in the Balkan countries were a result of
many former Yugoslav republics continuing to adopt the Markovic Law on the transfer
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of state-owned assets to private hands, which allowed insiders to control essential assets.
Baltic transition countries took common approaches to privatisation. As seen Table 5-3,
management-employment buyouts received priority. Croatia embarked on privatisation
of national assets in 1991. The Croatian government relied on management-employment
buyouts in the early phase of transition and introduced voucher systems afterward.
Similarly, Albania also adopted the two privatisation programs. Small-scale
privatisation for agriculture and housing took place at a relatively rapid pace, but
large-scale privatisation was greatly disadvantaged by economic and political upheavals
in Albania during the 1990s. However, the Albanian government restarted the
large-scale privatisation for banking, transportation, energy and communication sectors
in 1998. Moreover, the long history of Albania as a closed country also inhibited the
pace of its transition process. One of common problems involved in the privatisation
process in the region was that the state controlled the majority ownership of many
privatised firms.
5.3.3 Institutionalisation of FDI Practices
In this section, I elaborate on the significance of the institutionalisation of FDI policies.
FDI policies are “institutional measures” (Bandelj, 2004: 459) created to capture the
positive benefits of FDI but also “mechanisms that institutionalise official national
attitudes toward the presence of foreign actors in the national economy” (Bandelj, 2004:
459). Institutionalisation of FDI policies is driven by two ways. One is the
establishment of IPAs and another is the provision of financial and fiscal incentives.
The following sections will present various institutional factors, which would affect FDI
allocation of profit-seeking multinationals in CEE.
5.3.3.1 The Establishment of IPAs
The establishment of investment promotion agencies (IPAs) is said to have been a
relatively crucial phenomenon for firms already in operation, as well as for prospective
investors in CEE. Among scholars of international business pointing to the relevance of
IPAs in attracting FDI inflows, Meyer and Nguyen (2005) argue that regions and
countries that have IPAs to support FDI projects can promote ties with prospective
foreign multinationals. IPAs play a crucial role in representing and promoting the image
of their countries as attractive investment sites. Loewendahl (2001: 1) argues that
“image, brand awareness, and perceptions are major factors influencing the location of
foreign direct investment (FDI)”. However, there are few scholars who have explained
the causal association between IPAs and FDI inflows to date (e.g., Bandelj, 2004, 2008;
Cass, 2007; Head et al., 1999; Lim, 2005, 2008; Loewendahl, 2001; Woodward, 1992).
IPAs are a product of “legitimisation of FDI practice”, affecting firms’ business
strategies (Brandelj, 2008: 72). The presence of IPAs in CEECs reflects a sign of a
country’s commitment to promoting economic liberalisation in line with the Washington
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Consensus and to integrate the home economy into the world economy (Bandelj, 2008).
Moreover, some scholars of economic sociology (e.g., Bandelj, 2002, 2008) attempt to
extend the logic of normative institutional forces or mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio
and Powell, 1990; Scott, 1995) to explain the relationship of the establishment of IPAs
to FDI inflows in CEE in recent years. Actors such as the state involved in policy design
to create and develop market-supporting institutions are likely to imitate successful FDI
practices other actors exercise in their quest for economic efficiency as far as learning is
necessary to survive in imperfect markets (Bandelj, 2004, 2008).
It is of critical concern that foreign investors comprehend what processes,
structure and strategies IPAs adopt for attracting FDI and what variations exists across
Eastern European transition economies in the institutional context. Functions and tasks
of investment promotional activities have been diverse. The role of investment
promotional activities can be classified into four main pillars in a broader sense (Cass,
2007). They are (1) investor facilitation and investor services; (2) image building; (3)
investment generation; and (4) policy advocacy. First, investor facilitation is crucial to
mitigate uncertainties and risks by providing investors with comprehensive and
consolidated information (e.g., market conditions, the potential giving of state aid, trade
policy). Considering information on state aid, IPAs often play a crucial role in initiating
discussions with investors about available incentives. From the perspective of
institutional economists, all desired information is not freely obtainable since markets
are imperfect. Hence, a problem arises where one party has complete information, while
the other has no information.
Lim (2998: 40-41) states the significance of IPAs as an information provider as
follows: “the asymmetry of information tends to change the bargaining power between
the supplier and the demander and the side which possesses less information will be at a
disadvantage. Therefore, in order to overcome asymmetry of bargaining power,
harmonisation of information possession should be achieved”. Compared to Western
firms, non-European firms such as Japanese and Korean firms have less information on
local market conditions, local business practices and local bureaucracy when searching
for a site for production in the CEE region. In this case, the firm can acquire desired
information from IPAs at minimum costs.
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Table 5-4: Institutionalisation of FDI Practices in CEECs
Second, image-building has been recognised as a key factor to success for
facilitating smooth FDI transactions (Leowendahl, 2001; Lim, 2008). Marketing
techniques include general PR campaign, printing of brochures, newsletters, CD-ROMs
and fact-sheets, participating in investment exhibitions, IPA conferences, investment
missions, trade mission, direct mail campaigns, and creating an IPA website
(Leowendahl, 2001).
Third, investment generation is one of the basic tasks of IPAs. Clear identification
of targeted firms and prioritised industries contributes to the operational effectiveness of
IPAs. Moreover, understanding the strength and weakness of location sites enables IPAs
to evaluate whether they are able to meet the interests of potential investors and to
match them with competitive advantages of firms (Cass, 2007; Loewendahl, 2001).
Lastly, policy advocacy is central to upgrading investment environments through
surveys, policy proposals and lobbying (Cass, 2007: 84).
In the post-communist region, IPAs are already in operation in 16 CEE
countries (Table 5-4). CzechInvest supports joint ventures between foreign investors
and indigenous companies (Loewendahl, 2001). CzechInvest is regarded as a FDI
agency “with a clear strategy sharply defined sectoral priorities and an active
Country Name of Investment Promotion Agency Year ofEstablishment
Albania Albania Investment Promotion Agency 1998
B&H Foreign Investment Promotion Agency of
Bosnia and Herzegovina
1999
Bulgaria InvestBulgaria Agency 1995
Croatia Croatian Investment Promotion Agency 1996
Czech Republic CzechInvest 1992
Estonia Estonian Investment Agency 1994
Hungary Hungarian Investment and Trade
Development Agency
1993
Latvia Latvian Development Agency 1993
Lithuania Lithuanian Development Agency 1995
Macedonia Agency for Foreign Investments of the Republic
of Macedonia
2005
Montenegro Montenegro Investment Promotion Agency 2005
Poland Polish Agency for Foreign Investment 1992
Romania Romanian Agency for Foreign Investment 1997
Serbia Serbia Investment and Export Promotion Agency 2001
Slovakia Slovak Investment and Trade Development
Agency
2000
Slovenia Trade and Investment Promotion Agency 1995
Source : Own slight modification based on Bandelj (2008: 71) and each IPAs website.
Note : B&H indicates Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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involvement in the negotiation of incentives with individual investors” (Cass, 2007:
112) across Central and Eastern European countries. “[CzechInvest] annual reports
looked similar to those of multinational corporations, and the agency willingly provided
estimates of the worth of the FDI transactions that it facilitated” (Bandelj, 2008: 72). On
its website, firms interested in investing or being active in that region can access
profiles of more than 2,000 local suppliers. There are also special data bases focusing on
potential indigenous suppliers in the automobile industry and the aerospace industry.
These supplier development programs may facilitate access to potential local suppliers,
thus leading to the improvement of local embeddedness. In sharp contrast, Slovakia and
Macedonia were relatively slow starters in advancing institutionalisation of FDI policies
as compared to their neighbors.
5.3.3.2 Financial and Fiscal Incentives
In CEE, FDI incentives (e.g., tax holidays, tax exemption, grants and the like) have
become a greater concern to foreign investors since different countries in the region
seem to offer similar business conditions. Preferential financial and fiscal privileges
were commonly used by incumbent governments of CEE during the 1990s to attract
FDI inflows (see Table 5-5). Tax competition has markedly intensified between
Visegrád -4 (i.e., Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) since the late 1990s
(Cass, 2007: 105) because of their similar economic advantages. Werner (2004: 11)
calls this FDI-related policy battle between CEE-4 a “jurisdictional competition”. As
seen in Table 5-6, these four countries are graded as relatively active in concentrating
both FDI incentives and promotional activities in the region (Meyer and Jensen, 2005:
143). It has been argued that state authorities in transition economies are more likely
than those in developed economies to resort to the provision of FDI incentive schemes
as a policy tool (Bitzenis, 2003). This is because incumbent governments seek to attract
more FDI transactions for an increase in the wealth of the nation, technology transfer,
improvement of balance of payments and job creation.
On the contrary, one of the critical problems facing the transition economies is
that budgetary constraints inhibit the institution of sufficient FDI incentives to develop
the attractiveness of their investment climate in relation to Western counterparts
(Bitzenis, 2003). That is to say, the provision of FDI incentives indicates a decline in
national revenues. Moreover, European transitional economies to enter EMU are also
subject to the stringent fiscal requirements necessary for realising the Maastricht
Convergence Criteria.
FDI incentives are more important for MNEs seeking to undertake greenfield
investment projects than for those participating in the privatisation process. The relation
between greenfield investors and host-based governments are not conflicting but
economically reciprocal (Meyer and Jensen, 2005). Large investors are deemed to
obtain more benefits from “non-transparent incentives” by leveraging their strong
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bargaining power against local governments, as observed in the Magyar Suzuki case
and the Fiat Polska case (Werner, 2004). Institutional inconsistencies and deficiencies
are exploited by powerful investors. Local governments are almost subordinate to large
MNEs in negotiations involving the scale of incentive deals because the latter can feel
free to choose other locations if their demands were not adapted. When it comes to
industry heterogeneity, tax exemption is a great concern to production firms since “they
require larger investment in fixed assets and are more likely to value incentives related
to depreciable assets than service industries” (Lim, 2005: 66).
It has also been argued that greenfield investors may lose their legitimacy and
reputation in a given country if they fail to match their own interests with what the local
government desires to achieve (Meyer and Jensen, 2005). I look further into FDI
incentives provided by some ex-Soviet type economies of CEE.
Figure 5-3: Correlation between log of FDI per capita and Corporate Income Tax in
CEECs (1991-2006)
Note: The slope of coefficient of the OLS regression is significant at the 1% level (t-statistics=–8.38)
Czech Republic
The Czech government was passive in formulating favourable FDI policies toward
inbound foreign capital during the 1990s. The provision of tax-based incentives was
prohibited in 1993 in the Czech Republic (Werner, 2004), but from the late 1990s, these
types of state aid have been reemployed. In 1999, the Czech government legislated
investment incentive schemes that had not yet been seen among its neighbours (Mallya
et al., 2004). A new Act on Investment Incentives came into force in May 2000 that
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Table 5-5: Summary of FDI Incentives in 2005
Country Special economic areas Taxconcessions
Corporate
tax (%)*
Tax
holiday
Tax
credits Grants
Albania N/A N/A 20 ×
B&H 4 free zones N/A 30 × ×
Bulgaria 6 duty-free zones (since 1987) Yes 15 × × ×
Croatia 6 technology parks Yes 20 × × ×
Czech Many industrial zones and technology parks Yes 24 × ×
Estonia Only free zones Yes 22 ×
Hungary 170 industrial parks and 13 logistic parks Yes 16 × ×
Latvia Free ports as well as special zones Yes 15 × ×
Lithuania Free trade zones and industrial parks No 15 ×
Macedonia 4 technological development zones N/A 10 × ×
Montenegro N/A N/A 9 ×
Poland 14 special economic zones with sub-zones Yes 19 × ×
Romania 30 industrial and technology parks Yes 16 ×
Serbia Free zones N/A 10 × × ×
Slovakia Many industrial parks Yes 19 × × ×
Slovenia Industrial zones (Bistrica, Celja, Lenart
and Mursika Sobots)
Yes 23 × ×
Source : Own adaptation from Dresdner Bank (2005), Index of Economic Freedom (http://www.heritage.org), the homepage of each IPA and Cass
(2007: 122).
Note : Data for corporate tax is 2007. B&H indicates Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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streamlined application procedures for financial and fiscal incentives. As a result, since
then the Czech Republic has been emerging as a major source of FDI in CEE. At
present, FDI incentives are generally given to two particular sectors, to be exact the
manufacturing sector and the business support services and technology services sector
(Allen & Overy, 2006: 22). Unlike Poland, the Czech government has established no
special economic zones where foreign investors can take advantage of a special legal
status.
Hungary
Hungary has been deemed the forerunner in adopting a friendly-FDI policy prior to the
fall of state socialism and has a well-structured legal framework for granting incentives
in the post-socialist era (Allen & Overy, 2006). Act XXIV on Investments of Foreign
Persons in Hungary was enacted in 1988. In 1995, the Act on Customs and Act CI on
Custom Tariffs was instituted to facilitate the market entry of export-oriented foreign
investors. In order to establish relations between foreign investors and indigenous
small-and-medium-sized enterprises, Széchenyi Plan was worked out and has been
enforced from 2001. Since January 2003 Smart Hungary Programme which offers
preferential tax treatments and grants to major greenfield investment projects has been
effective. Industrial parks were set up in regions situated close to Western European
markets. This FDI-related policy was devised in harmonisation with the EU standard.
Hungary has made the continued commitment of creating an attractive business climate
by offering a corporate tax rate under 20 percent since the mid-1990s, while the
corporate income tax of other CEE countries was not reduced until after 2000. There are
two particular ordinances associated with investment incentives, namely the Investment
Incentive Decree and the Investment Tax Incentives Decree. As of 2006, foreign
investors benefit from the broad range of industrial parks, with a number reaching
approximately 160 (Allen & Overy, 2006: 29).
Poland
During the 1990s, the Polish government adopted an active trade policy designed to
affect the interest of major foreign car producers, such as Opel, Fiat and Daewoo, by
imposing the tariff rate of 35 percent on cars imported from the Western European
market (Werner, 2004: 12). This special governmental treatment aided them in selling
cars produced in the oligopolistic domestic market. The Act on Financial Support for
Investment has been enforced in Poland since 2002. It is important to note that under
this FDI-related law the size of permissible grants differs from voivodship to
voivodship5. Ahead of other CEE counterparts, 14 SEZs were officially set up by Poland
to overcome growing regional economic inequality in October 1994 under the SEZ Act.
5 Voivodship indicates a Polish provincial unit. There are 16 voivodships (i.e., provinces)
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Technology parks are also situated in Gdansk, Krakow, Lodz, Poznan, Warsaw and
Wroclaw. A total of 677 greenfield investment projects were launched within the SEZs
by 2002 (Wisniewski, 2005: 13). Contrary to the Polish government’s expectation, FDI
experts state that the SEZs have been less successful to attract FDI inflows to Poland
(Wisniewski, 2005).
Table 5-6: The Degree of Institutionalisation of FDI Practices by Country (Unit:
average score 1994-2003)
Slovakia
In sharp contrast to the Czech Republic in the 2000s and Hungary in the 1990s,
Slovakia undertook “the most unstructured approach to approving aid for investors”
(Allen & Overy, 2006: 34). The major problem foreign investors seem to experience in
Slovakia was the lack of transparent legal and institutional frameworks for FDI
incentives. This did not change until the National Assembly of the Slovak Republic
enacted the Investment Incentives Act in 2001. This Act includes tax allowances, cash
contributions for the creation of new jobs, and cash contributions for the training of new
employees.
Other CEECs
As the negotiation talks for EU accession advanced over time, the concerted effort to
improve the legal structure related to FDI incentives was also seen in Romania and
Bulgaria. In 2001, the Slovene government initiated the Programme of the Government
of the Republic of Slovenia for the Promotion of Foreign Direct Investment in
2001-2004. This policy turned out to be a milestone in increasing FDI in Slovenia.
Cluster Country Incentivescore (A)
Promotion
score (B)
Average
(A+B)
Average in
cluster
1 Czech Republic 3.00 3.37 3.19
Hungary 3.73 2.80 3.27
Poland 3.60 2.90 3.25
Slovenia 2.77 2.13 2.45
Slovakia 2.84 2.04 2.44
Estonia 1.70 2.70 2.20
2 Romania 3.10 1.80 2.45
Lithuania 3.00 1.70 2.35
Latvia 2.63 2.00 2.32
Bulgaria 2.60 2.00 2.30
Croatia 1.90 1.00 1.45
3 Serbia & Montenegro 1.54 1.30 1.42
Bosnia & Herzegovina 2.17 1.64 1.91
Albania 1.67 1.20 1.44
Republic of Macedonia 1.70 1.00 1.35
2.80
2.17
1.53
Source : Own modification on Cass (2007: 107).
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Croatia adopted a FDI-related policy similar to that in Slovenia during the same period.
As a whole, it has been seen that FDI practices were institutionalised by active
state actions in Estonia, Hungary, and Latvia, while Croatia, Slovakia, and Slovenia are
likely to have been disinclined toward the adoption of friendly FDI policies during the
1990s after the dismantling of the former Soviet Union (Brandelj, 2008). The extent and
disposition of institutionalisation of FDI policies also diverge significantly at the
state-policy level as seen in the previous sections.
5.3.4 Regional Institutional Arrangements
Now let us turn to the perceived importance of EU enlargement. The expansion of the
EU to 25 Member States in 2004, and subsequently to 27 in 2007, is an indication of a
challenging experiment for enhancing further the overall competitiveness and internal
cohesion of the EU. One of the critical issues be aware of is that these two successive
enlargement processes in the new century exacerbated internal economic disparities
with reference to GDP per capita. The EU had already concluded European Agreements
(EA) with ex-Soviet type countries in the start of transition with the EU’s desire to
promote mutual trade relations during the early 1990s. The EA indicated “basically free
trade for non-food manufactured goods and the possibility to join the EU in the future”
(Hunya, 2000a: 8). In June 1993, the Copenhagen European Council was held to
consider eastward EU enlargement to integrate ex-communist countries if they met all
necessary EU laws and rules. The late 1990s turned out to be a landmark for
accelerating the eastward EU enlargement project. In 1998, the EU opened the official
negotiation talks for accession with a first wave of CEECs (Luxembourg Group).6 In
2000, the EU initiated the negotiation with a second wave of CEECs (Helsinki Group).7
In October 2002, the EU declared that all the negotiation talks except those with
Romania and Bulgaria had been completed. In May 2004, the EU celebrated the
acceptance of 10 new EU-CEECs. Romania and Bulgaria also achieved EU membership
in January 2007.
Economists place focus on the economic aspects of EU enlargement, while the
political and social aspects of EU enlargement are likely to be overlooked. On the basis
of the risk-return calculations of international economic activity, foreign investors can
enjoy taking full advantage of access to the Single European Market, no tariff barriers
within the territory of the EU, and cheap factor endowments in the East. It is a shared
view among economists that prospective EU membership lessens the probability that
economic risks (e.g., large exchange rate fluctuation and rise in interest rates) occur in
the CEECs (Baldwin et al., 1997; Bevan and Estrin, 2004). A study by Baldwin et al.
(1997: 147) presents simulation results that indicate that EU membership reduces the
trade costs between Western European countries and the CEECs by 15 percent and
6 The Luxembourg Group includes the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia.
7 The Helsinki Group includes Bulgaria, Lativia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia.
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CEECs can gain the real income of ECU30.4 billion.
Prospective membership in the EU is likely to serves as a guarantee of the quality
of institutional development in CEE as Eastern European transition economies face
institutional pressures from the EU to put structural adjustments and institutional
reforms in practice (Clausing and Dorobantu, 2005). Membership also enables ten new
EU-CEECs to benefit from various financial funding such as Cohesion Fund, Solidarity
Fund, and Structural Fund designed to equalise the levels of regional economic
development throughout the EU. Without facing budget constraints on their own, 10
new EU-CEECs can exploit rich financial sources from the EU. Moreover, “the CEE
countries within the EU have access to new resources through the structural funds,
which may be used also for financial incentives” (Meyer and Jensen, 2005: 136). For
example, the European Commission reports that the EU provided the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland with 936.1 million Euros, 1,112.7 million Euros and 4,178.6
million Euros as Cohesion Fund for years 2004-2006.8
On the other hand, scholars of transition economics (Kornai, 2006) and economic
sociology (Bandelj, 2008) present a different view on the EU enlargement project than
that which economists typically embrace. Kornai (2006: 208) points out that “the
memberships may be seen as certificates, which are supposed to attest to the fact that
[CEE] countries boast both democratic political systems and functioning market
economies”. The advantages of EU expansion for CEECs also
reflectsinstitutionalisation of foreign ties with international economic and political
organisations. Bandelj (2008: 113) states that “institutional connections could affect
economic relations between countries by routinising transactions and therefore
mitigating uncertainties and costs associated with international business”. Institutional
relations between West and East are expected to be further developed through active
political dialogue (Bandelj, 2004).
Eastward EU expansion can be understood as a vital catalyst for instituting
FDI-friendly practices into CEE and encourages mimetic behaviour of state action of
each country (Brandelj, 2008). New EU member countries are likely to vigorously
compete with one another to recruit foreign capital and imitate effective FDI practices
exercised by others. Hence, reflecting on the concept of institutional isomorphism
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), it can be said that Eastern European transition economies
tend to embrace a take-it-for-granted mindset that FDI rules favourable to foreign
multinational corporations are created, developed and legitimated through the course of
European integration (Brandelj, 2008). Consequently, economic gains are of minor
importance in this regard, rather, the adoption of favourable FDI practices is illustrative
of the consequence of alignment toward Western European standards of neoliberal
economic norms among political and societal groups in CEE.
8 See more detail in europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/intro/working1_en.htm
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In the late 1990s, governments of CEECs had to promote the harmonisation of
laws, anti-corruption campaigns, and efficient business transactions in order to become
part of the EU. The exclusion of custom controls stimulated the frequency and intensity
of trade transactions between the West and the East in the EU. As EU enlargement
reduced a new members’ average tariff rate of nine percent to an EU average tariff rate
of four percent (Tanaka, 2005), foreign firms could undertake FDI policy
complementary to trade activities, gaining benefits from cheap factor endowments (i.e.,
labour, land, and transportation costs) and less strict trade impediments. Since the new
member countries from CEE are locked into EU economic, political, and legal
institutions in accordance with the acquis communautaire, foreign investors encounter a
better investment climate. Foreign firms doing business in the single European market
can benefit from reduced administration costs and political stability. Supranational
pressures imposed on ex-Soviet type economies in CEE play a vital role in obliging the
countries to undertake market liberalisation and implement stabilisation measures as a
requirement of EU membership. The EU guarantees the introduction of ‘good
governance’ including market openness, macroeconomic stability, excellent road
infrastructure systems rules of law and property rights protection in CEE member
countries.
The vision of EU membership may have kept European transition economies at an
advantageous position in converging toward the institutional standards of the EU and in
materialising the establishment of good governance at an early phase of transition in
relation to other emerging economies such as the former Soviet Union, Central Asian
and China (De Melo et al., 2001). The prospective integration of Eastern European
transition economies into the EU is viewed as a cornerstone to make a turnaround to the
communism unrealistic (Estrin and Meyer, 1998). The realisation of prospective
membership of the EU is an indispensable precondition for promoting values of
democracy, property rights and civil liberty.
In the future, the evolution of FDI in CEE may be interrupted by two major
impediments. One is a massive drain of labour from CEE to rich EU member countries.
In order to mitigate fears of large-scale labour migration from CEE, the European
Commission has already enacted regulations restricting free movement within the EU of
labour from the new EU member countries for seven years following enlargement.
However, a few countries, such as Ireland and the UK, permitted workers from the new
member countries to immigrate. For example, a number of Polish workers have
immigrated to the UK, where the number of Polish migrant workers amounts to more
than 168,000 (Barrell et al., 2007: 4). Government officials in Poland fear that human
capital turns out to be scarcer due to massive emigration and this phenomenon thus
intensifies competition among foreign investors for the indigenous labour force and
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pushes up the wage level.9 As a result, predictably existing and potential foreign
investors may face difficulties finding human capital and economising on cheap labour
costs in CEE (JETRO, 2005a). Accordingly, foreign MNEs whose motivation lies only
in the exploitation of cheap labour capital would suffer from increasing marginal costs
and decreasing productive efficiency.
Another impediment is the end or contraction of most special financial and fiscal
incentives, such as tax breaks, grants and subsidies. Since 2004, the European
Commission has screened FDI incentives devised by new EU members and regulated
with caution whether state aid is given to particular businesses and distort EU
competition policy (Allen & Overy, 2006). It has been debated that special economic
areas may no longer be a policy instrument for leveraging and manipulating investors’
preference and interests. One of best examples of recent restrictions on the provision of
public incentives is that “the European Commission intervened to cut incentives for a
new Skoda engine plant from US$120 million to US$22 million in 1999” (Werner,
2003: 15). Another example of the EU’s interference with state aid to MNEs is the case
of Ford in Romania. In the beginning of February 2008 the Romanian government was
accused by the EU of giving illegal state aid to Ford in the privatisation process of
formerly Daewoo-Craiova. Romania has now been asked to recover 27 million Euro
(http://balkaninsight.com). These restrictions on FDI transactions should undermine
incumbent state authorities’ interests in reform and investors’ interests in embarking on
offshore production in CEE. According to Cass (2007: 105), “recent stabilisation of
incentive levels – and, in some cases, reduction – appears linked to EU rules and may
also reflect a shifting of competition from incentives to tax rates”.
In sum, the European transitional economies have applied a diverse range of
investment regimes and institutional development strategies, which render the region an
ideal object of analysis of the location characteristics influencing entry strategies of
foreign multinationals.
5.3.5 Institutional Continuity: Ideological Inheritance of State Socialism
Almost 20 years ago, citizens in CEE believed that the fall of state socialism would
warrant the transformation toward free-market capitalism and democracy, which would
allow for managing a successful integration into the global society. However, this
promising picture has been incomplete and misleading today. Rather, it turned out that
the mindsets of political elites structured by omnipresent communist ideology have not
yet been easily displaced by the spread of capitalism overnight. It is surprising that “no
Central European country, with the exception of the Czech Republic in the 1990s,
excluded communists from public office” (Tupy, 2006:12). This statement represents to
a large extent the limited progress in democracy during the course of joining the world
9 Interview with a local government in Katowice, Poland on 19 March, 2007.
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economy in the era of globalisation. ‘The end of history’, to borrow an expression from
Francis Fukuyama (1992) who addressed that the fall of the Iron Curtain would
guarantee democratisation in European emerging market economies, seems to be
illusory and out of touch with reality. From an institutional perspective of the world
economy, history has been enduring and the past characterises the present.
Table 5-7: Freedom from Corruption
Source: Own illustration based on Freedom House’s Economic Freedom
Note: Scale from 0 (the highest corruption rate) to 100 (the lowest corruption rate)
To date, rising neoliberal forces, such as foreign multinational corporations and
economic regionalisation, have been accused by populists of exploiting labour and
national assets in the post-communist society of CEE. The core political culture of
traditional communists who advocate improvement of workers’ rights, equal
redistribution of wealth, tax increases for private-owned enterprises, and promotion of
labour unionism has once again received attention from those who suffer from poverty
and unemployment problems.
The post-communist parties in CEE are not in power but its ideological remnants,
inherited from the past, have been kept intact at the base of internal politics. For
instance, in the Czech Republic, the recent rise of the Communist Party of Bohemia and
Moravia (Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy: KSČM) revolves around a dramatic
increase in regional economic inequality in the transition to capitalism, which creates a
divide between winners and losers. In neighboring Slovakia, the Communist Party of
Slovakia (Komunistická strana Slovenska: KSS) has steadily increased its parliamentary
Country 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 98‒06
Albania 10 10 10 23 10 10 25 25 25 ↑
Bosnia & Herzegovina 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 33 31 ↑
Bulgaria 30 30 29 33 35 39 40 39 41 ↑
Croatia 50 50 50 27 37 39 38 37 35 ↓
Czech Republic 53.7 52 48 46 43 39 37 39 42 ↓
Estonia 70 70 57 57 57 56 56 55 60 ↓
Hungry 48.6 51.8 50 52 52 53 49 48 48 ↓
Latvia 30 30 27 34 34 34 37 38 40 ↑
Lithuania 30 30 30 38 41 48 48 47 46 ↑
Macedonia N/A N/A N/A N/A 33 33 33 23 27 N/A
Montenegro N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 30 30 N/A N/A N/A
Poland 55.7 50.8 46 42 41 41 40 36 35 ↓
Romania 50 34.4 30 33 29 28 26 28 29 ↓
Serbia N/A N/A N/A N/A 10 10 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Slovakia 50 50 39 37 35 37 37 37 40 ↓
Slovenia 50 50 50 60 55 52 60 59 60 ↑
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presence. Its share jumped from 0.8 percent in 1992 to 6.3 percent in 2002.10 Moreover,
democracy was significantly threatened by a “return to communism” in the 2002
election campaign in the Czech Republic, as the political popularity of the Communist
Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM) in the Czech Republic increased its share of the
parliamentary seats in 2002 to 18.5 percent.11
Connecting the ideological inheritance of communism to cross-border movement
of capital into CEE, Bandelj (2008: 75) states that “governments committed to reform
would be more likely to legitimise FDI by selling strategic monopolies to foreign
investors, while successors of insignificantly reformed Communist parties or nationalist
governments would have other political agendas”. The conventional wisdom is that
political parties advocating liberal democracy seek to adopt policies designed to evolve
together with the participation of foreign owners. However, a society in which
traditional communist and nationalist ideology is prevalent may show political
resentment against foreign capitalists and thus inhibit the transfer of national assets to
foreign hands.
Moreover, corruption remains critical in CEE’s economic life. Freedom House’s
Index for Freedom from Corruption validates the proposition that corruption has
remained a serious problem in the region despite the transition toward a market-based
economy integrated into the family of European nations (see Table 5-7). More critical is
that corruption has been growing over time. Freedom from Corruption is measured on a
scale from 0 to 100. The larger the number, the lower a rate of corruption. Between
1998 and 2006, The Freedom from Corruption dropped in CEE-4, Estonia, Romania
and Croatia. Poland and Romania have had difficulty overcoming the fundamental
causes of corruption. Tupy (2006: 13) points out that the culture of corruption, bribery
and red-tape politics is rooted in the prevailing informality of social networks in CEE,
stating that “the strength of family and business ties, and the virtual nonexistence of
local civil society groups in the region, allowed corruption to materialise at the local
level, where enterprises, mayors and civil councilors have turned regional politics into a
gold mine”. Consequently, high corruption rates lower the reputation of the host
economy and discourage a high degree of business involvement by foreign investors.
Now let us turn to a review of the existing literature in order to highlight earlier findings
on which institutional ingredients may exert a significant influence on FDI inflows.
5.4 Available Empirical Evidence on the Role of Institutions for FDI in
Transition Economies and Hypothesis Formation
Research on the effect of formal and informal institutions on FDI in transition
economies has been neglected than that in developed countries (Grosse and Trevino,
2005). Although the number of FDI studies, which place focus on institutions, has been
10 See more details in http://www.parties-and-elections.de
11 See more details in http://www.parties-and-elections.de
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limited in emerging economies, consensus develops and evolves on the link between
FDI and the quality of institutions. Based on empirical evidence in prior work,
hypotheses are developed. In considering methodologies used in the past literature,
time-series and cross section analysis has been commonly employed as an econometric
tool (Grosse and Trevino, 2005; Disdier and Mayer, 2004; Campos and Kinoshita,
2003; Resmini, 2000; Sugawara, 2006; Brada et al., 2006; Bevan and Estrin, 2000;
Clausing and Dorobantu, 2005). Bandelj (2008) checked the robustness of coefficients
of parameters by employing Generalised Least Square (GLS) and Ordinary Least
Square (OLS). Similarly, feasible GLS (FGLS) pooled-panel regressions were run by
Brada et al. (2006).
Progress in Institution-Building
Disdier and Mayer (2004) incorporated the degree of freedom of a country in Europe
into their location choice study and find that poor institutional infrastructure was
responsible for reducing French firms’ incentive to locate. Examining FDI inflows into
13 CEE countries during the period 1990-1999, Grosse and Trevino (2005) tested the
variation of the impact of the quality of institutions on FDI inflows, as measured by
various institutional criteria (corruption in government, political risk index, rule of law,
repatriation controls, EBRD index of enterprise reform, and change in consumer price
index). All of these studies on institutional factors find that immature institutions
constrain FDI inflows.
Campos and Kinoshita (2003) verify that convergence toward a functioning
market economy is a driving force toward inducing FDI inflows, thus concluding that
countries with reform-minded politicians who intended to initiate a thorough shift
toward market liberalisation may be at an advantage in the race of FDI. Bevan, Estrin
and Meyer’s (2004) study shows legal institutional infrastructure, foreign exchange and
trade liberalisation are judged to be a success in attracting FDI inflows. Employing data
consisting of 10 recipient countries over the period 1991-1995 at sectoral level,
Resmini’s (2000) study evidences that investors for scale-intensive sector as well as
science-based sector are largely influenced by the degree of transition, while the degree
of trade openness determines the volume of FDI inflows for traditional sectors.
It is important that the determinants of FDI vary by sectoral distribution. Drawing
on empirical evidence from an analysis of FDI among 18 Eastern European transition
economies including Russia, Sugawara (2006) notes that the increase in FDI inflows is
due to privatisation. Furthermore, EU membership is found to be statistically significant
at a 1 percent level and has a positive effect on the amount of FDI. Since progress in
transition in the Balkan region is smaller than Central Europe, the Balkan region
receives a limited amount of FDI for the period between 1990 and 1993 (Brada et al.,
2006). I postulate the following hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 1: Countries with more developed market-supporting institutions receive
more FDI inflows.
Pressures from the EU
Little attention has been directed toward the influence of pressures from the EU on FDI
inflows. As for the transformative impact of the relational character of institutional
configurations associated with EU integration, there has been little or no consensus in
the literature. Using a panel of 28 host countries during the period 1992-2001, Clausing
and Dorobantu (2005) find that EU membership and Copenhagen Criteria, measured by
dummy variables, are statistically significant and positive. Furthermore, of interest is
that the magnitude of the coefficients of the release of Agenda 2000 on the amount of
FDI is larger for the second wave accession countries than that for the first wave
accession countries. Bevan and Estrin (2000) report a significant positive effect of the
1993 Cologne announcement on the proliferation of FDI. In contrast, employing an
OLS with Huber-White robust standard errors for the period 1990-2000, Bandelj (2008)
also fails to identify a causal mechanism of institutional relations (i.e., EU agreements)
for FDI flows in Central and Eastern Europe. Evaluating US FDI inflows in EU12 over
the period 1978-1995, Mold (2003) finds little evidence that American firms are
sensitive to the effect of the Single Market Programme (SMP). I test the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Countries with EU membership receive more FDI inflows.
Institutionalisation of FDI Policies: Impact of IPAs and FDI Incentive Schemes
There is a strong consensus on the magnitude of institutionalisation of FDI policies
(Bandelj, 2002, 2008; Lim, 2005; Head et al., 1999; Woodward, 1992). Lim (2005: 74)
suggests that “each government should adjust its FDI attraction policy to a particular
firm from a strategic viewpoint and should also introduce the concept of strategic
planning at the time investment policy is formulated”. Lim’s (2005: 74) study also
advocates that the adoption of well-prepared investment promotional plans, which
match investors’ needs and interests, will be consequential for prompting the host
economy to develop sustainably. Lim (2008: 49) evidences two significant results: (1)
the operational effectiveness of IPAs is determined by “experience and a well-structured,
well-staffed overseas network” and (2) IPAs play a central role in minimising the fear of
information asymmetry that investors face. Bandelj (2002, 2008) highlights that the
legitimisation and of FDI agencies matters to the decision-making of foreign investors
in the eastern European economies. Employing a conditional logit model, Head et al.
(1999) in an analysis of Japanese manufacturing firms’ location choices in the US in the
1980s find that the presence of IPAs of states in Japan has no effect on the motivation
and behaviour of Japanese investors. In sharp contrast, IPA branch offices opened in
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Japan are the contributing factor to increasing Japanese FDI inflows (Woodward, 1992).
A critical problem associated with Bandelj (2008), Head et al. (1999) and Woodward
(1992) is that the details of promotional schemes are not scrutinised, while they merely
take a close look at the presence of IPAs.
As regards the magnitude of financial and fiscal incentives in attracting FDI
inflows, recent empirical evidence sheds light on the conflicting nature of FDI
incentives. Mallaya et al. (2004), who examine whether the National Incentive Scheme
influences the quality of FDI in the Czech Republic, suggest that the government should
practice policy tools that stimulate domestic investment and technological transfer from
foreign-owned enterprises to indigenous enterprises without strong reliance on
quantitative incentives such as tax holidays. Devereux et al. (2007) identify that the
influence of regional grants is powerful in recruiting FDI in Great Britain. Deichmann
and Karidis (2005) find that regions which are endowed with SEZs and excellent
transportation networks are successful in attracting foreign investors in Poland, using
the data set of location selection for the period 1989-2002 that was compiled by the
Polish Agency for Foreign Investment and the Polish Statistical Office, Glowny Urzad
Statystyczny (GUS). Mallya, Kukulka and Jensen (2004) find that the announcement of
financial incentives exerts a positive impact on FDI inflows in the case of the Czech
Republic.
On the contrary, according to Bitzenis’s (2003) study based on the primary data of
64 MNEs operating in Bulgaria, only 17.2 percent of the total sampled firms attribute
their investment motivation to tax incentives. Cieślik (2005) find that the SEZ variable
has no significant effect on the number of foreign firms in Poland. He infers this
empirical result as follows: “most SEZs were established in relatively well-developed
Central and Western part of the country and other factors were more important than
fiscal incentives” (Cieślik, 2005: 873). Cieślik and Ryan (2005) in an analysis of
Japanese FDI flows in Poland at the province-level over the period from 1991-2001 also
identify that special economic zones do not raise the probability that a host region is
selected, while controlling for other locational characteristics. Cieślik and Ryan find that
inbound foreign capital in Poland is significantly sensitive to the size of both GDP and
area. The following hypothesis is put forward:
Hypothesis 3: Countries with more developed FDI policies receive more FDI inflows.
Ideological Inheritance of Communism
Bandelj (2008) assesses whether left-wing governments, measured by a dummy variable
of successors of communism and socialists, has some bearing on the pattern of FDI in
CEE. Bandelj finds that FDI inflows are relatively small when a left-wing party is in
power in a given country. Sugawara (2006) also identifies that the length of socialist
periods are negatively related to FDI receipts. I test the following hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 4: Countries with a greater degree of ideological inheritance of communism
receive less FDI inflows.
5.5 Methodology
5.5.1 Sample and Data Sources
Now I empirically analyse the relationship between institutional factors and levels of
FDI inflows in the CEE region by using panel data on aggregate FDI flows to host
economies. I use the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) data base for the independent variable. EBRD publishes a Transition Index
of 27 post-socialist countries at annual basis. This index is assessed on a scale of 1 to 4+
(4.33). A value of 1 means no change from a standard of the old planning economy and
4+ (4.33) represent a standard of advanced market economies. These indicators are the
appropriate measurement with which to assess the degree of departure from the
historical inheritance of ex-Soviet type economies. Other data sources are Parties and
Elections (http://www.parties-and-elections.de), World Bank’s World Development
Indicator, Michigan University Global Tax Database, and Bandelj (2008) and Cass
(2007) for IPAs.
The period of the sample is limited to the period from 1991-2006 due to the
limitation of data availability. The recipient countries are 14 Eastern European transition
economies (Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and
Slovenia). Serbia and Montenegro were excluded from the sample because there was
not sufficient and reliable FDI-related data to run an equation so that these limitations
inhibit the time-series analysis. The focus is placed on the set of institution-specific
variables expected to influence the pattern of FDI in accordance with the analytical
framework presented in Section 2.
5.5.2 Description of Variables
I use annual net FDI per capita (UNCTAD) as a dependent variable. In terms of
independent variables, three groups of independent variables are presented in this study
(see Table 5-8). Group 1 consists of economic variables such as market size, market
distance, economic stability and economic openness. Market size is measured by GDP
(US$ millions). Following the study of Mold (2003), market distance is measured by a
distance in kilometers from the capital city of each country to the central location of the
European economy, Frankfurt. Following Clausing and Dorobantu (2005), a misery
index is adopted to test economic stability. The misery index consists of a sum of each
sampled country’s inflation rate and unemployment rate. Economic openness is
measured by trade relative to GDP in percentage. These data, except market distance,
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were compiled from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator.
Group 2 focuses on formal and informal institutions such as internal and external
politics, ideological inheritance of state socialism and institutionalisation of FDI
policies, and progress in institution-building. The variables of progress in
institution-building are measured in 7 areas (1. large-scale privatisation, 2. small-scale
privatisation, 3. enterprise restructuring, 4. price liberalisation, 5. bank reform, 6.
securities market reform, 7. overall infrastructure) using EBRD transition indicators.
5.5.3 Model Procedure
I employ an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE)
technique applied to dynamic panel data to explore how progress in institutional
infrastructure leads to promoting the potential inflow of annual FDI capital over a long
time horizon. The research is of interest since I use formal and informal
institution-specific location variables in contrast to the existing literature, which
presented relatively insufficient measures of institutions. Moreover, the use of updated
data and other data sources, combined with modern econometric techniques, might
provide more proper estimations of the interactions between institutional infrastructure
and FDI.
This panel data analysis helps observe the impact of explanatory variables on the
dependent variables across time and space simultaneously. Ordinary Least Square
(OLS) with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) is employed for a time series and
cross section (TSCS) analysis. There are two primary reasons for preferring OLS with
PCSE. According to Beck and Katz (1995), OLS parameter estimates with PCSE are
more accurate than Generalised Least Squares (GLS) of Parks.12 Another is that OLS
with PCSE enables us to deal with the problem of panel heteroskedasticity,
autocorrelation and contemporaneous correlation more appropriately even in the
presence of complicated panel error structures (Beck and Katz 1995: 634-641).
It is widely acknowledged that serial correlation and autocorrelation in the use of
a pooled cross-sectional time series are also potential problems bearing statistical bias.
To tackle this problem, which persists across unit and time, I use a first-order auto
regression or AR(1) function in order to solve the problem of autocorrelation and serial
correlation seen as a nuisance in the residuals. In the estimation, the econometric results
present Prais-Winston coefficients with panel-corrected standard errors (Greene 2000).
To overcome the simultaneity problem, all independent variables are lagged by one year.
Zero or below zero valued net FDI inflows are a cause of a major problem for
econometric estimation when the dependent variable is transformed into logs (Cieślik
and Ryan, 2004). To overcome this problem, zero or below zero net FDI inflows are
replaced with 0.0000001 consistent with Cieślik and Ryan (2004: 21). I employ a panel
12 Katz and Beck (1995) point out that significance levels are prone to be too optimistic when feasible
generalised least square (FGLS) is considered and tested.
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regression method since the data is available not only in cross-section but also in
time-series. The generic TSCS model is as follows:
௜ܻ,௧ = ܺ௜,௧ߚଵ + ߝ௜,௧,ݓℎ ݁݁ݎ ݅= 1, … ,ܰ ;ݐ= 1, … ,ܶ
As the generic model (1) demonstrates, Y is a dependent variable. β is a parameter of
coefficients to be estimated and therefore explains the marginal effect of the explanatory
variables. i and t indicate firm and year, respectively. ε indicates an error term
representing immeasurable factors or idiosyncratic shocks and  is an interval term. To
enhance the credibility and validity of the estimation, I checked problems of
multicollinearity. I found numerous multicollinearity problems (see Table 5-9). First,
CORRUPT and CORTAX are highly correlated with all the variables associated with
progress in institutional infrastructure (LARGEPRI, SMALLPRI, RESTRUCT, PRICE,
COMPETE, BANK, SECURI, and INFRA). Second, these eight institution-specific
variables are also highly correlated with each another. Therefore, to avoid encountering
biased empirical results, these aforementioned variables are alternately tested in the
estimating equations. The following model is built on the aforementioned generic TSCS
framework. To avoid the simultaneity problems, the explanatory variables are lagged by
one year.
ܻ (ܨܦܫܥܣ)௜,௧ = ߚଵ(ܧ ݋ܿ݊ ݋݉ ݅ܿ ݋ܿ݊ ݀ ݅݅ݐ݋݊ ݏ)௜,௧ି ଵ + ߚଶ(ܲ݋݈ ݅݅ݐܿܽ ݈݅ ݀ ݋݈݁ ݋݃ ݕ)௜,௧ି ଵ+ ߚଷ(݊ܫ ݏ݅ݐݐݑ݅ݐ݋݊ ݈ܽ݅ܽݖ ݅ݐ݋݊ ݋݂ ܨܦܫ݌݋݈ ݅ܿ ݅݁ ݏ)௜,௧ି ଵ+ ߚସ(݊ܫ ݏ݅ݐݐݑ݅ݐ݋݊ ݈ܽܽݎܽݎ ݊݃݁݉ ݁݊ ݐݏ)௜,௧ି ଵ+ ߚହ(ܲݎ݋݃ ݁ݎ ݏݏ݅݊ ݉ܽ݇ݎ ݁ݐ– ܾܽ ݁ݏ ݀ ݅݊ ݏ݅ݐݐݑ݅ݐ݋݊ ݏ)௜,௧ି ଵ + ߝ௜,௧
The expected signs of the coefficients are as follows: β1>0, β2<0, β3>0, β4>0, β5>0. I
employed the OLS with PCSE to assess the parameters of the explanatory variables,
which determine the evolution of FDI inflows for 10 EU-CEECs plus four Balkan
countries utilising the panel data set over the years 1991-2006.
Interpretation: A host country’s level of FDI inflows is expected to be positively
correlated to its macroeconomic conditions and negatively correlated with the degree of
its ideological inheritance of communism. It is expected that the level of FDI is
positively correlated with the degree of institutionalization of FDI policies and EU
membership. Immature and inconsistent institutional conditions embedded in a host
country would have a negative influence over the level of FDI. The reason is that
foreign multinationals would have to pay high bureaucratic costs and to encounter a
limited degree of protection of intellectual property rights in countries with a weaker
institutional framework.
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Table 5-8: Description of the Variables Used in the Econometric Analysis
Description Sign Source
Dependent Variable
FDICA Log of foreign direct investment
adjusted for population
UNCTAD & WDI
Independent Variables
GDPt-1 Log of gross domestic
product (US$ millions)
+ WDI
MISERYt-1 Log of sum of inflation rates and
unemployment rates (%)
– WDI
DISTANCEt Log of distance of each capital
to Frankfurt in Germany (km)
– http://www.uk.
map24.com
OPENNESSt-1 Trade as percentage of GDP (%) + WDI
Political Ideology Formation
IDEOLOGYt-1 Share of post-communist
parties of a national election (%)
– Parties and
Elections
CORRUPTt-1 Ordinal variable (1=high corruption
and 100= low corruption)
+ Economic
Freedom
Institutional Arrangements
EUt Dummy variable indicating
whether a country is a EU member
+ EU
IPAt-1 Dummy variable representing
whether a country has a IPA.
+ Bandelj (2008) and
each IPA website
CORTAXt-1 Corporate income tax rate (%) – Michigan
University Global
LARGEPRIt-1 Large scale privatisation (1=poorly
improved and 5=highly improved)
+ EBRD
SMALLPRIt-1 Small scale privatization (1=poorly
improved and 5=highly improved)
+ EBRD
RESTRUCTt-1 Enterprise restructuring (1=poorly
improved and 5=highly improved)
+ EBRD
PRICEt-1 Price liberalization (1=poorly
improved
+ EBRD
COMPETEt-1 Competition (1=poorly improved
and 5=highly improved)
+ EBRD
BANKt-1 Bank reform (1=poorly improved
and 5=highly improved)
+ EBRD
SECURIt-1 Securities markets (1=poorly
improved and 5=highly improved)
+ EBRD
INFRAt-1 Infrastructure (1=poorly improved
and 5=highly improved)
+ EBRD
Variables
Institutonalisation of FDI practices
Economic Conditions
Progress in Institution-Building
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Table 5-9: Correlation Matrix of Multicollinearity
Variable Mean (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 GDPt-1 4.20 (0.51) 1
2 MISERYt-1 1.51 (0.43) -0.32 1
3 DISTANCEt 2.87 (0.16) -0.48 0.3 1
4 OPENNESSt-1 80.27 (27.41) 0.04 -0.3 -0.24 1
5 IDEOLOGYt-1 22.62 (15.05) -0.32 0.2 0.27 -0.47 1
6 CORRUPTt-1 38.36 (14.25) 0.43 -0.4 -0.28 0.49 -0.64 1
7 EUt-1 0.07 (0.26) 0.26 -0.2 -0.08 0.32 -0.19 0.17 1
8 IPAt-1 0.63 (0.49) 0.40 -0.5 -0.10 0.22 -0.26 0.18 0.21 1
9 CORTAXt-1 29.23 (8.32) 0.10 0.6 -0.09 -0.49 0.23 -0.11 -0.37 -0.48 1
10 LARGEPRIt-1 2.75 (1.00) 0.43 -0.6 -0.17 0.54 -0.43 0.63 0.27 0.70 -0.66 1
11 SMALLPRIt-1 3.55 (1.00) 0.29 -0.5 -0.24 0.34 -0.30 0.60 0.22 0.62 -0.61 0.78 1
12 RESTRUCTt-1 2.33 (0.78) 0.51 -0.6 -0.26 0.48 -0.52 0.73 0.34 0.68 -0.54 0.87 0.79 1
13 PRICEt-1 3.87 (0.77) 0.30 -0.2 -0.06 0.30 -0.33 0.26 0.15 0.50 -0.45 0.66 0.68 0.62 1
14 COMPETEt-1 2.07 (0.75) 0.58 -0.6 -0.27 0.46 -0.45 0.70 0.37 0.66 -0.59 0.82 0.69 0.87 0.56 1
15 BANKt-1 2.63 (0.89) 0.45 -0.7 -0.20 0.50 -0.47 0.61 0.33 0.73 -0.70 0.88 0.81 0.91 0.67 0.81 1
16 SECURIt-1 2.15 (0.81) 0.62 -0.6 -0.27 0.40 -0.47 0.70 0.37 0.66 -0.59 0.80 0.71 0.86 0.52 0.84 0.83 1
17 INFRAt-1 2.15(0.81) 0.53 -0.6 -0.11 0.43 -0.41 0.53 0.35 0.77 -0.67 0.81 0.66 0.80 0.57 0.78 0.85 0.84 1
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5.6 Empirical Findings
The panel data set constitutes observations of ten CEE-EU members plus four Balkan
countries over the period 1991-2006. Tables 5-10 and 5-11 summarises the econometric
findings for the variation in FDI inflows. OLS with PCSE method was used to estimate
parameters of the 12 models. In general, the estimations demonstrate strong overall
explanatory power that R squared values range from 0.22 to 0.53 except the low
R-squared value of 0.104 for the model including only economic-specific variables. The
regressions explain well over 50 percent of variation in the pattern of FDI inflows when
including the corporate income tax rate variable and the corruption variable. The first
and second rows correspond to the estimated coefficients and z-values, respectively.
As the dependent variable, the volume of FDI adjusted for population is used. The
twelve model specifications are collapsed into three groups of specifications. The first
group of a specification of the regression to run is one including only four
macroeconomic variables (GDP, economic instability, distance, and trade openness).
The second group is a synthesis of these four macroeconomic variables and political and
ideological specific variables (i.e., the ideological inheritance of communism,
institutionalisation of FDI practices and EU membership). The third group includes
these aforementioned variables plus variables for the degree of sophistication of
institutional building.
Empirical evidence concerning the receipts of FDI by the European transition
economies suggests that macroeconomic factors as well as non-macroeconomic factors
affect the amount of FDI, as seen in Table 5-10. First, results for the market size
variable are statistically significant and positive in almost all estimations (p<0.01).
These results lend support to the notion that the behaviour of foreign firms in CEE are
characterised by market-seeking and is of a horizontal nature. Since the market size
variable and the dependent variable indicating FDI per capita are transformed into logs,
this shows that a 1 percent increase in GDP in CEE countries indicates a 0.15-0.65
percent increase in FDI per capita. An association between the volume of FDI inflows
and a misery index is consistently significant (p<0.01) except Model 3 and 9 and is as
negatively signed as predicted. It suggests that foreign firms are interested in investing
in a foreign market whose economic stability is high. This result is in agreement with
the previous literature. All specifications except for Model 3 and 9 demonstrate that
trade openness exerts a positive effect on the FDI transactions of foreign firms,
indicating that the results are completely different from Wheeler and Mody’s
assumption that investment in closed markets would allow a foreign firm to gain its
monopolistic position due to host government intervention against imported goods. The
empirical evidence verifies that integration into the world economy determines the
receipts of FDI.
On the other hand, all model specifications show that geographic distance to the
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industrial center of the EU does not matter in attracting FDI. Evidence is incoherent
with previous studies (Buch et al., 2005). The IPA variable indicating the degree of
institutionalisation of FDI practices is statistically significant (p<0.01) and exerts a
positive effect on FDI per capita. The coefficients for this predictor range from 0.27 to
0.49. This result suggests that institutionalisation of FDI policies is likely to mitigate
various information costs ranging from market conditions to institutional framework of
a given country, hence facilitating internationalisation of business activity of
foreign-based enterprises. Moreover, it suggests that transnational companies can
benefit from a formal institutional framework to streamline administrative and legal
procedures. A signaling effect on FDI inflows is considered. This result is in line with
previous studies (Bandelj, 2008; Lim, 2008).
What makes this study unique and different as compared to past literature is the
incorporation of the variable of negative political ideology into the model estimations.
The communism variable indicating the degree of ideological inheritance of
communism is statistically significant (p<0.01) and has a negative impact on the
behaviour of FDI in the European transition economies. This evidence highlights that
investors’ attitude and economic transactions are shaped by and embedded in domestic
politics. The ideological remnants of communism that hamper institution-building and
the convergence of democracy to Western European standards are likely to discourage
investment by foreign investors in any given country. This study is supportive of the
evidence documented by Bandelj (2008). The level of corporate income tax rates has a
negative impact on the pattern of FDI inflows (p<0.1).
What is worth noting is that EU membership is not statistically significant in this
econometric study, although directional signs are as predicted. This result contradicts
evidence documented by previous scholars of economies in transition (Bandelj, 2008;
Bevan and Estrin, 2004; Clausing and Dorobantu, 2005). However, the reasons for no
impact of EU membership on FDI in this econometric study should be interpreted
cautiously. It would be more appropriate to infer that, with prospective EU membership
for a given country, foreign multinational corporations operating in that region might
have already embarked on the initiatives to reorganise their regional networks of
production and service activities even prior to the official entry in 2004 of a particular
country.
For instance, one possible interpretation of this result is that the data do not
contain any sub-sectoral breakdown in non-manufacturing and manufacturing sectors.
Another is that EU regulation on the provision of governmental incentives may have
conveyed a negative signal to foreign investors in the aftermath of the eastward
expansion of European integration. Hence, it may be too soon to verify the actual
impact of EU membership on FDI inflows since the time span observed was only from
1991 to 2006. We would need to expand the data set for future research, but it would be
necessary to wait additional time.
145
Table 5-10: OLS with Panel Corrected Standard Errors for 14 Eastern European
Transition Economies, 1991-2006
Model
1
Model
2
Model
3
Model
4
Model
5
Model
6
Economic Variables
GDPt-1 0.65***
(6.71)
0.37***
(5.84)
0.12*
(1.95)
0.42***
(5.55)
0.20***
(2.82)
0.32***
(4.48)
MISERYt-1 –0.61***
(–6.32)
–0.47***
(–4.32)
–0.12
(–1.22)
–0.26***
(–2.81)
–0.19*
(–1.72)
–0.17*
(–1.77)
DISTANCE 0.22
(0.82)
0.03
(0.11)
–0.37*
(–1.75)
0.34
(1.26)
–0.06
(–0.25)
0.11
(0.36)
OPENNESSt-1 0.01***
(9.35)
0.006***
(6.74)
–0.0004
(–0.45)
0.005***
(5.89)
0.003***
(3.75)
0.005***
(4.33)
Political Ideology Formation
IDEOLOGYt-1 –0.01***
(–5.67)
–0.008***
(–4.53)
–0.009***
(–4.47)
–0.007***
(–3.24)
–0.009***
(–4.05)
Institutionalization of FDI Practices
IPAt-1 0.55
(7.00)
0.33***
(4.68)
0.33***
(3.44)
0.43***
(5.04)
0.39***
(4.00)
CORTAXt-1 –0.009*
(–2.00)
Institutional Arrangements
EUt-1 0.03
(0.30)
0.13
(1.14)
0.007
(0.06)
–0.007
(–0.06)
0.09
(1.06)
Progress in Institution-Building
LARGEPRIt-1 0.53***
(10.26)
SMALLPRIt-1 0.39***
(7.13)
RESTRUCTt-1 0.46***
(5.98)
Constant –1.35
(–1.44)
0.37
(0.46)
1.03
(1.29)
–2.32**
(–2.20)
–0.10
(–0.01)
0.35
(0.29)
Obs. 190 190 190 190 190 115
Group. 14 14 14 14 14 10
R-squared 0.104 0.227 0.330 0.251 0.252 0.530
Prob>chi2 *** *** *** *** *** ***
Variables
Non-Economic Variables
Note : Z-values are reported in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, **
Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent level. The empirical results
presented in Model 6 are based on a sample of CEE-10 only during the period from 1995-2006.
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Table 5-11: OLS with Panel Corrected Standard Errors for 14 Eastern European
Transition Economies, 1991-2006 (Continued)
Model
7
Model
8
Model
9
Model
10
Model
11
Model
12
Economic Variables
GDPt-1 0.26***
(4.80)
0.24***
(3.56)
0.15**
(2.39)
0.23***
(3.20)
0.21**
(2.44)
0.27***
(4.10)
MISERYt-1 –0.53***
(–6.08)
–0.37***
(–3.37)
–0.06
(–0.72)
–0.36***
(–3.04)
–0.34***
(–3.23)
–0.27***
(–2.73)
DISTANCE –0.19
(–0.83)
–0.05
(–0.21)
–0.20
(–0.87)
–0.09
(–0.37)
–0.30
(–1.12)
0.11
(0.36)
OPENNESSt-1 0.004***
(4.25)
0.004***
(5.35)
0.001
(1.41)
0.004***
(5.79)
0.004***
(4.09)
0.006***
(6.31)
Political Ideology Formation
IDEOLOGYt-1 –0.008***
(–4.19)
–0.01***
(–4.83)
–0.007***
(–3.11)
–0.01***
(–4.73)
–0.01***
(–5.13)
–0.003
(–1.38)
CORRUPTt-1 0.001
(0.27)
Institutionalization of FDI Practices
IPAt-1 0.38***
(5.13)
0.47***
(5.63)
0.27***
(3.06)
0.49***
(5.56)
0.38***
(4.12)
0.28***
(3.15)
Institutional Arrangements
EUt-1 0.06
(0.56)
–0.008
(–0.07)
–0.02
(–0.16)
0.004
(0.03)
0.03
(0.22)
0.12
(1.23)
Progress in Institution-Building
PRICEt-1 0.55***
(13.50)
COMPETEt-1 0.24***
(3.21)
BANKt-1 0.63***
(10.20)
SECURIt-1 0.20***
(3.18)
INFRAt-1 0.28***
(3.78)
Constant –0.43
(–0.54)
0.63
(0.73)
0.023
(0.03)
0.78
(0.91)
1.45
(1.56)
0.43
(0.45)
Number of obs. 190 190 190 190 190 130
Number of groups 14 14 14 14 14 14
R-squared 0.317 0.221 0.350 0.219 0.221 0.534
Prob>chi2 *** *** *** *** *** ***
Variable
Non-Economic Variables
Note : Z-values are reported in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, **
Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent level. Empirical results
presented in Model 12 are based on a sample of 14 countries for the period from 1997-2006.
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Table 5-12: Summary of Empirical Results
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Economic Variables
GDP (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)** (+)*** (+)** (+)***
MISERY (–)*** (–)*** NS (–)*** (–)* (–)* (–)*** (–)*** NS (–)*** (–)*** (–)***
DISTANCE NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
OPENNESS (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** NS (+)*** (+)*** (+)***
Non-Economic Variables
Political Ideology Formation
IDEOLOGY – (–)*** (–)*** (–)*** (–)*** (–)*** (–)*** (–)*** (–)*** (–)*** (–)*** –
CORRUPT – – – – – – – – – – – NS
Institutionalization of FDI Practices
IPA – NS (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)***
CORTAX – – – – – (–)* – – – – – –
Institutional Arrangements
EU – NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
Progress in Institution-Building
LARGEPRI – – (+)*** – – – – – – – – –
SMALLPRI – – – (+)*** – – – – – – – –
RESTRUCT – – – – (+)*** – – – – – – –
PRICE – – – – – – (+)*** – – – – –
COMPETE – – – – – – – (+)*** – – – –
BANK – – – – – – – – (+)*** – – –
SECURI – – – – – – – – – (+)*** – –
INFRA – – – – – – – – – – (+)*** –
Obs. 190 190 190 190 190 115 190 190 190 190 190 130
Group. 14 14 14 14 14 10 14 14 14 14 14 14
R-squared 0.10 0.23 0.33 0.25 0.25 0.53 0.32 0.22 0.35 0.22 0.22 0.53
Prob>chi2 *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Note : NS indicates not significance. (+/–): Sign of causal association.
Variables
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Consistent with prior scholarship (Demekas et al., 2007; Grosse and Trevino,
2005), findings for institutional change show that all variables relating to the quality of
institution-building are statistically significant (p<0.01) and positive. In particular,
progress in banking reform, price liberalisation and large-scale privatisation is an
inevitable element for attracting foreign capitalists. The positive relationship between
large privatisation and FDI receipts to CEECs suggests that the spread of private
ownership leads foreign firms to reduce transaction and coordination costs, facilitates
the search for local partners with strategic business objectives similar to those desired
by foreign firms and creates market-supporting economies (Bevan et al., 2004: 48). The
result concerning the impact of competition policy on the magnitude of FDI suggests
that competition policy eases foreign investors’ market entry (Bevan et al., 2004).
Foreign firms may not be in favour of positioning themselves in a country whose
governmental authorities frequently intervene in market competition to protect
monopolistic rents of particular domestic and foreign enterprises for political interests.
Progress in bank reform suggests that foreign investors tend to rely on local banking
channels to finance their service and manufacturing operations. The relevance of overall
infrastructure to FDI receipts may be because well-established infrastructural service
helps foreign investors minimise operational costs.
In sum, the conventional wisdom holds that the motives for internationalisation of
economic activity of foreign multinationals are based on market-seeking (e.g., market
potential, as measured by GDP) and efficiency–seeking considerations (e.g., labour
productivity, as measured by misery index). In addition, I find that strategic decisions of
foreign investors are embedded in the path-dependency of political ideology,
institutionalisation of FDI policies and systemic evolution of institutional infrastructure.
In contrast to the prediction, it is found that foreign investors are not sensitive to
individual acts of corruption in a given country examined in this econometric study.
However, this result requires further consideration that there may be a great variation
among the type and the field of FDI. For instance, in the privatisation process, foreign
investors participate in competitive biddings that are not based on “price and quality”
but on “criteria” in Central and Eastern Europe (Tupy, 2006: 9). In the European
transition economies, economic transactions are framed not by the optimal point
between demand and supply, but in a web of social forces and the game of politics.
Accordingly, formal and informal negotiations with multiple local actors whose
interests are divergent are likely to give rise to a space for corruption.
5.7 Conclusions
Contrasting the approach adopted in this study with previous studies that are biased
toward an analysis of determinants of FDI in a conventional economic context, this
chapter sheds light on the institutional perspective. The concept of institutions has been
extended to studies of entry mode, but inadequate attention has been directed toward
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whether sophistication of institutional infrastructure acts as a catalyst for making the
FDI recipient country more attractive.
Although the ex-Soviet type economies have been converging towards the
standards of pure market-supporting economies since the early 1990s, the speed and
sequence of transitional reforms vary broadly by country and field. Some ex-socialist
economies (e.g., Hungary, Poland and ex-Yugoslavia) sought to set forth their own
mass privatisation process in conjunction with MNEs and their own citizens in the
1990s, while others (e.g., Czech Republic, Bulgaria) failed due to various formal and
informal institutional constraints persisting from the past. Kornai (2006: 210) noted that
“the characteristic institutions of capitalism - private property, hired labour, market-type
buying and selling, a credit system, and a legal system protecting the sanctity of private
property and contracts - evolved in various countries at various speeds”.
Employing the OLS with PCSE technique on a sample covering around ten
CEECs plus four Balkan countries for the period 1991-2006, it was examined how the
quality and specificity of institutional change and continuity (e.g., progress in
institutional building, political ideological orientation and institutional arrangements)
affected FDI transactions in transition economies. I have demonstrated that FDI inflows
are sensitive to institutional infrastructure in a given European transition economy in the
context of state-level policies. Empirical findings show that European transitional
economies with poor institutional quality experience limited FDI inflows, while
controlling for other economic-specific variables. This econometric study identifies key
economic and institutional factors that motivate FDI inflows in CEE as follows (see
Table 5-12):
 Market size;
 Economic stability;
 Economic openness;
 Ideological legacies of state socialism;
 Institutionalisation of FDI policies; and
 Improvement of institutional quality.
It was shown that unreformed and insular countries in transition tend to have lower
FDI inflows. The findings also suggest that the political ideology affects the
geographical distribution of FDI in transition economies. What also deserves attention
is that the establishment of IPAs gave an impetus for attracting FDI receipts to a given
country, indicating that the significance of active state action in showing a
welcoming-attitude to foreign capitalists. This study presented evidence that integration
into the global economy by means of trade also stimulated further FDI inflows. In other
words, a country’s trade openness hints at the extent to which foreign multinational
corporations can export freely. On the other hand, somewhat surprisingly, EU
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membership did not necessarily confer rapid foreign capital inflows to European
transition economies. The stage achieved in the transformation process is a crucial
determinant of FDI in CEE. Reflecting on the empirical results presented here,
host-based policy makers have to be aware of the fact that new investments or
additional investments will not occur unless dependency on the informal and hidden
economy is overcome. In other words, investors keep an eye on progress in institutional
arrangements favourable to them. At the same time, it is natural to think that foreign
investors themselves should continue to improve the ability to adapt to changing
institutional conditions over time. It implies that organisations and institutions
co-evolve in the European transition region.
There are a number of open issues to be addressed in future research. First, it
would be fruitful to examine how the magnitude of coefficients of EU membership on
FDI inflows differs by sectoral distribution and entry timing at a firm-level. Second,
institutionalisation of FDI practices should be operationalised in a more appropriate
fashion. It hence requires a context-specific approach. Third, future research should pay
attention to industry heterogeneity, since each industry may force MNEs to meet an
idiosyncratic set of conditions.
In sum, this chapter identifies that a higher degree of political and economic
stability, improvement of institutional infrastructure, trade liberalisation,
institutionalisation of FDI policies, and ideological inheritance of state socialism were
robust forces in generating higher FDI inflows. Last but not least, one of the major
implications for host-based policy makers in the European transition economies is that
the continued upgrading of institutional quality must ensure that history will not repeat
itself in the future.
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6 WHAT DETERMINES THE LOCATION CHOICE BY
JAPANESE MNEs IN EUROPEAN TRANSITION
ECONOMIES AT THE SUB-NATIONAL REGIONAL
LEVEL?
When studying the location decisions of FDI, the international business literature
has almost exclusively focused on countries as the unit of analysis, while largely
ignoring location within countries.
Meyer and Nguyen, 2005: 71
6.1 Introduction
Which determinants affect FDI location decision in the post-communist economies in
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)? Are foreign firms’ investment strategies mostly
influenced by emerging market demand in CEECs and their wage differentials with
Western Europe? Do positive agglomeration externalities that arise from the spatial
concentration of firms simply account for the rise in the number of foreign firms in
CEE? Does spatial separation occur at a certain point in time? How do a firm’s
intangible and tangible resources yield influence over its geographic orientation? Not
only a change in a variety of pull-push factors but also the extent of global integration
of a firm’s cross-functional units as well as the level of host-based government
interventions complicate a firmʼs location selection process (Buckly and Casson, 1995).
It has been perceived among scholars of economic geography (Krugman, 1991) and
international strategic management (Chang and Park, 2005; Chung and Song, 2004;
Porter, 1994; Shaver, and Flyer, 2000; Yamawaki, 2006) that the choice of FDI location
is as important as entry mode and entry timing since it places constraints on the extent
to which a firm can reduce operational costs and facilitates the reorganisation of
existing value-creating units beyond boundaries.
At the same time, an in-depth analysis of systemic patterns of foreign entrants for
plant location selection at a sub-national regional level is also critical for host-based
government officials seeking to attract FDI inflows as a driver for economic
development of disadvantaged regions in CEE. A firm may be able to successfully
minimise transaction costs and the liabilities of newness and foreignness if the firm
finds an optimal location based on sufficiently reliable information (Meyer, 2001;
Meyer and Nguyen, 2005). The acquisition of formal and experiential knowledge about
the site search process of foreign multinationals in CEE should allow the host
government to propose policies designed to rationalise the smooth transfer of advanced
product technology and superior managerial know-how to incumbent firms in regions
that require effective allocation of limited resources. Moreover, it has also been argued
that a dynamic inflow of foreign capital would help the ex-Soviet type economies to
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gain tax revenues accruing from foreign firms’ local operations.
Needless to say, it has been widely acknowledged that Hymer’s monopolistic
advantages (1960) and Cave’s internalisation hypothesis (1971) contribute to answering
the questions of why firms become multinational and why they internalise and exploit
their competitive advantages by means of direct investments over non-equity entry
modes. However, these theories are insufficient to detect why a firm chooses to locate at
a specific site at a specific time. By integrating various theoretical works: (1) Marshall’s
agglomeration logic (1920); (2) old and new Dunning’s OLI configurations (1981, 1993,
1998, 2005, 2008); (3) Porter’s Diamond Model (1990); (4) the resource-based view of
the firm; and (5) network theory, I develop a holistic model of the location choice of
MNEs.
To date, many scholars of international economics, strategic management and
economic geography have been devoted to constructing various models and elaborating
on foreign firms’ location strategies in the US, China and Europe. As far as Europe is
concerned, most scholarly attention has been directed towards old EU member countries
(Cieślik and Ryan, 2004). Most of the previous literature about the choice of FDI
location in CEE have drawn on aggregate data sets and used survey and case study
methods (e.g., Bandelj, 2002, 2008; Bevan and Estrin, 2004; Grosse and Trevino, 2005).
Some studies (Boudier-Bensebaa, 2005; Cieślik, 2005a; Cieślik and Ryan, 2005;
Deichman, 2004; Deichmann and Karidis, 2005) used disaggregate data sets and
attempted to examine MNE location choice at a single-country level. Spatial analysis of
MNE activity at a sub-national, regional level should contribute to economic
development within the single-country context.
In an analysis of plant location decisions at the disaggregate level in Vietnam,
Meyer and Nguyen (2005: 68-70) note that “local governments put polices devised by
the central government in practice locally and provide foreign investors with assistance
for applying for land permits and various grants at the central level”. Moreover, foreign
investors have to negotiate with local authorities over business licenses, real estate,
access to public utilities, and in some countries, tax incentives and subsidies. Chang and
Park (2005: 68) also claim that scholars should direct more attention towards the choice
of FDI location decisions on the basis of the sub-national regional unit since the level of
macroeconomic, social and institutional development varies greatly by region. This
particular focus could strengthen empirical grounds for location decisions by foreign
multinationals who seek to choose an appropriate place to gain high risk-adjusted
returns on investment, achieve scale economies and minimise production costs at the
same time.
This research is unique because of the following: First, none of the previous
studies, with one notable exception (Cieślik and Ryan, 2005), has focused on Japanese
investors’ location choices in CEE, although many have explored those in the United
States (Florida and Smith, 1994; Head et al., 1995; Ó Huallacháin and Reid, 1997),
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Western Europe (Head and Mayer, 2004; Yamawaki, 2006) and China (Belderbos and
Carree, 2002; Cheng and Stough, 2006; Wakasugi, 2005). Moreover, to date, no
research on location patterns for other Asian investors (e.g., Korean and Taiwanese
investors) in CEE has been done.
Second, the sample periods covered in the previous studies concerning the spatial
distribution of FDI in CEE were only focused on the 1990s. The inclusion of post-EU
enlargement years should provide deep insights into changes in location strategies of
foreign investors, notably in the explanation of the choice of Japanese manufacturing
FDI.
Third, to date, only a few scholars (e.g., Cieślik and Ryan, 2005; Schlunze, 2006)
try to unravel the question of which determinants are responsible for explaining the
locational determinants of Japanese MNEs in CEE at the sub-national regional scale.
Accordingly, research on this issue remains sparse. Limited data availability and small
Japanese FDI inflows relative to EU counterparts in CEE tend to deter researchers from
investigating the causal nexus between the spatial behaviour of Japanese subsidiaries
and locational advantages inherent in CEE in greater detail and have hence resulted in
this marginal interest. Moreover, this sparse attention also seems to echo the early stage
of the internationalisation of Japanese firms in the European transforming economies.
The goal of this chapter is hence to provide evidence that identifies determinants
that affect Japanese manufacturing firms’ location strategies in the former Soviet
satellite economies by shedding light on sub-national regions as the unit of analysis. In
this current study, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Montenegro, Poland,
Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania are included. In assessing the spatial dynamics of
Japanese FDI in CEE, I will employ McFadden’s conditional logit model (1974). This
discrete choice model at the disaggregate level provides concrete insights into each
individual firm’s site selection compared to ordinary least square (OLS) method that is
instead based on the aggregate approach along with FDI stock (Cheng and Stough,
2006). In other words, McFadden’s discrete choice model enables us to analyse
Japanese FDI in CEE at a firm level. In this chapter, I will particularly seek to clarify
the following questions:
 Where in particular did Japanese manufacturing firms invest in CEE at a
sub-national regional level?
 What economic and non-economic factors can explain the location choice of
Japanese manufacturing firms in CEE?
 To which extent does a web of keiretsu enterprises, which represents the social
organisation of Japanese economy, play a pivotal role in shaping the geographical
allocation of Japanese manufacturing FDI in CEE?
 How did the magnitude of agglomeration forces in the proliferation of Japanese
manufacturing FDI evolve over time?
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The data set used for this study consists of 205 Japanese manufacturing
subsidiaries and 21 Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS-1) regions
comprising 10 aforementioned countries in CEE in the period 1991 to 2006. The
intention of this chapter is to detect how economic and non-economic factors influence
Japanese MNEs’ location choices in the CEE region (see Figure 6-1). The remainder of
this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 6.2, I highlight the role of agglomeration
economies in both economic and institutional considerations. In Section 6.3, testable
hypotheses are developed in line with a brief summary of literature reviewing the
relevant location attributes that could determine the choice of FDI location by Japanese
manufacturing firms. Then, Section 6.4 and Section 6.5 demonstrate methodology, the
description of sample selection, econometric models the operationalisation of
explanatory variables and data sources. Empirical findings in the conditional logit
model will be presented in Section 6.6, and Section 6.7 presents concluding remarks
with propositions for future research.
Figure 6-1: Conceptual Model
6.2 Agglomeration Economies in Economic and Institutional
Considerations
There are two types of theoretical approaches toward an explication of a causal link
between multinational corporations’ location choices and agglomeration externalities
when investing abroad. One relies on the economic perspective of agglomeration that a
firm is likely to prefer industrial concentration to industrial dispersion because the
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former would maximise risk-adjusted returns on investment and productive efficiency
resulting from access to potential suppliers (Marshall, 1920), labour pooling (Krugman,
1991), information advantage and innovation-creating synergies (Porter, 1998). Another
is based on the institutional perspective of agglomeration that the firm is likely to follow
other firms in its quest for legitimacy in uncertain and unfamiliar environments. Namely,
political, economic and institutional hazards would compel the corporate strategy to be
more homogeneous (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). DiMaggio and Powell (1983)
integrate the term of isomorphism (Hawley, 1968) into organisational modelling and
conceptualise the behaviour of organisations to be mimetic. Now let us turn to explain
these two types of motives behind the causal association between location and
agglomeration with greater detail.
6.2.1 Economic Considerations
As already discussed in the previous chapter, a fine-grained analysis of the concept of
agglomeration economies serves as a critical step for tracing the localisation process of
offshore business activity of foreign firms. It has been recognised among scholars in the
fields of economic geography (Krugman, 1991; Marshall, 1920) and strategic corporate
management (Porter, 1990) that firms face critical tradeoffs between costs and benefits
in terms of agglomerative externalities. Discussing the positive aspect of agglomeration
economies, Marshall (1920), a father of ‘localisation’ logic, stresses that the geographic
concentration of specialised industries in particular localities would enhance the
attractiveness of a particular host country or region to a foreign investor because of a
pool of skilful labour capital and easy access to specialised inputs in proximity
(Marshall, 1920). MNEs might prefer to interact with other foreign firms if the quality
of the locally manufactured intermediate goods by domestic firms is lower than what
MNEs expect. For consumers, agglomerative forces may also facilitate making visual
inspection easy and reduce the frequency of their visits. Saving information gathering
costs pertaining to new customers and potential suppliers is also part of the underlying
concept of Marshall’s agglomeration externalities.
Porter (1990) also argues that proximity stimulates the speed and scope of
information flows over the attitudes, actions and strategies of competitors and on the
dynamic complexity of local market conditions. As pointed out by Porter (1998),
agglomeration economies encourage an organisation to collaborate with other
organisations in the form of strategic alliances, increasing the probability of creating
new technologies. Following Porter (1998), Tamayo (2000) also claims that industrial
concentration would enable multiple organisations to learn marketing strategies from
each other and would promote a pool of labour capital with specialised knowledge and
expertise. Formal and informal knowledge that firms have acquired from and shared
with other competitors in space reformulates the way of doing business more
successfully in foreign markets, thus improving product quality and production
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processes within their internal settings.
Scholars of economic geography (Arthur, 1990; Krugman, 1991) stress that the
increased intensity and density of spatial clustering encourage firms to co-locate owing
to increasing returns. Chung and Song (2004: 543) point out that “sequential entrants
may take advantage of specific infrastructure already established by earlier foreign
entrants, such as specialised suppliers and local institutions that sensitised to new
entrants’ requirements”. Silicon Valley is one of best examples for this phenomenon,
and Chang and Park (2005) suggest that positive agglomeration externalities neutralise
rising costs that arise from intensified competition.
Conversely, the negative element of agglomeration externalities has also received
attention from scholars (Chang and Park, 2005; Chung and Song, 2004; Head et al.,
1995; Oerlemans and Meeus, 2005; Shaver and Flyer, 2000). Oerlemans and Meeus
(2005) argue that spatial proximity may yield more risks and uncertainties than benefits.
Spatial clustering of firms may reduce potential investors’ incentives to co-locate due to
intensification of competition over time (Chung and Song, 2004; Head et al., 1995). In
the context of spatial proximity, the emergence of a large number of rivals tends to
minimise lucrative local monopolies and rents that a firm seeks to exploit. It is critical
to note that rising demand may result in pushing the price of inputs upwards (Head et al.,
1995; Chung and Song, 2004). Chung and Song’s (2004) study appears to vindicate the
argument that the propensity for this geographical isolation may notably increase when
transportation costs are not expensive.
In a similar vein, as time elapses, competition for labour appears to be of more
serious concern to firms operating in clusters since the supply of pooled talented labour
is not always abundant. As indicated by Shaver and Flyer (2000), spatial concentration
of economic activities enables firms to hire and attract competitors’ employees with an
offer of higher wages, indicating that the turnover rate of indigenous employees would
trend higher over time. It is pointed out by the authors that whether a firm agglomerates
or not depends on firm-specific traits such as the possession of technological
competencies. Belderbos and Carree (2002) also document that, ceteris paribus, the
more innovative firms are, the greater contribution they are likely to make to promoting
spillovers within industry clusters. Puga (2002) argues that there may be a strong
upward pressure on wages in order to prevent larger migration flows. Given these
accounts, it can be said that the positive effects of spatial externalities may die out due
to the upward trend of wage levels accruing from the growing intensity of competition
for attracting talented labour. A limited supply of human capital may also inhibit
potential foreign capital inflows and may hence reduce the probability of new R&D
development projects by foreign investors who aim at promoting higher value-added
activities. Chang and Park (2005) demonstrate in an analysis of Korean manufacturing
FDI in China that marginal benefits should be surpassed by marginal costs at a certain
point in time, while firms gain more profits from agglomeration economies at the initial
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stage. Chang and Park find that the causal relationship between location selection by
firms and agglomeration is an inverse U-curve.
6.2.2 Institutional Considerations
Apart from a heated debate on the role of mimetic behavior in stimulating a firm’s plant
locations and in enhancing economic welfare, scholars (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983;
Guillén, 2002; Henisz and Delios, 2002) view the causal interplay between
multinationals’ plant location decisions and agglomeration externalities through a
different lens, as compared to economists and business elites. The prior research
(Belderbos and Sleuwaegen, 1996; Chang and Park, 2005; Guillén, 2002; Martin et al.,
1998) underscores that the behaviour of organisations tends to be structured, developed
and recreated by the desire to raise legitimacy and acceptance, suggesting that mimetic
isomorphism would reduce economic and political uncertainty and risks (DiMaggio and
Powell, 1983; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Scott; 1995) when investing abroad. Henisz
and Delios (2001: 447) who study plant location patterns of 2,705 Japanese firms across
155 countries argue that “the number of firms adopting the same strategy or the
similarity and/or strength of the information flow between a focal firm and the firms
that it chooses to imitate may also influence rational bandwagons”.
Barry et al. (2003) stress the importance of demonstration and reputation effects
that indicate that existing firms send signals about the reliability and attractiveness of
the host country to potential investors. Imitating investors’ being already in operation in
countries with favourable locational advantages appears to send a positive signal to
banks that provide financial assistance to investors (Barry et al., 2003). Now let us turn
to develop hypotheses based on a review of past scholarship.
6.3 Review of the Literature and Hypotheses Formation
6.3.1 Classic Economic-Forces
Market demand conditions
Market size is a classic economic variable in explaining the choice of FDI location for
market-seeking investors, while the abundance of natural resources induces
resource-seeking investors. To date, numerous scholars have directed their attention
toward market potential. Driffield and Munday (2000) report that industry size and
growth, as a proxy for the level of scale economies, encourages the sequential entry of
foreign companies in the UK economy. Employing 117 Korean manufacturing firms in
the EU during the period 1986-1997 in a conditional logit model, Hong and Kim (2003)
find that the market size of the host country exerts a significant and positive impact on
the spatial distribution of Korean manufacturing firms. The larger and the more stable
the domestic market demand, the higher the possibility that a foreign firm can benefit
from taking advantage of economies of scale. Head and Mayer (2004) find that market
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potential, as measured by two primary indicators such as Harris market potential and
Krugman market potential, has a significant and positive impact on the spatial
concentration of Japanese firms in the EU. However, Yamawaki (2006) argues that the
impact of economic potential may depend on characteristics of FDI, suggesting that the
demand factor variable could be insignificant if MNEs target neighbouring markets
through exporting. Hence, I test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Japanese manufacturing firms are more likely to locate in regions where
market potential is large.
Labour costs
It has been recognised that labour cost corresponds to the structure of employment.
Similar to the unemployment rate variable, labour cost factor might also have two
conflicting outcomes. Hansen (1987) postulates a positive association between location
choice and wage, indicating that (1) labour is more efficient, (2) labour has more years
of job experience and (3) the seasonality of labour may be induced by higher wage rates.
Following the view of Hansen (1987), Majocchi and Strange (2007) argue that labour
cost provides an indication of the level of host regions’ labour productivity and average
purchasing power since there generally is a positive correlation between salary and
labour quality. Woodward (1992: 699) argues that “high wage level is considerably
detrimental to site selection for manufacturing”, while Head (1999: 206) suggests that
“high skill intensity of Japanese manufacturing plants would result in the apparent
preferences for high-wage regions”. Belderbos and Carree (2000) provide evidence that
Japanese electronics firms prefer to locate in a region where labour costs are
inexpensive in the case of China since most electronics assembly operations are
characterised by their labour-intensiveness.
In addition to previous studies, Cheng and Stough (2006) note that two more
inferences behind the positive relationship between labour costs and location choice
should be taken into account, with caution. One is that high wages can be an indicator
of high quality of life, enabling the population to enjoy a variety of shopping
opportunities and better social services (hospitals, libraries and the like). Another is that
high wage levels may result from high inflation levels. Campos and Kinoshita (2003)
point out that labour costs will be an important location factor for investors aiming at
exporting finished products from CEE to Western Europe. The authors also stress that
labour costs play a vital role in the choice of FDI location as far as low labour
productivity cancels out low labour costs. High wage levels as a proxy for labour
quality is of critical importance since labour quality is conditional on the introduction of
Japanese management systems. Consequently, two hypotheses are put forward.
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Hypothesis 2a: Japanese manufacturing firms are more likely to locate in regions
where labour costs are low.
Hypothesis 2b: Japanese manufacturing firms are more likely to locate in regions
where labour costs are high.
Area size
Conventional wisdom prevails that small regions or countries are less attractive than
large regions or countries due to the availability of potential sites. Previous studies
(Head and Mayer, 2004; Woodward, 1992) identify that the size of land is an important
scholarly explanation of location choice for Japanese manufacturing firms in the United
States and Europe, mirroring that, ceteris paribus, the larger the land size the higher
probability of the region being chosen by Japanese investors.
In contrast, Friedman et al. (1992) confirm that Japanese and European firms
were more motivated to invest in regions with less land available, while the land size
variable had no significance when testing all the sampled firms. Cieślik (2005a, 2005b)
find that the relevance of area size of voivodship in Poland in recruiting FDI is less
important compared to other locational variables. In Woodward and Rolfe’s (1993)
study, since the estimated coefficients for the area size of each country in the Caribbean
Basin region are positive but insignificant they draw a conclusion that there is no
association between area size and location choice. Therefore, the directional sign of the
land size variable remains inconclusive. I test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Japanese manufacturing firms are more likely to locate in regions where
land size is large.
6.3.2 Institutional Change
Progress in Institutional Infrastructure
The effect of institutions on FDI in transition economies has drawn less attention than
that in developed countries (Grosse and Trevino, 2005). There has been consensus of
the link between FDI and the quality of institutions. Disdier and Mayer (2004)
incorporate the degree of economic freedom of a country in Europe into their location
choice study and find that institutional deficiencies are responsible for reducing French
firms’ incentive to locate. Grosse and Trevino (2005), in a longitudinal analysis of FDI
inflows into 13 CEE countries during the period 1990-1999, advance and test the study
of the impact of the quality of institutions on FDI inflows, measured by various
institutional variables (corruption in government, political risk index, rule of law,
repatriation controls, EBRD index of enterprise reform, and change in consumer price
index). The authors also find that bad institutions constrain FDI inflows. Drawing on
evidence from previous studies, I expect the role of institutions to be of great
significance. The premise to test is as follows:
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Hypothesis 4: Japanese multinationals are more inclined to invest in a region where
political and economic institutions are stable.
Institutionalisation of FDI policies
It has been argued among researchers and host-based policy makers that policy
incentives are a crucial strategic instrument in influencing foreign firms’ location
choices in foreign markets. Host governments tend to attract foreign investors to
deprived areas through financial and fiscal incentives, such as vocational training grants,
new employment grants, and tax-holidays. It indicates that these policy incentives are
likely to help to reduce the trend for a polarisation on the capital regions. From a
corporate strategy point of view, it is expected that policy incentives enables foreign
firms to curtail operational costs. Cheng and Stough (2006) find that the impact of
policy incentives at the national level is more robust than those at the provincial level in
China, suggesting that policy efforts made by provincial governments are neither
sufficient nor effective.
In the Czech Republic, an investor obtains incentives ranging from 20 percent to
50 percent of the investment amount in a given region in accordance with state aid rules
established by the EU (CzechInvest, 2004). Provided that a firm invests in a region with
high unemployment rates, the government subsidises the firm with 200,000 CZK
(almost 6,300 Euro) per capita for new employment and 35 percent of vocational
training costs at a maximum in the Czech Republic.13 On the other hand, these FDI
incentives will be abolished or revised due to the application of EU competition policy,
while EU membership enables CEE countries to receive a great deal of benefits, such as
simplification of customs clearance, lowering of tariffs and access to Structural and
Cohesion Funds.
From a scholarly point of view, it is worth pointing out that policy incentives have
a confounding effect on foreign firms’ location choices. Taking a closer look at the
positive contribution that policy incentives make to plant location choices, Meyer and
Nguyen (2005) find that a region with institutions such as industrial parks that facilitate
access to scarce resources may attract more FDI at the provincial level in Vietnam by
employing a negative binomial count model. Meyer and Jensen (2005) argue that
special economic areas to attract greenfield investments may play a more important role
in shaping investors’ location choices in countries that completed privatisation.
With a negative binomial count model, Makabenta (2002) provides a detailed
account for the impact of special economic zones on the spatial distribution of FDI in
the Philippines. According to the author, the impact of special economic zones (SEZs)
varies by region and time. SEZs in poor regions tend to weaken economic links with
13 See JETRO home page for more detailed information.
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foreign investors. The impact of SEZs in the period 1993-1998 is more powerful than
that in the period 1987-1992. Wakasugi (2005) identifies that the impact of SEZs on
Japanese firms’ location patterns vary by industry in China. In his analysis, it is also
clarified that the average probability elasticity for Japanese FDI in the food processing
industry is the highest, followed by chemicals and transportation equipment. Hence,
numerous scholars confirm that benefits from policy incentives to attract FDI are
promising since input costs, such as labour training costs and environmental standards
costs, are diminished.
On the other hand, there are empirical findings that FDI is not necessarily
responsive to policy incentives. For instance, Basil et al. (2003) employ the nested logit
model and find that EU regional policy attracts EU MNEs to Cohesion Funds countries
and Objective 1 regions, while only Objective 1 regions lure US MNEs. In contrast, as
far as the spatial behaviour of Japanese firms in the EU concerned, Head and Mayer
(2004) find that the countries that were qualified to receive EU Structural Funds failed
to attract Japanese investment during the period 1984-1995.
Cieślik and Ryan (2005) analyse the Japanese FDI flows in Poland using a
province-level data covering years 1991-2001. The authors also identify that SEZs do
not raise the probability that a host region is selected, while controlling for other
locational characteristics. Cieślik and Ryan also discuss that it may be too early to judge
that fiscal incentives are not efficient FDI policy tools since the role of SEZs is
measured by a binary dummy variable instead of the use of detailed data such as the
amount of grants and tax exemptions. In accordance with the above empirical findings, I
postulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: Japanese manufacturing firms are more likely to locate in regions where
FDI practices are more institutionalised.
EU membership
I propose that EU membership stimulates a CEE country’s efforts to develop
institutional infrastructure and thus increases the likelihood that a firm would choose the
country. Empirical research, as noted by Bevan and Estrin (2004), confirms that the
effect of Agenda 2000 on FDI is statistically significant and positive at the 1 percent
level. Of great importance in Bevan and Estrin’s study is that the first entry candidate
countries including the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia, as
measured by a binary dummy variable, are positively related to FDI inflows. Suganuma
(2006), in an analysis of 18 CIS and CEE countries over the period 1993-2003, also
finds that EU membership positively influences FDI inflows. Iwasaki and Suganuma
(2007) also document that FDI intensity significantly changes depending on whether or
not countries completed the entry negotiations. In these studies in a macroeconomic
perspective, panel data is commonly used. However, there has been little or no evidence
162
about the impact of EU membership on foreign MNEs’ location choices at the
firm-level.
Hypothesis 6: Japanese manufacturing firms are more likely to locate in countries that
are officially part of the European Union.
6.3.3 Firm-Specific Advantages
Prior experience
Previous studies address that foreign multinationals learn from their prior experiences in
a host location and familiarity increases their propensity to reinvest (Johanson and
Vahlne, 1977). A consensus on the positive impact of experience on the
internationalisation of a firm has been built on previous relevant studies. International
experience is considered one of the vital factors in penetrating foreign markets by way
of direct investment instead of exporting or licensing. Davidson (1980) advocates the
argument that cumulative experience gives rise to learning, which leads to the
development of the firm. It is more difficult to duplicate and transfer experience due to
its intangible nature. Some behavioural theorists lend credence to the relevance of
experience in determining the variations in perception of performance of MNEs. The
accumulation of experience is believed to be a contributor to formulating more efficient
corporate strategies.
Johanson and Vahlne (1977) argue that experience constitutes an intangible
asset that rests on two types of knowledge: (1) general knowledge and (2) experiential
market-specific knowledge. Yu (1990: 561) argues that “general international operations
experience, which is composed of country-specific experience and experience gained
from managing a network of operations in different countries, tends to lead a firm to
conduct more international operations”. Yu (1990) examines the determinants of
international expansion of 100 US firms in developed and developing countries.
Consistent with Davidson (1980), Yu (1990) finds that the more experienced a
firm is in international activities the higher probability it is able to invest in new
overseas operations. In Yu’s study, the coefficient on the experience effect is statistically
more robust in developed economies compared to that in less developed economies.
Experience is found to be a significant determinant for affecting the decision to invest in
the United States (Hennart and Park, 1994). Henisz and Delios (2001) highlight that a
firm is more inclined to count on its previous entry decision when political hazards are
higher in a given location. By testing 540 Korean firms’ location choices for the period
1988-2002 in China, Chang and Park (2005: 607) provide evidence supporting
proposition that a 100 percent increase in the count of a firm’s prior entry in a region
raises the propensity to choose that region by 46.6 percent. Experience is an indication
of scope economies including market knowledge, which facilitates subsequent
investments (Hennart and Park, 1994: 431). With a longitudinal analysis of 506 South
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Korean firms in China from the beginning of January 1987 to the end of December
1995, Guillén (2002) who applied a Cox proportional hazard model finds that local
experience increases the rate of foreign expansion.
Shaver et al. (1997) find that the survival rate for firms with prior experience in
the target industry in the United States is 87 percent, suggesting that knowledge of the
host market makes reinvestments more successful. The survival of firms is in part
dependent on the question of whether they can compensate for the liability of
foreignness (Zaheer and Mosakowski, 1997). Zaheer and Mosakowski (1997: 439-40)
argue that experience resulting from learning-by-doing can moderate the liability of
foreignness defined as “high coordination costs, the foreign firm’s unfamiliarity with
the local culture and other aspects of the local market, a lack of information networks or
political influence in the host country, or the foreign firm’s inability to appeal to
nationalistic buyers”. A well-experienced firm’s location selection process is inclined to
be influenced by more technical considerations than social considerations (Henisz and
Delios, 2001). The accumulation of operational experience is in large part a tool for
alleviating environmental threats in the host country. “A host country experience
generates general knowledge and capabilities applicable to the local environment,
multinational firms that have accumulated host country experience reduce the scope of
their competitive disadvantage and face fewer operational difficulties in the local
market” (Delios and Beamish, 2001: 1029). An evolutionary perspective suggests that
the process of adjustment with global markets requires time. Accordingly, the following
hypothesis is tested:
Hypothesis 7: The number of a firm’s prior entry is likely to exert a positive influence
on the probability of a region being chosen.
6.3.4 Network-Specific Factors
Keiretsu organisation
Apart from the role of nationality and industry agglomeration in host nations in
promoting FDI, little scientific attention has been paid to the role of Japanese industrial
organisation (i.e., keiretsu) agglomeration in European emerging economies. It is
important for host governments to be aware of a sequential entry pattern of Japanese
firms where one single keiretsu member firm’s entry into a market leads to a series of
FDI inflows by member firms of the same keiretsu as already stressed in the previous
study (Belderbos and Carree, 2000; Blonigen et al., 2005; Head et al., 1995).
The keiretsu alliance of inter-firm arrangements as a source of competitive
advantage minimises transaction costs such as co-ordination costs, risks of broken
contracts, searching costs, switching costs and product quality tests in endemic and
structural market impurities (Dunning 1997). Accordingly, geographic proximity
between keiretsu members in foreign markets would also lead to the sustainable
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development of the intensive inter-firm linkages designed to merge the goals of profit
maximisation and risk sharing, and strengthen social relations. The duplication of the
vertical and horizontal form of domestic keiretsu ties abroad may facilitate the keiretsu
members’ capitalising on various mobile and immobile resources, such as competent
human resources, facilities, equipment, and experience, and financial assets within the
hybrid market compared with the arm’s-length market that involves a higher rate of
market failure. Keiretsu affiliation may also help reduce additional costs for information
acquisition, enabling member firms to stabilise the flow of parts supplies in the
procurement system and leverage strong negotiation power in foreign markets.
Moreover, in the case of vertical inter-firm networks, the duplication of the
keiretsu structure abroad permits group firms to cope with quality control and product
innovation as well as planning, while benefiting from territorial proximity. It also
promotes inter-firm business transactions at negotiated prices when capable indigenous
supplier channels are lacking. In this context, a Japanese keiretsu affiliate’s propensity
to imitate the location strategies of other keiretsu affiliates is expected to be high and
keiretsu member firms are at a more advantageous position relative to independent firms
because of group-based resource allocation in foreign markets.
As pointed out by the prior literature (Belderbos and Carree, 2002; Belderbos and
Sleuwaegen, 1996; Blonigen et al., 2005; Head et al., 1995; Head and Mayer, 2004),
keiretsu affiliation impacts the probability of the choice of Japanese FDI in foreign
markets. Chang and Park (2005) suggest that the marginal cost increase associated with
the same group agglomeration will be limited since a firm or a business group should be
more able to coordinate its location decisions to avoid any competition among its own
foreign operations. Chang and Park (2005: 599) also stress that the geographical
proximity of firms within the same corporate group or conglomerate is less subject to
the marginal costs of industrial clusters since they make deliberate efforts to seek the
overall competitiveness of the group.
Chang (1995) shows that Japanese electronics firms that belong to horizontal and
vertical keiretsu groups have higher probabilities of tapping into the US market in a
sequential form, as compared to independent firms. Firms in corporate networks
reinforce their international expansion of operations by learning other member firms’
entry experience. Chang also found that horizontal keiretsu firms have higher
propensities to take the sequential investment pattern compared to vertical keiretsu
firms.
Blonigen et al. (2005) argue that keiretsu affiliation empowers member firms to
cooperate and coordinate product design and development as well as JIT delivery
systems more flexibly with each other. Belderbos and Carree (2000: 198) also note that
the core keiretsu firm is likely to provide its member firms with active assistance in the
site selection process. The absence of local competing suppliers who can offer the same
quality of components as Japanese suppliers can be a major deterrent to Japanese
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manufacturing firms to achieve scale economies. In particular, the automobile sector
requires tight cooperation and control between a car assembler and suppliers for
specialised supplies, while products can be assembled in less complex production
processes with standardisation of technology and the use of relatively small parts in the
electric/electronics sector.
Gittelman and Graham (1994) find that the tendency that keiretsu member firms
co-locate with their parents seems stronger in the US than in the EU in the late 1980s
(Gittelman and Graham 1994). Their empirical findings are that independent keiretsu
groups in the automobile industry form a collective economic group in North America
and Western Europe as many subcontractors tend to be located close to or near their
main assemblers. Belderbos and Sleuwaegen (1996) also detect that the presence of
extensive vertical network systems developed by the parent company in the West
increases the probability that a firm invests in the West.
Head et al. (1995) who examine Japanese firms’ location pattern in the 1980s
identify that keiretsu-specific spatial concentration is a crucial incentive for encouraging
new establishments of Japanese manufacturing plants. They find that keiretsu
agglomeration is more consequential for FDI inflows than industry agglomeration and
Japan-specific agglomeration. Head et al. (1995: 242) identify that a 10 percent increase
in keiretsu agglomeration economies in a state corresponds to a 5-7 percent increase in
the likelihood of its location selection in the future. This suggests that geographic
considerations of Japanese MNEs are highly linked to the importance of intra and
inter-firm information transactions among Japanese MNEs, even when operating abroad.
Hence, it appears that internalisation plays a crucial role in the locational selection of
Japanese firms abroad.
Focusing on the location pattern of 229 Japanese electronics manufacturing firms
in China over the period 1990-95, Belderbos and Carree’s (2002) empirical results are
consistent with those presented in the study of Head et al. (1995). The authors find that
keiretsu agglomeration has a significant impact on plant selection in the electronics
industry in China. More specifically, the location pattern differs between keiretsu group
member firms and core keiretsu firms. Keiretsu group member firms prefer regions
where the manufacturing units by other keiretsu group firms are already in operation
because of information gathering costs, whereas this is not the case for core keiretsu
firms. That is to say, keiretsu agglomeration does serve as a magnet not for keiretsu
leaders but for keiretsu suppliers. More precisely, export-oriented keiretsu firms are
more inclined to amass in clusters where a number of same keiretsu member firms are
co-located.
It is importance that Japanese keiretsu suppliers tend to follow their customers in
timing and place. This is because keiretsu leaders play a crucial role in looking for
optimal candidate sites that yield high profits and low risks. In addition, core firms
leverage their bargaining capabilities to negotiate with host-based governmental
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agencies so as to exploit their strategic goals in a manner that is profitable for the
overall competitiveness of the group (Belderbos and Caree, 2002). Hence, keiretsu
member firms tend to chase after their leaders. Following these sequential investment
processes, keiretsu firms can exploit economies of scale and leverage strong negotiation
power over host-based governments.
Previous international business studies (Chang and Park, 2005; Guillen, 2002)
also confirm that group network externalities are also important in the explanation of
Korean firms’ location choices. Chang and Park (2005) find that, when contemplating a
location strategy in China, the degree of network externalities of Korean firms in the
same group is much more important than that of other Korean firms in the same
industry or different industries.
Surprisingly, there are a few studies that contradict the conventional wisdom that
advocates the significant impact of the keiretsu count variable on location choice
(Blonigen et al., 2005; Henisz and Delios, 2001; Hennart and Park, 1994). These
authors find that the vertical keiretsu agglomeration has no significant bearing on the
locational behaviour of Japanese firms. Blonigen et al. (2005: 85) infer the major
rationale behind this outcome as follows: “Vertical keiretsu members are so coordinated
in their investment decisions due to strong production linkages that new investments
into a region tend to generally occur all at roughly the same point in time”. Following
the above empirical results in the literature, I postulate:
Hypothesis 8: Japanese manufacturing firms are more likely to locate in regions where
the same keiretsu group firms are already operating.
6.3.5 Agglomeration-Specific Forces
Japanese nationality agglomeration
Consensus on the impact of agglomeration economies on Japanese firms’ location
choices has developed and evolved in the previous literature (Belderbos and Carree,
2002; Blonigen et al., 2005; Cheng and Stough, 2006; Head et al., 1995; Head and
Mayer, 2004; Smith and Florida, 1994; Togo and Arikawa, 2002; Woodward, 1992;
Yamawaki, 2006). Considering Japanese FDI in the United States, various statistical
methods such as Tobit, Poisson, negative binominal and conditional logit estimation
models were employed in the past literature. It is commonly confirmed that the
Japanese nationality agglomeration variable serves as a competitive advantage to lure
the number of investment projects by Japanese automotive-oriented firms.
Head et al. (1996) and Belderbos and Carree (2002) explore Japanese FDI in
China and also draw a similar conclusion that Japanese firms may imitate locational
patterns of other Japanese firms and may choose a region with spatial clusters of
Japanese-owned subsidiaries in China since they tend to rely on information on local
labour markets and institutions, and other Japanese firms’ experience. Cheng and
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Stough (2006) calculate that the marginal effect of Japanese nationality agglomeration
on regional location decisions in China is larger than that in the United States,
suggesting that inferior infrastructure capacity may increase the intensity and density of
spatial clusters of Japanese firms in China. These empirical results justify Chang and
Park’s (2005) postulation that the MNEs may show a preference for geographical
proximity with firms with the same nationality since they can learn more easily from
firms from the same nation than from firms that are from different nations.
It should be noted that spatial concentration of Japanese firms is strongly linked to
the duplication of JIT that is considered as “part of the Japanese social organisation of
production” (Sadler, 1994: 56). It is of great importance to duplicate good quality
control and JIT delivery systems through spatial closeness in areas endowed with
uncertainty (Belderbos and Carree, 2002). Although the quality of JIT relationships with
Japanese suppliers is significantly heterogeneous in terms of regions and countries, as
pointed out by Martin and Kenny (1988), the implementation of JIT deliveries is
perceived among Japanese assemblers in the United States as the overall strategic
competitiveness of Japanese automobile industry to outperform the Big Three firms
(GM, Ford and Chrysler) in a substantial reliance on arm’s length transactions. The
adoption of JIT linkages with Japanese suppliers in the United States is hence perceived
to be one of the key factors in success.
On the other hand, Sadler (1994) notes that the duplication of JIT linkages with
Japanese suppliers in Europe is constrained since Japanese assemblers’ greater reliance
on the European automotive component industry was attributable to political pressure
by the European Community and the presence of a number of component suppliers with
competitive strength in Europe. Similarly, Florida and Kenny (1992) argue that strategic
location behaviour of Japanese firms in the US steel industry is characterised by spatial
concentration instead of spatial dispersion since they feel the need for supplying steel
products to the Big Three on a JIT basis.
Chang (1995), who investigates the sequential entry process of Japanese
electronics manufacturing firms in the period from 1976-1989 in the United States,
identifies that Japanese firms take an evolutionary approach to entering the US markets
ranging from core to non-core businesses. According to Chang’s empirical analysis in
the Cox proportional hazard model, Japanese firms tap into core businesses in which
they can overcome the liability of foreignness by means of their strong intangible assets
(R&D and advertising skills) and strong spatial concentration with other Japanese firms.
Previous studies (Barrios et al., 2006; Belderbos and Carree, 2002; Shaver and
Flyer, 2000; Wakasugi, 2005) highlight the extent to which firm heterogeneity and
industry heterogeneity plays a role in promoting the impact of the geographical
proximity with other firms on location selection. Shaver and Flyer (2000), with special
focus on adverse selection, argue that firms that possess advanced technologies do not
gain benefits from the existence of agglomeration economies, suggesting that spatial
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separation thus enhances the probability of a firm’s survival. Shaver and Flyer’s study
also confirms that larger firms are less motivated to cluster. Barrios et al. (2006) suggest
the effect of agglomeration is heterogeneous depending on the level of technological
competitive advantages that firms possess. Barrios et al. find that the impact of
localisation, a measure to agglomeration economies, on low-tech firms’ location choices
is positive in the case of low-tech firms during the period 1983-1998 in Ireland, while it
has no significant effect on high-tech firms’ location choices during the same period
when controlling for wages.
In addition, Wakasugi (2005), who explores market entry strategies of potential
Japanese investors in China, finds the average probability elasticity varies by industry.
According to the author, Japanese firms in the food processing sector are more sensitive
to industrial agglomeration compared to other sectors such as electric and electronics as
well as textiles. Japanese MNEs can also reduce lead times to improve delivery
performance by means of situating their manufacturing plants close to local suppliers
and customers. In other words, transaction costs and investment uncertainty, such as
information sharing costs, transportation costs, supplier-searching costs, and
coordination costs, will be minimised through the spatial concentration of business
activities.
As far as soft factors are considered, it is important to note that Japanese
nationality agglomeration tends to generate a large community of Japanese expatriates
and their families and develop social infrastructure including Japanese schools and
Japanese grocery stores. A series of my interviews with Japanese expatriates in CEE
confirms that the presence of Japanese schools seems important to their location
decisions. Following the above empirical results, we can assume that Japanese
manufacturing companies may show a preference for sites situated close to Japanese
nationality agglomeration in order to reduce information gathering costs relating to
consumer preference, tax procedures, attitudes and behaviours of local workers and
political culture in the ex-Soviet type economies. I hypothesise that being a part of an
agglomeration confers upon Japanese firms more economic gains than competition
costs. I expect the directional sign to be positive.
Hypothesis 9: Japanese manufacturing firms are more likely to locate in regions where
the intensity of Japanese nationality agglomeration is high.
Japanese nationality agglomeration in the same industry and other industries
Strategic behaviour of rivals has played a critical role in affecting the location pattern of
firms (Chang and Park, 2005). From the perspective of institutional economics and
sociology (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995), mimetic isomorphism plays a
crucial role in explicating the behaviour of foreign investors. Besides the issue of a
cost-benefit calculation of economic returns, investors pay more attention to what rivals
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are doing and where they exist. Investment strategies are structured by competitors and
non-competitors, who notably are rooted in similar norms, cultural understanding and
identity.
Drawing on the learning effect, Japanese MNEs may benefit from early Japanese
entrants. In other words, we can assume that the intensity of Japanese agglomeration in
the same industry and different industries may play a positive role in attracting
would-be Japanese FDI since the success of early entrants in a region might create a
positive image of the region. In addition, this demonstration effect may justify that
formal and informal constraints external to firms are manageable even for Japanese
firms. Employing both conditional logit and nested logit models, Head and Mayer
(2004) find that Japanese nationality agglomeration in the same industry affects
would-be Japanese investors’ location choices in Europe.
On the other hand, the intensity of Japanese firms in the same industry may force
a Japanese firm to rely on spatial dispersion due to decreasing marginal benefits
resulting from competition. Chang and Park (2005), in a longitudinal analysis of Korean
FDI in China during the period for 1980-1995, find that Korean firms in the same
industry are inclined to agglomerate at an early entry period. However, they tend to rely
on spatial separation at certain threshold in time. This phenomenon indicates a shift
toward the introduction of a competition avoidance strategy. This leads to two
competing hypotheses:
Hypothesis 10: Japanese manufacturing firms are more likely to locate in regions
where the intensity of Japanese nationality agglomeration in the same industry is high.
Hypothesis 11: Japanese manufacturing firms are more likely to locate in regions
where the intensity of Japanese nationality agglomeration in different industries is low.
I now turn to research methodology.
6.4 Methodology
This empirical study is dedicated to investigating explicit causal links between the
spatial behaviour of Japanese investors and some key variables that influence their
locational choices in CEE at the sub-national regional level. I focus on the location
selection of Japanese manufacturing investments across regions in the ex-Communist
economies. The original data set was compiled from Kaigai Kigyō Shinshutsu Sōran
2007 by Toyo Keizai Shimpōsha and from Zai Oushū Toruko Nikkei Seizōgyō no Keiei
Jittai 2007 by Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO). The former database
contains the information that includes location, entry mode, ownership characteristics,
number of indigenous employees and Japanese expatriates, capital, name of contact
person, telephone and fax numbers, and date of entry. The latter database contains the
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information on location, industry classification, and date of entry. It should be noted that
most of the sampled firms in this study are listed companies on the Tokyo Stock
Exchange and are large transnational companies.
6.4.1 Sample Data
Table 6-1: The Number of Japanese Manufacturing Firms by the NUTS-1 Level
Source: Own illustration based on JETRO (2007)
Table 6-2: NACE Manufacturing Industry Sub-Classifications
NUTS-1 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 ∑
Centralny 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 2 0 7
Poludniowy 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 2 1 1 0 2 1 11
Wschodni 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 5
Polnocno-Zachodni 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 9
Poludniwo-Zachdni 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 2 4 5 0 2 17
Polnocny 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 9
Czech Republic 1 4 1 0 1 3 3 0 2 4 12 12 7 10 3 4 67
Közép-Magyarország 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 2 0 2 2 1 12
Dunantul 1 0 1 0 0 1 2 2 3 4 0 2 2 1 1 3 23
Alfold es Eszak 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 3 0 1 1 0 0 13
Slovakia 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 2 2 0 0 1 2 1 12
Macroregiunea unu 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2
Macroregiunea doi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Macroregiunea trei 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 2 6
Macroregiunea patru 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 5
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2
Severna i iztochna 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Yugozapadna i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Serbia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Montenegro 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
∑ 3 4 4 3 5 7 12 6 10 16 24 25 20 22 15 29 205
NACE code Description
DA15-16 Food Products, Beverages, and Tobacco
DB17-19 Textiles and Textile Products
DE21-22 Pulp, Paper and Paper Products Publishing and Printing
DG24 Chemicals, Chemical Products and Man-made Fibers
DH25 Rubber and Plastic Products
DI26 Other Non-metallic Mineral Products
DJ27-28 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal Products
DK29 Machinery and Equipment Not Elsewhere Classified
DL30-33 Electrical and Optical Equipment
DM34 Transport Equipment
DN36 Manufacturing Not Elsewhere Classfied
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I limit the analysis to the location decisions of 205 Japanese manufacturing firms for
years 1991-2006. The reason for this is derived from data availability and mitigation of
measurement errors. Moreover, of great importance is that economic, political and
social distance between the EU member countries and EU candidate countries has
decreased from the early phase of transition after the fall of state socialism. For instance,
many of the sampled countries concluded the European Agreement with the EU in the
early 1990s. Second, using this longitudinal data empowers us to capture the dynamic
variation in the magnitude of location factors.
Table 6.1 demonstrates the relative proportion of Japanese manufacturing firms to
the total. Roughly 75 percent of total establishment of Japanese manufacturing affiliates
of the sample used took place after 2000. Table 6.3 shows the geographical distribution
of Japanese-owned manufacturing firms across NUTS-1 regions. Macroregiunea doi in
Romania had no new start-ups by Japanese firms during the years 1991-2006. The
Czech Republic (67) is the most successful destination that accounts for the largest
number of Japanese manufacturing firms at the NUTS-1, followed by the Dunántúl
region (23) and Poludniwo-Zachdni region (17), in Hungary and Poland respectively.
Based on the country breakdown, the Czech Republic has attracted 66 firms (I dropped
one company that entered in 1990.), accounting for roughly 32.7 percent, followed by
Poland (28.7 percent) and Hungary (23.4 percent).
Table 6-3 shows that the spatial distribution of Japanese firms is widely dispersed.
Many favourable destinations are concentrated in southern Polish regions, northern
Hungarian regions and central Czech regions. The 21 regions, as defined by NUTS-1 of
the EU, consist of one region in the Czech Republic, three regions from Hungary, six
regions from Poland, one region in Slovakia and four regions in Romania, two regions
in Bulgaria, one region in Lithuania, one region in Montenegro, one region in Serbia,
and one region in Slovenia. Previous relevant studies followed an estimation rule that
all alternatives are required to be chosen at least once (e.g., Belderbos and Carree, 2002;
Cheng, 2005; Cheng, 2007; Cheng and Stough, 2006; Head et al., 1995). Following this
rule of the estimation technique, Macroregiunea doi in Romania is excluded from this
analysis, although this procedure may cause a sample selection bias. This study
examines 205 locational decisions made by Japanese MNEs from 1991-2006 across 20
location alternatives for investment. The total number of observations is 4,100.
I also examine the location patterns for the years 1998-2006 as well because of
the following reasons. Of great importance is that economic, political and social
distance between the EU and EU member candidate countries became substantially
closer after 1998. First, the EU started negotiation talks for accession with a first wave
of CEECs (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia) in 1998 and a second
wave of CEE aspirants (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia) in 2000.
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Figure 6-2: Nested Structure Tree of Regions in CEE
Source: Own illustration
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Second, the EU started providing the former Soviet satellite countries with
structural assistance after initiatives for institutional reforms in those nations shifted
from the IMF to the EU. Third, the late 1990s have witnessed a sharp increase in FDI
inflows in many transforming economies of the CEE countries as an indication of
success in institutional reforms, financial liberalisation, and mass privatisation.
Although the number of Japanese manufacturing firms has been increasing with
slow pace since the dawn of the new century, their experience and knowledge about
products, labour, capital and housing markets, work ethic and cultural divergence
remain relatively limited compared to Western counterparts in CEE. Many firms in my
interviews reported that communication gaps, amorphous social welfare systems,
excessive bureaucratic complexity, and administrative procedures with much red tape
shift transaction and coordination costs upward. Hence, a vital approach toward
achieving better performance is to promote knowledge acquisition and exploitation in
proximity with other firms with the same country of origin.
Table 6-3: Sub-National Regional Percentages of Japanese MNEs in New
Manufacturing Plants in the Period 1991-2006 (205 plant start-ups)
A number of companies in the sample invested across CEECs at least twice or
more during the sample period. In the automobile-related sector, Toyota set up three
factories (two in Poland and one in the Czech Republic). Nissan’s leading tier one
supplier, Calsonic, is also deeply involved in the development of the manufacturing
units in Poland, Hungary and Romania. Bridgestone also invested five times. Of these,
three factories are concentrated in the region of Polnocno-Zachodni in Poland.
Sumitomo Electric invested more than ten times and has established an extensive
network of production and sales across the region. Notably, Sumitomo Electric’s
N % N %
58 28.7 13 6.3
Centralny 7 3.4 Macroregiunea unu 2 1.0
Poludniowy 11 5.4 Macroregiunea doi 0 0.0
Wschodni 5 2.4 Macroregiunea trei 6 2.9
Polnocno-Zachodni 9 4.4 Macroregiunea patru 5 2.4
Poludniwo-Zachdni 17 8.3 Bulgaria 2 1.0
Polnocny 9 4.4 Severna i iztochna 1 0.5
67 32.7 Yugozapadna i yuzhna
centralna
1 0.5
12 5.9 2 1.0
48 23.4 1 0.5
Közép-Magyarország 12 5.9 1 0.5
Dunantul 23 11.2 1 0.5
Alfold es Eszak 13 6.3 Total 205 100
Czech Republic
Slovakia
Hungary
Source : Own calculation based on JETRO (2007)
Location Location
Lithuania
Slovenia
Serbia
Montenegro
RomaniaPoland
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production activity is concentrated in Poland and Hungary. Yazaki also invested five
times. What is common for Sumitomo Electric and Yazaki is that both of them focus on
manufacturing labour-intensive products such as wire-harness. In the consumer
electronics sector, Matsushita, which already invested seven times, has strengthened its
market presence, while other firms such as Toshiba, Sharp and Hitachi were late comers
who decided to invest in 2006.
6.4.2 Model Specification
Following neoclassical economic theory of utility-maximising behaviour, a decision
maker would select one of the candidate countries or regions that would provide an
investment environment that would maximise high earnings and returns on investment
when setting up subsequent plants. In the plant location decision-making process, the
issues of where to minimise high transportation costs, how to have efficient access to
the labour pool and how to form well-functioning value chains in parallel with the
exploitation of cheap but quality input attributes at a maximum. In this regard, discrete
choice models have shown methodological reliability and appropriateness in
disaggregate analyses. I present a conditional logit model and a nested logit model to
assess crucial factors that determine the location patterns of new Japanese
manufacturing start-ups in the CEE economies at the sub-national regional level.
6.4.2.1 Conditional Logit Model
Apart from topics in politics, labour economics, sociology and psychology, the
conditional logit model established by McFadden (1974) has been commonly used as an
econometric model to analyse the location behaviour of firms in the previous literature
(e.g., Chang and Park, 2005; Cheng and Stough, 2006, Chung and Song, 2004;
Coughlin et al., 1991; Deichmann and Karidis, 2005; Friedman et al., 1992; Guimarães
et al., 2000; Head et al., 1995; Head and Mayer, 2004; ; Wakasugi, 2005; Woodward,
1992; Yamawaki, 2006), since the model can incorporate various qualitative variables.
McFadden’s (1974) conditional logit model takes for granted that alternatives are not
correlated with one another in the random utility maximisation specification (Guimarães,
Figueiredo and Woodward, 2000).
Assuming that firm i (i=1,…,n) selects one of J alternatives to locate and firm i is
a rational decision maker in choosing area j which provides a higher profit than
somewhere else, the profit function, π୧,୨, that firm i chooses j is as follows:
ߨ௜,௝ = ܯܽݔ൛݈݊ߨ௜,௝;݆= 1,⋯ ,ܬൟ
The above equation can be transformed into:
ߨ௜,௝ = ߚܺ௜,௝+ ߝ௜,௝
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X denotes region j’s observable attributes in the year t, while ߝ௜,௝corresponds to a
function of unobservable or unmeasurable characteristics in the region y in the year t. β
is the vector of parameters to be estimated. The primary aim is to explore β to be the
maximum likelihood in the estimation model (McFadden, 1974). Considering the
maximum likelihood ௜ܲ,௝ that firm i chooses j in the year t, the likelihood to observe a
particular pattern will be obtained in the linear function. McFadden (1974: 110) assumes
that the disturbance terms are independently and identically distributed according to
Weibull distribution. The probability of choosing j is mathematically expressed as
follows:
௜ܲ,௝ = ܲݎ൫ߨ௜,௝≥ ߨ௜,௞൯= ܲݎ൫ߝ௜,௞ − ߝ௜,௝≤ ߚܺ௜,௝− ߚܺ௜,௞൯,∀݇≠ ݆
Follwoing McFadden (1974), the likelihood that investor i chooses j in the year t is
expressed as follows:
௜ܲ,௝஼௅ = ݁ݔ݌൫ߚܺ௜,௝൯ ෍ ݁ݔ݌൫ߚܺ௜,௝൯௃
௝ୀଵ
ൗ
Accordingly, the likelihood that investor i chooses j in the year t in the explanation of a
Japanese manufacturing firm’s site selection in CEE is presented by:
௜ܲ,௝஼௅ = ݁ݔ݌൫ߚܺ௜,௝൯ ෍ ݁ݔ݌൫ߚܺ௜,௝൯ଶ଴
௝ୀଵ
ൗ
The tested explanatory variables are structured into a five-component taxonomy of (1)
classic economic factors, (2) institution-specific factors, (3) firm-specific advantage, (4)
network-specific factor, and (5) agglomeration-specific factors, which originate in a
combination of the logic of agglomeration externalities (Marshall, 1920; Porter, 1990),
Dunning’s O and L advantages (Dunning, 1981, 1993, 1997, 2008), theory of economic
geography (Krugman, 1991) and network theory (Gerlach, 1992; Lincoln and Gerlach:
2004).
All variables used for this model appear in natural logarithm in order to make the
range of the variable values narrower and to allow the coefficients to function as
elasticity. In addition, it will contribute to scaling down the variation and minimising the
probable impact of heteroskedasticity (Kumar 2002: 19). Since the effects of various
locational variables on Japanese firms’ location choice over time and space are
examined, the structure of the model specification needs not only a spatial aspect but
also a time dimension. I will explore the period from 1998 to 2006. Based on the
significance of the coefficients, I will define whether selected variables play a role in
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recruiting Japanese FDI.
All the variables are measured in t-1, because the investment decision is normally
determined by an assessment of endowment effects in an earlier year, at least t-1. In
other words, of importance is to avoid potential problems of simultaneity (Cieślik,
2005). The dependent variable takes the value of one, if a given MNE i established a
plant in a given region y in a given year t, and zero otherwise.
Several critical aspects of the use of the conditional logit model should be kept in
mind. First, it is of great importance that the conditional logit model is reliable only if
the assumption of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is not violated. In other words, random
terms are required to be independent across locations in the conditional logit model
(Head and Mayer, 2004).
Second, McFadden’s conditional logit model does not give a complete picture of
the structure of a hierarchical and sequential decision process from the national level to
the sub-national regional level in managing the geographic configuration of foreign
investors. To minimise the violation of the IIA assumption, regional dummy variables
are included in previous studies (Bartik, 1985; Cheng and Stough, 2006; Head et al.,
1995; Woodward 1992). Coughlin and Segev (2000) find that the parameter estimates
for explanatory variables do not change with and without regional dummy variables in
their study. In contrast, according to Cheng (2007), the inclusion of regional dummy
variables is just a temporal solution to counterbalancing the IIA problem. Hence, the
author argues that the validity of empirical findings in the conditional logit model needs
to be verified by different methods such as the nested logit model and the mixed logit
model. Some researchers have confirmed their empirical findings with a greater reliance
on more appropriate statistical methods including the nested logit model (Basile et al.,
2003; Cheng, 2007;; Disdier and Mayer, 2004; Guimarães et al., 1998; Hansen, 1987;
Head and Mayer, 2004 ; Yabe, 2005) and the mixed logit model (Cheng, 2005).
6.5 Operationalisation of Independent Variables
The appropriate operationalisation of explanatory variables is an important part of the
econometric evaluation. The process of such selection tends to be contingent on
interests for research as well as on data availability. The test is devoted to assessing
what factors play a crucial role in shaping Japanese manufacturing firms’ location
choices at the disaggregate level. The hypotheses tested in this study are
multidimensional. Japanese nationality agglomeration, keiretsu affiliation, market size,
area size, highway network intensity are positively associated with Japanese
manufacturing firms’ location choices in CEE, while distance to Frankfurt is negatively
related. As previous studies showed a mixed relationship, other explanatory variables
such as unemployment rates and labour costs are inconclusive. The hypotheses will be
rejected if the empirical results are not consistent with the expected signs. Three
agglomeration-related variables will be tested separately to avoid problems of
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multicollinearity (see Table 6-5).
6.5.1 Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables
Table 6-4: Definition of Explanatory Variables
6.5.1.1 Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is dichotomous in this discrete choice model. If a Japanese
manufacturing firm chooses one region out of 20 NUTS-1 regions for the period from
1991-2006, the value of one is taken, and zero otherwise.
6.5.1.2 Independent Variables
Now turn to consider the measurement of the independent variables. In the model part, I
consider four groups of explanatory variables: (1) classic economic factors (market
potential, labour cost and area size); (2) institution-specific factors (progress in
institutional infrastructure and institutionalisation of FDI laws); (3) firm-specific
advantage; (4) network-specific factors; and (5) agglomeration-specific factors.
Variable Definition Signs
1 Economic forces Market potential ln(host GDP and
neighboring GDP in millions)
+
2 Economic forces Labour cost ln(monthly labour costs) in 2006 ?
3 Economic forces Area size ln(area size of NUTS 1 in
square km)
+
4 Institution-specific Progress in institutional
infrastructure
Average index of 13 EBRD
transition indicators*
+
5 Institution-specific Institutionalization
of FDI policies
1 if the country has a FDI
promotion law in a given year
+
6 Institution-specific European Union
membership
1 if the country gained EU
membership in a given year
+
7 Firm-specific
advantage
Host-region experience ln(1+count of a firm’s own prior
entry)
+
8 Network-specific
forces
Keiretsu agglomeration ln(1+number of keiretsu firms) ?
9 Agglomeration forces Japanese agglomeration
in all industries
ln(1+number of Japanese firms) +
10 Agglomeration forces Japanese agglomeration
in the same industry
ln(1+number of Japanese
firms in the same industry)
+
11 Agglomeration forces Japanese agglomeration
in different industries
ln(1+number of Japanese
firms in other industries)
+
Note : * indicates the larger the indicator the more developed institutional infrastructure (1 indicates
low convergence toward the standard of developed countries and 5 indicates high convergence.)
Categorization
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Table 6-5: Correlation Matrix of Explanatory Variables
Market demand conditions
I measure market potential across regions by comparing Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
in the European transition economies. As proposed in the previous literature (Belderbos
and Carree, 2000), I include the market size variable such as GDP in the conditional
logit specification of this study to avoid the problem that the coefficients of the
agglomeration variables are biased. Cieślik (2005) stresses that the GDP variable can be
characterised by two dimensions: (1) demand and (2) supply sides. The variable can be
interpreted as an indicator of potential demand as well as the availability of domestic
suppliers. Hong and Kim (2003) used the value of GDP as their indicator of economic
potential. The sum of GDP of a host region and its neighbouring regions is used as a
proxy for market potential in this study, consistent with Chung and Song (2004). Data
was obtained from Eurostat. Positive directional signs are predicted.
Labour cost
The operationalisation of the labour cost variable is relatively straightforward. Hong and
Kim (2003) use earnings per hour in manufacturing as their indicator of labour costs.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Mean.(SD.)
Min.
(Max.)
1 1 18.3
(6.0)
7.9
(32.2)
2 0.24 1 2.7
(0.2)
2.3
(3.1)
3 0.12 -0.32 1 4.6
(0.3)
3.8
(4.9)
4 0.38 0.47 -0.05 1 3.0
(0.7)
0.9
(4.0)
5 0.25 0.31 -0.19 0.42 1 0.7
(0.5)
0.0
(1.0)
6 0.08 0.15 -0.02 0.19 0.14 1 0.1
(0.2)
0.0
(1.0)
7 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.11 0.08 0.04 1 0.0
(0.1)
0.0
(0.7)
8 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.11 0.10 -0.04 0.30 1 0.0
(0.1)
0.0
(1.2)
9 0.51 0.39 -0.01 0.60 0.51 0.18 0.21 0.19 1 0.5
(0.4)
0.0
(1.8)
10 0.31 0.27 -0.03 0.38 0.31 0.08 0.23 0.26 0.70 1 0.2
(0.3)
0.0
(1.6)
11 0.48 0.38 0.01 0.57 0.48 0.20 0.17 0.14 0.96 0.52 1 0.4
(0.4)
0.0
(1.8)
Note : N=4100 (=205×20).
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Head and Mayer (2004) use total wage bill divided by number of employees as their
indicator of labour costs. The expected sign of labour cost is either positive or negative
in the econometric estimation. Average monthly gross wage in the manufacturing sector
is used for this analysis. Data for the level of wages at the NUTS-1 level in CEE is not
available in the Eurostat database. I use WIIW’s (Wiener Institut für Internationale
Wirtschaftsvergleiche) database which provides the level of wages in the year 2006
for each country. Positive or negative directional signs are predicted.
Area size
Following previous studies (Woodward, 1992), I use land size in square kilometres to
control for the size of the regions. The data source is from Eurostat. Positive directional
signs are predicted.
Progress in institutional infrastructure
Consistent with Meyer (2001), the average value of EBRD’s transition indicators in
thirteen fields is used as a proxy for the development of institutional building of each
country in a given establishment year.
Institutionalisation of FDI policies
Meyer and Nguyen (2005) use the sum of square metres of industrial zones within a
province in Vietnam as the availability of special economic areas to capture the impact
of policy incentives on the scale of FDI in the Poisson regression. Cieślik (2005) use a
binary dummy variable for SEZs as his indicator of fiscal incentives. Yamawaki (2006)
uses statutory corporate tax rates at the national level as an indicator for government
intervention. Hong and Kim (2003) employ corporate tax revenue as a percentage of
GDP to measure tax burdens. Hong and Kim argue that the level of tax burdens
determines Korean firms’ capacity to finance locally. Nevertheless, common statistical
data on public incentives such as the amount of subsidies and tax exemption and the
number of special economic areas at the NUTS-1 level are not available. I use a binary
dummy variable for the enforcement of FDI promotion laws at the national level as a
proxy for the institutionalisation of FDI policies. This variable accounts for the extent to
which FDI practices are institutionalised to facilitate FDI inflows.
EU membership
Following the previous scholarship (Bevan and Estrin, 2004; Iwasaki and Suganuma,
2007; Suganuma, 2006), I use a binary dummy variable in a given region at a given
establishment year..
Prior experience
180
In line with the previous scholarship (Chang and Park, 2005; Henisz and Delios, 2001),
I use the count of a firm’s prior entry in a given region as a proxy for experience or
familiarity.
Keiretsu network externalities
Belderbos and Carree (2000) and Head and Mayer (2004) employ the number of
affiliates owned by the same Japanese parent or members of the same vertical keiretsu.
Similarly, the count of market entry by firms belonging to the same vertical keiretsu
group is used as a proxy for keiretsu affiliation in this research in a given region at a
given establishment year. Positive directional signs are predicted.
Japanese nationality agglomeration
Head and Ries (2002) and Blonigen et al. (2005) used the number of employees as a
proxy for agglomeration and information effects, while Head et al. (1995, 1999) applied
the number of Japanese-owned greenfield investments in a state prior to the decision of
a particular investor as a proxy for agglomeration effects. In addition, the value of
production of firms as well as the starting year of producing operations can be taken as
alternatives. Here, this study employs the number of Japanese and foreign plant
facilities already set up in each region.
Japanese nationality agglomeration is gauged by the cumulative number of
previous investment projects at the time of each venture establishment in a given region.
Following Belderbos and Carree (2002) and Head et al. (1995), to overcome a problem
to take the log of zero for regions with no previous investment, the variable is hence
measured by one plus the number of new plants the year prior to the investment i in a
given region in a given establishment year. I use various directories of Japanese firms
operating in the enlarged Europe in order to compile the appropriate data. The
directories are JETRO (2006), Toyo Keizai’s (2007) Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyō Souran,
the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in the Czech Republic (2006) and JETRO Hungary
(2006). Since this list of Japanese firms with operations does not provide location at the
sub-national regional level, the address of each individual company was checked on the
Internet.
Japanese agglomeration in the same industry and different industries
Data were compiled from JETRO (2007). Agglomeration externalities arising from the
geographic clustering of Japanese firms in the same industry and different industries
were gauged by the cumulative number of previous investment projects at the time of
each venture establishment in a given region. Following prior work, the variable is
measured by one plus the number of new plants the year prior to the investment in a
given region in a given establishment year. Positive directional signs are predicted.
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6.6 Empirical Results
This section presents empirical findings. It is important to keep in mind that logit
models do not allow us to directly interpret the coefficient estimates as marginal effects
since logit models are not linear-oriented (Chang and Park, 2005; Head et al., 1995;
Wakasugi, 2005). The appropriate interpretation of empirical results requires us to
calculate the average probability elasticity for each explanatory variable which
represents the marginal effect, as pointed out by the prior scholarship (Chang and Park,
2005; Head et al., 1995). The elasticity of the probability of investor i selecting region j
with factor endowment ܺ௞can be measured as follows:
ܧ௜,௝ = ߲ܲݎ݋ܾ (ܬ) ߲ܺ௞/ ∙ ܺ௞ ܲݎ݋ܾ (ܬ)/ = ߚ௞{1 − ܲݎ݋ܾ (ܬ)}
The sum across all states of the individual probabilities of investor i selecting region j
enables us to find the average probability elasticity of factor endowment ܺ௞where J is
the total number of alternative regions and ߚ௞ is the estimated coefficient of factor
endowment ܺ௞(Chung and Song, 2004). In this study, Japanese investors have 20
alternative regions in the period from 1991-2006. The average probability elasticity of
explanatory parameter ܺ௞is approximately 95.23 percent of ߚ௞ in the period.
ܧ௜,௝ = ෍ ෍ ܧ௜,௝ଶ଴
௝ୀଵ
ே
௜ୀଵ
= ߚ௞ ∙ {(ܻ− 1)/ܻ} = ߚ௞ ∙ {(20 − 1)/20} ≈ 0.95ߚ௞
The coefficient magnitudes of explanatory variables can be measured by the elasticity of
the probability of investor j selecting region j based on explanatory variables. Because
the number of choices is equivalent to 20 in the estimations, elasticity can be found by
multiplying the coefficient estimates by 0.95. The conditional logit model was
employed to assess the impact of the explanatory parameters, which maximise the
probability of choosing plant sites by 205 Japanese MNEs from 1991 to 2006 in CEE.
Tables 6-6 and 6-7 summarise the empirical findings for the locational choice of
Japanese MNEs. The statistical significance of agglomeration effects, cost variables,
stimuli factor, demand and institutional conditions and supply factors are measured by
maximum likelihood estimations. The first and second rows correspond to the estimated
coefficients and z-values, respectively. More specifically, the empirical investigation
includes various time-variant and time-invariant variables. While the former is the
number of Japanese firms and the size of GDP, the latter is area size.
The chi-square statistic proves that all estimation models are highly significant,
with p<0.0001. The pseudo R square ranges from 0.185-0.198 for the period from
1991-2006, indicating that all models presented in Table 6-6 have good model fit.
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Market demand conditions
Market potential is found to exert no significant effect on location choice for both of the
periods from 1991-2006 and 1998-2006, although the former period shows that the
market potential variable is consistently as positive as predicted.
Labour cost
The labour cost variable is found to have a positive impact on location choice for the
period 1991-2006. The coefficient estimates on this labour variable are statistically
significant at the ten percent level for the period from 1991-2006. A ten percent rise in
the labour cost would enhance the probability of choosing that area by 11.4 percent (i.e.,
0.95×1.204). However, when it comes to the coefficient estimate on the labour cost
variable for the period from 1998-2006, its statistical significance disappears.
Area size
The area size variable is a significant positive determinant in affecting Japanese MNEs’
location choices as seen in Models 2, 3 and 5. A ten percent increase in the area size
results in a 6.76 (i.e., 0.95×0.712) to 8.24 (i.e., 0.95×0.867) percent increase in the odds
of being chosen.
Progress in institutional infrastructure
Model 2 and Model 5 provide evidence that improvement of institutional infrastructure,
as measured by the average value of EBRD’s transition indicators for 13 fields, plays a
vital role in increasing the probability of a NUTS-1 region being selected.
Institutionalisation of FDI laws
The FDI-institution variable, measured by a binary dummy variable for the enforcement
of FDI promotion laws, is found to be significantly positive for both of the periods from
1991-2006 and 1998-2006, holding all other variables constant. Consistent with the
previous chapter, the institutionalisation of FDI laws explains the spatial patterns and
consequences of Japanese FDI.
EU membership
EU membership exerts no influential impact on Japanese manufacturing firms’ location
choice in CEE. The coefficients are as positive as expected, but they are statistically
insignificant. Japanese manufacturing MNEs may not perceive EU membership as a
direct effect on their location strategy.
Prior experience
Prior experience, measured by the count of a firm’s own prior market entry, has a
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statistically significant impact on a Japanese multinational corporation’s location choice,
holding all other variables constant. The coefficient estimates on this experience
variable range from 3.524 to 3.871 for the period from 1991-2006. When calculating the
average probability elasticity, it can be interpreted that a 10 percent rise in the count of a
firm’s own prior entry in a NUTS-1 area would enhance the probability of choosing that
area by 33.5 (i.e., 0.95×3.524) to 34.3 percent (i.e., 0.95×3.871). The magnitude of the
prior experience variable surpasses that of other explanatory variables, suggesting that
Japanese firms are inclined to count on imitative market-entry strategies, as pointed out
by Heinz and Delios (2001).
Keiretsu agglomeration
All things being equal, Table 6-5 shows that the keiretsu agglomeration variable shows
high significant positive coefficient estimates. The presence of keiretsu networks serves
as a magnet in the explanation of the spatial behaviour of Japanese MNEs in the
formerly centrally-planned economies of the CEECs. Japanese keiretsu firms are
inclined to follow member firms of the same keiretsu and be located in close proximity
to each other. This phenomenon indicates that the social organisation of Japanese
network relations is duplicated in the European transition economies, and a firm is
highly inclined to benefit from information sharing and technical assistance by ways of
entering the market at a close timing and proximity. The coefficient estimate on the
keiretsu agglomeration variable ranges from 2.420 to 3.077 over the 1991-2006 period.
When calculating the average probability elasticity, it can be interpreted that a 10
percent rise in the count of firms in the same group in a NUTS-1 area would enhance
the probability of choosing that area by 22.99 (i.e., 0.95×2.420) to 29.23 percent (i.e.,
0.95×3.077). The average probability elasticity for the period 1998-2006 ranges from
25.8 percent to 31.12 percent.
Japanese agglomeration in all industries
All things being equal, a rise in the number of existing Japanese firms in a given region
should also have a positive effect on location strategy. The coefficients of the Japanese
nationality agglomeration variable are consistent with the prediction and are statistically
significant and positive at the one percent significance level. Largely supporting the
existing literature (e.g., Belderbos and Carree, 2002; Head et al., 1995, 1999;
Woodward, 1992), the findings of this study provide evidence that location choice is
shaped by other firms with the same national origin. When calculating the average
probability elasticity for the period 1991-2006, a 10 percent increase in the count of
Japanese firms in all industries in a NUTS-1 region leads to a 13.64 percent increase in
the probability of that region being chosen. Interestingly, the average probability
elasticity for the period 1998-2006 becomes slightly weaker relative to the former
period.
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Japanese agglomeration in the same industry
All things being equal, the count of Japanese firms in the same industry shows a
positive sign as anticipated and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, as seen
in Model 2 and Model 5. This result is consistent with the previous study (Chang and
Park, 2005; Henisz and Delios, 2001) When calculating the average probability
elasticity, it can be interpreted that a 10 percent rise in the count of a firm’s own prior
entry in a NUTS-1 area would enhance the probability of choosing that area by 15.01
(i.e., 0.95×1.580) for the period from 1991-2006 to 13.6 percent (i.e., 0.95×1.436) for
period 1998-2006.
Japanese agglomeration in different industries
The impact of the count of Japanese firms in different industries on location choice is
positive and statistically significant at a 1 percent significance level in Model 3 and
Model 6. When calculating the average probability elasticity, it can be interpreted that a
10 percent rise in the count of a firm’s own prior entry in a NUTS-1 area would enhance
the probability of choosing that area by 11.88 (i.e., 0.95×1.251) for the period from
1991-2006 to 12.19 percent (i.e., 0.95×1.283) for the period of 1998-2006.
In sum, the empirical results of this present study confirm that the wage variable
exerts a significant positive impact on Japanese firms’ location choices in CEE, all
things being equal. One interpretation may be that Japanese MNEs pursue highly
qualified labour with specialised skills required for the automobile and
electronics/electric sector, which is intensively technology-oriented. At the same time,
the role of the high wage cost in attracting current Japanese FDI implies that Japanese
MNEs have to compete with foreign MNEs in search for better human capital, while the
number of job-hoppers is constantly rising, thus it is not surprising that a very large and
significant effect is estimated for the wage variable. Significant considerations are given
to cheap labour costs in the European transition economies when compared to those in
Western Europe. However, this study shows that cheap labour costs turned out to be of
little importance for Japanese MNEs at the sub-national regional level.
It is clear that firms’ location choices are inclined to be positively affected by the
level of FDI-related policy certainty, which ensures the provision of employment
creation grants, job training subsidies, tax breaks and environmental regulation grants.
The enforcement of legal practices pertinent to FDI incentives under the established
institutional structure helps ease financial and political burdens that Japanese MNEs
have to incur when investing in CEE.
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Table 6-6: Estimated Results for Japanese Location Patterns in CEE at the NUTS-1
Level for Years 1991-2006
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
0.001
(0.05)
0.008
(0.53)
0.002
(0.14)
0.005
(0.32)
0.007
(0.47)
1.137
(1.60)
1.204*
(1.78)
1.127
(1.62)
1.127
(1.60)
1.078
(1.55)
0.629
(1.98)
0.867***
(2.78)
0.712**
(2.22)
0.653**
(2.05)
0.647**
(2.00)
0.773**
(2.65)
0.855***
(2.97)
0.815***
(2.83)
0.800***
(2.73)
0.837***
(2.88)
0.577
(0.54)
0.669
(0.63)
0.663
(0.63)
0.565
(0.53)
0.585
(0.55)
3.524***
(4.16)
3.590***
(4.26)
3.871***
(4.55)
3.426***
(4.06)
3.490***
(4.13)
in all manufacturing industries
the same industry
different industries
–493.27 –492.65 –500.34 –489.60 –490.32
Chi-square 241.71*** 242.95*** 227.56*** 249.05*** 247.60***
0.1968 0.1978 0.1853 0.203 0.202
4100 4100 4100 4100 4100
0.594**
(2.14)
Note : z-statistics in parentheses at the *** 1%, **5% and *10% level.
Macroregiunea doi (ROM) is excluded from this analysis.
0.198
(0.65)
0.258
(0.85)
2.328***
(2.79)
0.805**
(2.47)
0.943***
(2.68)
2.368***
(2.85)
1.267***
(4.45)
Japanese agglomeration in
Japanese agglomeration in
Japanese agglomeration
Host-region experience
N
1.251***
(5.16)
3.077***
(3.68)
1.580***
(6.46)
0.271
(0.88)
Institutionalisation
of FDI policies
Keiretsu agglomeration
Progress in institutional
infrastructure
0.113
(0.37)
EU membership
Variable
2.625***
(3.14)
Log-likelihood
2.420***
(2.92)
Pseudo R-squared
Market potential
Labour cost
Area size
0.447
(1.53)
1.436***
(6.35)
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Table 6-7: Estimated Results for Japanese Location Patterns in CEE at the NUTS-1
Level for Years 1998-2006
6.6.1 Robustness Check
To check the validity and reliability of these empirical findings, I try other specifications
to investigate the robustness of the above-reported findings. The primary reason for this
is to show the extent to which the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives
(IIA) holds for this study. It is necessary before turning to concluding remarks to justify
whether the empirical findings of this study remain reliable through carrying out
sensitivity tests. I eliminate (1) NUTS-1 regions where the number of entries by
Japanese multinationals is less than two and (2) firms that entered the CEE market in
the form of cross-border merger and acquisition. As seen in Table 6-8, the robustness
check justifies that the results are almost similar to those found in Tables 6-6 and 6-7
with the exception of the variable for progress in institutional infrastructure. The
detrimental effect of this institution-specific variable on location choice remains
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
–0.015
(–0.88)
–0.007
(–0.44)
–0.012
(–0.72)
–0.011
(–0.68)
–0.009
(–0.52)
0.397
(0.48)
0.408
(0.53)
0.385
(0.48)
0.346
(0.43)
0.283
(0.36)
0.523
(1.51)
0.729**
(2.14)
0.567
(1.62)
0.531
(1.53)
0.495
(1.41)
0.939**
(2.10)
1.093**
(2.49)
0.964**
(2.17)
0.996**
(2.23)
1.021**
(2.29)
0.677
(0.64)
0.768
(0.72)
0.718
(0.67)
0.681
(0.64)
0.687
(0.64)
3.431***
(3.81)
3.508***
(3.92)
3.690***
(4.08)
3.353***
(3.74)
3.390***
(3.78)
in all manufacturing industries
the same industry
different industries
–390.33 –390.23 –394.45 –387.70 –387.74
Chi-square 191.01*** 191.21*** 182.76*** 196.26*** 196.19***
0.197 0.197 0.188 0.202 0.202
3135 3135 3135 3135 3135
2.657***
(3.04)
1.099***
(3.64)
0.677**
(2.22)
Note : z-statistics in parentheses at the *** 1%, **5% and *10% level.
Macroregiunea doi (ROM) and Severna i iztochna Bulgaria are excluded from this analysis.
Progress in institutional
infrastructure
0.325
(0.95)
0.355
(1.05)
2.613***
(2.99)
0.794***
(2.25)
0.843***
(2.27)
Log-likelihood
Pseudo R-squared
N
Japanese agglomeration 1.375***
(5.66)
Japanese agglomeration in 1.458***
(5.69)
Japanese agglomeration in 1.283***
(4.89)
0.602*
(1.85)
0.365
(1.06)
Institutionalisation of
FDI policies
Keiretsu agglomeration 2.873***
(3.27)
2.718***
(3.12)
3.276***
(3.73)
Host-region experience
EU membership
Variable
Market potential
Labour cost
Area size
0.241
(0.70)
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questionable due to the issue of multicollinearity problems. The statistical significance
of a firm’s prior experience as a firm-specific intangible advantage as well as the
significance of network externalities remains as high as predicted (see Tables 6-8 and
6-9).
Table 6-8: Robustness Check of the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)
(Excluding NUTS-1 regions with less than 2 market entries)
The positive relationship between labour costs and location choice may be
attributed to the following reasons. One is that most of Japanese manufacturing firms
operating in CEE are characterised as being middle-to-high technology-intensive rather
than labour-intensive, since most of them are engaged in the consumer electronics and
automobile sectors. In this regard, cheap wages are not as important as expected. During
my field study, there was consensus on this point.14 Second, complementing the first
14 Mr. Kambara in NSK Polska and Mr. Shimato in Ibiden Hungary pointed out that the quality of the
labour force is more important than cheap labour costs.
Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15
–0.025
(–1.43)
–0.027
(–1.58)
–0.027
(–1.53)
–0.024
(–1.39)
–0.023
(–1.33)
3.039**
(2.35)
3.654***
(2.87)
3.286**
(2.51)
3.230**
(2.51)
3.256**
(2.52)
0.416
(1.33)
0.576*
(1.92)
0.503
(1.61)
0.436
(1.40)
0.434
(1.38)
0.7446**
(2.33)
0.826**
(2.57)
0.777**
(2.45)
0.783**
(2.44)
0.814**
(2.54)
–0.064
(–0.06)
–0.172
(–0.16)
–0.018
(–0.02)
–0.150
(–0.14)
–0.158
(–0.15)
3.568***
(4.14)
3.601***
(4.22)
3.868***
(4.49)
3.496***
(4.08)
3.547***
(4.14)
manufacturing industries
the same industry
different industries
–429.227 –426.642 –435.807 –425.02 –425.48
Chi-square 147.01*** 152.18*** 133.85*** 155.42*** 154.50***
0.146 0.151 0.133 0.155 0.154
2548 2548 2548 2548 2548
1.034***
(2.87)
1.294***
(4.50)
0.442
(1.51)
–1.017**
(–2.01)
–1.000**
(–1.82)
1.984**
(2.38)
2.011**
(2.41)
0.626***
(1.80)
Variable
Market potential
Labour cost
Area size
Progress in institutional
Infrastructure
–1.004*
(–1.98)
Institutionalisation of
FDI policies
Host-region experience
Keiretsu agglomeration 2.310***
(2.76)
2.034**
(2.44)
2.741***
(3.28)
EU membership
N
Japanese agglomeration in all 1.355***
(5.62)
Japanese agglomeration in 1.512***
(6.10)
Japanese agglomeration in 1.134***
(4.44)
–0.982*
(–1.92)
–0.928*
(–1.80)
Note : z-statistics in parentheses at the *** 1%, **5% and *10% level.
Log-likelihood
Pseudo R-squared
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point, Japanese manufacturing firms tend to be in favour of operation sites close to
capital cities where educational, economic, and social infrastructures are more
developed than in non-metropolitan areas. In other words, Japanese investors can have
easy access to qualified labour force at the expense of high wage costs. The last is that
the data used in this study may have created biased statistical results because the wage
variable was based on the data in 2006 due to limited data availability.
Table 6-9: Robustness Check of the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)
(Excluding market entries in the form of M&A)
6.6.2 Learning Process
As Crozet et al. (2004), this study also confirms the downward trend of the coefficient
estimate on agglomeration economies over time (see Table 6-10). First, a probable cause
for this downward curve of the magnitude of agglomeration economies can be derived
from the learning process of Japanese multinational firms in the European transition
economies. This learning process involves the accumulation of both experience and
Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20
0.002
(0.13)
0.009
(0.56)
0.002
(0.14)
0.006
(0.38)
0.009
(0.55)
0.474
(0.59)
0.697
(0.92)
0.481
(0.62)
0.517
(0.65)
0.511
(0.61)
0.477
(1.40)
0.805**
(2.43)
0.569*
(1.66)
0.512
(1.50)
0.511
(1.48)
0.408
(1.14)
0.795**
(2.32)
0.589
(1.63)
0.481
(1.35)
0.558
(1.58)
0.654**
(2.07)
0.739**
(2.38)
0.717**
(2.30)
0.670**
(2.11)
0.722**
(2.29)
13.060
(0.02)
12.859
(0.03)
13.160
(0.02)
13.070
(0.02)
13.0.65
(0.02)
3.443***
(3.89)
3.501***
(3.98)
3.814***
(4.27)
3.354***
(3.81)
3.427***
(3.88)
manufacturing industries
the same industry
different industries
–419.87 –421.46 –427.522 –417.32 –418.36
Chi-square 250.70*** 247.53*** 235.40*** 255.81*** 253.72***
0.230 0.227 0.216 0.235 0.233
3640 3640 3640 3640 3640
2.688***
(3.08)
2.572***
(2.98)
3.181***
(3.64)
2.450***
(2.82)
2.502***
(2.88)
1.659***
(6.66)
1.050***
(2.87)
1.672***
(6.48)
0.852***
(2.24)
1.284***
(4.24)
1.469***
(5.50)
0.755**
(2.46)
Japanese agglomeration in
Variable
Market potential
Labour cost
Area size
Institutionalisation of
FDI policies
Log-likelihood
Pseudo R-squared
N
Progress in institutional
Infrastructure
Note : z-statistics in parentheses at the *** 1%, **5% and *10% level.
EU membership
Host-region experience
Keiretsu agglomeration
Japanese agglomeration in all
Japanese agglomeration in
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knowledge of an idiosyncratic set of local environmental and institutional conditions, as
stressed in the internationalisation model of Johanson and Vahlne (1977). At the early
stage, Japanese firms that lack experience and possess a poor understanding of local
business traits are at a relative disadvantage in relation to indigenous firms or Western
European firms sharing some cultural grounds. This unfamiliar environment may have a
compelling effect on the geographic clustering of Japanese entrants. It is the cost of
information about local market conditions that may appear to be compensated for by the
spatial concentration of Japanese firms operating in CEE.
Figure 6-3: The Evolution of Coefficients of Agglomeration Effects over Time
Source: Own illustration
In contrast, the pervasiveness of information of local business traits as well as
rising competition for input resources ought to reduce the necessity for agglomerating
together at the later stage. Figure 6-3 plots the three coefficients over the period from
1991-2006 and proves the predicted fall. The positive outcomes of these agglomeration
variables are dropping over time. The coefficients on Japanese agglomeration in all
manufacturing industries begin with 3.309 over the 1991-1994 period and end at 1.590
for the 2004-2006 period. Likewise, the evolution of the coefficients on Japanese
agglomeration in the same industry and different industries are also a downward curve,
suggesting that the magnitude of the agglomeration effects loses significance over time.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1991-1994 1995-1997 1998-2000 2001-2003 2004-2006
All manufacturing industries
Same industry
Different industries
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Table 6-10: The Interaction Term of Agglomeration Externalities and Time
Model 21 Model 22 Model 23
manufacturing industries*(91-94)
manufacturing industries*(95-97)
manufacturing industries*(98-00)
manufacturing industries*(01-03)
manufacturing industries*(04-06)
the same industry*(91-94)
the same industry*(95-97)
the same industry*(98-00)
the same industry*(01-03)
the same industry*(04-06)
different industries*(91-94)
different industries*(95-97)
different industries*(98-00)
different industries*(01-03)
different industries*(04-06)
-515.80 -524.74 -533.07
196.65*** 178.78*** 162.11***
0.160 0.146 0.132
4100 4100 4100
Japanese agglomeration in all
Japanese agglomeration in all
Japanese agglomeration in all
Japanese agglomeration in all
Japanese agglomeration in
Log-likelihood
Japanese agglomeration in
Japanese agglomeration in
Japanese agglomeration in
Japanese agglomeration in
3.309***
(3.91)
2.569***
(8.90)
Japanese agglomeration in
Japanese agglomeration in
Japanese agglomeration in all
Japanese agglomeration in
Japanese agglomeration in
Japanese agglomeration in
4.159***
(4.76)
2.749***
(5.01)
2.746***
(5.77)
3.019***
(4.66)
1.590***
(6.15)
7.708***
(3.48)
3.115***
(9.12)
1.858***
(6.03)
N
Chi-square
Pseudo R-squared
Note : z-statistics in parentheses at the *** 1%, **5% and *10% level.
3.020***
(2.96)
1.561***
(5.64)
Variable
2.766***
(8.29)
2.453***
(4.08)
2.846***
(5.56)
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Table 6-11: Summary of Significant Predictors Influencing Japanese Firms’ Location Choices (Part 1)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
NS (+)* NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
NS (+)*** (+)** (+)** (+)** NS (+)** NS (+)** (+)**
(+)** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)** (+)** (+)** (+)** (+)**
NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
(+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)***
(+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)***
manufacturing industries
the same industry
different industries
0.195 0.196 0.185 0.203 0.202 0.206 0.207 0.197 0.202 0.202
4100 4100 4100 4100 4100 3135 3135 3135 3135 3135
EU membership
– (+)**
NS NS
(+)*** –
(+)*** (+)***
1991-2006 1998-2006
Note : NS indicates not significance. (+/–): Sign of causal association.Variables are significant at *** for p <0.01, ** for p <0.05 and * for p <0.1.
NS
(+)**
(+)***
Institutionalisation of FDI
Host-region experience
Keiretsu agglomeration
Variable
Market potential
Labour cost
Area size
Progress in institutional
infrastructure
(+)***
– –
–
NS
– ––
(+)*NS
(+)***
(+)***
(+)***
(+)***
–
NS
–
Pseudo R-squared
N
–
– –
–
Japanese agglomeration in all
Japanese agglomeration in
Japanese agglomeration in – (+)***
NSNS (+)*
(+)***
(+)**
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Table 6-12: Summary of Significant Predictors Influencing Japanese Firms’ Location Choices (Part 2)
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
(+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)** (+)** NS NS NS NS NS
NS (+)* NS NS NS NS (+)** NS NS NS
(+)** (+)** (+)** (+)** (+)** (+)** (+)** (+)** (+)** (+)**
NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
(+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)***
(+)*** (+)** (+)*** (+)** (+)** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)***
manufacturing industries
the same industry
different industries
0.195 0.196 0.185 0.155 0.154 0.195 0.196 0.185 0.235 0.233
2548 2548 2548 2548 2548 3640 3640 3640 3640 3640
– (+)**
EU membership
(+)*** (+)***
– NS
NS NS
(+)*** –
(+)*** (+)***
(–)** (–)**
(+)*** –
N
Excluding NUTS-1 regions with less than 2 Excluding market entries in the form of M&A
Note : NS indicates not significance. (+/–): Sign of causal association.Variables are significant at *** for p <0.01, ** for p <0.05 and * for p <0.1.
Host-region experience
Keiretsu agglomeration
Japanese agglomeration in all
Japanese agglomeration in
Japanese agglomeration in
Pseudo R-squared
Variable
Market potential
Labour cost
Area size
Progress in institutional
Institutionalisation of FDI
infrastructure
– (+)*** –
– – (+)***
(–)* (–)* (–)*
(+)*** – – –
– (+)*** –
– – (+)***
NS (+)** (+)*
(+)*** –
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What is worth noting is that the evolution of the Japanese agglomeration in the same
industry indicates a sharp drop (from 7.708 for years 1991-1994 to 1.858 for years
2004-2006) relative to other two agglomeration variables. Accordingly, it can be
interpreted that the emergence of rivals would compel a firm to rely on a
competition-avoidance strategy and to choose spatial separation over spatial
concentration.
6.7 Conclusions
The goal of this chapter was to examine Japanese multinationals’ location choices and
to evaluate the determinants of their choice processes in the formerly centrally-planned
economies of the CEECs with firm-level data. Given the increasing scholarly and
managerial attention to the comparative advantages of CEE, such as a pool of labour
capital with intermediate technical skills (Estrin and Meyer, 1998) at affordable costs,
which complements ownership advantages of MNEs, research on the determinants of
FDI location in this region has not been completely popular. Since the late 1990s, the
number of Japanese manufacturing firms has been growing gradually in CEE due to
their increased search and need for lower production costs and higher efficiency in the
emergence of the United States of Europe relative to Western Europe. In this context,
location decision plays a critical role in the reorganisation of a firm’s regional value
chains that help accommodate accelerating European integration and thus influences its
economic performance.
This chapter demonstrates the econometric findings of an empirical investigation
of the determinants of Japanese firms’ site choices in a multi-location setting by
incorporating variables identified in studies on a regional sub-national level.
McFadden’s conditional logit model was employed. In this statistical analysis, I focused
on a particular mechanism of agglomeration externalities together with the demand-pull
mechanism (GDP, area size, labour costs), firm-specific traits (prior experience), the
informal and formal institution effect (progress in institutional infrastructure,
institutionalisation of FDI laws, keiretsu membership). The data set consists of 205
Japanese manufacturing entrants in 20 regions classified at the NUTS-1 level for years
1991-2006.
The present study relied on the theoretical perspectives ranging from institutional
theory, agglomeration theory, the resource-based view of the firm, OLI paradigm and
network theory. With particular emphasis on the importance of FDI-driven
agglomeration economies, the empirical findings support evidence that various types of
Japanese nationality agglomeration are inclined to increase the probability a region
being chosen by would-be Japanese entrants (Tables 6-11 and 6-12). We can consider
three possible reasons for the industrial agglomeration. First, Japanese manufacturing
MNEs can compensate for potential economic and institutional hazards by geographical
concentration. Second, the firms can take advantage of manifold benefits such as a pool
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of formal and informal information, infrastructure development, and easy access to
intermediate products. Lastly, the firms can enhance their legitimacy in local economic
and political environments.
Furthermore, the empirical findings assign an overriding importance to a firm’s
prior experience and keiretsu membership. It appears convincing that plant location
patterns by Japanese firms in the European transition economies are characterised by the
consequence of “inter-organisational mimetic strategies” (Henisz and Delios, 2001:
448). Accordingly, host-based government officials should bear in mind that Japanese
firms’ location patterns are principally dependent on a firm’s intangible assets and its
network relations embedded in the social organisation of the Japanese economy.
Accordingly, the speed and scale of the horizontal and vertical integration of Japanese
multinationals across CEE are determined by network and institutional considerations.
As the market demand conditions have no significant impact on location choice,
the empirical outcomes give little weight to market-seeking considerations. Consistent
with evidence from existing studies (e.g., Belderbos and Carree, 2002; Head and Mayer,
2004; Head and Ries, 2002; Head et al., 1995), this study confirm that the dominating
role which the Japanese keiretsu system plays in the spatial formation of Japanese
manufacturing activities prevails. The empirical tests presented in this study also
confirm that spatial separation has not taken place yet in the case of Japanese-owned
manufacturing affiliates in CEE, while a decline in the coefficient estimates of
agglomeration externalities is observed. There are two possible explanations for the
positive association between Japanese nationality agglomeration and location choice.
First, the majority of Japanese FDI is highly related to consumer
electronics/transportation equipment sectors which require the implementation of the
JIT system. Second, the presence of poor transportation infrastructure and uneven roads
in CEE countries may indeed increase transportation costs, thus increasing the
probability of investing in regions that are characterised by a high degree of geographic
intensity of Japanese manufacturing firms.
The statistical findings provide support for the assertion that the enforcement of
FDI promotion laws as a proxy for institutionalisation of FDI policies at the national
level plays an influential role in the increase in the number of Japanese manufacturing
multinationals. The thesis draws a conclusion that the improvement of a legal
infrastructure that ensures the protection of a foreign investor acts as an important
catalyst for the industrial reconfiguration of foreign capital. The empirical test partially
confirmed the positive association between the wage level and location selection,
suggesting that low wage costs no longer translate into the attractiveness of candidate
regions. Namely, it can be interpreted that wage differentials as a proxy for differences
in the level of labour productivity and life quality matters to Japanese multinationals in
this regard.
The estimated results have several practical implications for the incumbent
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governments of CEE. First, the CEE central governments as well as local governments
should be devoted to upgrading the quality of sustained location-specific traits, for
example, quality communication and material infrastructure and educated labour capital,
instead of relying heavily on the existing comparative advantages of CEE (i.e., a pool of
inexpensive labour force relative to Western counterparts).
Second, following the empirical results, it should be borne in mind that NUTS-1
regions with a small amount of FDI inflows could fall further behind in the future and
remain uncompetitive in terms of location attractiveness. This pessimistic view implies
that a region’s success in attracting FDI in the future is locked into that in the past,
pointing to the actual importance of history. Porter (1990, 1996, 1998) also extends this
path-dependent character of FDI inflows to regional policies. Porter points out the
caveat that an excessive effort to attract FDI inflows to distressed areas may result in
yielding additional transaction costs and lead to diluting the degree of
complementarities and already established interpersonal links in the development
process of agglomeration economies in a given region. The introduction of regional
policies without a special focus on efficient distribution of resources based on type of
FDI inflows may also result in discarding potential opportunities to improve economic
performance at the industry and firm level.
Third, Japanese investors assign substantial importance to the access to a qualified
labour force that contributes to the sustainable growth of their local production. For
policy makers of host central and regional governments, it is important to introduce
various educational programs designed to constantly foster the quality of labour while
creating a high quality of life.
Lastly, I should stress that institutionalisation of FDI policies should not serve as a
simple conduit for winning in “international location tournaments” (Wheeler and Mody,
1992: 57). Rather it should be intended to overcome the widening gap between regions
as well as countries and to ensure the transfer of advanced technology and managerial
know-how to local firms. Moreover, it may be a feasible option for policy makers in
CEE to shed light on the promotion of inter-regional cooperation rather than
inter-regional competition across CEE in order to be more responsive to foreign
investors’ commitment to reinforcing global and regional networks of value-creating
activities.
As with all empirical research, some shortcomings and caveats need to be
addressed for further research. First, this empirical study did not identify differences in
Japanese MNEs’ location decisions based on different sectors, for example, in the
electronics sector, the machinery sector, or the transportation equipment sector
(labour-intensive vs. capital-intensive), since a small number of observations
constrained further detailed empirical tests. Second, further research should confirm the
extent to which the choice of FDI location varies between SMEs and large firms in CEE.
Wakasugi (2005) argues that firm size plays a critical role in the choice of FDI location
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because sources of capital, bargaining power, business networks and international
experience are likely to bear upon location decisions. Third, the inclusion of political
and institutional variables could be of great relevance, since the location choice may be
to a greater extent influenced by FDI promotion policies conducted by the central
governments in CEE. It is still conceivable that local politicians’ commitments or
enthusiasm may matter to Japanese MNEs’ investing behaviour. Political interactions
between Japanese investors and individuals in the central and regional governments
should be scrutinised in the context-specific approach. Fourth, it would be of great
interest to analyse the extent to which the presence of rival firms and rising competition
encourage Japanese firms to reconfigure their location strategies in an extension of
Knickerbocker’s (1973) theory of oligopolistic competition. Moreover, it would be
fruitful to assess the impact of the successes and failures of competitors in local
operation on the spatial behaviour of new entrants. Last but not least, this study fails to
distinguish whether the positive impact of agglomeration economies on Japanese
multinationals’ location choices in CEE is motivated by the desire to raise economic
efficiency or legitimacy and acceptance. These questions are left for future research.
This chapter examined what factors determine the location pattern of Japanese
MNEs in the CEE region. However, it deserves paying attention to the issue of how
important changes in environmental and institutional advantages determine the success
of Japanese investors in the CEE region. It is because locational advantages have been
rapidly changing in recent years due to (1) the phenomenon of EU enlargement that
forces CEECs to align their institutional quality with the standards of the EU-15 and (2)
massive capital inflows.
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7 WHAT DETERMINES THE PERFORMANCE OF
JAPANESE MNEs IN EUROPEAN TRANSITION
ECONOMIES
To determine the actual entry strategy, it is important to understand the most
important performance determinants because the market entry strategy has to be
designed in order to support the success factors in the best way. This is important
for the entry itself but also for coping with the competitive situation in the new
market beyond the short-term.
Kretzberg, 2007: 264
7.1 Introduction
The main focus of this chapter is on explaning the determinants of firm performance.
Since the collapse of state socialism, multinational corporations have extracted profit
opportunities in European emerging economies by capitaising on their comparative
advantages of cheap factor endowments, and their geographical proximity to Western
Europe in the European maquiladora15 (Hardy, 2007: 775).
The former Communist countries in Europe have been traditionally attractive to
major Western nations, such as Germany, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom
and the United States (see Chapter 3). The conventional wisdom is that firms from
Western European nations are in a more advantageous position than Asian firms in
terms of historical ties, culture distance, and experiential market knowledge. Western
capitalists have accumulated intangible assets, such as host-based managerial expertise
and marketing knowledge, and have reinforced their reputation, brand awareness and
legitimacy in CEE transition economies since the demise of the communist regime in
1989 (Meyer, 1998).
Moreover, Western European multinational corporations are not subject to the
EU’s institutional constraints related to trade and investment, such as local content rules
and quotas, which have been used to protect interests of domestic industries from
non-EU rivals such as Japanese and Korean MNEs. Consumers in CEE have also
enjoyed vast inflows of Western products and pop culture into the region during the
post-socialist period, implying that a number of Western MNEs are likely to have the
benefit of a friendly reception in CEE. Given these grounds, non-European firms may
be at a disadvantageous position when compared to Western entrepreneurs. From a
MNE’s point of view, a concrete understanding of key causes of corporate growth in an
15 A maquiladora means a manufacturing plant that imports duty-free materials and equipment for
assembly or manufacturing and then reexports the assembled product to the originating country. Maquila
production plants exist in the border region between the United States and Mexico. A number of MNEs
capitalize on wage and price differentials.
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environment of rapid changes in comparative advantages and in institutional
circumstances in transition economies determines the decision-making and operation of
the firm.
To date, there have been numerous Western firms that have exploited
opportunities to enhance their business scale in unsaturated market environments
relative in CEE. For instance, General Electric (GE) is an illustrative model not only of
gaining high market share and profits but also of making great contributions to
economic development of the host economy in CEE. GE, the largest US investor
(US$1.1 billion) and the largest employer (15,000+) in Hungary, has established its
strong market presence by advancing an integrated configuration of various functional
units ranging from production to financial intermediation. 16 According to the
Hungarian Investment and Trade Development Agency, GE has been remarkably
successful as its destination sales to Hungary jumped from US$490 million to US$835
million and the company accounted for 23 percent of Hungarian exports in 2004.17
Another major case is the Volkswagen group. In CEE markets, Volkswagen, as a
‘frontrunner’ with strong access to the home government (Van Tulder and Ruigrok,
1998), has reinforced its strong market position since its acquisition of two former
Czechoslovakian national car producers, Škoda and BAZ, in the early 1990s (Pavlínek,
2002). Having transformed Škoda’s brand image and sales networks into the group
strategy, Volkswagen has remarkably increased sophistication of value chains and price
competitiveness despite the existence of a number of rivals in the enlarged Europe. As a
result, the performance of Volkswagen is predominantly striking. In 2006, Škoda’s share
in the Czech Republic was 52.4 percent, followed by Slovakia (36 percent), Poland (12
percent) and Hungary (8.9 percent) at the country level (Škoda Annual Report, 2006).
Thus, these two examples both share that the success of the host economy in CEE is
strongly linked to that of major Western MNEs and vice versa.
The success of international business activities has long been perceived by a
number of scholars, practitioners and business executives as an important theme of
global management (Delios and Beamish, 2001). As of today, numerous studies of
international business and strategic management have focused on the effects of
firm-specific and internalisation-specific advantages on managerial satisfaction with
foreign activities (Brouthers, 1999, 2002; Brouthers et al., 2000; Capar and Kotabe,
2003; Millington and Bayliss, 1997).
However, a cost-benefit approach to foreign subsidiary performance, with
particular attention to the role of changing location-specific advantages, has been
under-explored. Some scholars of international business (Brouthers et al., 2000; Keats
and Hitt, 1988) point out that a comprehensive conceptual framework for how various
16 See more detail in GE’s website (http://www.ge.com/hun/en).
17See more detail in Hungarian Investment and Trade Development Agency’s website
(http://www.itdh.com).
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factors such as perceived environmental and institutional factors, entry mode choice,
firm-specific characteristics influence firm performance has been lacking. It is
important to direct more attention toward locational advantages since “characteristics of
the environment are generally beyond the control of management” (Kotabe and Wheiler,
1998: 180). Especially, recent years have witnessed that rising labour costs, high
turnover rates, a limited pool of labour capital and increased local competition have
been detrimental to foreign firms’ business activities in European transition economies.
A few studies have provided evidence on this issue in transforming economies, such as
Turkey (Demirbag et al., 2007) and China (Abramson and Ai, 1999; Carlsson,
Nordegren and Sjöholm, 2005; Li, 2004) as well as less developed economies
(Appiah-Adu, 1999). Moreover, these studies have focused mainly on Western firms.
Hence, to narrow the gap between theory and reality for the case of Japanese
manufacturing firms in CEE, this study attempts to conceptualise a dynamic model of
the effects of environmental factors, a firm’s ownership advantages and relational assets
on firm performance. I try to answer the following questions with caution:
 Do locational advantages matter to the success of the subsidiary?
 If perceived environmental and institutional factors are not important, what factors
are the most responsible for explaining firms’ performance outcomes?
 Are there any particular predictors other than location-specific variables that merit
attention?
 How do formal and informal institutions as location-specific assets structure
economic performance?
It is important to note that the ability to generalise the empirical results presented in the
past studies may not necessarily be applicable to Japanese MNEs within the CEE
context. Due to linguistic and cultural barriers inherent in CEE markets, Japanese
investors might feel the need for more incremental and careful market entry strategies in
relation to Western counterparts. Importantly, what distinguishes Japanese MNEs from
Western counterparts may be grounded in their consensus-oriented culture, networking
organisation, and hierarchical control structure. Unlike Western MNEs that rely on
transactional relationships in arm’s-length markets, Japanese firms tend to take an
evolutionary, sequential and incremental approach to tapping into foreign markets
owing to their idiosyncratic cultural identity and philosophy, such as Confucian values,
consensus, inter-personal relations, group-oriented thinking, respect to seniority and so
forth (Chang, 1995; Kagono et al., 1985).
Identification of influential predictors of market performance will contribute to
enhancing resource efficiency and allocative productivity, achieving stable
organisational development and streamlining site selection procedures for potential
Japanese investors in the foreseeable future. Understanding the survival factors in
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post-entry situations is important for penetrating the transition markets where societal,
economic and political actors may still seek opportunistic rents and sunk costs remain
relatively high due to institutions inherited from the past. This chapter will also present
opportunities for a circle of policy makers, economists, and business experts in CEECs
to reconsider policies, which enable not only Japanese investors but also local firms to
survive and achieve better corporate performance in a complementary fashion.
Therefore, the goal of this chapter is to enhance our understanding of which
factors are essential to determine the success of local affiliates of Japanese firms in CEE
transition economies with a special emphasis on the link between
environmental-institutional factors and performance in a more systematic way. The
variables tested in this study are mainly categorised into six groups: (1)
institutional-environment-specific factors; (2) firm-specific factors; (3) internalisation
advantages; (4) parent-subsidiary relationships; (5) human integration; and (6)
network-specific factors.
More importantly, most of prior studies tested the above correlation with the use
of financial performance. This approach is unique since I examine the relative
importance of the specific factors on Japanese firms’ performance with subjective
measures based on senior managers’ judgment. Four subjective measures of
performance are introduced in this analysis. Using an evaluative survey a variety of
testable hypotheses will be detected by the use of a multiple regression analysis.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 7.2 I begin with an overview
of the performance outcomes of Japanese firms in CEE on the basis of past surveys
conducted by JETRO and the Chubu Industrial Advancement Centre. A conceptual
model is presented in Section 7.3. Testable hypotheses are developed in line with
literature review in Section 7.4. Section 7.5 presents data and methodology. Section 7.6
demonstrates two primary data of a survey questionnaire: (1) performance assessment
and (2) evaluative outcomes of environmental and institutional factors. Section 7.7
focuses on the operationalisation of explanatory variables and the development of the
model specification. Section 7.8 evaluates the specific determinants affecting the growth
of corporate performance of Japanese manufacturing firms in CEE transforming
economies. Based on the empirical outcomes, Section 7.9 highlights some shortcomings
and caveats for future research.
7.2 Background
First of all, a few cases of Japanese manufacturing firms operating successfully in CEE
are presented. In Hungary, Magyar Suzuki has been acknowledged to be one of the most
successful foreign investors (Hwang et al., 2008). Since the initiation of the local
production in Esztergom in 1992, Magyar Suzuki’s production capacity and sales in
Hungary have been steadily growing. Magyar Suzuki has won the acceptance of
domestic consumers as a ‘national car producer’. One of the most cited reasons for
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Magyar Suzuki’s success is grounded on free access to GM’s global supplier network
(globally optimised procurement system) as well as close communication with GM
Europe in Rüsselsheim (Furukawa, 2005). Given these cooperative environments,
Magyar Suzuki’s new models were also introduced to stimulate market demand in
cooperation with Opel and Fiat. These strategic co-operations have kept Magyar Suzuki
competitive in quality and cost considerations in relation to other Western car
manufacturers in CEE. Magyar Suzuki, located in the city of Esztergom near the
Slovak-Hungarian border, responds to emerging demands for labour in Hungary by
accessing available labour in Slovakia.
Another successful case is Panasonic that has established an integrated network of
sales, marketing, product development and production operations in the enlarged
Europe. Especially, Panasonic has concentrated LCD and plasma TV production lines in
the Czech Republic. While Panasonic, as the biggest producer of television sets in the
Czech Republic, produced more than 1.24 million televisions over the fiscal year
2005-2006, the company has been well-recognised as ‘global citizen’ actively
cooperating with the University of Western Bohemia and sponsoring five to eight
dissertations every year (CzechInvest, July 16, 2007). Balancing the strategic fit
between global integration and local responsiveness keeps Matsushita Electric at a
cost-competitive advantage despite rising competitive global circumstances. Moreover,
the company has been successful in upgrading its brand name not only in Western
Europe but also in CEE.
Denso Manufacturing Hungary, founded in 1997 in Hungary, has also been
successful in achieving high sales growth and customer diversification. The company’s
sales turnover increased from 64.9 million Euro in 2002 to 428.4 million Euro in 2006
(Denso Europe, 2006) since the company won the large order of diesel common rail
components from Ford in 2003.18
Drawing upon JETRO (2007), Table 7-1 reveals performance survey results from
2005-2007 by country and sector. It is apparent that roughly 60 percent of the total
respondents reported ‘gain’ in each year, while only 20 percent reported ‘loss’. In
reviewing the performance at the country level, it turns out that Japanese manufacturing
firms’ performance in the Czech Republic and Hungary deteriorated substantially, while
that in Slovakia and Romania ameliorated over time. A rationale behind this improved
performance of the latter countries may perhaps be attributed to the fact that labour
shortage and weakened labour cost advantages are not as critically problematic as in the
Czech Republic and Hungary. When consideration is directed to the sectoral variation, it
should be noted that the proportion of the respondents who reported a net loss in the
transportation equipment sector dramatically increased from 20 percent in 2005 to 31.6
percent in 2007
18 See more detail in Denso’s website (http://www.denso-europe.com).
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Table 7-1: The Performance Outlook of Central and Eastern European Subsidiaries of Japanese Manufacturing Firms
(Unit: number and percent)
Gain Even Loss Gain Even Loss Gain Even Loss
Czech Republic 7 (87.5) 0 (0.0) 1 (12.5) 6 (75.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (25.0) 4 (57.1) 1 (14.3) 2 (28.6)
Hungary 12 (63.2) 4 (21.1) 3 (15.8) 9 (50.0) 4 (22.2) 5 (27.8) 7 (36.8) 5 (26.3) 7 (36.8)
Poland 11 (61.1) 3 (16.7) 4 (22.2) 15 (83.3) 2 (11.1) 1 (5.6) 11 (61.1) 6 (33.3) 1 (5.6)
Slovakia 3 (42.9) 1 (14.3) 3 (42.9) 3 (50.0) 2 (33.3) 1 (16.7) 6 (85.7) 0 (0.0) 1 (14.3)
Romania 2 (40.0) 1 (20.0) 2 (40.0) 3 (60.0) 1 (20.0) 1 (20.0) 4 (80.0) 1 (20.0) 0 (0.0)
Bulgaria N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Lithuania 2 (100) 0 (0.0) 1 (0.0) 1 (50.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (50.0) 1 (50.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (50.0)
Montenegro 0 (0.0) 1 (0.0) 1 (100) 1 (100) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (100) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
Total 37 (61.7) 9 (15.0) 14 (23.3) 38 (65.5) 9 (15.5) 11 (19.0) 34 (57.6) 13 (22.0) 12 (20.3)
Gain Even Loss Gain Even Loss Gain Even Loss
Food 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (100) 1 (100) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (100) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
Textile 1 (100) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (100) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (100) 0 (0.0)
Chemical N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Metals, steel and
non-metals
2 (75.0) 1 (25.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (75.0) 1 (25.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (75.0) 1 (25.0) 0 (0.0)
General machinery 0 (0.0) 1 (33.3) 2 (66.7) 1 (33.3) 1 (33.3) 1 (33.3) 2 (66.7) 1 (33.3) 0 (0.0)
Electric and electronics 12 (57.1) 4 (19.0) 5 (23.8) 8 (40.0) 7 (35.0) 5 (25.0) 13 (61.9) 3 (14.3) 5 (23.8)
Transportation equipment 14 (70.0) 2 (10.0) 4 (20.0) 15 (75.0) 0 (0.0) 5 (25.0) 7 (36.8) 6 (31.6) 6 (31.6)
Total 37 (61.7) 9 (15.0) 14 (23.3) 38 (65.5) 9 (15.5) 11 (19.0) 34 (57.6) 13 (22.0) 12 (20.3)
Country
Sector
Source : JETRO (2007)
2005 2006 2007
2005 2006 2007
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Table 7-2: Performance Frequencies (Unit: number and percent)
With regard to non-financial performance, somewhat surprisingly, the Chubu
Industrial Advancement Centre (2004) reports that only 30 percent of the surveyed
firms in CEE reported that their local operations were satisfactory (see Table 7-2). This
negative finding may be representative of deteriorating environment-specific pressures,
such as rising labour costs, intensified market competition, job-hopping problems, and
macroeconomic uncertainty. The Chubu Industrial Advancement Centre survey (2004)
concludes that local operations of Japanese manufacturing firms aiming only at
exploitation of cheap production inputs may fail, indicating that the architecture of
globally integrated production value chains and the adoption of sustainable training
systems for local employees will be inevitable for raising the survival rate of local
affiliates of Japanese multinationals for a long term. It is fair to say that CEE may
gradually lose its comparative advantages, such as a cheap labour force and inexpensive
land, over time as compared with Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Russia. To revamp managerial
satisfaction, Japanese firms are likely to feel the necessity for upgrading their local
responsiveness to adapt to changing market environments as well as idiosyncratic
informal and formal institutions.
These two statistical surveys are subject to some limitations. One is that the
number of sampled firms is considerably limited. Second, performance measures used
in these surveys are not sufficient since they did not include major financial
performance indicators, such as sales growth, profitability and market share. Last, these
data are unable to offer clear and useful theoretical and practical implications for
Japanese investors in CEE since they presented not the causal association between
perceived location uncertainties and performance but a simple picture of performance
based on descriptive statistics. Hence, the thrust of this chapter is to provide practical
insights into performance determinants, since it reveals the success factors of doing
business in CEE with a special emphasis on the strategic dynamics of the interplay
between organisations and environmental-institutional forces in volatile transition
economies.
N % Cum. N % Cum.
Completely satisfied 1 5.0 5.0 2 6.7 6.7
Likely satisfied 6 30.0 35.0 8 26.7 33.4
As expected 11 55.0 90.0 7 23.3 56.7
Likely unsatisfied 2 10.0 100.0 12 40.0 96.7
Completely unsatisfied 0 0.0 100.0 1 3.3 100.0
Total 20 100 100.0 30 100 100.0
Overall satisfaction Cost reductionLevel of satisfaction
Source : Chubu Industrial Advancement Centre (2004)
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7.3 Conceptual Framework
Numerous scholars have tested various theories in assessing firm performance, ranging
from industrial organisation (IO) theory to transaction costs theory. The central
theoretical foundation of this chapter is based on a synthesis of Dunning’s eclectic
paradigm, institutional economics and spatial approaches to FDI. Location-specific
advantages have been discussed based on a neoclassical economic theory. Major
neoclassical economists, such as Heckscher and Ohlin, point to the importance of
comparative advantages in terms of input costs. I investigate the association between L
advantages (host-based market conditions) and performance together with firm-specific
attributes, internalisation advantages and other relevant forces. This integrative
framework is appropriate since this allows us to grasp insightful information on
causality. Perceived environmental-institutional factors originating in the transaction
cost economics have been seen as a vital factor in having a bearing on the strategic
decision process of firms. Li (2004: 153) sheds light on the relative importance of the
location-performance relationship and claims that “natural or artificial impediments
may vary across locations to create persistent unequal returns”.
Dunning (1981, 1988, 1993) extends the concept of comparative advantage to his
eclectic paradigm and insists that locational advantages would provide a firm with
opportunities to reduce transaction costs and market uncertainty. Porter (1990) also
conceptualises a competitive advantage framework integrating four factors which are
referred to by (1) supply conditions; (2) demand conditions; (3) related and supporting
industries; (4) firm strategy, structure and rivalry. There have been many studies in the
past with respect to the effect of spatial conditions in the local economy on the nature
and pattern of the allocation of foreign capital. However, limited efforts have been
devoted to explore how changes in perceived locational advantages put constraints on
the growth of corporate performance, although a number of economic geographers rely
on secondary data and anecdotes, concluding that location influences corporate
performance.
In addition to these firm-specific conditions as well as external conditions, it is
also important to integrate “internal relational conditions” (Hewett et al., 2003: 569)
such as the relationship between the subsidiary and headquarters. This view is
emphasised by Hewett and his colleagues (2003: 569) saying that “within the MNE,
foreign subsidiaries operate in a host country environment and, at the same time, they
are part of a ‘MNE environment”.
As seen in previous chapters, local market conditions vary widely by country
and region. For instance, MNEs run counter to rising labour costs and job-hopping
problems, notably in the capital city of each ex-Communist country (Prague, Budapest,
Warsaw, Bratislava and Bucharest) in recent years. The uneven development of
infrastructure networks may be unfavourable to foreign investors. In particular, eastern
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Poland has struggled with its stagnant economy. Poor highway networks have been a
critical issue in the border regions between Hungary and Romania, whereas southern
Poland and most areas of the Czech Republic benefit from specialised infrastructure
systems, such as airports and highways, which are deemed to be key factors in attracting
FDI inflows. Accordingly, the erosion of favourable market conditions is assumed to
place formidable burdens on the business performance of foreign firms. Foreign
investors should ensure a way to configure their profit-seeking goals with local business
settings, since external resources and assets they rely on may become scarce due to
unpredictable environmental uncertainties in economies in transition. The following
section builds hypotheses by reviewing the vast literature on this issue. This study
postulates that Japanese manufacturing firms’ performance, as measured by overall
operational satisfaction, profitability, sales growth and cost reduction, are contingent on
six groups of variables (see Figure 7.1):
1. Environmental-institutional factors (economic and political uncertainty, unstable
labour market, unfavourable government policy, special economic areas and
agglomeration effects)
2. Firms-specific factors (cost leadership, managerial expertise, and bargaining power
with the host government)
3. Informal institutional relations (social capital)
4. Internalisation-specific factors (entry mode)
5. Parental control (subsidiary autonomy)
6. Human integration (information sharing; sense of unity)
7. Japanese-specific factors (keiretsu organisation)
A more detailed theoretical and operational definition of the variables is presented
below.
7.4 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
7.4.1 Environmental and Institutional Factors
Economic and political certainty
Although numerous relevant studies have investigated the impact of economic and
political uncertainties that are typically hostile to business, there is little agreement on
this issue. Brouthers (2002), with the use of a convenience sample of 178 EU firms in
CEE transforming economies, examines the impact of investment risks on performance
using a set of four questions, such as (1) the risk of converting and repatriating profits;
(2) nationalisation risks; (3) cultural similarity; and (4) the stability of the political,
social and economic conditions. Brouthers finds that EU firms operating in countries
with a higher degree of investment risk have better non-financial performance.
Note: (1) Environmental-institutional
favourable government policy; special economic areas; agglomeration effect), (2)
advantages (cost leadership; managerial expertise; bargaining power), (3) institutional environment
relations (social capital), (4) internalisation
sharing; sense of unity), (6) parent control (autonomy), (7) net
success of the firm (overall operational satisfaction; profitability; sales; cost reduction). Entry timing is a
control variable.
Similarly, Brouthers
investment risk and managerial satisfaction in an analysis of 369 German and Dutch
firms in CEE also find that investment risk affects performance in a positive way.
Rasheed (2005) who studies the performance outcomes of 123 publicly held
manufacturing SMEs in the United States
higher levels of foreign transactional risk perform better when their entry mode is
equity-based. This result reinforces the validity of the contingency theory that
underscores that foreign MNEs
environmental and situational volatility and entry mode to perform better in the
international market.
Abramson and Ai (1999), in an analysis of 77 Canadian companies located in
China, identify that high foreign transactional risks stimulate high overall performance
and sales performance. In order to rationalise this conflicting effect, Abramson and Ai
(1999) offer an explanation that changing Chinese market environments keep Canadian
firms ready to undertake more flexible marketing approaches in response to risks,
consequently leading to better performance.
(6)
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Figure 7-1: Proposed Model
factors (economic and political certainty; stable labour market;
(mode of entry), (5) Human integration (information
work relations (keiretsu
et al. (1999) who investigate the relationship between
presents evidence that SMEs in markets with
have to maximise a strategic fit between perceived
Firm
Performance
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)(5)
(7)
firm-specific
organisation). (7)
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In contrast, Demirbag et al. (2007) report that political risk, measured by two
items, such as political stability and economic stability, on a five point Likert scale, is
not an influential factor to stimulate or inhibit FDI performance in Turkey. Demirbag et
al. clarify that the rationale behind this insignificant association between political
uncertainty and FDI performance is rooted in the fact that Turkish governments have
undertaken their active FDI policy toward foreign investors over time. It is plausible
that convergence of CEE economies with the EU average has taken place with gradual
pace due to contribution from EU regional policies to alleviating the regional economic
inequality in an enlarged EU. It is argued by researchers that institutional uncertainty
and structural immaturity in CEE are perceived by investors to be hazardous to
additional investments. Hence, following the argument (Glaister and Buckley, 1998;
Glaister and Buckley, 1999), I postulate that financial performance with a short-term
horizon is likely to be more satisfactory in more stable markets.
Hypothesis 1: Economic and political certainty will be positively associated with a
Japanese firm’s performance.
Stable labour market
It is considered inevitable to the success of a foreign operation that local labour markets
are stable and not volatile. Securing a pool of cheap but skillful labour is seen as an
important element of offshore production management. Conventional wisdom is that the
rationale behind rapid Japanese economic growth in the 1970s and 1980s is in part
grounded in the stable employer-employee relationship. It is widely perceived that
militant labour attitudes are a source of downgrading efficiency and productivity in
Japanese production systems and of generating internal organisation costs. Moreover,
foreign firms will encounter financial and non-financial damages from job-hopping
problems. It is threatening when local employees leave after absorbing and
accumulating a great deal of firm-specific knowledge within the organisation. Ceaseless
job-hopping and absenteeism make it more difficult for firms to have local employees’
long-term commitments based on mutual trust and reciprocity. Such disappointing
labour markets may also become impediments to advances in localisation.
The previous chapters provide evidence that the primary aim of most Japanese
firms investing in CEE is to enhance cost leadership by reconfiguring the expansion of
their multidimensional business units with the exploitation of comparative locational
advantages in CEE economies. A possible explanation for Japanese firms’ relocation
strategies is that they attempt to maximise economic benefits in the emergence of an
enlarged EU by means of exporting their manufactured products in CEE to Western
Europe. To capitalise on cheap input costs in CEE is part of their operational adaptation
to losing locational merits in Western Europe. Following Demirbag et al. (2007), who
find that firms motivated by capitalising on comparative cost advantages of the host
208
country perform better, I postulate as follows:
Hypothesis 2: Stable labour markets will be positively associated with a Japanese firm’s
performance.
Favourable government policy
To date, FDI-related policy variables, such as the creation of SEZs (Deichmann, 2005;
Deichmann and Karidis, 2005; Devereux et al., 2007; Meyer and Nguyen, 2005), the
presence of inter-state highways (Friedman et al., 1992; Head, et al., 1995; Head and
Ries, 1996; Smith and Florida, 1994; Woodward, 1992), the implementation of stable
and credible exchange rate policies (Loree and Guisinger, 1995; Sethi et al., 2002) and
the development of formal and informal institutions (Meyer and Nguyen, 2005) have
been broadly incorporated in the study of market entry strategies, notably strategic
location selection and the intensity of FDI.
Scholars (Pangarkar and Lim, 2003; Sanyal and Guvenli, 2000) accentuate that
host government policy serves as a key determinant in the successful operation of
foreign firms. Supportive government attitudes toward cross-border movement of
foreign capital, the exchange rate and tax policies are believed to directly influence the
success of the firm (Demirbag et al., 2007; Luo, 2003; Luo and Peng, 1999). The host
government hence plays a vital role in cushioning institutional risks, such as fragile
judiciary systems, discriminatory tax regulations against foreign firms, weak property
rights protection and a prevalent culture of corruption. Arbitrary changes in FDI policies
may force foreign firms to shy away from profitable opportunities. A foreign firm’s
success in doing business may depend on the scale of government intervention in terms
of ownership structure and the transfer of resources across borders (Cheng and Wu,
2001).
The impact of national policies on the internationalisation of firms has already
been debated in numerous studies. Mallya et al. (2004), who compare foreign firms
with incentives and those without incentives in terms of intention to reinvest in the
Czech Republic, find that roughly 80 percent of foreign firms with incentives are
motivated to reinvest in the foreseeable future. Pangarkar and Lim (2003) find that
governments’ friendly attitudes towards foreign companies are positively effective in
increasing the perception of the overall success, stability and profitability. Demirbag et
al. (2007) who analyse the performance of 145 Western MNEs in Turkey find that
supportive governments’ attitudes towards foreign capital also exert a positive impact
on all three performance dimensions, such as (1) overall performance, (2)
marketing-related performance and (3) productivity and cost efficiency. Moreover, Li
(2004) reports that the effect of infrastructure on firm subsidiary performance is
statistically significant and positive in China.
Conversely, some scholars (Cheng and Wu, 2001; Pan and Chi, 1999) identify that
209
MNEs operating in SEZs in China perform worse than those operating outside of SEZs.
Cheng and Wu (2001) highlight that the rationale behind this contradicting result is that
factor endowments in SEZs in China are more expensive than cities and the latter are
more responsive to MNEs’ demands. Sanyal and Guvenli (2000) find no specific
relationships between government relations and the perception of the success of local
affiliate of American firms in China. Park and Kim (2005) also show no relationships
between Korean firms’ profitability and SEZs or open cities in China, suggesting that
incentives provided by the government may be offset by high wages and land costs in
those areas.
What should be taken into consideration is that foreign firms have to deal with the
infrastructure problems in emerging markets characterised by inadequate distribution
channels, immature banking structure, and uneven road networks (Prahalad and
Liebberthal, 1999). Li (2004: 153) underscores that “with the rapid advancement in
transportation and communications, the role of location in determining firm
performance may decrease with respect to factors that can be easily sourced across
regions in free-market economies, such as capital, goods, and technology”. As
government policy influences the accumulation of FDI and location selection over the
last decade, it could also contribute to affecting firm performance. Hence, I postulate the
following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 3a: Favourable government policy will be positively associated with a
Japanese firm’s performance.
Hypothesis 3b: Operating in a special economic area will be positively associated with
a Japanese firm’s performance.
Agglomeration economies
In the economic geography literature, agglomeration forces have proved to be one of the
most influential predictors to explain foreign firms’ location patterns (Head et al., 1995).
Porter (1998) suggests that agglomerative forces lead to enhancing firm performance.
According to Porter (1998), there are five factors in the explanation for the positive
effect of clusters on the growth of corporate productivity, (1) better access to employees
and suppliers; (2) access to specialised information; (3) complementarities; (4) access to
institutions and public goods; (5) better motivation and measurement. Porter (1998: 80)
stresses that “a cluster allows each member to benefit as if it had greater scale or as if it
had joined with others formally without requiring it to sacrifice its flexibility”. The
cluster of firms that serves as a function of information exchanges helps reduce
impediments to the growth of firm performance.
Porter (1998: 90) challenges a paradox that location matters less and less over
time due to improved transportation systems, easy access to global markets and rising
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input costs such as labour and land by underpinning as follows: “The enduring
competitive advantages in a global economy are often heavily local, arising from
concentrations of highly specialised skills and knowledge, institutions, rivals, related
businesses, and sophisticated customers”. “The importance of interpersonal links of a
common institutional culture amongst workers, entrepreneurs and politicians, and of a
positive attitude towards collaboration, all facilitated by spatial proximity, stimulated
interactions between actors in general and the flow of knowledge and information in
geographical space in particular” (Oerlemans and Meeus, 2005: 95).
From an institution-based view of strategy, Meyer and Nguyen (2005: 66) attach
importance to the impact of a cluster of firms on corporate strategies because “an area’s
population of firms creates pressures to establish institutions that best meet their needs”.
In this regard, firms in industrial clusters are likely to be able to accommodate
institutional conditions more easily in comparison with firms in industrial separation.
In an analysis of the causal nexus between FDI inflows and industry development
in the case of the UK economy, Driffield and Munday’s (2000) study reports that
agglomeration economies give rise to a strong revealed industry comparative advantage.
Shaver and Flyer (2000: 1191) also point out that agglomeration facilitates a
competitor’s hiring workers trained by other competitors and obtain access to the
latter’s technological expertise. Li (2004) confirms that the concentration of foreign
firms in the same industry exerts a positive influence over firm performance, while the
industrial concentration of domestic firms has an opposite impact. Eickelpasch et al.
(2007) find that geographic proximity to rivalries does not improve firm innovativeness
and performance in East Germany using 2,070 sampled firms and, in particular, firms
that engage in knowledge intensive services are worse performers than high-tech
manufacturers. Oerlemans and Meeus (2005), using a sample of 224 Dutch firms for the
period 1989-1994 in the Netherlands, found that geographic proximity has a positive
effect on firm performance. Oerlemans and Meeus document firms that take advantage
of both intra- and interregional ties tend to have better performance. Chung and Kalnins
(2001) demonstrate that independent and smaller hotels benefit from markets where
large hotels are located. Shaver and Flyer (2000) find that centripetal forces decrease a
firm’s survival rate in the US. The following competing hypotheses are tested:
Hypothesis 4a: Agglomeration economies will be positively associated with a Japanese
firm’s performance.
Hypothesis 4b: Agglomeration economies will be negatively associated with a Japanese
firm’s performance.
7.4.2 Firm-Specific Advantages
When highlighting the importance of firm-specific strategic resources to invest abroad,
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Hymer’s monopolistic advantages (1960) and Dunning’s eclectic paradigm (1981) have
been dominant theories in the strategic management and international business literature.
These theories have much in common with the resource-based view of the firm. Their
central argument is that a firm’s ownership advantages play a crucia role in
compensating for the liability of foreignness and in outperforming indigenous firms that
possess knowledge of and access to local labour, capital and product markets. At an
initial stage of market penetration, foreign firms are at a disadvantageous position to
compete against local rivals with well-accepted brand image as well as reputation and
long-established value chains (Luo, 2003).
Firm-specific advantages, as referred to by technological intensity, marketing
capability, reputational assets, managerial capabilities, and international experience, are
expected to determine firm performance when investing abroad. Delios and Beamish
(2001) suggest that the success of the transfer of intangible assets depends on the extent
to which MNEs adapt to the complexity and dynamism of local markets. Foreign firms
that have the ability to capitalise on ownership advantages, together with locational
advantages, tend to be more active in CEE (Meyer, 1998). There is a strong tendency
among scholars for employing R&D as a major proxy for intangible assets.
Nevertheless, the following three advantages deserve additional attention in the era of a
‘global chess’ that forces MNEs to reorganise the strategic direction of foreign
activities.
Cost leadership
Cost leadership is the term that refers to “cost control in the area of organisational
management, engineering and accounting” (Reid, 1993: 128). More specifically, cost
leadership can be interpreted as a firm’s ability to reduce costs involved in the
implementation of value chain systems ranging from sales to production. Strong cost
leadership enables firms to outperform rivals and generate barriers that make it difficult
for rivals to enter in an era of increasingly accelerating globalisation (Porter, 1980).
There are various measures that firms enhance cost leadership. Tight cost
control in raw materials, efficient access to capital, flexible distribution channels, and
high level of know-how in cutting-edge production methods are vital to firms in
sustaining cost leadership. In addition, introducing in-house production enhances cost
leadership since an increase in in-house production rates regarding core components
requires original technological developments and hence results in product
differentiation against rivals. The formation of strategic alliances is also effective for
firms to acquire cost advantages. It is because the firm can sell its services and products
below rivals’ prices by forming strategic alliances with potential partners in fields, such
as procurement, marketing, production and R&D. At the same time, the firm can
improve product quality, streamline production processes and cut procurement costs.
Dedicated cost leadership by means of strategic alliance formation points to the
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importance of resource complementarity.
To date, the impact of cost leadership on firm performance has been poorly
explored by scholars of strategy and international business. With a particular focus on
the dismantling or reorganisation of the traditional keiretsu system in Japan in recent
years, Nobeoka and Tanaka (2002) ask to what extent cost leadership has a positive
influence on return on sales of 201 Japanese manufacturing firms in Japan. Nobeoka
and Tanaka find that cost leadership is positively related to firm performance but the
impact of the variable differs depending on the degree of perceived technology and
business uncertainties. Similarly, Lee and Miller (1999) identify that dedicated cost
leadership is at the heart of organizational success for the case of Korean firms. In sum,
firms find it impossible to survive without upgrading cost leadership. Hence, I postulate
the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 5: Cost leadership will be positively associated with a Japanese firm’s
performance.
Managerial expertise
Managerial expertise within the firm is believed to be a source of competitive strength
for MNEs. Managerial expertise refers to the ability for MNEs to organise strategies in
terms of financing, product development, international marketing and the evaluation and
training of human resources. This firm-specific ability generates good profit margins by
streamlining the organisation. Hence, I postulate the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 6: Managerial expertise will be positively associated with a Japanese firm’s
performance.
Bargaining power with the host government
Apart from the conventional ownership advantages, such as R&D intensity and
advertising intensity, a firm’s bargaining power with host government authorities are
important predictors for foreign MNEs doing business successfully. A firm’s bargaining
power refers to the ability to realise its special objectives and aims over what
counterparts aspire to achieve in the pre-and post-entry process. Moreover, the level of
bargaining power that the firm possesses determines the success or failure of its
competition for receiving government attention. MNEs with strong negotiation power
are capable of bargaining for desired resources, such as training grants and tax
exemptions in the ex ante and ex post investment periods. As a result, the policy
formulation of state actors can be manipulated by the nonmarket power of firms. Moon
and Lado (2000) assert that MNEs with strong R&D and advertising intensity are less
vulnerable to host government intervention and are more capable of achieving desired
strategic outcomes. This view supports the hypothesis that the success of the subsidiary
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is influenced by relative bargaining power. Moreover, the scale of a MNE’s bargaining
power varies depending on entry mode, notably in transition economies. Firms that
build factories from scratch are more competitive in the FDI negotiation process with
host governments than those who enter the market in the form of M&A because the
former can feel free to choose one of many location candidates (Meyer and Jensen,
2005). Hence, I postulate the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 7: Bargaining power with a host government will be positively associated
with a Japanese firm’s performance.
7.4.3 Informal Institution-Specific Factor
Institutional environment relations/social capital
Building personal ties and networking know-how has been treated as either social
capital or social embeddedness (Grabher, 1993; Granovetter, 1985), which denotes that
economic transactions and values are determined by social ties of networks in the fields
of institutional economics, economic sociology, political science and organisational
behaviour. For firms, the accumulation of social capital indicates the integration of “a
sort of cultural software” (Grabher, 1993: 2) and “knowledge-sharing routines”
(Yli-Renko et al., 2001: 589) into an organisation. Zhou et al. (2007: 7) define social
capital as “a collection of knowledge of foreign market opportunities, advice and
experiential learning and referral trust and sense of unity by a third party”. Social capital
is cheap, rich and more detailed in the context of desired information, trustful in
economic transactions apart from opportunism (Granovetter, 1985). Dunning and
Lundan (2008: 585) define the notion of social capital as “a measure of the quality of
the informal institutions in a society”. Scholars of economic sociology (Uzzi, 1996,
1997) shed particular light on the intensity and breadth of knowledge sharing available
in social relations relative to those available in arm’s length markets. Social capital aids
firms in gaining timely access to strategic resources and assets desired by economic
actors seek (Grabher, 1993).
Granovetter (1985) and Yeung (1997) criticised Williamson (1985)’s transaction
cost economics (1985) for disregarding the relation of economic transactions to social
interactions and networking strength. In fact, Williamson (1985) treats MNEs as an
economic entity economising on transaction costs and assumes that MNEs are
motivated to enhance economic efficiency by establishing hierarchical governance
systems.
Yeung (1997: 4)19 underscores the importance of network arrangements with
societal actors in considerations of economic geography and remarks that firms usually
19 Yeung (1997: 10) argue that there are three types of social relations in which MNEs are embedded: (1)
intrafirm networks (coordination and control within the organization); (2) interfirm networks (personal
and business contacts); and (3) extrafirm networks (political bargaining).
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seek the following three goals at the extra-firm level: (1) to establish power relations
more than monetary relations; (2) to search for proprietary rights; (3) to reinforce social
and political legitimacy.
The institutional perspective considers that a firm’s ability to survive is dependent
on the extent to which the firm accommodates institutional controls and environmental
constraints by minimising transaction costs (e.g., asymmetric information problems and
opportunistic behaviour) and maximising legitimacy, social support, stability,
recognition, mutual acquaintance, and reciprocity (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Meyer
and Rowan, 1991).
Scholars of strategic management (Peng, 2003; Peng and Heath, 1996) also attach
importance to the forging of social ties. Transaction costs (e.g., bureaucratic and
coordination costs) are reduced when economic actors search for business-related
information acquisition through the use of extrafirm networks because of no need for
“substantial formal transfers of ownership rights” (Peng and Heath, 1996: 514). Peng
and Heath (1996: 505-506) highlight that the impact of relational assets on the success
of the firm is contingent on the accumulation of social contacts on the basis of personal
trust, notably during the transition “because they offer some constancy and
predictability in times of fundamental change in the formal institutional frameworks”.
In addition, Meyer (2000: 139) also emphasises that personal ties act as a vital mediator
for binding firms with governmental institutions such as ministries, party officials in the
commanding economic system. Moreover, Peng (2003) argues that firm performance is
conditional on informal connections and social influences in the initial period of
transition, whereas the importance of firm-specific competitive advantages exceeds that
of such relation-specific advantages in the late stage of transformation in the Soviet-type
economy.
The types of information available in the extrafirm networks range from tax
reforms to political certainty and FDI-related incentives (Wu, 2008). According to Zhou
et al. (2007), the growth of transaction values varies depending on the intensity and
density of relationships and social ties. The development of such social capital enables
MNEs to circumvent the liability of foreignness and to collect appropriate information
on the local political system (Zhou et al. 2007). In other words, MNEs with stronger
network relations with local institutional actors can more effectively exercise host-based
business practices and hence mitigate cultural and language hurdles.
Cultivating institutional environment relations, notably with government agencies,
facilitates the acquisition of desired resources such as “direct funding (e.g., government
subsidies), strategically useful information and contacts (e.g., professional associations,
government agencies), lucrative business contracts (e.g., state contracts eligible only to
firms that demonstrate compliance with regulations), and influential product
endorsements (e.g., ‘healthy’ food products)” (Oliber, 1997: 103).
It has also been perceived by MNEs to be imperative that they build social ties
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with local communities. Increasing attention has also been given to corporate social
responsibilities, for committing themselves to making their production facilities
environment-friendly, sponsoring local sports and cultural events and participating
actively in local dialogues and charities. Such efforts influence the development of
cooperative relationships with the local society based on personal trust and reciprocity.
Firms have the need to achieve shared goals and legitimacy, while seeking profits with
long-term horizons.
In the existing international business and strategic management literature, social
network has been used to enhance our understanding of the behaviour and nature of the
firm (Oliver, 1997; Uzzi, 1996; Wu, 2008; Yli-Renko et al., 2001). There has been
strong theoretical and empirical agreement on the positive link between the magnitude
of networks of social ties and firm performance (Rhee, 2008).
Zhou et al. (2007) find that social capital promotes the ability of MNEs to obtain
credibility, legitimacy and efficiency in emerging markets. Demand for better
understanding how to deal with the host-based government intervention and the local
political system requires MNEs to more actively interact with local governmental
officials. High degrees of social ties with host government agencies help firms enhance
the degree of legitimacy in local markets. Special access to government authorities and
excellent communication with them may also allow foreign enterprises to decrease the
incurred coordinating and negotiating costs within the MNE-local government
interaction.
Uzzi (1996), who studies how organisation outcomes of 23 apparel firms in New
York are shaped by social capital, finds that the intensity of social capital reduces the
possibility of operational failure. More interestingly, the author identifies the
relationship between social capital and the likelihood of failure is U-shaped curve-linear
oriented, indicating that hybrid social capital characterised by in-between arms-length
ties and embedded ties generates the highest survival rate of the firm.
Yeung (1997) who investigates the role of personal ties and network competencies
in promoting a Hong Kong firm’s market position in ASEAN, identifies that personal
contacts with government officials reduce the operational cost and augment the
profitability of the firm. According to Yeung’s survey conducted in the period from
December 1993 to August 1994, roughly 20 percent of the sample Hong Kong firms
operating in ASEAN report that relationships with host-based governmental agencies
facilitate successful local operations by means of stimulation, guidance and assistance
from local government institutions.20
Peng (2000), in an analysis of three Chinese-foreign automobile joint ventures
(Beijing Jeep Corporation, Shanghai Volkswagen Automobile Company, and
Guangzhou Peugeot Automobile Corporation) in China, examines how their
20 See more details in Yeung (1998).
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relationships with local and state authorities improve organisational outcomes in the
principal-agent context. Peng finds that the establishment of cooperative ties with local
government enables foreign firms to achieve strategic interests. In a similar vein,
Biziouras and Crawford (2001) point out that the primary reason for Shanghai VW’s
success in China should be attributed to its special access to the central government in
Beijing. Special governmental support was provided to Shanghai VW in the 1989
economic crisis as well as in the process of market liberalisation in the early 1990s,
while its counterpart, Guangzhou Peugeot suffered from the lack of strong connections
with the central government in Beijing (Biziouras and Crawford, 2001: 180).
With the help of the informal local networks, TNC subsidiaries are able to extract
information on unexpected changes in institutional conditions without time lags, while
indigenous political and societal actors can also design policies and enforce rules, which
bring optimal benefits not only to the whole society but also to their own political
interests to coevolve with TNC subsidiaries. The premise is that poor social capital or
network competences in the local market contributes to increasing chances for MNEs to
confront asymmetric and insufficient information problems and poor legitimacy, and
hence limit the success of the subsidiary. I propose the following premise:
Hypothesis 8: The magnitude of social networks will be positively associated with a
Japanese firm’s performance.
7.4.4 Internalisation-Specific Characters
Entry mode
The transaction cost theory has been commonly used as the central theoretical
foundation for assessing the importance of the entry mode selection and performance
link. Williamson (1985) claims that MNEs are likely to internalise technological
knowledge, marketing skills and managerial know-how within their hierarchical
organisations, because transactions in arm’s length markets are characterised by cost
and uncertainty. Especially, it is evident that the transfer of firm-specific advantages
from the parent company to its affiliates involves coordination problems, transaction
costs, market uncertainties and information asymmetry when investing abroad
(Williamson, 1985). A debate on entry mode selection and performance has developed
on the discussion of a trade-off between resource commitment and efficiency (Brouthers
et al., 1999). However, empirical research on this issue has been limited and its
empirical results have been inconclusive (Brouthers et al., 1999).
Regarding the build-up of own factories from scratch, it is a consensus that firms
can better implement a smooth transfer of firm-specific assets from the parent to the
affiliate without any intervention by local partners inherent in the JV mode. The
advantages of a full ownership strategy face neither free-riding problems (Chang and
Rosenzweig, 2001; Madhok, 2005), monitoring costs (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986),
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nor the issue of shirking (Gomes-Casseres, 1989). To be more specific, complete
ownership enables the parent to independently dictate value systems, technological
innovation, resource networks, organisational patterns, financial leverage and
managerial methods of its local affiliates at a lower cost (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986;
Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001) and to achieve desired strategies and outcomes although
the establishment of new ventures from scratch requires time and capital to operate and
adapt to inflexible and ambiguous legal infrastructures in transition economies (Estrin
and Meyer, 1998). Compared to JVs, wholly owned subsidiaries are in an advantageous
position in implementing their own marketing, production and sales strategies and
introducing new products developed in the HQs and other foreign units.
Greenfield investments are likely to be less influenced by host government
regulations. This is because economic gains of local governments are linked to the gains
of greenfield investors. Since the initial stage of the transition to a market-based
economy, local governments have been under pressure to outcompete their rivals for
inducing large greenfield projects that contribute to job creation, technology transfer,
integration of local suppliers into global markets whereas greenfield investors desire to
obtain financial and fiscal incentives (Meyer and Jensen, 2005).
To explain why the full ownership encourages the success of the firm requires
reliance on the transaction cost theory, which underlines the importance of control. High
degree of control may matter in achieving high returns on investment. Empirically,
Brouthers (2002) and Brouthers et al. (1999) find that complete ownership
commitments are an optimal entry form of investing abroad and increasing financial and
non-financial performance. Brouthers and Nakos (2004), who examine the entry
mode-performance relationship with a data set of 185 Dutch and Greek SMEs in 14
different CEE markets, find that firms that high degrees of entry mode fit in accordance
with the transaction cost theory perform better. Conversely, Siripaisalpipat and Hoshino
(1999) examine a causal association between entry mode and performance for 190
Japanese firms investing in Thailand. Siripaisalpipat and Hoshino draw the conclusion
that Japanese firms with full ownership are the least profitable and ownership type does
not matter in achieving successful operations. Thus, a premise to study is as follows:
Hypothesis 9: Hierarchical control mode will be positively associated with a Japanese
firm’s performance.
7.4.5 Human Integration
Information sharing and sense of unity
The growth of the firm hinges on the level of integration of local employees into the
organisational structure of the firm. Drawing upon the resource-based view of the firm,
efficient integration of key resources such as local personnel within the organisation
makes the firm more valuable and efficient due to information, experience and
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dedication contributed by local employees. Prior work notes that a firm’s commitment
to local employees serves to ensure high labour productivity, and to enhance a sense of
involvement or unity (Eisenberger et al., 1990; Lee and Miller, 1999; Organ and
Konovsky, 1989; Whitney, 1994). The improvement of communications not only
between foreign expatriates and local employees but also between workers and
management and their contribution to the organisation of a firm, is likely to be seen
essential to development of a shared vision and shared goals, thus engendering mutual
trust between expatriates and local employees.
Active human integration can increase the likelihood of local employees behaving
not opportunistically but complementarily. An effort to promote human integration
through the upgrading of information sharing and sense of unity is considered
fundamental to the success of a foreign operation. Majek (2005) who conducted
interviews with managers from four Japanese subsidiaries (Toyota, Isuzu, Denso and
Toyo Seal) in the Polish automobile industry, points out that improvement of group
awareness would contribute to transferring the model of Japanese management systems
to Poland. The study by Majek gave evidence that group consciousness, as measured by
a five Likert scale in three items such as small group activities, information sharing
practice and sense of unity, is not as high as the average. Luo (2003) also argues that the
lack of efficient information sharing mechanisms within the firm will hamper technical
or market opportunities that could boost business performance. Froese and Geritz
(2007) who investigate two M&A cases (Renault and Nissan, Daimler and Mitsubishi)
find that a high degree of organisational and human integration affects the success of
M&A communication in Japan. En (2006) argues that insufficient communication that
results from cultural gaps between Japan and CEE may hinder the development of
stable labour relationships and the transfer of production technology in CEE. Using the
case study approach of internationalisation of Western invested-enterprises in the Czech
Republic and Slovakia, Pavlínek (1998) attributes the success of Whirlpool to efficient
human resource management and communication initiatives such as face-to-face weekly
meetings between management and workers. I postulate the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 10: Information sharing will be positively associated with a Japanese firm’s
performance.
Hypothesis 11: Sense of unity will be positively associated with a Japanese firm’s
performance.
7.4.6 Parent-Company Control
Autonomy
The regionalisation of the manufacturing sector has been spurred by a heightened level
of competition in an enlarged Europe, requiring subsidiaries to have the ability to react
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flexibly to emerging customer demands so as to sustain access to local market
knowledge and innovation. Considering these environmental dynamics and the
complexity of the EU, firms have to attain a high level of autonomy. Subsidiary
autonomy refers to “the degree to which the foreign subsidiary of the MNE has strategic
and operational decision-making authority” (O’Donnell, 2000: 528) and “the level of
freedom that a venture has to operate without parent company interference” (Newburry
and Zeira, 1999: 264). Slangen and Hennart (2008) integrate internal conformity
pressures based on institutional theory into performance of MNEs, assuming that ceteris
paribus the lower internal conformity pressures from the HQs a subsidiary experiences,
the higher degree of local responsiveness the subsidiary can enjoy. Slangen and
Hennart’s study verifies that foreign MNEs perform worse when the level of subsidiary
integration is higher (i.e., tighter HQs’ control).
Yeung (1997) argues that the degree of autonomy depends on the extent to which
the parent company trusts the local manager and how much that manager understands
the corporate identity and vision. Greater autonomy for the subsidiary results in
subsidiary managers having greater managerial discretion to be able to choose the way
firm-specific resources, such as technology, knowledge, finance and human capital, are
utilised. Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998: 105-107) underscore that “foreign operations
dependent on a central unit may be unable to exploit local market opportunities or
respond effectively to strong national competitors”. Luo (2003: 292) supports this view,
indicating that “through increased strategic adaptation in response to emerging market
opportunities, local responsiveness and control flexibility embedded in a
parent-subsidiary link support the deployment and exploitation of existing capabilities
and bolster the building and upgrading of new capabilities vital in the host country”.
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998) point out that too much reliance on practices and policies
mandated by the parent retards a subsidiary’s business activity due to too much
bureaucracy in the consensus decision-making process, and asymmetric information
between the parent and the subsidiary. The reinforcement of decentralisation helps
lower operational costs and enhances the subsidiary’s own responsiveness to rapid
changes in its operating environments.
Scholarly attention has been given to the impact of the parent-subsidiary
relationship on the success of the subsidiary. Additional costs arise from the
misalignment of policy to local market conditions arising from dependence on the
parent; strategies developed by the parent may not be adequate due to physical distance
and less adequate knowledge than that possessed by the affiliate (Luo, 2003). The
delegation of autonomy is of critical importance in making local operations efficient and
workable. Empirically, it has been widely recognised that the delegation of authority
and responsibility to subsidiaries increases their ability to adapting the changing host
business climate in an efficient manner. Kotabe and Wheiler (1998) find that local
autonomy has a positive impact on corporate performance since a higher degree of
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transference of operational and managerial autonomy from the parent to the affiliate
allows the subsidiary better to respond to changes in local demands and needs. Luo
(2003: 292) argues that “MNE parents depend on subsidiaries to seize rent-generating
opportunities or acquire host country-specific knowledge”. The delegation of autonomy
and responsibility to foreign subsidiaries could serve as an incentive for managers to
increasing personal efficiency and commitments (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1998). I
postulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 12: The delegation of autonomy to a Japanese subsidiary will be positively
associated with its firm performance.
7.4.7 Network Relations
Social organisation of the Japanese economy (keiretsu)
Keiretsu membership, a network governance structure that augments learning and
exchange efficiencies, can also be regarded as a relational asset. More precisely, keiretsu
firms are embedded in social and economic relations at the inter-firm level when
following Yeung’s (1997) classification of social capital. Business group ties can also be
interpreted as a contributor to synergising existing firm-specific competitive advantages,
such as complementary marketing and managerial information, trust and shared goals
with social capital that builds on groupthink, informal meetings and interpersonal
relations. By virtue of frequent interaction with exchange partners a keiretsu firm can
align with optimal strategic goals and enjoy economic reciprocity and minimise
exchange partners’ behavioural opportunism. The keiretsu tie enables group member
firms to save costs involved in market transactions and economise on the costs of
trading goods, labour, capital and service within the group boundary. Wang et al. (2005:
95) argue that “it is not uncommon for a keiretsu to have a long-term vision of
collective welfare that some firms benefit, while others pay a price. Thus, a subsidiary
whose parent firm belongs to a keiretsu would benefit more from the affiliation than one
whose parent does not belong to a keiretsu”.
To date, the impact of keiretsu affiliation on performance remains inconclusive,
since some (Chen et al. 2006; Douthett et al. 2004; Hoshi et al. 1990; Lai and
Limpaphayom 2003) agree that keiretsu is of great importance to the success of the firm
in the home market, whereas others show conflicting results (Gerlach, 1992; Lincoln et
al 1996; Jameson et al., 2000; Nakatani 1984). Gerlach (1992), in a cross-sectional
analysis of the impact of ownership concentration on profitability of Japanese firms for
the period 1976-85 in the home market, finds that group membership harms corporate
performance. Lincoln et al (1996), who investigate the association between corporate
profitability and the keiretsu presidents’ council (shachōkai) using 197 Japanese
industrial firms over the periods 1965-1988, 1967-1988 and 1967-1985 found that the
keiretsu membership based on shachōkai has a significant and negative impact on return
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on asset.
Wang et al. (2005) examine the keiretsu network in the Asian market as a
significant predictor for the success of foreign affiliates of Japanese firms in the Asian
monetary crisis of 1997 by using a sample of 1,128 firms. Wang et al. (2005) find that a
local subsidiary whose parent company is a horizontal keiretsu member could enjoy
better opportunities for making profits even in the crisis period, due to inter-group
capital allocation and the impact of horizontal keiretsu membership providing additional
advantages beyond a single subsidiary’s experience.
Ma et al. (2006), who investigate the extent to which the intensity of business
group affiliation is reflected in optimum levels of performance in China, fnd that the
interaction of business group affiliation and state ownership exerts a positive impact on
the success of firms. Wu (2008), in an analysis of 108 Hong Kong-based Chinese
family-owned firms from the manufacturing sector also found that information-sharing
in a business group network plays a mediating role in the positive relationship between
network relations and firm competitiveness.
What is striking is that independent firms tend to better align their corporate
strategy with economically turbulent environments in Japan, compared with keiretsu
firms. Recent years witness that many independent suppliers compete against keiretsu
firms in domestic and global contexts. Alps Electric, Bridgestone, Diamond Electric,
Daikin Industry, NGK Ceramics, NSK, NTK Technical Ceramics, NYB, Sanden and
Yazaki Corporation are all competitive independent firms in the ‘arm’s length market’
and aggressively sell their products to foreign customers abroad. Given these above
discussions, I postulate the following competing hypotheses.
Hypothesis 13a: Keiretsu networks will be positively associated with a Japanese firm’s
performance.
Hypothesis 13b: Keiretsu networks will be negatively associated with a Japanese firm’s
performance.
7.4.8 Control Variable
Entry timing
The impact of entry timing on firm performance has been an interest of research on
international business and strategic management. First-mover effects are perceived to be
of great significance among foreign investors who seek to take advantage of cheap input
costs in less developed countries. Early entrants are able to stockpile intangible assets,
such as experience and knowledge, and can thus establish a dominant market position.
As a result of first-mover advantages, minor market players at home are likely to gain a
strong market position in competitive industries in which the host government provides
foreign investors with special support (Luo, 1995). For instance, the first-mover effect
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holds for the case of Suzuki in Hungary (Van Tulder and Ruigrok, 1998). Employing
859 MNEs in China, Pan and Chi (1999) find that firms that began prior to 1988
perform better than those that began after 1990, suggesting that, at the early stage of
transformation, first movers can enjoy various financial rewards and concessions that
late comers cannot obtain. First-mover advantages lead firms to develop, strengthen and
leverage ties with the host-based incumbent government and local customers with a
long-term horizon. Lending support to this analytical view, Estrin and Meyer (1998:
217) also highlight that “firms may even be able to influence the local regulatory
environment in their favour”.
Despite various positive advantages accruing from the first-mover effect, early
entrants bear additional costs related to institutional deficiencies in the host economy.
Early investors’ profits could be distorted by low quality of laws and peculiar
requirements of operating, local politicians’ erratic decisions, and corruption and bribery
problems in the early stage of transformation, since a wide discrepancy exists between
formal rules and social norms. In other words, host governments in emerging economies
still need time to align rules and laws to those of industrialised countries and to develop
the organisational and administrative capabilities to encourage foreign capital.
Institutional convergence does not occur overnight. Estrin and Meyer (1998: 218) also
contend that “brand names may be worth less where brand loyalty is low because
consumers may want to experiment with new products”, while the establishment of long
term brand recognition can, in theory, be thought of as part of a superior competitive
advantage for early entrants.
In contrast to early entrants, followers can learn from both successful and failing
outcomes of strategic management associated with marketing and product development
in transitional economies, while they may face a strong reaction from initial entrants to
protect the market shares that they have gained (Fahy et al., 1998). This behaviour can
be interpreted as “free rider effects that refer to the ability of later entrants to avoid
some of the costs that early entrant must pay, such as R&D and buyer education”
(Schoenecker, 1994: 33). In the context of the economic transition, late investors
capitalise on host government officials’ increased acceptance of and pro-active stance
towards foreign capital designed to open the path to a free market-based economy over
time. The advancement of industrial restructuring driven by early investors helps to
reduce institutional constraints. Estrin and Meyer (1998:218) state that late investors
benefit from early investors’ commitments to “building the market”. Foreign MNEs that
entered in CEE markets, especially, after 2000, have benefitted from improved legal and
political infrastructure resulting from the implementation of the EU’s acquis
communautaire. Nevertheless, Woodcock and Beamish (2001: 90-91) point out that
financial and non-financial performance may not be satisfactory in the start-up period
because it takes time for late entrants to adapt to local markets, benefit from scale
economies and acquire information about rivals, labour management and government
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regulations. I postulate that the earlier a firm enters an emerging market, the greater the
likelihood of superior performance by that firm.
Hypothesis 14: Early entry timing will be positively associated with a Japanese firm’s
performance.
7.5 Research Methods and Sample Characteristics
The analysis in this chapter relies on an evaluative survey including performance,
changes in perception of location-specific advantages, firm-specific capabilities,
internalisation advantages, institution-specific factors, human integration,
parent-subsidiary relationships and keiretsu systems at the subsidiary level.
To identify sample firms, I used the latest Tōyō Keizai Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyō
Sōran 2007, a list of Japanese firms published by the Japanese Chamber of Commerce
and Industry in the Czech Republic in 2006 as well as a list of Japanese investors in
Hungary published by the JETRO Hungary Office in 2005. There were 206 Japanese
manufacturing firms in CEE. 179 of those companies in the manufacturing sector were
finally chosen, while 27 firms that were in operation since 2006 were excluded, because
a new venture normally earns no or little profit in the first years of operations
(Demirbag et al., 2007). Then I confirmed whether the companies could participate in
the survey aimed at evaluating a performance-changing locational advantages
relationship. Those who were contacted were executive level company staffs who were
asked to assess their affiliates’ performance in a multi-dimensional way. Secondary data
about each of the surveyed firms’ investment projects in the ex-Soviet markets were
compiled from their Internet websites.
In January 2008, I used three techniques of survey delivery to collect primary data
from respondents from the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia,
Lithuania, Serbia and Montenegro: (1) survey delivery by email; (2) survey delivery by
mail to senior managers of subsidiaries whose email addresses could not be identified;
and (3) direct visits to some Japanese companies operating in CEE in January 2008. The
survey questionnaires, accompanied by cover letters, were then personally delivered
using the above techniques. The survey was prepared in Japanese. Two native speakers
verified the accuracy of the Japanese-language questionnaire.
After sending out the two-page questionnaire by email and mail, reminders were
delivered over the telephone for those who had not responded. In order to obtain a high
response rate, I tried to keep the questionnaire simple and clear. Out of 179 Japanese
subsidiaries in CEE, a total of 61 affiliates (33.4 percent) showed their willingness to
participate in the evaluative survey. The responses of six affiliates’ were unusable, due
to a number of incomplete and invalid answers. There were two major underlying
reasons for rejecting an offer of participation in the survey. First, some senior managers
were prohibited from participating in this type of survey even for academic purposes,
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Table 7-3: Representativeness of Sample Japanese Manufacturing MNCs
due to the need to comply with strict company policy. Second, some senior managers
reported that they were not inclined to participate in such a survey, given their busy
schedules. This kind of attitude of senior managers towards the survey in general may
indicate that they have little expectations of receiving a summary report after
responding, and may find the empirical results of little importance to their local
management. The final number of the valid cases was 55, which represents a response
rate of 30.7 percent.
Representation Population Percent Surveysample Percent
Czech Republic 64 35.8 18 32.7
Hungary 45 25.1 15 27.3
Poland 44 24.6 16 29.1
Slovakia 11 6.1 4 7.3
Lithuania 2 1.1 0 0.0
Slovenia 0 0.0 0 0.0
Bulgaria 1 0.6 0 0.0
Romania 11 6.1 2 3.6
Serbia 0 0.0 0 0.0
Montenegro 1 0.6 0 0.0
Total 179 100 55 100
Automobiles and
automobile
83 46.4 16 29.1
Electornics products and
electric components
35 19.6 17 30.9
General machinery 10 5.6 6 10.9
Chemical and petroleum 5 2.8 4 7.3
Others 29 16.2 9 16.4
Food processing 4 2.2 1 1.8
Plastic 4 2.2 0 0.0
Precise machinery 3 1.7 0 0.0
Metal 6 3.4 2 3.6
Total 179 100 55 100
Before 1990 0 0.0 0 0.0
1990-1994 16 8.9 2 3.6
1995-1999 41 22.9 19 34.5
2000-2004 107 59.8 29 52.7
2005 15 8.4 5 9.1
Total 179 100 55 100
Country
Industry
Year of establishment
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Table 7-4: Sample Industry Distribution, Ownership Structure and Entry Timing by
Country of Destination
The data collection process involved a great deal of time, complexity and difficulty in
identifying proper contact persons and proper company addresses. The response rate is
relatively reasonable in comparison with other relevant studies of emerging economies
done by Brouthers (2002), Brouthers and Nakos (2004) and Carlsson et al. (2005)
whose response rates are 21 percent, 29 percent, and 35 percent. It can be concluded
that this relatively high response rate seems contributory to producing less biases in the
data and hence leads to an increase in the degree of generalisation and reliability for the
economic performance of Japanese manufacturing firms in CEE.
CZ HUN POL SLK ROM Total
Before 1990 Count 0 0 0 0 0 0
Layer % 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1990-1995 Count 0 1 0 1 0 2
Layer % 0.0 6.7 0.0 25.0 0.0 3.6
1995-2000 Count 4 6 6 2 1 19
Layer % 22.2 40.0 37.5 50.0 50.0 34.5
2000-2005 Count 11 8 9 1 0 29
Layer % 61.1 53.3 56.3 25.0 0.0 52.7
After 2005 Count 3 0 1 0 1 5
Layer % 16.7 0.0 6.3 0.0 50.0 9.1
Total Count 18 15 16 4 2 55
Layer % 32.7 27.3 29.1 7.3 3.3 100
Wholly-owned Count 16 14 12 2 1 45
Col % 88.9 93.3 75.0 50.0 50.0 81.8
Joint ventures Count 2 0 3 2 0 7
Col % 11.1 0.0 18.8 50.0 0.0 12.7
M&A Count 0 1 1 0 1 3
Col % 0.0 6.7 6.3 0.0 50.0 5.45
Total Count 18 15 16 4 2 55
Col % 32.7 27.3 29.1 7.3 3.3 100
General machinery Count 1 0 3 0 2 6
Col % 5.6 0.0 18.8 0.0 100.0 10.9
Consumer electronicsCount 6 8 1 2 0 17
Col % 33.3 53.3 6.3 60.0 0.0 30.9
Transportation Count 7 4 4 1 0 16
Col % 38.9 26.7 25.0 20.0 0.0 29.1
Chemical Count 1 1 2 0 0 4
Col % 5.6 6.7 12.5 0.0 0.0 7.3
Others Count 3 2 6 1 0 12
Col % 16.7 13.3 37.5 20.0 0.0 21.8
Count 18 15 16 4 2 55
Col % 32.7 27.3 29.1 7.3 3.3 100
Year of establishment
Firm ownership
Industry
Total
Country of Destination
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7.5.1 Sample Characteristics
Of the 55 valid responses, 3.6 percent of the sample firms entered the CEE markets
between 1990 and 1994, 34.5 percent entered between 1995 and 1999, 52.7 percent
entered between 2000 and 2004 and 9.1 percent entered in 2005. 32.8 percent of the
surveyed firms operate in the Czech Republic, 26.2 percent operate in Hungary, 29.5 per
cent operate in Poland, 8.2 percent operate in Slovakia and 3.3 percent operate in
Romania.
Of the 55 valid responses, 81.8 percent of the sample firms undertook the wholly
owned subsidiary (WOS) mode, 12.7 percent undertook the joint venture (JV) mode,
and 5.45 percent undertook the merger and acquisition (M&A) mode. This result
indicates that Japanese firms favour keeping control over their foreign subsidiaries. Of
the 55 surveyed firms, 30.9 percent of the respondents are engaged in the
electronic/electric industry, 29.1 percent are engaged in the transportation equipment
industry, 10.9 percent are engaged in the general machinery industry, and 7.3 percent
are engaged in the chemical industry (Table 7-3).
In terms of the nationality of senior managers in local operations, 86.9 percent of
the respondents are Japanese. In terms of the number of Japanese expatriates, roughly
50 percent of the respondents employ between one and four Japanese expatriates,
followed by 24.6 percent employing between five and nine Japanese expatriates, and
16.4 percent employing between 10-19 Japanese expatriates.
The above table shows that there are two main waves of Japanese manufacturing
firms’ market entry in CEE. The first entry wave occurred in the period between 1995
and 2000. This denotes that the strategic choices of Japanese manufacturing firms were
based on risk-avoidance. The second entry wave took place in the period between 2000
and 2005, during which the majority of the surveyed firms entered CEE markets. In
particular, 61.1 percent of the sample firms operating in the Czech Republic are
concentrated in this specific period, indicating that numerous Japanese automotive
suppliers followed their main customers such as Toyota in Kolín, Czech Republic. In
this period, considerable effort by the host government in CEE was also given to the
creation of various incentives and to the removal of key institutional constraints to
promote foreign capital inflows.
The survey sample demonstrates that the industry specialisation of Japanese
manufacturing companies differs depending on country of destination (see Table 7-4).
The Czech Republic attracts Japanese FDI to the transportation equipment sector,
accounting for 38.9 percent. More than half of the surveyed firms in Hungary (53.3
percent) and in Slovakia (60.0 percent) operate in the consumer electronics/electric
industry. Romania seems to be an appropriate FDI destination for firms specialising in
the general machinery industry.
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7.6 Performance Assessment
The performance outcomes of Japanese manufacturing subsidiaries in CEE were
assessed by their managers, who evaluate overall operational satisfaction, profitability,
sales and cost reduction. Approximately 33 percent of the surveyed Japanese
manufacturing subsidiaries reported that their overall satisfaction performance is lower
than initially expected, while more than 40 percent stated that their performance
exceeded their original expectations (see Table 7-5).
More than 40 percent of the surveyed Japanese manufacturing subsidiaries
reported that their profitability performance is lower than their initial expectation, while
less than 20 percent stated that their profitability performance exceeded their original
expectations. In terms of sales performance, the majority of the surveyed firms
answered that their sales performance is as expected. More than 50 percent of the
surveyed Japanese manufacturing subsidiaries reported that their cost reduction
performance is lower than their initial expectation, while only 4.92 percent stated that
their performance exceeded their original expectations. Table 7-6 demonstrates the
performance evaluation by Japanese manufacturing firms in the transforming economies
in CEE on a five-point Likert scale. Higher scores on each performance variable signify
relatively higher levels of performance achievement. As a whole, Japanese
manufacturing firms were more satisfied with their overall operations (3.09), while their
performance in profitability (2.67) and cost reduction (2.47) is lower than their original
expectations. In examining results within the same country, the surveyed firms in
Slovakia reported the highest score (2.88) in terms of the average, followed by Poland
(2.86), the Czech Republic (2.85), Hungary (2.82) and Romania (2.75). With an average
response of 2.81, one can conclude that Japanese manufacturing firms have assessed
their local operations in a relatively pessimistic way.
As seen in Table 7-7 on a five-Likert scale, the findings of this study show that the
performance of companies surveyed vary by industry and entry timing. Regarding the
industry difference, the highest score for overall satisfaction is 3.38 in the transportation
equipment sector, followed by the general machinery sector (3.00), the consumer
electronics industry (2.82), and the chemical industry (2.50). It is evident that Japanese
firms operating in the transportation equipment sector are more satisfied with their
economic performance than those in the other sectors. Comparing the pre-2000 market
entry firms with those that entered the market after 2000, Japanese firms who entered
prior to 2000 perform better in terms of profitability (2.76) and cost reduction (2.71),
while those who entered after 2000 do better in terms of overall operational satisfaction
(3.12) and sales (3.06). In sum, it may be concluded that Japanese firms have not
achieved outstanding organisational outcomes yet, while the economic performance of
Japanese manufacturing firms operating in Slovakia and in the transportation equipment
sector is slightly higher than average.
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Table 7-5: Tabulation for Four Dimensions of Performance
Source: Own survey (2008)
Note: Scale from 1 (the lowest performance) to 5 (the highest performance).
Table 7-6: Performance Assessment of Japanese Manufacturing Firms in the
Ex-Soviet Economies by Country
Source: Own survey (2008)
Note: Scale from 1 (the lowest performance) to 5 (the highest performance).
Table 7-7: Performance Assessment of Japanese Manufacturing Firms in the
Ex-Soviet Economies by Sector and Entry Timing
Source: Own survey (2008)
Note: Scale from 1 (the lowest performance) to 5 (the highest performance).
Table 7-8 shows the mean score of different environmental and institutional factors
assessed by all the surveyed Japanese firms operating in CEE in terms of country. The
surveyed firms were asked to evaluate the nature of various environmental factors on a
five-point Likert scale. Higher scores on perceived environmental factors indicate that
firms face higher levels of uncertainty, difficulty and instability. Considering the overall
assessment, the most distorting environmental factor was rising labour costs (4.55),
followed by limited labour availability (3.98), exchange rate instability (3.82),
competition with rivals (3.80), job-hopping problems (3.71) and economic instability
Freq. % Cum.(%) Freq. %
Cum.
(%) Freq. %
Cum.
(%) Freq. %
Cum.
(%)
1 3 5.5 5.5 5 9.1 9.1 1 1.8 1.8 4 7.3 7.3
2 15 27.3 32.7 19 34.6 43.6 12 21.8 23.6 24 43.6 50.9
3 14 25.5 58.2 21 38.2 81.8 28 50.9 74.6 24 43.6 94.6
4 20 36.4 94.6 9 16.4 98.2 14 25.5 100 3 5.5 100
5 3 5.5 100 1 1.8 100 0 0.0 100 0 0.0 100
Overall operational
satisfaction Profitability Sales growth Cost reduction
Total CZ HUN POL SLK ROM
(N=55) (N=18) (N=15) (N=16) (N=4) (N=2)
Overall saisfaction 3.09 3.06 2.93 3.19 3.50 3.00
Profitability 2.67 2.72 2.73 2.63 2.50 2.50
Sales 3.00 3.11 3.20 3.20 2.75 2.50
Cost reduction 2.47 2.50 2.40 2.40 2.75 3.00
Average 2.81 2.85 2.82 2.86 2.88 2.75
Performance
Trans Electro Machine Chem Before2000
After
2000
(N=16) (N=17) (N=6) (N=4) (N=21) (N=34)
Overall saisfaction 3.38 2.82 3.00 2.50 3.05 3.12
Profitability 3.00 2.59 2.50 2.00 2.76 2.62
Sales 3.25 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.90 3.06
Cost reduction 2.56 2.59 2.33 2.00 2.71 2.32
Average 3.05 2.75 2.71 2.38 2.86 2.78
Performance
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(3.22). Poor economic growth (2.51) and weak government support (2.80) were
perceived among the surveyed firms to be the least troublesome environmental and
institutional factors.
Table 7-8: Evaluative Outcomes of Environmental and Institutional Factors by Total
and Country
Source: Own survey (2008)
Note: Scale from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree): “Does the local environment in which
your company operates experience …?”
Table 7-9: Evaluative Outcomes of Environmental and Institutional Factors by
Industry and Entry Year
Source: Own survey (2008)
Note: Scale from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree): “Does the local environment in which
your company operates experience …?”
In terms of the country breakdown, the evaluative outcomes do not vary greatly.
The issue of rising labour costs is considered the most severe problem that the Japanese
firms have experienced in five countries. Although the mean value for rising labour
Environmental factors Total CZ(N=18)
HUN
(N=15)
POL
(N=16)
SLK
(N=4)
ROM
(N=2)
Rising labour costs 4.55 4.56 4.53 4.63 4.50 4.00
Competition 3.80 4.11 3.80 3.56 3.75 3.00
Economic instability 3.22 3.17 3.53 3.13 2.25 4.00
Political uncertainty 3.00 3.00 3.47 2.81 2.00 3.00
Job hopping problems 3.71 3.67 3.60 3.94 3.50 3.50
Weak economic growth 2.51 2.44 3.07 2.31 2.00 1.50
Weak governmental support 2.80 2.39 2.73 3.38 2.50 3.00
Poor infrastructure systems 2.98 2.78 2.87 3.50 2.25 3.00
Exchange rate instability 3.82 3.89 3.53 4.00 4.00 3.50
Instable labor relations 2.93 2.78 2.60 3.38 3.00 3.00
Limited labor availability 3.98 4.11 3.93 3.94 4.00 3.50
Environmental factors Trans(N=16)
Electro
(N=17)
Machine
(N=6)
Chem
(N=4)
Before
2000
(N=21)
After
2000
(N=34)
Rising labour costs 4.75 4.47 4.50 4.50 4.52 4.56
Competition 3.88 4.06 3.33 3.00 3.71 3.85
Economic instability 3.13 3.35 3.00 3.50 3.10 3.29
Political uncertainty 2.88 3.18 2.67 3.75 2.71 3.18
Job hopping problems 3.56 3.94 3.50 4.00 3.71 3.71
Weak economic growth 2.25 3.00 1.83 2.00 2.52 2.50
Weak governmental support 2.31 3.06 3.17 2.50 2.57 2.94
Poor infrastructure systems 2.38 3.24 3.50 2.75 2.67 3.18
Exchange rate instability 3.50 3.76 4.00 3.25 3.62 3.94
Instable labor relations 2.88 2.94 3.17 3.75 2.86 2.97
Limited labor availability 3.81 4.47 4.00 3.75 4.14 3.88
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costs is similar, the surveyed firms in Poland show the worst mean score (4.63). The
second and third most severe problems are limited labour availability and rising
competition with rivals. These environmental pressures prove to be the most serious in
the Czech Republic. The mean value for economic growth is more than 3.0, suggesting
that the surveyed firms do not have pessimistic views about economic growth in each
country. The firms surveyed in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, are relatively
concerned about exchange rate volatility. It is interesting to note that the firms surveyed
in Poland assess infrastructure systems as relatively poor. This reflects anecdotal
evidence on the poor infrastructure in Poland, except for the south of Poland. With the
mean value above the average, the firms surveyed in the Czech Republic and Slovakia
agree that their host governments provide supportive attitudes towards foreign capital
indicating that CzechInvest has succeeded in attracting FDI to the country and removing
the complexity of its administrative procedure.
Similar to the ranking of environmental factors based on country, the evaluative
outcome does not vary to any larger extent by industry and entry timing (see Table 7-9).
The surveyed firms report that labour-related factors, such as rising labour costs, limited
labour availability and job-hopping problems are the most challenging factors.
Conversely, weak economic growth and weak government support are not perceived as
problematic. In other words, their view on these two issues is relatively optimistic. The
firms in the transportation equipment sector that were surveyed show great concern
about rising labour costs (4.75), while limited labour availability is viewed as
problematic among those in the electronics sector. What is surprising is that the
respondents operating after 2000 are more concerned about exchange rate instability
(3.94), political uncertainty (3.18), and economic instability (3.29) than those operating
prior to 2000 despite the expectation that EU membership would oblige new member
countries to enforce stable exchange rate policy and to make economic and political
systems compatible with those practiced inside the EU.
In order to tackle labour-related problems, such as job-hopping problems and
rising labour costs, Japanese firms have undertaken various measures. Upgrading labour
productivity through the introduction of new machinery and the reduction of raw
material procurement costs is considered a fundamental approach to dealing with rising
labour costs. In terms of job-hopping problems and high absenteeism, a number of firms
provide special rewards for those who show high commitments and eagerness to work.
Some firms take wage settings based on constant job participation. Active
communications as well as knowledge sharing within the organisation are likely to serve
not only as a response to job-hopping problems but also as a mean of motivating local
employees. The lack of communication within the organisation is subject to the risk of
an increased rate of defects. The relative importance of morning assembly is largely
considered (JETRO, 2003).
Some Japanese firms claim that the new construction of inter-country highways,
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for instance, from the southern Poland to Prague, could lead to the further development
of Japanese agglomeration in the automotive corridor and help forge the access to new
customers as well as potential suppliers in the future (JETRO, 2003).
In contrast to Western firms, Japanese MNEs intend not to rely on arbitrarily
setting higher wages. The provision of improved working environments and the
development of working ethics and morale as well as loyalty to the firm are believed to
achieve sustainable corporate growth with a long time horizon.
7.7 Operationalisation of Variables and Model Specification
In this section, I operationalise the variables that help capture the variation in the level
of performance of a firm. The variables applied are defined as follows:
7.7.1 Dependent Variable
Defining corporate performance is a difficult and complicated task as no clear
consensus on the measurement of adequate corporate performance exists in the
international business literature (Glaister and Buckley, 1999; Keats and Hitt, 1988; Mao
and Wang, 2007). Previous relevant studies have chosen various objective
measurements, such as value-added per worker (Geng and Weiss, 2007; Li, 2002),
imputed profit to total assets (Geng and Weiss, 2007), a ratio of total profit relative to
total sales (Cheng and Wu, 2001), size adjusted sales (Abramson and Ai, 1999),
productivity growth (Zemplinerová and Jarolím, 2001), return on assets (Luo, 2003;
Miller and Eden, 2006; Riahi-Belkaoui, 1998), export performance and return on
investment (Luo, 2003). Li (2004) employed output per employee as a proxy for firm
productivity. Delios and Beamish (2001) used survival rates as one of their performance
measures in the cox proportional hazard model. These balance sheet data have widely
received acceptance from scholars.
However, it is substantially difficult to collect such objective financial figures of
MNEs at the subsidiary level (Brouthers, 2002; Brouthers et al., 1999), whereas there
are objective measures available at the aggregated corporate level (Rasheed, 2005). First,
annual reports that the public can access are not published and obtainable at each
subsidiary level. Second, it may be because foreign subsidiaries are excessively
concerned about the risk that the data they supply would be misused or revealed in
public. Shama (2000: 662) also reports according to his previous experience that “most
executives are unable, unwilling, or forbidden to provide [exact profit figures]”,
recommending that subjective data are more obtainable. The unwillingness to supply
objective financial data also became evident for the case of Japanese subsidiaries during
my field research in CEE in 2006 and 2007. Moreover, Japanese firms are inclined to be
more hesitant and less motivated to provide third parties detailed financial data
compared with Western European counterparts. This explains the level of difficulty in
conducting the survey regarding the perceived environment uncertainty and
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performance link.
As far as objective measures are compared with subjective measures, various
scholars argue that the latter are more appropriate. First, different national accounting
systems tend to distort the quality of balance sheet data (Brouthers, 2002; Brouthers et
al., 1999). Second, the transfer-pricing systems and financial reporting procedures of
foreign MNEs vary “depending on features peculiar not only to the local subsidiary, but
also to the multinational network as a whole” (Szanyi, 2000: 65). These divergences
within the organisation complicate objective measures. Chen and Wu (2001: 35) also
lend support to the use of subjective performance measures, pointing out that “the
subjective indicators are considered better indicators than objective indicators in that the
former may capture the long-term and non-financial aspects of the enterprises’
performance”. Subjective performance measures are appropriate in assessing a firm’s
strategic aims as well as market positioning (Anderson, 1990, Brouthers, 2002). Cheng
and Wu (2001) point out that correlations between subjective and objective performance
measures are of limited relevance and suggest that financial and non-financial indicators
should be tested separately.
In my evaluative survey, subjective performance is measured in a
multidimensional way. I follow previous relevant studies (Brouthers, 2002; Brouthers
and Nakos, 2004; Brouthers and Xu, 2002; Brouthers et al., 1999; Delios and Beamish,
2004; Demirbag et al., 2007; Dimitratos, 2004; Glaister and Buckley, 1999; Pangarkar
and Lim, 2003; Tatoglu and Glaister, 1998), which used multiple performance indicators
in order to capture a comprehensive picture of the determinants of performance. It
should be noted that part of the organisational efforts of firms are associated with a
reduction of various costs pertaining to the local operation, such as labour costs, raw
material costs, and transportation costs. To be precise, this variable focuses on the more
qualitative side of organisational outcomes. Four subjective measures are introduced in
this study: (1) overall operational satisfaction; (2) profitability; (3) sales; and (4) cost
efficiency.
These four performance predictors are measured on a five point Likert scale
ranging from “(1) completely dissatisfied” to “(5) completely satisfied” as well as from
“(1) much less than expected” to “(5) much more than expected”. It should be borne in
mind that performance, as measured by overall satisfaction, sales, profitability and cost
reduction, may be biased by the parent company’s global strategy rather than
determined by the successful improvement of the individual company per se. Table 7-11
demonstrates that there are two strong correlations between the subjective measures of
performance. One is between overall operational satisfaction and profitability and
another is between profitability and cost reduction.
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Table 7-10: Variables and Operational Measures
H. Variables Operational measure
Non-financial performance Ordinal scale (overall operational satisfaction) from 1=completely not satisfied to 5=completely satisfied.
Financial performance Ordinal scale (profitability, sales growth and cost efficiency) from 1=much lower than expected to 5=much higher than
1 Economic and political
certainty (reverse coded)
Composite of scores in three dimensions (Cronbach’s α=0.72) Ordinal scale from 1: political certainty to 5: political
uncertainty; 1: economic stability to 5: economic instability; 1: high economic growth to 5: low economic growth.
2 Stable labour markets
(reverse coded)
Composite of scores in three dimensions (Cronbach’s α=0.63) Ordinal scale from 1: no rising labour costs at all to 5: high rising
labour costs; 1: abundant labour availability to 5: labour shortage; 1: no turnover to 5: high turnover.
3a Favorable government
policy (reverse coded)
Composite of scores in three dimensions (Cronbach’s α=0.71) Ordinal scale from 1: low exchange rate policy fluctuation to 5:
high exchange rate policy fluctuation; 1: rich infrastructure systems to 5: poor infrastructure systems; 1: strong government
support to 5: weak government support.
3b Special economic areas A dummy variable (1 or 0) defined according to whether a firm is located in a special economic area.
4 Agglomeration The log of FDI stock as of 2004 (each national statistical bureaus).
5–7 Firm-specific advantages Ordinal scale from 1=much weaker than rivals to 5=much stronger than rivals
(cost leadership, managerial skills and bargaining power).
8 Social capital Composite of scores in three dimensions (Cronbach’s α=0.82): central government, regional government, local communities).
Ordinal scale from 1: weak ties to 5: strong ties.
9 Entry mode A dummy variable (1 or 0) defined according to whether a firm is wholly-owned or not.
10–11 Human integration Ordinal scale (information sharing and sense of unity) from 1=very low to 5=high.
12 Autonomy
(reverse coded)
Composite of scores in three dimensions (Cronbach’s α=0.83): (1) planning, (2) budget, (3) additional investment, (4)
organizational restructuring, (5) diversification of business lines.
13 Keiretsu membership A dummy variable (1 or 0) defined according to whether a firm belongs to any vertical keiretsu groups.
14 Entry timing A dummy variable (1 or 0) defined according to whether a firm entered before 2000 or after 2000.
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Table 7-11: Correlation Matrix of Four Dimensions of Performance
Note: The words significant or not significant in the top half of the table refer to the paired comparison
tests for the two variables in the corresponding row and column. * means p<0.05
Table 7-12: Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables
Variable
Overall
operational
satisfaction
Profitability
performance
Sales growth
performance
Cost reduction
peformance
Overall operational
satisfaction 1 Significant Significant Significant
Profitability
performance 0.5897* 1 Significant Significant
Sales growth
performance 0.3102* 0.4571* 1 Significant
Cost reduction
peformance 0.3882* 0.6297* 0.2775* 1
Companies
reporting Mean S.D. Min Max
Overall operational satisfaction 55 3.09 1.04 1 5
Profitability 55 2.67 0.92 1 5
Sales 55 3.00 0.75 1 4
Cost reduction 55 2.47 0.72 1 4
H1 Economic and political certainty(reverse coded) 55 2.91 0.76 1.67 5
H2 Stable labour market(reverse coded) 55 4.08 0.69 2.67 5
H3a Favourable government policy(reverse coded) 55 3.20 0.81 1.33 5
H3b Special economic areas
H4 Agglomeration 55 3.44 0.43 2.4 4.4
H5 Cost leadership 55 3.05 0.76 1 4
H6 Management expertise 55 3.20 0.78 1 5
H7 Bargaining power 55 2.69 1.00 1 4
H8 Social capital 55 2.66 0.86 1.33 4.33
H9 Entry mode (1: WOS) 55 0.82 0.39 0 1
H10 Information sharing 55 3.56 0.69 2 5
H11 Solidarity/sense of unity 55 4.18 0.64 2 5
H12 Autonomy (reverse coded) 55 2.95 0.81 1 5
H13 Vertical keiretsu membership 55 0.22 0.42 0 1
H14 Entry timing (1: before 2000) 55 0.38 0.49 0 1
Independent and dependent variables
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Table 7-13: Correlation Matrix of Multicollinearity
1 2 3a 3b 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 13 14 15
1 Economic and political certainty 1
2 Stable labor market 0.26 1
3a Favourable government policy 0.39 0.16 1
3b Special economic areas (1: SEZ) 0.18 0.36 0.25 1
4 Agglomeration 0.11 0.00 -0.30 0.01 1
5 Cost leadership -0.19 -0.05 -0.04 -0.11 -0.21 1
6 Management expertise -0.14 -0.03 -0.04 0.17 -0.09 0.14 1
7 Bargaining power -0.21 -0.18 -0.11 -0.05 -0.19 0.05 0.13 1
8 Social capital -0.21 -0.06 -0.02 0.03 -0.09 -0.02 0.06 0.64 1
9 Entry mode (1: WOS) 0.13 0.01 0.08 0.19 0.22 -0.22 -0.18 -0.10 0.02 1
10 Information sharing -0.22 -0.07 -0.08 0.03 -0.05 0.15 0.27 0.39 0.40 -0.16 1
11 Solidarity/sense of unity -0.03 -0.07 -0.06 0.06 -0.12 -0.06 0.30 0.21 0.27 -0.16 0.35 1
12 Autonomy -0.11 0.02 -0.17 -0.20 -0.23 0.20 -0.04 0.06 -0.09 -0.34 -0.08 0.01 1
13 Vertical keiretsu membership 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.14 0.15 -0.01 -0.12 -0.09 0.08 0.26 -0.04 1
14 Entry timing (1: before 2000) -0.14 0.06 -0.24 -0.11 0.16 0.14 -0.06 0.25 0.30 -0.11 0.17 0.07 0.14 -0.14 1
Independent variables
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7.7.2 Independent Variables
The operationalisation of explanatory variables is presented below. Some variables are
created based on groups of multiple items to evaluate the extent to which divergent
measures represent the same quality. I will check internal consistency reliability,
measured by Cronbach’s coefficient alpha, which is important in evaluating the level of
the homogeneity or the complementarity of the different items of the same idea.
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha ranges from 0 and 1. The higher values are, the higher
reliability among the indicators. A level of 0.6 or more is considered an acceptable
cut-off point to denote sufficient internal consistency reliability (Nunnally, 1978).
Economic and political certainty (Reverse coded)
In this study, I use a three item additive measure. The scale of economic and political
uncertainty was measured by three items: ‘Does the local environment in which your
company operates experience high macroeconomic volatility?’, ‘Does the local
environment in which your company operates experience high political uncertainty?’,
and ‘Does the local environment in which your company operates experience low
economic growth?’. Responses were evaluated using five-point Likert scales (i.e.,
1=“completely disagree” to 5=“completely agree”). The reliability of this measure is
relatively high as Cronbach’s alpha is 0.72. I take the average score based on three
items (see Table 7-14).
Table 7-14: Composite of Scores about Economic and Political Certainty
Stable labour market (Reverse coded)
In this study, I use a three item additive measure. The scale of labour market instability
was measured by three items: ‘Does the local environment in which your company
operates experience rising labour costs?’, ‘Does the local environment in which your
company operates experience serious job-hopping problems?’, and ‘Does the local
environment in which your company operates experience poor labour availability?’. I
take the average score based on three items. Responses were evaluated using five-point
Likert scales (i.e., 1=“completely disagree” to 5=“completely agree”). The reliability of
this measure is relatively high as Cronbach’s alpha indicates 0.63 (see Table 7-15).
Variable
(Number of obs=55)
Factor
loadings
Cronbach ’s
alpha score
Political uncertainty 0.851
Economic instability 0.824
Poor economic growth 0.725
0.720
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Table 7-15: Composite of Scores about Stable Labour Market
Favourable government policy (Reverse coded)
In Pangarkar and Lim’s (2003) study, a five item additive measure (1. government
restraints on cross-border ventures; 2. availability of investment protection scheme to
foreign companies; 3. non-discriminatory policies towards foreign investors in terms of
investment incentives; 4. state interference for the development of business; and 5. the
extent of government influence on investment) was used. In this study, the scale of
unfavourable government policy was measured by three items: ‘Does the local
environment in which your company operates experience high exchange rate
fluctuation?’, ‘Does the local environment in which your company operates experience
weak government support?’, and ‘Is the local environment in which your company
operates endowed with poor infrastructural services’. Broz et al. (2008: 419-420)
comment that: “The exchange rate is centrally important to economic activity, and
government policy has a powerful impact on the currency. ... Volatile exchange rates
create uncertainty about international transactions, adding a risk premium to the costs of
goods and assets traded across borders”. Accordingly, for international firms, it is a
critical issue of whether a country confronts heavy exchange rate fluctuation, which
makes their cross-border transactions more costly. Moreover, CEECs aiming for the
EMU membership are required to keep their exchange rates stable for two years within
the ERM II system prior to the official approval. Responses were evaluated using
five-point Likert scales (i.e., 1=“completely disagree” to 5=“completely agree”). I take
the average score based on three items. The reliability of this measure is relatively high
as Cronbach’s alpha is 0.71 (see Table 7-16).
Table 7-16: Composite of Scores about Favourable Government Policy
Agglomerative forces
I compile FDI stock data at the sub-national level from each national statistical bureau
in CEE as of 2004 (see more detail in Chapter 6). The value was transformed into a
logarithm.
Variable
(Number of obs=55)
Factor
loadings
Cronbach ’s
alpha score
Poor labour availability 0.780
Rising labour costs 0.709
Serious job-hopping problems 0.794
0.626
Variable
(Number of obs=55)
Factor
loadings
Cronbach ’s
alpha score
Strong exchange rate fluctuation 0.571
Poor infrastructure 0.881
Favourable governmental support 0.904
0.710
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Special economic areas
In this study, there are various ways of measuring the effect of special economic areas
on firm performance. I employ a binary dummy variable to investigate this issue. A
value of one is assigned where a firm positions itself in a special economic area, or zero
otherwise.
Firm-specific advantages
I use three firm-specific advantages (cost leadership, managerial expertise, and
negotiation power with host government). Responses were evaluated using a five-point
Likert scale (i.e., 1= “very weak relative to rivals” to 5= “very strong relative to rivals”).
Institutional environment relations/social capital
Various measures of the magnitude of social capital of international ventures have been
employed by the existing international business literature. Social capital is measured by
the number of social networks a firm relied on to acquire information for international
expansion (Rhee, 2008). In an analogy to the study of Zhou et al. (2007) who evaluate
the role of guanxi networks in determining the success of global
small-and-medium-sized firms located in China, the social capital variable is measured
by a scale of three dimensions based on a five point Likert-type scale in this study: (1)
connections and ties with the central government; (2) connections and ties with
subnational governments; (3) connections and ties with local communities. The
indicators range from (1) to “have very weak connections and ties” (5) to “have very
strong connections and ties”. All three measures loaded on a single factor with a
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.82. This high Cronbach’s alpha score validates the use of these
measures in this study (see Table 7-17).
Table 7-17: Composite of Scores about Social Capital
Internalisation advantages (entry mode)
I include a binary dummy variable so as to assess whether firms who engage in the
build-up of their own operations from scratch perform better than those in the form of
JVs and M&A. A value of one is assigned when firms are WOSs and zero otherwise.
Variable
(Number of obs=55)
Factor
loadings
Cronbach ’s
alpha score
Connections with
the central government 0.826
Connections with
the regional government
0.929
Connections with
the local community 0.835
0.820
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Human integration
For firms, socialisation is a key task in coordinating and managing foreign operations
abroad. In particular, installing the parent’s corporate identity, as well as the subsidiary’s
management style and future goals into local employees may determine the sustained
operational success. This process should also reinforce the quality of an
employee-employer relationship, thereby building and developing trust, shared
responsibility and loyalty.21 Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998: 211) point out that “an
enduring barrier to the development of a transnational organisation is the lack of
individual understanding and acceptance that surrounds the international activities in
most corporations”. It is inevitable that the gap between expatriates and indigenous
employees will be decreased, in order to increase operational efficiency and
organisational competences. I measure socialisation with two proxies. One is a degree
of information sharing among expatriates and local employees and another is a degree
of sense of unity within the organisation.
The variable for human integration is measured by two predictors in this study.
One is the extent of information sharing and the level of sense of unity within the
affiliate. Apart from the importance of the transfer of high technology involved in FDI,
full commitments of trust-building between Japanese expatriates and local employees
are crucial predictors in affecting superior performance. Following Abo (2005) and En
(2006), the human integration variable is measured by two separate indicators.
One is information sharing. In this item, the respondents were asked: “To which
extent does information sharing take place within the organisation?” It was categorised
as follows: (1) no information sharing within the organisation exists at all; (2)
Communication gaps exist between expatriates and local employees, resulting in
relatively passive information; (3) Although no particular measure is undertaken, our
company is committed to efficient information sharing through meetings; (4) Our
company undertakes various measures in order to improve information sharing; (5) No
communication gaps exist at all, and active information sharing takes place within the
organisation. An ordinal variable ranges from 1 to 5 for each category, respectively.
Another is solidarity/sense of unity. The respondents were asked: “To what extent
does internal sense of unity exist?” It was categorised as follows: (1) There is no
specific measure to improve an internal sense of unity; (2) There exist only social
events; (3) Although no particular measure is undertaken, our company is aware of the
importance of increasing internal sense of unity; (4) Our company undertakes a few
measures in order to improve internal sense of unity; (5) Our company has a cafeteria
that local employees can utilise, morning assembly, social events, work uniform. An
ordinal variable ranges from 1 to 5 for each category, respectively.
21 Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998) attribute Matsushita’s success to its efforts to instill corporate identity and
goals in all company employees.
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Managerial autonomy
O’Donnel (2000) used the percentage of the subsidiary’s top management team that is
from corporate headquarters as a proxy for subsidiary autonomy. The concept of
managerial autonomy is defined as the extent to which a subsidiary can make its own
strategic decisions independently from the parent company over key areas of its local
management. The managerial autonomy variable is measured by a scale of five tasks
based on a five point Likert-type scale: (1) mid-term planning; (2) budget organisation;
(3) additional investment in equipments; (4) organisational restructuring; and (5) entry
to new ventures. The indicators range from (1) “can fully decide independently from the
parent company” to (5) “cannot decide independently from the parent company at all”.
These items were adapted from the measures that were used by Ito et al. (2002). The
high Cronbach’s alpha score (0.83) validates the use of these measures in this study
(Table 7-18). This variable was reversely coded in data analysis.
Table 7-18: Composite of Scores about the Transfer of Autonomy
Vertical keiretsu affiliation
As major aim of this study, I check the robustness of the impact of vertical keiretsu
affiliation on the development of corporate performance. To define keiretsu affiliation, I
use Dodwell Marketing Consultants Industrial Groupings in Japan (1988) and Kigyō
Keiretsu to Gyōkai Chizu (2001). Since it is considerably difficult to compile concrete
data on ownership concentration over time, I used a binary dummy variable. If a firm
belongs to one of existing vertical keiretsu groups, the dummy independent variable
assumes a value of one and zero otherwise. This method is consistent with previous
scholars (Wang et al., 2005). A negative sign is predicted. The negative sign should
indicate that a high degree of dependence, coordination and administration costs and the
limited scope of customers within the hierarchy of the keiretsu organisation distort
corporate performance.
Entry timing
Entry timing is another critical factor in affecting the performance of Japanese firms in
the transforming economies in CEE. Firms that entered the emerging economies at the
early phase of the transition period, in particular, in the 1990s, have accumulated
Variable
(Number of obs=55)
Factor
loadings
Cronbach ’s
alpha score
Planning 0.833
Budgetting 0.843
Additional capital injection 0.822
Organisational restructuring 0.709
Participation in new businesses 0.626
0.828
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knowledge and experience over time in contrast to those who invested at the dawn of
the 21st century. A huge difference in the cost of foreignness exists since the forerunner
may be better embedded into the local community and more familiar with the
complexity of local bureaucracy as well as local business practices than the latecomers.
Moreover, the forerunner already found ways to achieve efficiency as well as legitimacy
in the local environment. I use a binary dummy variable. If a firm entered after 2000,
the firm takes the value of one and zero otherwise.
7.7.3 Model Specification
I test the multiple regression models as follows:
ܦ݁݃ ݁ݎ ݁݋݂ ݌ ݂݁ݎ ݋݉ݎ ܽ݊ ܿ݁ ݋ݑܿݐ ݋݉ ݁ݏ= ߙ+ ߚଵ(ܧ݊݅ݒ ݎ݋݊ ݉ ݁݊ ܽݐ ݈ܽ݊݀ ݅݊ ݏ݅ݐݐݑ݅ݐ݋݊ ݈݂ܽܽ ܿݐ݋ݎݏ)+ ߚଶ(݂݅ ݉ݎ ݏ݌݁ܿ ݂݅ ݅ܿ ݂ܽ ܿݐ݋ݎݏ)+ ߚଷ(݊ܫ ݏ݅ݐݐݑ݅ݐ݋݊ ݈ܽ݁݊ ݅ݒ ݎ݋݊ ݉ ݁݊ ݐ݁ݎ ݈ܽ ݅ݐ݋݊ ݏ) + ߚସ(݊ܫ ݁ݐ ݊ݎ ݈ܽ݅ܽݖ ݅ݐ݋݊ )+ ߚହ(ܪݑ݉ ܽ݊ ݅݊ ݁ݐ ݃ܽݎ ݅ݐ݋݊ ) + ߚ଺(ܲܽ݁ݎ ݊ݐ ݋ܿ݊ ݐݎ݋݈ ) + ߚ଻(ܰ ݁ݐݓ݋݇ݎ )+ ε
Where the β terms are parameters to be estimated and ε terms refer to unobservable
variables.
7.8 Empirical Results
A multiple regression procedure was run to identify which determinants account for the
performance of Japanese manufacturing investors in the former socialist economies of
the CEECs. Tables 7-19 and 7-20 summarise the empirical findings for four dimensional
performance indicators. The columns presented in the table correspond to variable
groups, explanatory variables, estimated coefficients, standard deviations and t-statistic,
respectively. The statistical significance and magnitude of the explanatory and control
variables based on firm-specific advantages theory, internalisation theory, institutional
theory, resource-based theory and network theory were tested by the OLS. Since the
empirical outcomes are based on self-evaluative surveys, we should interpret them with
caution.
Pearson correlation tests were run and it was confirmed that none of the variable
sets exceeds more than 0.50 except for the highest correlation coefficient (0.64) between
the proxies of bargaining power and social capital (see Table 7-13). These two variables
are used alternately so as to overcome the multicollinearity problem. There is also no
multicollinearity problem through testing the variance inflation factor (VIF) values of
all explanatory variables in the model estimations. The common agreement is that the
multicollinearity does not exert any influence over the findings as far as the VIF is
lower than five (Majocchi and Strange, 2007). In this study, the VIF values range from
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1.22 to 1.54 and the mean value is 1.37.
With the use of the multiple regression analysis, a significant relationship between
the independent variables and each performance measure is identified. The multiple
regression analysis reports the most significant relationship (p=0.001) between the
explanatory variables and overall operational satisfaction corresponding to the variance
of 43-45 percent. Adjusted R-squared values were 38-39 percent for profitability
performance, 22-24 percent for sales growth performance, and 37-39 percent for cost
reduction performance. These high adjusted R-squared values indicate that the
over-fitting bias arising from the small sample sizes is unlikely to be problematic in the
regression models. In addition, they imply that the proposed predictors confirm a
satisfactory level of explanatory power. Namely, to a larger extent, the conceptual model
developed in this study recommends itself a proper avenue for bridging the gap between
theory and practice consistent with previous studies (Brouthers, 2002; Brouthers et al.,
1999). The explanatory power of the model increases with the replacement of
bargaining power with social capital.
Economic and political certainty
I found a positive relationship between performance and perceived economic and
political uncertainty (β=0.217, p<0.05). This empirical result indicates that the company
facing economic and political uncertainty had better cost reduction performance,
consistent with previous relevant studies (Abramson and Ai, 1999; Brouthers, 2002;
Brouthers et al., 1999; Rasheed, 2005). Likewise, perceived economic and political
uncertainty was also positively related to overall operational satisfaction and sales
performance, but the relationship was not statistically significant. Hypothesis 1 was
significant but opposite to the prediction.
Stable labour market
Labour market stability, measured by a composite of three items (rising labour costs,
labour availability and job-hopping problems), is negatively related to overall
operational satisfaction. Profitability performance is negatively associated with labour
market instability but this relationship shows no statistical significance. As seen in
Model 1 and 5, the erosion of comparative advantages, such as rising labour costs,
limited labour availability and serious job-hopping problems, exerts a negative effect on
overall operational satisfaction of Japanese MNEs in CEE (β=-0.306 and β=-0.296,
p<0.1). Hypothesis 2 was partially supported.
Favourable government policy
Although the variable for unfavourable government policy, measured by a composite of
three items (exchange rate fluctuation, weak governmental support for FDI and poor
infrastructure) is negatively related to all the performance indicators, none of them are
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statistically significant. Hypothesis 3a received no support.
Special economic areas
Hypothesis 3b predicting that special economic areas would exert a positive impact on
firm performance was rejected. The variable is positively associated with overall
operational satisfaction, profitability performance and sales performance but they show
no statistical significance.
Agglomeration
Hypothesis 4 predicting that industrial clusterings of foreign firms would exert a
positive impact on firm performance receives strong support. The agglomeration
variable is positively related to profitability and the coefficients for the agglomeration
variable are statistically significant at the one percent level. Hence, Hypothesis 4a is
partially supported.
Cost leadership
Hypothesis 5, predicting that cost leadership would exert a positive impact on fim
performance, was highly supported. The cost leadership variable helps shape the level
of performance outcomes in a positive fashion and its effect is highly significant at the
one percent level. New ventures with cost leadership are likely to reap superior
performance in terms of overall operational satisfaction, profitability and cost reduction.
An explanation for this is that cost leadership comes into play as the primary
requirement in cultivating business transactions in arm’s length markets in Europe
where cost efficiency is crucial to winning the local market. Hypothesis 5 was highly
supported.
Managerial expertise
Hypothesis 6, predicting that managerial expertise a firm possesses would exert a
positive impact on firm performance, was highly supported. The managerial expertise
variable is positively related to overall operational satisfaction (β=0.287, p<0.1;
β=0.297, p<0.05), and sales growth (β=0.357, p<0.01) dimensions of performance. The
managerial expertise variable is a key factor in doing business successfully in CEE
since this type of ownership advantage is effective in streamlining the transfer of
managerial expertise and in circumventing risks of huge demand shifts.
Bargaining power with host governments
Hypothesis 7 predicting that the ability to bargain for desired resources with host
governments would exert a positive impact on firm performance was partially supported.
The impact of the bargaining power variable was insignificant for three dimensions of
organisational success but it is positively related to the cost reduction dimension of
244
performance at the five percent level (β=0.229). It highlights that firms with stronger
bargaining power can attain better cost reduction consequences. It implies that
leveraging firm-specific assets and capabilities, such as experience and advanced
technologies, eases the acquisition and exploitation of financial and non-financial
supports from the host governments. A typical case is that MNEs with strong resource
capabilities are likely to demand the construction of new transport infrastructure,
governmental support and information on potential indigenous suppliers in CEE.
Hypothesis 7 was partially supported.
Institutional environment relations/social capital
Consistent with previous relevant studies (e.g., Meyer and Nguyen, 2005; Uzzi, 1996;
Wu, 2008; Yiu and Makino, 2002), the results offer strong evidence that social capital is
a crucial determinant in positively affecting cost reduction performance. This result also
explains that firms with strong ties with incumbent governments and local community
may obtain up-to-date information on capital, product and labour markets and acquire
business licenses more easily. They can also convey their desired interests to
government authorities in a more informal and diplomatic fashion relative to firms with
fewer social networks. In other words, reducing information costs may help to enhance
cost reduction performance. In line with Oerlemans and Meeus’s study (2005), I can
reasonably infer that the success of the Japanese manufacturing firms in CEE may be
determined by inter-organisational exchange relationships that legitimatise their
behaviour and production activity in the local market. In this regard, the argument of
institutional theorists (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) about the positive association
between social capital and performance is supported for the context of Japanese
manufacturing firms in transition economies. Informal institutional arrangements
improve a firm’s ability to maintain its competitive position and rationalise allocative
efficiency as well as productive capability. The result of the present study lends support
to the fact that ensuring favourable business conditions requires foreign investors to
develop close ties with the host government. Hypothesis 8 was supported in the
explanation of cost reduction performance.
Entry mode
The coefficients for entry model were as positive as expected in the three performance
dimensions expect for overall operational satisfaction. However, none of the coefficients
showed any significant association between entry mode and firm performance. Thus,
Hypothesis 9 was rejected.
Human integration (information sharing/sense of unity)
The relationship between human integration and performance has been widely discussed
in the management literature. Hypothesis 10 predicting the relationship between
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information sharing and performance heterogeneity was not supported. However, the
variable for sense of unity is positively related to three dimensions of performance, such
as overall operational satisfaction (β=0.422, p<0.05; β=0.380, p<0.1), profitability
performance (β=0.491, p<0.01; β=0.460, p<0.05) and sales growth (β=0.292, p<0.1;
β=0.323, p<0.1). Accordingly, sense of unity is likely to raise the probability of
enhancing firm performance. The empirical results lend support to Hypothesis 11.
Autonomy
Hypothesis 12 predicting that a high degree of autonomy transfer to the affiliate leads to
better firm performance due to high local responsiveness to the rapidly changing CEE
business environment has not been supported. It is surprising that I found that
centralisation exerts a positive impact on cost reduction performance and this
association is significant at the ten percent level. The results contrast with those in the
previous studies (Kotabe and Wheiler, 1998; Luo, 2003; Slangen and Hennart, 2008)
that claim that ceteris paribus the higher degree of autonomy, the better performance
outcomes. From an institutional theoretical perspective, MNEs’ business actions and
outcomes tend to be shaped by internal conformity pressures from their parents. A
hierarchical decision-making structure from the parent to the subsidiary (i.e., global
integration) generates better firm performance. Slangen and Hennart (2008: 1305)
reveal a variety of hints on the positive nexus between global integration and cost
reduction performance, arguing that “the optimal exploitation of scale economies in
manufacturing requires that managers of foreign subsidiaries implement the production
methods of their MNE parents and make the smallest possible number of adaptations to
the design of products, since such adaptations lower the size of production runs and
hence scale economies. Intra-firm shipments of intermediate products should also be
determined by headquarters, so as to avoid excessive inventories and production delays”.
It may also be possible to argue that this conflicting result may be derived from
measurement errors. Moreover, the result may be different once I expand the data
sample for future research. Hence, future research is warranted.
Vertical keiretsu membership
Hypothesis 13, predicting that vertical keiretsu membership would exert either positive
or negative impact on firm performance, was not supported. The sign for the keiretsu
dummy variable is negative, but not statistically significant. However, Table 7-21
exhibits results of t-tests on four dimensions of performance to investigate differences
between keiretsu affiliated companies and independent companies. I found a significant
difference in sales performance. This result conveys a message that keiretsu firms may
benefit from cultivating transactional relationships with Japanese and Western firms
through leveraging relational assets, such as extensive inter-firm sales and marketing
channels, and personal contacts.
246
Table 7-19: Regression Estimates of Multidimensional Performance Outcomes
Note: t-values are reported in parentheses. ***=significant at 1% level, **=significant at 5% level,
*=significant at 10% level.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
H1 Economic and political certainty
(reverse coded)
0.086
(0.51)
0.116
(0.69)
0.218
(1.40)
0.237
(1.52)
H2 Stable labor market
(reverse coded)
–0.306*
(–1.72)
–0.296*
(–1.71)
–0.061
(–0.37)
–0.078
(–0.48)
H3a Favorable government policy
(reverse coded)
–0.177
(–1.08)
–0.187
(–1.16)
–0.025
(–0.17)
–0.043
(–0.28)
H3b Special economic areas (1: SEA) 0.008
(0.03)
–0.002
(–0.01)
0.020
(0.09)
0.020
(0.09)
H4 Agglomeration 0.178
(0.58)
0.232
(0.79)
0.751***
(2.66)
0.734***
(2.67)
H5 Cost leadership 0.834***
(5.23)
0.852***
(5.44)
0.820***
(5.55)
0.819***
(5.58)
H6 Managerial expertise 0.287*
(1.86)
0.297**
(1.95)
0.224
(1.57
0.235
(1.65)
H7 Bargaining power –0.025
(–0.20)
0.082
(0.70)
H8 Social capital 0.164
(1.12)
0.125
(0.91)
H9 Entry mode (1: WOS) –0.125
(–0.40)
–0.160
(–0.52)
0.145
(0.50)
0.127
(0.44)
H10 Information sharing 0.02
(0.11)
–0.053
(–0.29)
–0.089
(–0.51)
–0.097
(–0.56)
H11 Solidarity/sense of unity 0.422**
(2.13)
0.380*
(1.91)
0.491***
(2.68)
0.460**
(2.47)
H12 Autonomy 0.084
(0.56)
0.100
(0.67)
0.052
(0.37)
0.067
(0.48)
H13 Vertical keiretsu membership –0.407
(–1.45)
–0.368
(–1.32)
–0.284
(–1.09)
–0.248
(–0.95)
H14 Entry timing (1: before 2000) –0.392
(–1.56)
–0.481*
(–1.92)
–0.176
(–0.76)
–0.195
(–0.83)
Intercept –1.100
(–0.51)
–1.525
(–0.73)
–5.539***
(–2.76)
–5.427***
(–2.78)
0.43 0.45 0.38 0.39
0.0003 0.0002 0.0012 0.001
55 55 55 55
Internalisation-specific factor
Informal institution factor
Local management
Parent control
Environmental-institutional conditions
Firm-specific advantages
Overall operational
satisfaction
ProfitabilityExplanatory variables
Network relations
Control variable
R squared (adj.)
Probability
Cases
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Table 7-20: Regression Estimates of Multidimensional Performance Outcomes
Note: t-values are reported in parentheses. ***=significant at 1% level, **=significant at 5% level,
*=significant at 10% level.
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
H1 Economic and political certainty
(reverse coded)
0.147
(1.05)
0.125
(0.89)
0.217*
(1.81)
0.251**
(2.05)
H2 Stable labor market
(reverse coded)
0.197
(1.32)
0.195
(1.34)
0.154
(1.21)
0.103
(0.81)
H3a Favorable government policy
(reverse coded)
–0.210
(–1.53)
–0.200
(–1.48)
–0.078
(–0.66)
–0.117
(–0.99)
H3b Special economic areas (1: SEA) –0.189
(–0.89)
–0.183
(–0.88)
–0.140
(–0.78)
–0.136
(–0.74)
H4 Agglomeration 0.408
(1.60)
0.382
(1.55)
0.385*
(1.77)
0.31
(1.44)
Firm-specific advantages
H5 Cost leadership 0.105
(0.79)
0.095
(0.72)
0.490***
(4.30)
0.479***
(4.15)
H6 Managerial expertise 0.365***
(2.83)
0.357***
(2.79)
0.150
(1.36)
0.175
(1.56)
H7 Bargaining power –0.006
(–0.05)
0.229**
(2.55)
H8 Social capital –0.124
(–1.00)
0.243**
(2.25)
H9 Entry mode (1: WOS) 0.071
(0.27)
0.095
(0.37)
0.254
(1.14)
0.225
(0.99)
H10 Information sharing –0.063
(–0.40)
–0.020
(–0.13)
0.151
(1.12)
0.168
(1.24)
H11 Solidarity/sense of unity 0.292*
(1.76)
0.323*
(1.94)
0.081
(0.57)
0.021
(0.14)
H12 Autonomy 0.046
(0.36)
0.033
(0.26)
0.182*
(1.69)
0.214*
(1.94)
H13 Vertical keiretsu membership 0.227
(0.97)
0.196
(0.84)
–0.060
(–0.30)
0.015
(0.07)
H14 Entry timing (1: before 2000) –0.275
(–1.31)
–0.220
(–1.05)
0.044
(0.25)
0.043
(0.23)
Intercept –1.491
(–0.82)
–1.276
(–0.73)
–4.019*
(–2.60)
–3.502**
(–2.29)
0.22 0.24 0.39 0.37
0.0324 0.02 0.001 0.002
55 55 55 55
Explanatory variables Sales growth Cost reduction
R squared (adj.)
Probability
Cases
Environmental-institutional conditions
Informal institution factor
Internalisation-specific factor
Local management
Parent control
Network relations
Control variable
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They can also take the best advantage of an information sharing mechanism within the
group organisation. On these grounds, they may be able to expand sales volume in CEE.
Other than sales performance, I found no clear statistical difference between keiretsu
firms and independent firms. This consequence may allow us to consider a unique
feature of keiretsu organisation, namely that keiretsu firms are likely to pursue and
sustain the overall competitiveness and profitability of the keiretsu group in a long-term
perspective. In other words, the definition of performance for keiretsu organisation may
be more dynamic and complex. This should be clarified in future research.
Table 7-21: Results of T-test (Keiretsu Affiliated Firms vs. Independent Companies)
Note: *** indicates p<0.01.
Entry timing
The large volume of existing literature justifies the consideration of entry timing as an
important determinant of predicting firm performance. The empirical results presented
in this study confirm that a first mover advantage does not hold for the context of
Japanese manufacturing firms in CEE. A binary dummy variable for the period prior to
2000 exerts a detrimental impact on overall operational satisfaction (β=-0.481, p<0.1).
In other words, the late entrants perform better, rejecting the postulation that the early
entrants can benefit from the absence of competition and exploit affluent technical or
market opportunities. Hypothesis 14 was significant but opposite to what was expected.
7.9 Conclusions
This chapter was devoted to advancing and testing factors of superior firm performance
in an effort to synthesise the vast literature on this issue with a special emphasis on the
location-performance link in a more systematic way. Firm location choice and entry
mode per se are better viewed as a static process. However, it seems more difficult to
evaluate firm survival in the rapidly changing foreign market and its complexity,
notably in the post-socialist region. To shape the actual investment policy, it is important
to be familiar with the performance aspect of foreign MNEs in transition economies
since the real market entry strategy should be devised to achieve the firm’s long-term
growth as opposed to a quest for short-term profits. To date, existing findings are based
more on anecdotal accounts or simple descriptive surveys without any conceptual
framework for influencing performance of value-added activities of foreign MNEs in
the former Soviet bloc.
Variables Means forKeiretsu Sample (12)
Means for
Independent Sample
Overall satisfaction 3.17 3.07 –0.28
Profitability 2.83 2.63 –0.68
Sales 3.42 2.88 –2.27 ***
Cost reduction 2.58 2.44 –0.60
t-statistic
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Table 7-22: Summary of Empirical Findings by Multiple Dimensions of Performance
Note: NS indicates no significance. ***=significant at 1% level, **=significant at 5% level, *=significant at 10% level.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
H1 Economic and political certainty NS NS NS NS NS NS (+)* (+)**
H2 Stable labor market (–)* (–)* NS NS NS NS NS NS
H3a Favourable government policy NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
H3b Special economic areas (1: SEZ) NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
H4 Agglomeration NS NS (+)*** (+)*** NS NS (+)* NS
H5 Cost leadership (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** NS NS (+)*** (+)***
H6 Managerial expertise (+)* (+)** NS NS (+)*** (+)*** NS NS
H7 Bargaining power NS – NS – NS – (+)** –
H8 Institutional environment relations– NS – NS – NS – (+)**
Internalisation-specific factor
H9 Entry mode (1: WOS) NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
H10 Information sharing NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
H11 Solidarity/sense of unity (+)** (+)* (+)*** (+)** (+)* (+)* NS NS
H12 Autonomy NS NS NS NS NS NS (+)* (+)*
H13 Vertical keiretsu membership NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
H14 Entry timing (1: before 2000) NS (–)** NS NS NS NS NS NS
Explanatory variables
Operational
satisfaction Profitability
Sales
growth
Cost
reduction
Environmental-institutional conditions
Firm-specific advantages
Parent control
Local management
Network relations
Control variable
Informal institution factor
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Moreover, the potential impact of perceived institutional and environmental factors on
the international expansion of MNEs has been neglected, whereas more emphasis has
been placed on entry mode and site selection in this research.
This study is noteworthy for using primary data at the subsidiary level instead of
secondary data and archival information at the aggregated corporate level, which are not
sufficient to understand the underlying factors in doing business successfully in CEE in
greater detail. I focused on Japanese manufacturing firms operating in CEE whose
characteristics and dynamic behaviour have long been unexplored. A multiple
regression analysis was conducted on a sample of 55 Japanese affiliates in CEE in
January 2008. In order to investigate the determinants, I construct an integrative model
that draws on various theoretical arguments, such as Dunning’s OLI paradigm, Porter’s
Diamond Model, the resource-based view of the firm, organisational theory and
institutional theory. In the absence of previous literature relevant to Japanese
manufacturing FDI in the transforming economies of CEE, the empirical results should
be interpreted as indicative. Moreover, empirical evidence found in this chapter verifies
the utility of multidimensional performance determinants (see Table 7-21):
 The higher the level of labour market stability, the higher overall operational
satisfaction.
 Greater economic and political volatility is likely to make a firm more aware of the
need for commitments in coping with cost reduction.
 Agglomeration economies have a positive impact on financial and non-financial
performance.
 The extent to which a firm’s competitive advantage is based on cost leadership,
managerial expertise and bargaining power against incumbent governments is
positively associated with both non-financial and financial performance.
 The intensity of a firm’s networking competencies (e.g., institution environment
relations/social capital) is positively related to firm performance (cost reduction).
 A sense of unity/solidarity has positive effects on firm performance.
 The extent to which the headquarters dominate strategic decisions by its subsidiary
is positively related to cost reduction performance.
As seen in the descriptive statistics part, the performance evaluation of Japanese
manufacturing firms in CEE is quite pessimistic in general. In particular, the mean
scores for profitability and cost reduction are below the average. The major reason may
be that their market experience in the former Soviet bloc is still insufficient. Moreover,
the reorganisation of their global and regional networks has been far from completion
and in transition due to various environmental changes within the enlarged Europe, such
as eastward EU enlargement in 2004, the emergence of Russia, the dynamic complexity
of the Single European Market (SEM), standardisation of FDI policy at the EU
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supranational level and a wave of other Asian rivals into CEE. As time is perceived as
crucial to the growth of firms (Pangarkar and Lim, 2003), Japanese firms may be able to
win high profitability only with a long-term horizon in transition economies where
cultural differences and governmental bureaucratic intervention remain critical and
challenging to their local production activities. Hence, it should be borne in mind that it
might be too early to judge the organisational outcomes of Japanese manufacturing
firms in the CEE transition economies.
Regarding location-specific factors, namely perceived environmental factors, it
seems reasonable to say that the overall operational satisfaction of Japanese
manufacturing firms is positively affected by the degree of stability of local labour
markets. What is somewhat surprising is that political and economic uncertainties,
which are conventionally hostile to business, exert a positive effect on firm performance
in cost reduction. There are two possible explanations. One is that the local environment
featuring in highly volatile economies as well as unpredictable political conflicts may
heighten Japanese companies’ awareness of the rapidly changing CEE business
circumstances and thus keep them well-prepared to be responsive to potential risks in
their continuous efforts to enhance efficiency and flexibility in terms of human resource
management, production processes, procurement channels and financing, consequently
leading to better performance. Another is that we can infer that ceteris paribus the
worse a country’s economy is, the more enthusiastically indigenous workers would
work not to let its economic situation fall behind other neighboring countries in CEE.
The reliability of this assumption is reflected in one of my interviews conducted in
Poland in 2007. According to a worker in a Japanese company operating in southern
Poland: “in comparison with our past structured by the central planning system of the
Soviet regime, our present situation is satisfactory and happy because we have jobs and
we are rewarded when we work harder. We are aware of the threatening scenario that
our country may be left out of competition with neighbouring countries, such as the
Czech Republic and Hungary, for foreign capital when we are not diligent. In addition,
we fear that foreign firms may leave the country when the economy is stagnating so that
we have to continue to work hard to secure our current jobs” (Interviewed in a Japanese
manufacturing firm in Poland on 24 March, 2007). The financial incentive variable,
proxied by a binary dummy variable for special economic areas, does not impact on any
of the performance dimensions although FDI location decision is determined by
supportive FDI laws in the context of Japanese manufacturing firms.
The empirical contributions concur with the theoretical accounts of Marshallian
agglomeration externalities (Marshall, 1920; Porter, 1990) that firms are likely to
benefit from industrial concentration not only in the explanation of FDI location
decision but also in the explanation of performance dimensions of profitability and cost
reduction in the CEECs. An inference is that firms are more able to access desired
resources, managerial talents and information on potential local suppliers as a result of
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industrial clustering. Firms can also benefit from well-developed communication and
transportation infrastructure, consistent with Li’s (2004) study. While agglomeration
stimulates the inflow of knowledge and information in territorial closeness in particular,
firms can also ensure certain level of legitimacy to align their business objectives with
those that local governments, local communities and other societal actors pursue in the
context of the local market. Consequently agglomeration offers them incentives to
reduce high transaction and coordination costs inherent in transition economies. In sum,
I arrive at the conclusion that the level of firm performance could be largely predicted
by the firms’ perception of environmental changes. In short, location-specific
advantages are deemed relatively vital in affecting the performance outcomes of
Japanese manufacturing firms in the ex-Soviet type economies, although they have long
been neglected in the international business and strategic management literature
(Dunning, 1998). However, the inclusion of additional perceived environmental factors,
such as socio-cultural dimensions in future research is likely to be highly warranted.
The empirical findings suggest that firm-specific competitive advantages exert a
positive effect on the subsidiary performance, although those impacts vary depending
on performance dimensions. For instance, cost leadership is the key variable of
determining three dimensions of performance indicators, such as overall operational
satisfaction, profitability and cost reduction. Managerial expertise also positively affects
overall operational satisfaction, and sales performance, whereas negotiation power
determines only cost reduction outcomes. This study confirmed that late entrants feel
more satisfied with their overall operations in relation to early entrants. The theoretical
implication for this result is perhaps that late entrants seem to benefit from both
successful and failing outcomes of early entrants concerning marketing strategies and
access to raw materials and governmental officials in transitional economies. Moreover,
improved legal, social and economic infrastructure provides late entrants with
opportunities to do business more successfully without being hampered by critical
informal constraints, such as corruption and bribery. This allows us to draw a
conclusion that firms that have not yet entered the CEE market can still consider
offshore production.
What was different from expectation was that lack of autonomy, namely strong
parent control, has proved to boost firm performance, notably in cost reduction. There
are three main explanations for this result. One possible explanation for this
consequence is that hierarchical management control by the parent company plays a
crucial role in constraining moral hazards of the subsidiary. Another is that it may be
perceived among senior managers of Japanese subsidiaries operating in CEE that high
parent company involvement in business plans and policies would be one of risk
avoidance strategies (Newburry and Zeira, 1999). Third, centralisation of
decision-making procedures initiated by the parent company may render its subsidiary
more capable of achieving high cost reduction strategy due to the former’s financial and
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non-financial resources to respond to an unpredicted change of global market trends.
As regards the salience of social network, the result verifies that interpersonal
linkages with government officials in the transitional stage of European emerging
economies are crucial relational assets in conducting the efficient cost reduction strategy.
It suggests that Japanese MNEs operating in CEE should ensure that they can actively
forge close social ties with host-based social networks so as to respond more rapidly to
changing institutional environments. To mitigate transaction costs and market failure,
Japanese firms with manufacturing operations leverage social ties with local
stakeholders that serve as a strategic tool of making their local operations more lucrative
and satisfactory. In other words, firms may leverage the social capital as a
non-economic or lobbying tool for securing their legitimacy in policymaking
considerations. Information on policy shifts, potential local suppliers and access to raw
materials is expected to be obtainable by means of the development of social capital.
The creation and strengthening of social ties with local actors in the postsocialist
countries is an institutional precondition for better economic performance for Japanese
companies. Moreover, evidence presented in this study stipulates that
institution-building leads to an improvement of legitimacy and hence facilitates social
integration into the local society. It is important to grasp how rules and trust developed
by interpersonal ties as a governance mechanism determines the level of firm
performance and the extent to which the magnitude of social networks changes as
formal and informal institutions become more established.
Despite interesting factors found in this study, we should be aware of two caveats.
One is that firm performance should be defined in a multidimensional fashion as the
statistical significance of the empirical outcomes largely varies depending on which
dependent variables are tested. Another is that it may be too early to judge whether local
operations of Japanese manufacturing firms have been successful, since their history of
the internationalisation of business in the CEE context is relatively short. It cannot be
denied that it usually takes more years to attain high net profits through accumulated
local market knowledge, building network ties and increased legitimacy over time.
This study has some drawbacks, as with all empirical research. The following
steps should be taken to lead to more robust results with more comparative implications
for future research:
First, the degree of generalisability of the outcomes of this study remains doubtful
because the sample size is relatively limited, although the response rate and the
representativeness are at least as high as in previous studies (Abramson and Ai, 1999;
Appiah-Adu, 1999; Brouthers, 2002: Brouthers and Nakos, 2004; Carlsson et al., 2005).
The data should be expanded so as to increase the reliability of empirical results in
future research.
Second, the performance measures employed in this study were rather subjective
than objective, indicating that the results might be biased since subjective data tends to
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suffer from diplomatic responses, although a survey approach is good at integrating
non-quantifiable factors. Subjective or perceptive success measurements may have the
problem of biased empirical results due to retrospective elements. An effort should be
made to test the hypotheses with the use of objective performance measures as well,
such as the growth of total factor productivity, return on assets and return on sales.
Moreover, longitudinal data should be collected from both headquarters and subsidiaries
to capture deeper empirical evidence.
Third, it would be fruitful, for instance, to investigate whether the results are
applicable to the case of other Asian affiliates such as Korean manufacturing firms in
the transforming economies in CEE. Moreover, a cross-country comparative study (for
instance, some transforming economies such as Russia, China, and Turkey) would
enable us to check the robustness of the current theoretical model and to provide more
practical and managerial implications for both top executives and policy makers, since
institutional and cultural uniqueness in those countries may affect the validity of the
location-performance relationship. Therefore, this type of comparative study should
bring deeper insights into the variations in business practices and local market
conditions on performance. This study remains inconclusive but suggestive for future
research.
Last but not least, a firm’s strategic orientation should be considered for future
research. It would be of great relevance in exploring how the success of the subsidiary
differs in relation to four types of a firm’s strategic orientation, such as resource-seeking
FDI, market-seeking FDI, efficiency-seeking FDI and strategic-seeking FDI.
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Table 7-23: A List of the Surveyed Firms in CEECs
Nr. Company name Country NUTS2 region Entry year
1 Czech Republic ONAMBA Czech Republic Strední Morava 2001
2 Showa Alminium Czech s.r.o. Czech Republic Strední Cechy 1997
3 IBIDEN Hungary Manufacturing Kft. Hungary Közép-Magyarország 2004
4 Toyota Motor Industries Poland Sp.z.o.o. Poland Dolnoslaskie 1999
5 Taiho Corporation of Europe Kft. Hungary Közép-Magyarország 2000
6 Three Bond Czech s.r.o. Czech Republic Strední Cechy 2006
7 Takada Industries Czech Republic s.r.o. Czech Republic Severozápad 2002
8 TRCZ s.r.o. Czech Republic Severovýchod 2001
9 Mi-King s.r.o. Czech Republic Strední Cechy 2004
10 Toray Textile Central Europe s.r.o. Czech Republic Strední Morava 1997
11 Panasonic AVC Networks Czech, s.r.o. Czech Republic Jihozápad 1996
12 SEWS Components Europe Hungary Ltd. Hungary Közép-Dunántúl 2002
13 Ajinomoto Poland Sp.z.o.o. Poland Podlaskie 1999
14 Sanyo Hungary Kft. Hungary Közép-Dunántúl 1999
15 ASMO Czech s.r.o. Czech Republic Strední Cechy 2004
16 Clarion Hungary Electronics Kft. Hungary Közép-Magyarország 1997
17 Sunarrow Hungary Kft. Hungary Közép-Dunántúl 2002
18 NSK ISKRA Poland Swietokrzyskie 1998
19 Nachi Czech s.r.o. Czech Republic Severozápad 2003
20 Shin-Etsu Polymer Hungary Kft. Hungary Nyugat-Dunántúl 2003
21 Nissho Hungary Precision Kft. Hungary Közép-Magyarország 1999
22 TRIM LEADER a.s. Slovakia Stredné Slovensko 2000
23 Alpine Electronics Manufacturing of Europe Ltd. Hungary Közép-Dunántúl 1998
24 Summit D&V Kft Hungary Közép-Dunántúl 1999
25 ISUZU MOTORS POLSKA Sp.y.o.o. Poland Slaskie 1997
26 TBMECA Poland Sp.z.o.o. Poland Dolnoslaskie 2003
27 Makita Romania Romania Macroregiunea trei 2006
28 Koyo Romania Romania Macroregiunea trei 1998
29 SMK Hungary Kft. Hungary Del-Alföld 2000
30 ACCUROMM Central Europe Sp.z.o.o. Poland Dolnoslaskie 2004
31 Furukawa Electric Autoparts Central Europe s.r.o. Czech Republic Strední Cechy 2001
32 AKS Precision Ball Polska Sp.z.o.o. Poland Dolnoslaskie 2002
33 SATO Polska Sp.z.o.o. Poland Dolnoslaskie 2001
34 DAIDO METAL Czech Czech Republic Jihovýchod 2005
35 DENSO Manufacturing Hunagry Ltd. Hungary Közép-Dunántúl 1997
36 Yazaki Wiring Technologies Czech Republic Jihozápad 1993
37 INDET SAFETY SYSTEMS a.s. Czech Republic Strední Morava 1999
38 U-Shin Europe Kft. Hungary Közép-Dunántúl 2000
39 Yazaki Debnar Slovakia spol.s.r.o. Slovakia Východné Slovensko 1994
40 Ryowa Hungary Hunagry Közép-Dunántúl 2000–05
41 Sluzba SIIX Electronics s.r.o. Slovakia Západné Slovensko 2001
42 Sumitomo Electric Wiring Systems Slovakia Slovakia Stredné Slovensko 1996
43 NIFCO Poland Dolnoslaskie 2006
44 Daicel Safety Systems Europe Sp.z.o.o. Poland Dolnoslaskie 2004
45 AISIN EUROPE MANUFACTURING CZECH Czech Republic Jihozápad 2002
46 Meiji Rubber Europe Industrial Products Co.Ltd. Hungary Észak-Alföld 2003
47 Euro Comfort Sp.z.o.o. Poland Malopolskie 1995
48 NGK Ceramics Polska Sp.z.o.o. Poland Slaskie 2003
49 YAGI Factory Poland Sp.z.o.o. Poland Dolnoslaskie 2003
50 Elektroporcelan Louny Czech Republic Severozápad 2000–05
51 NTK Technical Ceramics Polska Sp.z.o.o. Poland Dolnoslaskie 2003
52 Muramoto Manufacturing Czech Republic Strední Cechy 2005
53 Sharp Poland Poland Kujawsko-Pomorskie 2006
54 Mitsubishi Electric Automotive Czech s.r.o. Czech Republic Severozápad 2000
55 Tokai Rubber Poland Malopolskie 1999
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8 CASE HISTORIES: JAPANESE MANUFACTURING
FIRMS IN EUROPEAN TRANSITION ECONOMIES
8.1 Methodological Issues
This section focuses on complementing some of the information presented in the
previous chapters through the use of a survey approach, with four case studies. The
in-depth case study method is adopted to highlight the primary motives of each firm in
the study regarding their investments in CEE and its current operational experience. It is
generally acknowledged that a case study approach on the basis of a series of
semi-structured interviews empowers the researcher to acquire detailed information
about the underlying motives behind corporate strategy (Meyer, 2000; Yeung, 1995). A
case study approach has the ability to explain complicated factors that influence the
strategies and actions of MNEs. More precisely, the strength of the case study method is
rooted in the detail of cause-effect relationships, hidden insights and findings deviating
from the expected and better inferences (Jensen and Rodgers, 2001). Yeung (1995: 314)
also support this view by emphasising that “the beauty of [the case study approach] lies
in its validity (i.e., dealing directly with decision makers and the richness of information
collected) and reliability (i.e., ability to be repeated in practice).” The case study
approach is useful in exploring the characteristics of FDI since different companies tend
to utilise different investment strategies and invest in different location sites at different
times. It is important to note that the management and strategy of MNEs cannot be
accounted for by a ‘one-size-fits-all’ model. The case study approach is especially
suitable for scrutinising the behaviour and nature of foreign investors in CEE since the
transition into a market-supporting economy is still in progress (Lim, 2003: 350).
In sharp contrast, a survey approach encounters poor response rates and weak
reliability of given information, although it can theoretically address a relatively large
number of investments and incorporate non-quantifiable factors. Hence, one of the most
critical issues facing those who adopt the survey approach is that a particular
observation may not necessarily be applicable. Similarly, an econometric approach is
largely unable to address non-quantifiable determinants of an investment decision or
measures targeted at a specific investment although it has the advantage of a large
sample size. On these grounds, the case study approach is more adequate and presents
greater insight into the characteristics, actions and operational outcomes of Japanese
subsidiaries in CEE. Hence, policy makers in the region can better understand the
implementation of the strategies.
This chapter explores four case studies (NSK Poland, Denso Hungary, Sanyo
Hungary and TMMP/TPCA). These firms are representative of the industrial
competitiveness of the Japanese economy. There are some common characteristics
behind the major reasons for the selection of these four cases in particular. First, these
firms were at the forefront of entering in the European transition economies
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(NSK-ISKRA in 1998, Denso Hungary in 1997, Sanyo Hungary in 1999 and
TMMP/TPCA in 1999/2002). Second, the corporate strategy of all four of these firms is
embedded in a strategic orientation toward actively advancing into foreign markets.
Third, each case firm possesses competitive ownership advantages (e.g., bearing
products for NSK, automotive-related products for Denso, solar batteries and large-scale
air conditioners for Sanyo, and hybrid technology as well as production methods for
Toyota) at the global level. Fourth, the most common distinctive feature of these case
firms is that network relations revolve around the central role in their
internationalisation process. Lastly, these four case study firms are commonly
characterised as well-experienced in foreign markets.
Of these four case studies, the NSK-ISKRA case is one of the most interesting
ventures among Japanese subsidiaries because of its method of entry and organisational
restructuring. Second, the Denso Hungary case provides an opportunity to test how the
Toyota keiretsu system affects the motive and industrial location of Toyota keiretsu
group firms when entering post-socialist economies. Third, emphasis should be given to
the Sanyo Hungary case because of the company’s internationalisation process. Lastly,
the TMMP case reflects the significance of FDI incentives in attracting large scale FDI
projects. The TPCA case also provides interesting insights into its location choice,
network sources and corporate strategy, because of its 50-50 joint venture between
Toyota and PSA.
During the period from autumn 2006 to spring 2007, we carried out
semi-structured interviews with management from a number of Japanese manufacturing
firms investing in CEECs in light of the eastward expansion of European integration.
The interviewees were the same as those who participated in the preliminary survey
presented above, except for the TMMP/TPCA case. All interviewees were either
individuals who were involved in the FDI decision-making procedure or those who
have been responsible for the local operations for a long period of time. The interviews
were conducted in an open-ended manner. It was expected that the interviewee would be
able to speak more freely due to an open-ended character of questions. Interviews were
recorded so as to obtain as much insightful information as possible and they were
subsequently triangulated. The average length of each interview was one hour. To check
and back-up the information gathered during the interviews, secondary data from media
reports and companies’ corporate websites, and newspapers were also used.
The case study approach is suited to scrutinising the process as well as the
consequences of the spatial organisation and corporate strategy of the four case study
firms in the context of international business and economics in CEE. We emphasise the
following questions in the examination: (1) what internal and external factors affected
the FDI decision-making process of these case firms, (2) how institutional forces shape
the spatial organisation of these MNEs, (3) whether the CEE region is a profitable
location for them, (4) to what extent foreign investments are conducive to promoting
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sustainable regional economic development in CEE. These questions will be
deliberately expounded upon through the case study method. We will highlight a
general profile of the historical development of the parent company in each case,
followed by locational strategy, human resource management, external networks and
performance.
Table 8-1: Comparison of Parent Company Data of Four Case Firms in 2007
8.2 Case Study 1: NSK-ISKRA Poland
8.2.1 Company History
NSK was established in 1916 as the first bearing producer in Japan. NSK has been
primarily involved in the manufacture of ball and roller bearings and successfully
diversified its product range from automotive components to mechatronic products and
precision machine parts. Steering technology and tribology technology are relatively
high by global standards. The domestic share of NSK accounts for 30 percent while the
world share is close to 17 percent (NSK Annual Report 2004). NSK is also the leading
company producing the core components of Half Toroidal CVTs. The first foreign
production facility of NSK was established in Brazil in 1970. Since then, NSK has
expanded its value chains in Asia, Europe and North America. As of today, NSK has
cross-border vertical and horizontal networks. NSK has approximately 30 sales
subsidiaries and 20 production facilities abroad. The primary goal of placing production
in Europe was to bypass anti-dumping barriers (Lange, 1993). As of 2007, NSK
employed 23,413 people and for the year 2006-2007 had a sales volume of 360 billion
yen (see Table 8-1).
NSK’s globalisation strategy sought market presence in four specific regions:
Parent-specific
characteristics NSK Denso
Sanyo
Electric
Toyota
Motors
1 Sector Machinery Electrical
machinery
Electrical
machinery
Transport
Equipment
2 Establishment year 1916 1949 1950 1937
3 No. of employees
(ave. age)
23,413
(41.0)
112,262
(N/A)
94,906
(41.1)
299,394
(37.0)
4 Overseas sales ratio (%) 49 48 55 74
5 Sales (mil. yen) 717,225 3,609,700 2,308,628 23,948,091
6 Technology intensity
(R&D/sales) (%)
1.3 8.1 6.2 7.6
7 First foreign market entry
(Country name)
1970
(Brazil)
1973
(Canada)
1965
(Taiwan)
1959
(Brazil)
8 No. of overseas
production subsidiaries
18 67 52 52
Source : Toyo Keizai (2007)
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North America, Asia, Europe and South America. The world bearing market is
characterised by fierce competition, with a very limited number of rivals. The global
bearing industry has seen organisational and geographical changes since 2000, coupled
with a sequencing of competition and cooperation. NSK’s foreign and domestic rivals,
such as SKF (a Swedish corporation), INA (a German corporation), TIMKEN (an
American corporation), NTN (a Japanese corporation) and Koyo Seiko (a Japanese
corporation) have continued to exert significant pressures on the speed, extent and
intensity of NSK’s globalisation strategy (Figure 8-1). INA took over FAG (a German
corporation) in 2002 and TIMKEN acquired Torrington (an American corporation) in
2003. In 2008, NTN is ranked as second next to NSK in terms of domestic market share.
On the global scale, NTN has become the second largest bearing company, surpassing
TIMKEN and NSK, due to its acquisition of the Renault subsidiary SNR in 2008. It can
be said that NTN’s purchase of SNR has enabled NTN to attain extensive market
channels in the enlarged EU market. In 2006, the former Koyo Seiko, ranked third in the
domestic market, merged with a Toyota keiretsu member, Toyota Machine Works,
which produces machinery products and achieved the rationalisation of managerial and
productive capabilities. A succession of mergers and acquisitions within the global
bearing industry resulted in pushing NSK down to its position as the fourth largest
bearing manufacturer in the world. Mr. Katsuyuki Kambara, the former president of
NSK-ISKRA, was interviewed in Warsaw, Poland on 15 October 2006.
Figure 8-1: Market Shares in the Global Bearing Industry
Source: NSK Poland
8.2.2 Location Strategy in CEE
NSK’s location strategy in CEE can hardly be understood without considering its
SKF (SW)
16%
Koyo (JP)
8%
Rest 28%
NSK (JP)
12%
NTN (JP)
8%
Timken/
Torrington
(US) 13%
INA/FAG
(DE) 15%
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production history in the UK. In order to penetrate the European markets, NSK decided
to establish its production facility for standard ball bearing in the UK in 1974 (Figure
8-2). Great Britain finally became a member of the European Community in 1973 after
France had blocked the country’s joining the Community for a long time. Peterlee,
Durham County, was chosen as NSK’s strategic location serving the European markets.
The NSK production facility was established in Peterlee, a town with an industrial
structure heavily dependent upon the mining industry.
There were two decisive factors that determined NSK’s location selection in
Peterlee. One was that Nissan Motor Company had already invested in Peterlee prior to
NSK’s entry. Another was that NSK received financial grants from the British
government.
NSK’s acquisition of a local bearing maker, RHP Bearings Ltd., took place in
1990. Nevertheless, the company was subject to external shocks such as the bursting of
the bubble economy in Japan, the rapid erosion of cost competitiveness of British car
makers and rising transaction costs arising from the UK’s refusal to enter the Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU). The 1990s witnessed the UK placing more of its weight
on the financial sector and not on the manufacturing sector. This industrial
transformation was known as the “Wimbledon Phenomenon”. Moreover, rising costs of
labour force and raw materials and the increasing impact of fluctuations in the
Pound-Euro exchange rate in the UK also prevented NSK from sustaining or achieving
high labour productivity and sustaining cost leadership (NSK, 2003: 12). The exchange
rate problem was of critical concern to the company, since 70 percent of finished goods
produced by NSK in the UK were exported to the continent.
Intensified competition in the European ball bearing markets urged NSK to shift
emphasis to cost-effective production management. For instance, a Swedish firm, SKF,
and a German firm, INA/FAG, reinforced their market presence in the 1990s by
decreasing operational costs and relocating to the European transition economies.
As a result of these changing macroeconomic circumstances in the UK and the
behaviour of foreign rivals, NSK was pressured to reconsider the future of its UK
operations and to discuss the possibility of relocation to other European nations that
would offer NSK cheap input costs such as labour and materials. Losing its comparative
advantage in the UK automobile industry (e.g., with rising labour costs and stagnated
labour productivity) was seen as a justification for NSK’s relocation. In the mid-1990s,
top executives at the headquarters in Japan concluded that relocation was necessary in
order to rationalise production systems and regain cost competitiveness. However, there
was a critical obstacle that deterred NSK’s decision to immediately shut down its
Peterlee factory. It was argued that the company could still benefit from financial
incentives granted by the British government even though the UK was losing
comparative cost advantages relative to CEE.
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Figure 8-2: Spatial Distribution of European Subsidiaries of NSK (as of 2008)
Source: Author’s illustration based on Toyo Keizai (2007)
After the final decision on relocation was made in 1995, NSK launched a
feasibility study about where to relocate its production facility. After investigating
various locations, the company finally decided to target the Polish general machinery
industry despite the economic turmoil in Poland in the 1990s, where the inflation rate
was 600 percent. NSK has a history of business involvement in Poland stretching back
to the mid-1990s. In the past, NSK had been asked by a Polish state-owned enterprise,
FLT-ISKRA, to sell equipment and machinery for standard ball bearing production and
to provide technical cooperation and to contribute capital. In those days, FLT-ISKRA
desperately had to seek external support since the competitiveness of the Polish bearing
industry was failing at a rapid pace during the 1990s. FLT-ISKRA had been used to
producing 60 percent of the national bearing output as Poland’s largest producer of
bearings (Central Europe Automotive Report, 1998: 1). NSK exported equipment and
machinery to a few bearing factories of this state-owned enterprise in Poland and
offered Polish workers technical instruction and on-the-job training (OJT). An affiliated
company of NSK, Amatsuji Bearing Company, also exported machinery to the Krasnik
Sales
Production
R&D
Regional HQ
Business Units
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factory of this state-owned enterprise, while NSK did so to the Kielce factory.
At the same time, the Polish government introduced large-scale privatisation
schemes to restructure a weak economy hit by the deep recession of the late 1990s.
Government officials felt that the country’s reliance upon privatisation led by foreign
entrepreneurship was inevitable, as the Polish government was not confident enough to
administer the privatisation process on its own. The aim of the central government was
the privatisation of the machinery and shipbuilding sectors in particular. In the
cost-benefit calculations linked to brownfield investment opportunities, NSK paid
particular attention to acquisitions of the Kielce and Krasnik factories of FLT-ISKRA.
However, competition turned out to be intensive, as foreign rivals rushed to the
opportunities arising out of the privatisation of state-owned firms in Poland. For
instance, the FLT-Poznan factory had already been privatised by a Swedish firm, SKF,
while the factory in Sosnowiec was acquired by an American bearing competitor,
TIMKEN. FLT-Krasnik was privatised by one of the leading Japanese bearing firms,
Tsubaki-Hoover. The only remaining chance was the Kielce factory of FLT-ISKRA.
NSK succeeded in acquiring the Kielce factory of FLT-ISKRA after an intensive
bidding competition. In the bidding process, price competition became severe, because
NSK’s major rival, SKF, also joined the bidding. NSK eventually won the bidding
although the tender price was much higher. There was another reason why NSK wanted
to take over the Kielce factory of FLT-ISKRA.
In January 1998, the Japanese companies, NSK Ltd. and Nichimen Corp., paid
nearly US$44.8 million to the Polish Privatisation Ministry for 80 percent of the equity
shares of the FLT ISKRA roller-bearing factory in Kielce (Central Europe Automotive
Report, 1998: 1). Mr. Kambara, the former president of NSK-ISKRA, pointed out that
“our entry in Poland was not affected by the potential that Poland would receive EU
membership in the future although Poland had announced its intention to obtain
membership in the early 1990s. Rather, radical changes in the UK’s market conditions,
such as rising labour costs and falling industrial competitiveness urged us to relocate
our UK operations to a location with cheap input costs within Europe. Other than
Poland, Bulgaria was also studied because NSK had exported machineries and
equipment to Bulgaria. We had no business activities in the Czech Republic and
Hungary. In contrast with Poland, the Bulgarian government announced
implementation of privatisation privileged to domestic investors. According to this type
of privatisation, only Poland was selected as a relocation destination. Koyo Seiko also
traced the same trajectory as ours to acquire an indigenous factory to which Koyo Seiko
exported equipments for bearing production in Romania”.
Scholars of economies in transition have long argued that it is usual for
brownfield investment to involve uncertainties about employee quality and
organisational competences while mergers and acquisitions are instrumental in entering
potential markets with high economic growth much faster than in the form of greenfield
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investment and joint ventures (Meyer, 1998; Meyer, 2002). Furthermore, one could
argue that brownfield investment in transforming economies would be more complex.
First, acquiring firms inherit local employees whose work ethic may not have been
aimed at economic efficiency during the era of state socialism. Second, outdated
equipment may have lost value. On these negative grounds, investors are likely to be
concerned about the scenario that costs may outweigh benefits. The former president of
NSK ISKRA also stated that “the question was raised of whether we can effectively
transfer Japanese management systems and mentality to the local venture during the
post-acquisition period. At the same time, we were afraid of the risk that the factory
would be cheaply purchased and nationalised by the host government in transforming
economies once local employees were trained and new machineries were
well-equipped”.
In the NSK-ISKRA case, NSK was confident of gaining more benefits from
brownfield investments in Poland as compared to greenfield investments. The rationale
for NSK’s acquisition of FLT ISKRA in Kielce was varied. First, NSK’s historical
relationship with the FLT ISKRA encouraged NSK to undertake the brownfield
investment. Prior to the purchase, NSK had already assisted FLT ISKRA in recovering
its business performance through exporting cutting-edge equipment for bearing
production.
Second, NSK had already become acquainted with how to improve production
systems, product quality, and engineers’ competence due to its experience with FLT
ISKRA. Moreover, many Polish employees were, to some extent, familiar with Japanese
management systems since they had already been sent to Japan to undergo training
during the two companies’ technical cooperation period. This historical relationship
relaxed the threats and uncertainties that were perceived by Japanese expatriates when
working with the Polish employees, as these employees had already experienced how
Japanese production systems function. At present, those who have undergone training in
Japan work at the mid-management level. This background reinforces the explanatory
power of the strategic network theory (Chen and Chen, 1998: 448) asserting that
“network resources are particularly useful in entering a primitive market in which
institutions that facilitate internationalisation are still lacking”.
Third, emotional matters also played a critical role in urging NSK to prefer
mergers and acquisitions over other entry modes. NSK was reluctant to give up its
bearing production machinery to other competitors in the privatisation process. There
was another case similar to the NSK experience. When a Japanese small-compact-car
maker, Daihatsu, participated in the mass privatisation scheme in the automobile
industry and tried to purchase an indigenous firm to which an Italian automobile
assembler, Fiat, had traditionally exported machinery and equipment, Fiat blocked
Daihatsu from purchasing the local firm. It was illustrative of the fact that Fiat did not
want to abandon its machinery and its network relations with this local company.
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Fourth, in general, the bearing industry requires a great amount of additional
investment in facilities. Hence, greenfield investment constitutes more costs and time
than M&A while a WOS firm can retain financial and managerial independence.
Despite a Polish business climate with poor application of property rights and
inconsistent legal practices during the 1990s, successful market entry was achieved by
NSK through taking advantage of the path dependency of its established relational
assets with ISKRA.
In the contemporary FDI policy environment in the CEE region, financial and tax
incentives usually have a positive impact on MNEs’ motives for investment. However,
it does not hold true for the NSK-ISKRA case. As NSK received no financial assistance
- such as cash grants and tax holidays - from the central government, financial and tax
incentives had no direct impact on NSK’s decision to relocate to Kielce in Poland.
Rather, the Polish government laid down strict conditions on NSK for M&A. NSK was
obliged to invest an additional US$46 million in the expansion of the acquiring factory
for five years after the acquisition and to ensure a five-year employment guarantee and
the same salary level as in the pre-privatisation period (Wada and Abo, 2005: 155).
These constraining factors prevented NSK-ISKRA from restructuring organisational
management, rationalising production, increasing productivity and profitability and
downsizing the number of employees in a prompt fashion.
8.2.3 External Linkages
Originally, when the decision was made to enter Poland, the EU market was considered
to be the target market for ball bearings. Currently, however, NSK exports finished
goods produced in Kielce to Poland, Europe, North America, Southeast Asia and Japan.
Of these destinations for export, Poland accounted for 20 percent and the remaining
markets accounted for 80 percent. Among those other countries, the Western European
market dominates. The firm has perceived it to be of great importance for them to sell
quality products at cheap prices since a flow of cheap products from China into Europe
became dominant during the 1990s and has exerted an enormous influence over the
demand structure of global markets in recent years. NSK has been pressured to ensure
cheap and steady sources of quality raw materials such as iron. Sources of raw materials
for NSK-ISKRA are 20 percent from Poland, 40 percent from the Czech Republic and
40 percent from Western Europe. The company remains reluctant to purchase iron from
Russia because the quality of Russian iron is unstable. The former senior manager of
NSK-ISKRA reported that network relations with local suppliers remained immature.
A distinguishing feature of NSK’s strategy of forging network relations is its
encouragement of its affiliated companies to follow the parent, and its engagement in
additional investments. This development of strategic networks has helped NSK-ISKRA
to leverage its competitive advantage over Western competitors. At present, NSK has
another factory in Wałbrzych. The entry strategy involved greenfield investment, which
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profited from cash grants incentives from the local government. Amatsuji, an affiliated
company of NSK, has been in operation in Poland since 2004. Investment decisions by
NSK facilitated its small- and medium-sized affiliate companies to bypass some stages
of internationalisation. For instance, Toho Industry, Toyo Seal, and Yagi Industry
entered Poland after 2000, notwithstanding having only limited internal resources
(international experience, technology and managerial expertise). Strategic linkages with
NSK are likely to supplement their weak firm-specific advantages. Toho Industry and
Yagi Industry had no foreign business experience before their entry into Poland22. Toyo
Seal is also encouraged to supply seals for bearings produced by NSK Poland. In
geographical terms, Amatsuji and Yagi are in operation in Wałbrzych, while Toho
Industry and NSK run their production lines in Radom and in Kielce, respectively.
This sequential entry of the affiliated and related companies has enabled NSK to
ensure quality control and delivery times and to respond quickly to market changes. The
geographical advantage of the Polish operation serves as a strategic point for continued
access to the global markets.
8.2.4 Human Resource Management
Figure 8-3: NSK-ISKRA’s Employment Growth
Source: Author’s illustration based on data provided by NSK Poland and Toyo Keizai (1999, 2002, 2003,
2004, 2005, 2007)
During the post-privatisation period top executives of NSK perceived it to be important
22 NSK accounts for over 30 percent of the equity holdings in the parent companies of both Toho
Industry and Yagi Industry in Japan.
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not to make radical personnel cutbacks when initiating measures for enterprise
restructuring. NSK showed a high degree of institutional engagement in and
organisational commitments to its restructuring process. First, NSK deliberately
explained to the governor of the Swietokrzyskie voivodship and the mayor of Kielce
how the company intended to restructure the old system, creating functioning market
competition with high productive efficiency in order to survive in the era of
globalisation (Wada and Abo, 2005: 159). This close communication with key local
actors was a precondition for enhancing legitimacy and trust. It is worth noting that
5,800 employees in a city with a population of 240,000 used to work for ISKRA in
Kielce (Wada and Abo, 2005: 159) when it was restructured. Therefore, the company
had to eschew antagonism and nationalist sentiments of the local population by
practicing a gradual approach towards its enterprise restructuring process.
Second, NSK introduced an innovative measure for the restructuring of the
formerly state-owned enterprise. NSK’s privileged goal was to ensure better
performance and to exploit cost economies without radical lay-offs. The measure was
undertaken to encourage employees to retire early and voluntarily in return for a
retirement allowance. The amount of this retirement benefit was 3,000 Polish Zlotych
(PLN) a month for 12 months. Other than NSK, none of the foreign firms that merged
with other firms or acquired additional companies introduced such early and voluntary
retirement programmes. As a consequence of these efforts, 700 employees out of 3,500
retired. However, this measure for personnel cutback became gradually less effective
over time because of the difficulty of finding new jobs for the retirees due to the weak
Polish economy. Finally, the number of employees declined dramatically from 3,500 to
2,200. Although there was an incremental restructuring program, NSK-ISKRA was still
NSK’s largest factory in Europe, with 1,500 employees.
It should be noted that a former executive of NSK-ISKRA in Kielce used to be the
senior director of the Polish subsidiary of Nichimen, a Japanese general trading
company, in the 1980s. He was heavily involved in NSK’s acquisition of ISKRA and
was hired as the president of the newly acquired company because of his rich
experience about the Polish business and relational ties with the local government.
The former senior executive of NSK-ISKRA commented on the eroding
comparative advantages in Poland that “the supply of cheap but skilled labour in Poland
has been more constrained in specific regions such as Wroclaw and Katowice because
not only Western firms but also Japanese firms are more heavily concentrated over time.
This uneven distribution of foreign direct investment in Poland resulted in excessive
demand for labour and indeed caused a dramatic rise in the level of wages among
foreign investors, in particular, in Southern Poland. Coupled with competition for
human capital arising from unbalanced and constrained labour markets, the
job-hopping problem has also deterred Japanese firms from achieving stable and
efficient production management to date. Moreover, the emergence of an enlarged EU
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has made the utilisation of cheap human capital more difficult since numerous Polish
workers immigrated to Ireland or the UK after 2004 when Poland became a member of
the EU. This changing nature of local labour conditions tends to keep Japanese firms
from gaining continued access to high quality labour and puts them under pressure to
pursue a specific policy designed to sustain the motivations of their employees for
working longer. We are very concerned that the wage growth would offset the
productivity growth in Poland”.
As regards the risk of labour rigidity in Poland, the company is not subject to
strong labour power. This runs counter to the traditional beliefs that strikes and
lock-outs frequently occur as labour dominates capital due to the institutional
inheritance of state socialism. The former senior executive of NSK-ISKRA pointed out
that “the main reason for the existence of peaceful labour relations is that it is
commonly perceived among local employees that labour disputes would harm the
domestic economic development as a whole and the Polish economy may hence be far
behind other counterparts of CEE such as the Czech Republic and Hungary. Therefore,
workers are reluctant to come out on strike. Enthusiasm for work has been much higher
than expected since many people had suffered from being unemployed for a long period
of time. In my opinion, they seem to be diligent and happy to work. The number of job
applicants for a new recruitment of 35 employees reached more than 1,000 when the
company set up its second production facility in Wałbrzych. NSK Poland in Wałbrzych
pays 1,300 PLN (352.34 Euro) for starting pay”23.
The degree of delegation of authority to local employees is relatively high.
Except for the president of NSK-ISKRA, leading positions in the HR, finance and
marketing departments are occupied by local employees. An attempt has been made by
the company to increase local employees’ work morale and work ethic by introducing
promotion systems. The existence of training systems for local employees in Japan also
helps to facilitate the transfer of production and managerial expertise to the local
production activity.
8.2.5 Corporate Performance
Together with the personnel cutback plan, NSK transferred part of the production lines
used in the Peterlee factory in the UK to the Kielce factory in Poland in order to
gradually rationalise production systems and expand manufacturing capacity (see Figure
8-4). NSK currently assumes one of the leading positions among foreign and Japanese
bearing manufacturing firms. After the restructuring process, the company began
generating profits in 2003. Total sales doubled from US$4.7 million in 2000 to US$9.8
million in 2003 (see Figure 8-5). NSK has pursued a strategy of subsequent expansion
of equity shares to acquire managerial, production and financial control over other
23 Calculated based on 1 PLN=0.27 Euro on 26 November 2007.
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shareholders (Table 8-2).
Figure 8-4: Shift of Production Base of Ball Bearing from the UK to Poland (Unit:
thousands of units/month)
Source: NSK (2003)
Figure 8-5: NSK-ISKRA’s Corporate Performance (Unit: US$ million)
Source: Author’s illustration based on data provided by NSK Poland
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Table 8-2: Evolution of NSK’s Equity Share of NSK-ISKRA
8.2.6 Summary
The relocation strategy of NSK into Poland has been depicted as successful seeking a
response to the emerging competitive disadvantages of rising labour costs in the UK,
deteriorating labour productivity and fluctuations in the Pound exchange rates. By
relocating its factory lines from Peterlee in the UK to Kielce in Poland, NSK’s global
market position vis-à-vis Western and other Japanese rivals has been secured. Moreover,
NSK’s historical business connections with the formerly state-controlled firm, a gradual
step in enterprise restructuring of the acquired firm in the post-privatisation period and
the appointment of the former sogo shosha director of Nichimen Poland as president of
NSK-ISKRA in Kielce eased the liability of foreignness. Poland’s strong industrial
tradition in the general machinery sector was also a vital factor in determining the entry
of NSK. It is of significant interest that neither governmental incentives nor market size
considerations influenced the FDI allocation of NSK in Poland. The NSK case is also
illustrative of the expansion of the range of business units from sales and production to
R&D in Poland. The NSK case lends support to the view that the accumulation of a
firm’s international experience permits its associated and affiliated firms to leapfrog
some of the classic steps of internationalisation developed by Aharoni (1966).
8.3 Case Study 2: Denso Hungary
8.3.1 Company History
Denso is the largest auto-related supplier in Japan. As of the end of 2007, the company
had more than 50 manufacturing factories in the global markets. Total employment
amounts to 112,262 (Toyo Keizai, 2007). In the Fortune Global 500, Denso was ranked
214th in 2007 with a total net profit of US$1.754 billion. Denso has strong competitive
advantages in technology, financial stability, managerial expertise and international
experience. In particular, Denso’s R&D ratio relative to sales over the 1998-2006 period
reaches on average approximately 10 percent. In 2007, Denso invested 305 billion yen
in its R&D activity. The main business lines of Denso have been diversified into two
segments. One is the automotive-related segment that comprises 6 systems: (1) thermal
systems; (2) power train systems; (3) information and safety systems; (4) electric
systems; (5) electronic systems; and (6) small systems, while another is the new
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
NSK 70 70 70 88 88 93 93 93
Nichimen* 10 10 10 8 8 5 5 5
Polish government 20 20 20 4 4 2 2 2
Source : Toyo Keizai (1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007)
Note : * Nichimen merged with Nissho Iwai in 2004. Since then, the new company
has been Sojitz Corporation.
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business-related segment that includes bar-code readers, robots and non-contact IC card
readers/writers.
The establishment of Denso can be traced back to 1949, following a spin-off
from Toyota. Denso is currently the second largest automobile components supplier in
the world behind a German competitor, Robert Bosch. Since Denso originally belonged
to the Toyota Group, the company has established strong network ties with Toyota and
other Toyota keiretsu firms. Toyota is the largest equity shareholder of Denso as it
accounts for 22.7 percent (Toyo Keizai, 2007). However, Denso has been growing more
independent from Toyota because of its very large customer ties (Ahmadjian and
Lincoln, 2001). Denso extensively supplies its car components not only to Toyota but
also to various domestic and foreign customers both at home and abroad. Denso’s
product quality in engines and electric as well as electronics components has been
widely acknowledged.
To date, Denso has developed extensive production, sales and distribution
networks around the world. The total number of overseas subsidiaries is 91, of which 22
are in North and South America and 23 in Europe (Toyo Keizai, 2007b). The most
distinctive feature of Denso’s corporate network in an enlarged Europe is that a large
number of its subsidiaries are concentrated in CEE (see Figure 8-6). Mr. Nobuyuki
Fujitani, the former president of Denso Hungary, was interviewed in Dunavarsány,
Hungary on 12 October 2006.
8.3.2 Location Strategy in CEE
The main reason for Denso’s market entry in Hungary was not related by Toyota. The
presence of Isuzu Poland, which has produced diesel engines for Opel since 1997, was
seen to justify Denso’s local production (Toyama, 2005: 170). The rationale behind the
establishment of Denso Hungary was based on Denso’s core corporate philosophy
emphasising the strategy of placing production facilities near its customers. An initial
feasibility study for possible manufacturing sites was begun in the late 1990s. Denso’s
preference of CEE over Western Europe, notwithstanding the fact that Denso still has an
extensive sales, marketing and distribution networks in that region, is based on two
distinctive factors. First, Denso needed to select a location that was geographically
distant from Robert Bosch which dominated Western European markets. By considering
the importance of physical distance from this leading market competitor, Germany,
France and the UK were automatically ruled out of Denso’s location alternatives. The
former senior executive of Denso Hungary stressed that “it was already perceived even
before the entry that Denso would not be able to compete equally with Robert Bosch in
quality and price in case of producing products in Western Europe. To compete against
Robert Bosch on equal terms, CEE is an ideal production site for Denso in cost and
strategic considerations”. Second, Denso had to find a place with a pool of skilled
labour because the production of engine parts in which Denso specialises requires not a
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labour-intensive process but a middle-tech oriented process. Hence, Denso had to select
one of the Central European countries that had an engineering tradition. Feasibility
studies of three Central European countries, namely Poland, the Czech Republic and
Hungary, were carried out.
Figure 8-6: Spatial Distribution of European Subsidiaries of Denso (as of 2008)
Source: Author’s illustration based on Toyo Keizai (2007)
Poland was assessed to be insufficient in terms of the quality of its
transportation and communication networks. Regarding the investment climate in both
the Czech Republic and Hungary, the former senior executive of Denso Hungary stated
that “the Hungarian Investment Promotion Agency was keen on providing low cost
information such as labour market conditions as well as high cost information such as
institutional structure whereas the Czech Republic was not proactive in attracting
inward FDI in the mid-1990s. Enthusiasm of Czech (sub) national authorities was
lacking”. It was only Hungary that met investment conditions of Denso, which was
seeking to capitalise on a combination of a pool of labour supply, cheap input costs and
the existence of well-developed infrastructure systems.
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Moreover, the former senior executive of Denso Hungary mentioned that
“Hungary was attractive since the country has a higher level of technological potential
than other counterparts. Denso’s site selection was also affected by Audi’s decision to
shift its engine factory to Hungary in 1993. We also paid attention to non-economic
factors such as cultural affinity, language and historical roots. Japanese feel kinship
with Hungary as Japanese and Hungarians share the same root in Asia. As is
well-known, Hungarian is the only language in Europe in which the family name comes
first in the name order like Japanese. Hence, we believed that these non-economic
factors will contribute to better communication between Japanese expatriates and local
employees in Hungary”.
Table 8-3: Grants of Larger Amounts in 1998 (Unit: HUF millions)
Table 8-4: Denso’s Network in CEE
Name of company Subject of development Grant Loan
1 Caterpillar Hungary Expansion of capacity 0 180
2 Curver Expansion of capacity 50 300
3 Denso Hungary Fuel-injector pump production 200 200
4 Ford Hungary Modular fuel-pump production 9.7 266.6
5 GE Lighting Tungsram Halogen car-lamp development 0 200
6 Luk Savaria Clutch production plant 42.7 200
7 Philips Monitor Computer monitor production 0 200
8 SCI Hungary Electronic assembly plant 112.4 287.6
9 Sony Hungary Video apparatus production 0 200
Source : Antalóczy (2000)
Year N Content of operations Location
1 Denso Manufacturing Hungary 1997 4,039 Common rail systems, diesel
injection pumps, and VCT
Székesfehérvár,
HUN
2 Denso Thermal Systems 2001 244 Heaters and cockpit modules Tychy, POL
3 TBMECA Poland 2003 105 Automotive components and
engine components
Legnica, POL
4 Advanced Diesel Particulate
Filters
2007 N/A Diesel particulate filters Wroclaw, POL
5 Denso Manufacturing Czech 2001 1,659 HVAC units, evaporators,
condensers and radiators
Liberec, CZ
6 ASMO Czech 2004 186 HVAC units, evaporators,
condensers and radiators
Zruc nad
Sazavou, CZ
7 LIPLASTEC 2002 152 Plastic products forcar air
conditioners and radiators
Liberec, CZ
8 Airs Manufacturing Czech 2002 314 Car air conditioner-related
components
Liberec, CZ
Subsidiary
Source : Author’s illustration based on Denso’s website. (http://www.globaldenso.com)
Note : N indicates the number of employees.
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At the sub-national level, Denso chose to establish its factory in an industrial park
in the city of Székesfehérvár, which is one of the oldest cities in Hungary and about 65
km away from the capital city of Budapest. Labour productivity, transportation costs,
incentives and the level of support and friendliness toward inward foreign capital were
decisive factors in Denso’s location decision at the sub-national level in Hungary. In
addition to these aforementioned factors, close geographical proximity and easy access
to the capital city of Budapest were also felt to be inevitable factors for 20 Japanese
expatriates who were scheduled to work for the Hungarian subsidiary. They could
commute and their families live more comfortably due to the presence of abundant
shopping opportunities and better transportation infrastructure.
8.3.3 External Linkages
As regards parts procurement, Denso Hungary imports most of components from
Germany. Although Denso Hungary procured no parts from local suppliers when
starting its operation in Hungary in 1999, the company has gradually cultivated a
network of indigenous suppliers over time. At present, Denso Hungary closely
cooperates with approximately 10 local suppliers (Toyama, 2005: 172). The former
senior executive of Denso Hungary stressed that “Denso Hungary directed its own
attention to attaining a higher rate of local content in order to obtain favourable
investment incentives”. In June 2004, Denso Hungary became one of four major
foreign-owned enterprises 24 that received financial incentives for additional
investments from the Hungarian central government (Tanaka, 2005).
The number of local suppliers increased to five indigenous firms in 2003 as
compared to zero when investing in Hungary in 1997 (JETRO, 2003: 127). The
existence of local content rules has also encouraged Denso Hungary to create and
develop backward linkages. Despite its aim of seeking potential local suppliers, only a
few local firms were successful in concluding business deals with Denso, since Denso’s
evaluation criteria in terms of constant product control, financial ability, and punctual
delivery systems is thought to be considerably stringent (Szanyi, 2002: 19). In reality,
Denso Hungary’s business transactions were mostly established with local firms that
have partial foreign ownership from the West, since purely Hungarian firms are far
beneath them in quality control, technological strength and management systems
(JETRO, 2003: 127). The president of Denso Hungary evaluates that network relations
with local suppliers remain underdeveloped. Less than 10 percent of materials and
components of Denso Hungary are from CEE, while the majority comes from Western
Europe and Japan. Similarly, the region accounts for less than 10 percent of Denso
Hungary’s sales in value, while Western Europe dominates more than half.
24 Other than Denso, Robert Bosch, Exxon Mobile and Electrolux also received financial incentives in
2007.
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8.3.4 Human Resource Management
Figure 8-7: Denso Hungary’s Employment Growth
Source: Author’s illustration based on company’s website
Due to its presence in a small city with a population of 100,000 people, Denso Hungary
has faced difficulty in finding workers. To conquer this unfavourable labour market
condition, Denso Hungary runs shuttle buses to reach the potential labour force within a
radius of 30 km from Székesfehérvár (Toyama, 2005: 171-172). Denso Hungary
maintains a turnover rate of 5 to 6 percent (Toyama, 2005: 172). The number of
employees has been dramatically increasing, accounting for approximately 3,660 people
as of 2006 while it used to be 600 people in the first-year operation in 1997 (see Figure
8-7). Forty Japanese expatriates are working for Denso Hungary. Considering
management and employee-employer relations, the firm did not face any militant labour
attitude and low labour productivity, while major job-hopping problems are currently
problematic.
The degree of delegation of authority to local employees is relatively high. With
the exception of the president of Denso Hungary, the individuals in leading positions of
the finance and HR departments are local employees. The company has also introduced
promotion systems in order to encourage local employees to work hard.
8.3.5 Corporate Performance
Denso Hungary has recently invested about 100 million Euros into enlarging its diesel
engine fuel injection factory in Székesfehérvár, which is ultimately expected to employ
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over 2,000 additional people. To ensure high quality standards, Denso Hungary has
introduced various technologies such as calibration of machinery and assembly robots
in addition to constant training of all local employees (Denso Hungary, 2007). Denso
Hungary has been active in diversifying its products. The company has produced diesel
injection pumps to supply Isuzu Polska since 1997. Since August 2002, the company
has begun manufacturing variable camshaft timing (VCT) and other automotive-related
components such as engine control valves to supply Toyota and Volkswagen (Denso
News Release, March 19, 2002). Denso Hungary also expanded the overall volume of
common rail diesel injection systems for supplying Ford Motor in 2005, against Robert
Bosch’s dominating role with 90 percent of the global share of advanced fuel systems
for diesel engines and common rail systems.
Denso Hungary has devoted itself to strengthen social ties with the regional
communities through supporting sports competitions, giving lectures and disseminating
teaching materials. Denso’s diversified client networks in an enlarged Europe are found
to be very important for Denso’s global expansion. Isuzu Poland, Toyota UK,
Volkswagen, and Nissan are Denso’s main customers (Toyama, 2005: 171). During our
personal interview, a former senior executive of Denso Hungary commented that
“Denso knew it would experience intensive competition in a European market of engine
parts because of the presence of Robert Bosch before entering Hungary. Especially, the
demand for diesel common rail systems, diesel injection pumps, system control
components and spark plugs is rapidly growing owing to the emergence of the rigid
European environmental regulatory regime”. In response to this market trend with the
pressure for environmental protection from European supranational institutions, Denso
Hungary has been dedicated to an environmentally friendly production process, with the
company introducing a strict EcoVision programme in 2001, becoming the first
European subsidiary to achieve Zero Landfill Emissions in 2003 (Denso Hungary, 2007).
Denso Hungary also received the ‘European Union Environment Award’ in 2004. The
company has been certified with ISO 14001 and has actively engaged in environmental
management in accordance with Denso Group Green Procurement Guidelines. Denso
Hungary has ensured its product quality through the introduction of TS (Technical
Standard) 19649 integrated certification. Denso Hungary’s efforts to engage in activities
that enhance corporate social responsibility have been acknowledged by various
rewards. Denso Hungary received OHSAS 18001 certificate in 2001, Business for the
environment award in 2003, NSCA accident reduction award in 2003, CE
Environmental Reporting award in 2003, Clean and Healthy City award in 2003. Denso
Hungary received the European Business Award for the Environment in 2004, as a
result of the company’s success in cutting packaging materials, CO2 emissions and
water consumption by 30 percent, 35 percent and 40 percent, respectively (Denso News
Release, June 22, 2004).
After the initial production facility in Hungary, Denso has set up various
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production facilities across the European transition economies by the time of Toyota’s
entry into Poland in the late 1990s and the Czech Republic in 2002. In 2007, Denso
made an official plan to set up a joint venture with Robert Bosch in Wroław to produce
Diesel Particulate Filters (DPFs). The equity ownership structure of this joint venture is
equally divided, with 50 percent for each firm. The chief objective of this joint venture
is to respond to the enforcement of “Euro 5” (EU’s environmental regulation). Denso
has expanded into various locations and succeeded in achieving a wide range of
customer ties not only with Japanese car manufacturers but also with Western car
manufacturers. The sales growth, which reflects a successful performance of Denso
Hungary over time, is depicted in Figure 8-8. Contrasting its sales in 1999 with those in
2006, the sales level was roughly sixty times larger.
Figure 8-8: Denso Hungary’s Sales Growth (Unit: million Euro)
Source: Author’s illustration based on company’s website.
8.3.6 Summary
Denso Hungary’s primary motives for investment and site selection were cultivation of
network relations with their customers, as well as shortening production lead-times.
Denso Hungary is an example of the recent trend of the first-tier Toyota keiretsu
affiliates for expanding international subcontracting ties with other Japanese and
Western firms from which it can learn managerial expertise and product development
methods. No mention was made that cheap labour costs were the primary factor. Rather,
labour quality, proactive attitudes of host-based FDI promotion organisation and
geographical proximity to western and Japanese customers had positive effects on the
investment strategy of Denso Hungary. Technological transfer seems likely to be limited,
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while the local economy has benefitted from substantial job creation as well as
sustainable and steady corporate growth by Denso Hungary since its inception in the
late 1990s.
8.4 Case study 3: Sanyo Hungary
8.4.1 Company History
Sanyo has been one of the leading consumer electronics companies in the global
markets. On the list of the Fortune Global 500 in 2007, the company was the 356th
largest company with total revenues of US$19.737 billion and total employment of
94,906 people. In 2007, Sanyo Electric’s overseas sales ratio was 55 percent, suggesting
that the company has been fairly successfully integrated into the global economy. Sanyo
Electric’s business lines can be categorised into (1) consumer products, (2) commercial
services, (3) components. Among these business lines, consumer products dominate in
its consolidated sales, accounting for 43 percent, followed by components (38 percent)
and commercial services (12 percent). In 2007, the company spent 123,000 million yen
on R&D activity. This was equivalent to 6.2 percent of total sales.
Headquartered in the city of Moriguchi, Osaka, Sanyo Electric Co. Ltd was
founded by Toshio Iue in 1947. Toshio Iue was the brother-in-law of Kōnosuke
Matsushita who was the founder of Matsushita Electric Co. Ltd. Toshio Iue was
employed by Matsushita from 1917 until he retired in 1946. The company's name,
Sanyo, derives from the phrase three oceans in Japanese, referring to the founder's
vision to expand its business scale to cover the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian oceans.
Sanyo embarked on producing bicycle lamps as Sanyo’s first product in 1947. Sanyo
manufactured Japan's first plastic radio and Japan's first pulsator-type washing machine
in 1952 and 1953, respectively. A combination of production technology and extensive
delivery and sales channels has served as a driver for raising Sanyo’s cost leadership in
the global markets characterised by intensive price competition. At the end of 2007, the
company had 52 manufacturing facilities across the world. Mr. Yoshio Oe, the president
of Sanyo Hungary, was interviewed in Dorog, Hungary, on 14 October, 2006.
8.4.2 Location Strategy
The turn of the new century witnessed Sanyo having to dispose of its microwave oven
manufacturing plant in County Durham in the UK due to a growing wave of Korean
electronics firms in the EU, although the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, tried to
persuade the president of Sanyo Electric over the phone not to disinvest from the UK
market. At present, Sanyo has only one TV factory in Lowestoft, UK. Moreover, Sanyo
Electric also closed down its production factory in Spain. Changing market settings in
the EU due to the introduction of the Euro, the presence of the Single European Market
and eastward EU expansion put pressure on Sanyo to reshape and reconfigure its value
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chain networks in Europe. In 1999, Sanyo Hungary was established to produce small
rechargeable batteries for use in mobile phones. This business line is one of the most
important segments for Sanyo Electric. Sanyo accounts for 45 percent of the total
market share for rechargeable batteries in Europe (JETRO, 2001: 67). A capital of 36
million Euros was injected in this venture. Sanyo Hungary’s equity is 100 percent
owned by its parent company. This mode selection indicates Sanyo Electric’s corporate
philosophy to accumulate cutting-edge knowledge and ideas within the Sanyo group by
controlling the whole production process from invention to manufacturing.
Figure 8-9: Spatial Distribution of European Subsidiaries of Sanyo (as of 2008)
Source: Author’s illustration based on Toyo Keizai (2007).
Demand considerations were of great concern to the FDI allocation decision of
Sanyo Electric when investing in Europe. Demand for rechargeable batteries for use in
mobile phones has been growing rapidly in the region. Importantly, Nokia’s investment
in Hungary was seen to justify Sanyo’s local production. Since the beginning of the new
century, Sanyo Hungary has been producing rechargeable batteries for Nokia, which
invested in Komárom in Hungary and which has been in operation since 2000.
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Sanyo’s investment approach toward CEE can be treated as a step-wise and
risk-hedge strategy. Before entering Hungary in 1999, Sanyo made limited market
commitments such as exporting and licensing. First of all, Sanyo supplied rechargeable
batteries to Nokia from Japan and China by exporting through its extensive sales and
marketing channels in Germany. Currently, Sanyo Electric has five sales and marketing
subsidiaries in Germany. The first establishment of Sanyo’s sales network channel in
Germany can be traced back to 1969. Sanyo Büro-Electronic Europe-Vertrieb GmbH
was founded in München. However, a critical problem arose from their exporting
strategy despite the fact that transportation costs remained low since cell materials were
very small and light. Sanyo Electric was concerned that exporting may be inappropriate
for responding effectively and flexibly to changes in future consumer demand and
preference in Europe. Given this reason, Sanyo Electric had to consider a viable
alternative to exporting. To enhance the ability to adapt to the Single European Market,
the company relied on a dual supply strategy that was based on a mix of exporting and
original equipment manufacturing (OEM) in the Czech Republic and Hungary.
Moreover, a subcontracting agreement was conluded with Videoton MBKE Electronics,
which employed 200-250 people and which would assemble rechargeable battery packs
for Sanyo at a plant in Kaposvar (Radosevic and Yoruk, 2001: 13; JETRO, 2001: 67).
While Sanyo injected some capital into this subcontracting firm, the company faced the
need to produce on its own in response to a rapidly emerging demand for mobile phone
batteries in Western Europe over time.
Feasibility studies focusing on the Czech Republic, Hungary Poland, Slovakia
and Romania were conducted. Geographical considerations (i.e., easy access to the
Western European markets) were of great importance since Sanyo Electric sold various
types of batteries for various equipment including electric tools and electric shavers.
Hungary was thought of as the centre of CEE in geography and as the appropriate
location to reap economies of scale, to bypass trade barriers and to capitalise on the
presence of well-developed transportation infrastructure systems. Sanyo Electric was
also attracted to Hungary because of the presence of relatively better financial, legal and
economic infrastructure, a pool of skilled labour and political stability compared to
other countries of CEE.
Looking at site location criteria at the sub-national level, geographical proximity
to Nokia, which was located in Komárom, Hungary, had a significant influence on
Sanyo Electric. The president of Sanyo Hungary pointed out that “to develop more
stable business networks with Nokia, Sanyo has paid attention to the importance of
flexible response to Nokia’s demand for design and quality since functions, shapes, and
price in mobile phone production constantly change over time”. This primary business
model of Sanyo originated from Toyota’s kanban system and just-in-time delivery,
which function as an efficient means of reducing excessive production, upgrading
quality through the use of newest inventories, and controlling any delay in operations.
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In addition to access to Nokia in order to shorten lead times and to respond to its
demand for product quality and control, Sanyo sought potential location candidates to
fulfil three primary conditions: price stability, labour availability and good distribution
systems within Hungary. Particularly, the presence of excellent road networks was of
great importance to Sanyo Electric to assure a stable supply of its products to Nokia and
other western customers in Western Europe. Feasibility studies about potential
production sites within a 50 km radius of the capital city of Budapest were conducted.
Undergoing a consultation with a public FDI promotional agency, Sanyo Electric
decided to choose an industrial park in the City of Dorog, although other alternatives
could have been selected. The city is not only in the close vicinity of the capital city of
Budapest, but also just 50 km away from Komárom, where Nokia runs its production
facility.
The local authority of the City of Dorog proactively welcomed Sanyo Electric.
In the past, the city had reaped economic benefits from the mining industry. However,
the mining business within the city fell off dramatically, owing to the emergence of
environmentally conscious European markets and increased market competition with
emerging rivals from developing countries. As a result of a change in industrial structure
caused by these external pressures, the unemployment level soared in the region. It was
widely understood among municipal officials that the city per se would not be able to
survive without introducing concrete industrial development plans, in particular, in
parallel with some efforts to attract inward foreign capital. FDI was expected to have a
great influence over future economic prosperity of the city. Officials of the City of
Dorog lobbied the central government to promote FDI in order to combat high
unemployment rates and requested that it should offer a policy designed to integrate the
city into the world economy in the face of globalisation.
Although other cities close to the capital city and with a high intensity of
Japanese firms’ agglomeration were also short-listed as candidates for Sanyo’s
production location, the City of Dorog was chosen as the final destination since it felt
welcoming. The president of Sanyo Hungary mentioned that “abundant labour and
strong enthusiasm of local government including the City of Dorog over FDI were
attractive”. Moreover, government incentives were considered as one of the crucial
preconditions for investment, because they would reduce operational costs. Sanyo
Hungary gained benefits from various FDI incentives. First, a land price below market
standard was offered for purchases of land in a Dorog industrial park. Second, Sanyo
Hungary was promised a 15-year corporate income tax exemption. Third, 50 percent of
costs on local job trainings and education were refunded upon request. As a result,
government incentives were also felt to be crucial factors affecting the scale of FDI as
well as promoting expansion plans and operational strategies in the Sanyo Hungary
case.
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8.4.3 Human Resource Management
Environmental and situational factors have been changing over time in Hungary.
Increasing labour costs and high turnover rates have turned out to be critical problems
for the local management of Sanyo Hungary. In particular, the absence of skilful labour,
despite its low cost, proved to be a serious concern to Sanyo Hungary. Competition for
access to labour intensifies as the number of foreign firms in Hungary increases.
Notwithstanding these changes in environmental factors, the number of employees in
Sanyo Hungary has grown steadily, proportional to the level of sales every year (see
Figure 8-10, which demonstrates that the number of employees exceeds 2,000). Among
its 2,000 employees, Sanyo Hungary has 1,500 regular employees. Temporary workers
are also hired by manpower agencies in response to changes in market demand for
products. The number of temporary workers varies seasonally from 500 to 1,000.
Sanyo Hungary does not intend to overcome the issues of job hopping and
sick-leave through raising the level of wages. Rather, according to the president of
Sanyo Hungary, “particular attention was paid to creating stable and comfortable work
environments through providing substantial welfare assistance and social amenities to
local employees”.
Figure 8-10: Sanyo Hungary’s Employment Growth
Source: Author’s illustration based on information provided by Sanyo Hungary and various sources
Sanyo Hungary also points to the importance of delegating more authority to
local staff at the management level, since localisation is deemed to be responsible for
sustainable production management for the future of Sanyo Hungary. However, the
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degree of delegation of authority to local employees is not high. While the president of
Sanyo Hungary and a head of the finance department are Japanese expatriates,
responsibility for HR and marketing departments is in the hands of local employees. A
possible cause of this preference for localisation concerning the HR and marketing units
may be derived from the fact that local employees would be more familiar with both
local labour conditions and local market opportunities as compared to Japanese
expatriates. Promotion systems are introduced to strengthen local employees’ morale
and work ethic.
8.4.4 External Linkages
In 2006, half of Sanyo Hungary’s batteries were supplied to Nokia, while more than 60
percent of its sales came from Nokia. The president of Sanyo Hungary pointed out that
“Sanyo Electric’s efforts to forge a win-win relationship with Nokia indicates the
formation of ‘Schicksalsgemeinschaft’ not as being one of Nokia’s normal
subcontractors but as being a true partner”.
As regards supply management, Sanyo Hungary procures parts and materials by
leveraging its global and regional networks of production and distribution in Europe and
imports from Japan and China. Sanyo Hungary imports 90 percent of components from
Japan, while the rest is partially procured from Hungary and Germany. This high import
figure is also affected by the fact that Sanyo Hungary takes advantage of a customs free
zone in the City of Dorog. With respect to sales destinations, the Western European
markets account for the majority. Batteries produced in the factory are supplied to Braun,
Black & Decker, Robert Bosch, and Sagem Communication. In contrast to the
automobile industry, Sanyo’s battery business does not require tight local supplier
networks, since battery cells are easily transportable. On these grounds, Sanyo’s local
content rate of parts and materials has not been as high as those in the automobile
industry. Sanyo Hungary’s local content rate was 25 percent in 2006. The degree of
local embeddedness of Sanyo Hungary remains small, although Sanyo Hungary
regularly visits local suppliers to provide them with technical instructions, assistance
and product inspection. Imported components dominate in Sanyo Hungary’s local
procurements. This preference for in-house and imports is likely to reduce the
possibility of local firms entering Sanyo’s global and regional value-creating networks
of production and distribution.
The president of Sanyo Hungary has played a central role in lobbying the
Hungarian government directly to cancel the proposed increase in corporate tax rates,
which the government had just announced at the time of our visit. At that time, the
president of Sanyo Hungary was a representative of the Japanese Chamber of
Commerce in Budapest, and he submitted a petition that underlines the need to maintain
a good investment climate for Japanese investors, suggesting that Hungary may have
difficulty in attracting further Japanese FDI in the future if the tax was increased.
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8.4.5 Corporate Performance
The success of Sanyo Hungary is to a large extent attributable not only to the formation
of extensive network relations with western firms but also to product and customer
diversification with its strenuous efforts to align with the European regulatory
institutions associated with environmental protection. According to the president of
Sanyo Hungary, “it is highly expected that the need for battery production for electric
automobiles would be mounting in the near future. Thus, Sanyo has already made
contracts with Volkswagen, Ford, and Honda which are leading and prospective
assemblers for electric automobiles next to Toyota. Sanyo Electric has devoted itself to
putting forward R&D projects with Volkswagen. Increasing efficiency, rationalising
production and upgrading product quality are essential in winning ‘survival’ (Ikinokori)
in an increasing competitive environment”.
Sanyo has been one of the leading photovoltaic cell producers, behind Sharp,
Q-Cells, Kyocera and Suntech (see Figure 8-11). Since 2004, Sanyo Electric has been
cooperating with Mercedes Benz to develop batteries for hybrid cars (JETRO 2005). In
order to meet rapidly growing demands for solar photovoltaic equipments in Europe
(see Figure 8-12), Sanyo invested approximately 3.5 billion yen to set up a new
production facility on the grounds of the company in the Dorog industrial park and has
begun to manufacture solar cells modules since 2005. In 2005, JBIC also decided to
finance Sanyo Hungary’s production of photovoltaic products with a loan of 5.2 million
Euros for the purpose of promoting environment-related business ventures (JBIC, 2005).
The level of sales in solar cells appeared to be equivalent to that of rechargeable
batteries for use in mobile phones in 2006. Commercial air conditioners have also been
produced since December 2006. The company aims to produce 100MW of solar cells
and 120,000 units of commercial air conditioners. Most of the products manufactured in
the Hungarian subsidiary are aimed at serving customers in Western Europe, notably
Germany, where the number of photovoltaic applications are the highest in the world.
As regards the prospective investment in the internationalisation process of
Sanyo, Russia was recently seen as attractive to Sanyo’s global strategic considerations
because of its market size. However, its high political risks, limited free market-based
systems and a slow transition toward democratisation prevented Sanyo from making a
final decision to produce in Russia. Given these critical factors, Sanyo’s economic
involvement is still confined to exporting to Russia from Finland.
Sanyo Hungary provides support for various social events. One of the most
prominent examples is an environmental event for local students, the Environmental
Children Day Event. By assisting such environmental activities, the company strives to
promote the attention of the local population toward environmental protection and
resource recycling. The company also provides technical college students with
internship opportunities to understand the company’s leading environmental protection
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technologies and knowledge by the on-the-job training (http://www.sanyo.co.jp).
Figure 8-11: Major PV Cell Producers in 2006
Source: European Photovoltaic Industry Association (2007)
Original Source: Photon International
Figure 8-12: Trends in Photovoltaic Applications (Unit: MW)
Source: Author’s illustration based on JPEA
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Table 8-5: Top 10 Consumer Electronics Producers in Hungary
Figure 8-13: Sanyo Hungary’s Sales Growth (Unit: million Euro)
Source: Author’s illustration based on information provided by Sanyo Hungary
8.4.6 Summary
The Sanyo case underlines the motivations for developing network relations and
leveraging core technologies in the enlarged European markets. In sum, the major
reason behind Sanyo’s decision to set up its production factory in Hungary was indeed
aimed at cultivating network relations with Nokia, as opposed to the phenomenon that
Japanese FDI in Western Europe has been driven by the threat of (non-) tariff barriers
such as quotas and antidumping proceedings during the 1980s and 1990s (Belderbos
Rank Company name 2002 Net sales(EUR million)
2003 Net sales
(EUR million)
2002-2003
Growth (%)
1 Nokia Kománom 1,643 2,234 36
2 Philips Magyarország 1,829 2,054 12.3
3 GE Hungary 1,230 1,543 25.4
4 Samsung Electronics Magyar 600 565 –5.8
5 Electroux Lehel 428 486 13.6
6 Sony Hungária 308 360 16.9
7 Siemens Nemzeti Vállalatcsoport 315 296 –6.0
8 Sanyo Hungary 184 281 52.7
9 Videoton Holding 279 235 –15.8
10 LG Electronics Magyar Kft 145 167 15.2
Source : PricewaterhouseCoopers (2004/2005: 49) Global Retail & Consumer Study from Beijing
to Budapest.
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and Sleuwaegen, 1996; Belderbos, 1998). Accordingly, Sanyo’s FDI in CEE was
characterised as network-and market-seeking FDI rather than tariff-jumping FDI. One
of the most interesting points is that cheap labour costs were of little relevance to the
Sanyo Hungary case. Besides cellular phone batteries, Sanyo Hungary is also an
example of successful spearhead FDI for targeting the German market with the
substantial growth of photovoltaic products. Its corporate performance has, to a large
extent, followed an upward trend, suggesting that the company makes significant
contributions to economic development and job creation.
8.5 Case Study 4: Toyota in CEE
8.5.1 Company History
Toyota, headquartered in the city of Toyota near Nagoya, is the largest vertical keiretsu
parent company in the Japanese automobile industry. On the list of Fortune Global 500
in 2007, Toyota was ranked as the 6th largest corporation and the 2nd largest automobile
maker with revenues of US$204,7 billion. Toyota has also received marked brand
recognition and reputation, as it also ranked as 2nd in Fortune’s 2007 list of the world’s
most admired companies.
The company was founded in 1937 by Kiichiro Toyoda. The original start of
Toyota’s corporate history can be traced back to the time when Kiichiro Toyoda became
involved in automobile production as a part of Toyoda Automatic Loom Works in 1933
before the spin-off in 1937. Special financial support from the central government as
well as high tariffs against the imported cars of foreign competitors such as GM and
Ford ensured Toyota’s sustainable corporate growth (Reich, 1990: 289). The company
played a crucial role in producing trucks for the Japanese Army during the Second
World War. In the late 1940s after the defeat, Toyota was on the verge of bankruptcy,
but the government (the Bank of Japan, the Japanese Development Bank and the
Industrial Development Bank of Japan) prevented the company from becoming
insolvent (Reich, 1990: 289). Toyota’s first overseas production facility was opened in
Brazil in May 1959. Toyota also embarked on a joint venture with GM in the United
States in 1982. It has been broadly acknowledged that Toyota has become the
forerunner for technology in the automobile industry. The introduction of hybrid
gas-electric vehicles and an advanced parking guidance system has reinforced the
market presence of Toyota. Toyota has also invented efficient production methods such
as JIT system, kaizen (constant improvement), Total Quality Management and Kanban
with Western car makers following suit.
Toyota owns majority equity shares in Daihatsu (51.1 percent) and Hino (50.1
percent), and is a minority equity holder in Isuzu (5.8 percent), Yamaha Motor (4.3
percent), Fuji Heavy Industries (8.6 percent) (Toyo Keizai, 2007). Toyota has 52
manufacturing companies and 170 distributors in the world (Toyota in the World, 11).
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A few distinctive features of Toyota stand out. First, Toyota has traditionally
dominated the home market and has placed importance on a stepwise expansion of
operations with an attitude toward avoiding risky investments abroad (Lim, 2003: 351).
Second, concomitant with the first feature, Toyota has lagged behind other domestic
competitors such as Nissan and Honda in the development of a localisation of
automobile production in Europe (Wada, 2005: 144). To date, Toyota has established six
factories in the enlarged Europe (1 for UK, 1 for France, 1 for Portugal, 1 for the Czech
Republic and 2 for Poland). (see Figure 8-14). The company has diversified its product
lines from compact cars, such as Yaris, to middle-to-high-class cars, such as Avensis, in
the region. It is important to note that Toyota has set a new goal to achieve a 10 percent
market share in Europe by 2010.
8.5.2 Locational Strategy
Toyota invested relatively late in the CEE region as compared to other Asian car
producers such as Suzuki in Hungary (1990), Daewoo in the Czech Republic (1994),
Poland (1995) and Romania (1994) and Isuzu in Poland (1997). The degree of business
involvement of Toyota was very limited in the early stages of transition in CEE. Toyota
set up sales and marketing subsidiaries in CEE in the early 1990s. In January 1991,
Toyota started selling cars in Poland in cooperation with a Japanese general trading
company, Nissho Iwai, followed by Toyota Motor Hungary Kft in December 1991 and
Toyota Motor Czech Spol.s.r.o. in the Czech Republic in January 1994 (Toyo Keizai
1998; Toyota, 2005). The latter two companies were joint ventures of Toyota and its
own trading firm, Toyota Tsūshō (Toyo Keizai, 1998). In the late 1990s, offshore
production in CEE became an integral part of Toyota’s corporate growth in response to
the deteriorating investment climate in Western Europe and to the emerging demand for
diesel engine vehicles that was derived from increased awareness of Europeans towards
environmental protection. Specifically, the entry strategy of Toyota was ultimately
determined by the imposition of institutional constraints such as Euro 5 in 2009
(Orihashi, 2006: 131). Toyota has three production facilities in CEE. Two factories in
Poland are located in Wałbrzych and Jekz-Laskowice in Poland and one is in Kolín in
the Czech Republic (see Figure 8-14).
Toyota Motor Manufacturing Poland (TMMP)
The establishment of Toyota’s first factory in CEE can be traced back to the late 1990s.
Toyota announced an investment in Wałbrzych, Poland, in 1999 and production of
transmissions began in 2002. Isuzu had already been in operation in Tyhcy prior to
TMMP in Wałbrzych. The size of Toyota’s investment was US$600 million and it was
the largest Japanese investment in Poland, followed by Isuzu in Tychy. The total equity
share of TMMP consisted of the Toyota S.A./N.V. with 94 percent in 2007, indicating
that Toyota prefers to take complete control over its subsidiaries.
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Figure 8-14: Spatial Distribution of European Subsidiaries of Toyota (as of 2008)
Source: Author’s illustration based on Toyo Keizai (2007).
Toyota’s decision to produce diesel engines in Wałbrzych in Poland is indicative
of its initial efforts to develop an integrated European value chain system and to forge
network relations with Western suppliers and to upgrade price leadership in Europe,
characterised by the agglomeration of competitive car makers (IRC, 2005). The reasons
behind the market entry of Toyota in Poland were diverse. First, the market size of
Poland and easy access to the EU market due to its spatial centrality was attractive (IRC,
2005: 305; Wada, 2005: 150). Second, the provision of FDI incentives had a strong
influence over the FDI decision-making procedure of Toyota (En, 2006: 131). Besides
public incentives, the Polish government also showed its positive and supportive
attitude toward Toyota. Third, together with the presence of already existing road
networks25, Poland’s engineering tradition is notable and provides the advantage of a
pool of quality labour capital. An executive manager from a Toyota-relational insurance
company in Germany commented on the underlying factor behind Toyota’s investment
25 Many foreign investors show their concern that poor road infrastructure is a critical problem in the
whole area of Poland except southern Poland. TMMP is situated in southern Poland.
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in CEE in our interview, “Toyota’s investment in CEE can be treated as an experimental
offshore production project for entering Russia. Toyota will target both Eastern and
Western markets, by strengthening its West-European networks”.
As regards location choice, a primary explanation for choosing Wałbrzych to
manufacture diesel engines and transmission was the provision of FDI incentives.
Wałbrzych is also a convenient location from which to deliver diesel engines and
transmission to Toyota factories in the UK, France and Turkey. Besides the favourable
government treatment and the geographical proximity to Western Europe, Marinov et al.
(2003: 171) point out that “high unemployment rate in the region of 25 percent, and the
availability of abundant subterranean water needed for industrial production” also
affected Toyota’s location choice at the sub-national regional scale. Of importance is
that the TPCA project in the Czech Republic did not act as a conduit for choosing
Wałbrzych.
Toyota Peugeot Citroën Automobile
The Toyota-Peugeot/Citroën consortium is one of the largest FDI transactions (1.84
billion Euros) in the Czech Republic as of 2007 (Czech Business Weekly, October 29,
2007). The site selection of TPCA occurred between June and December 2001 (TPCA,
2005: 2). The joint venture was launched in 2002 and begun production in 2005. The
plant is located in Kolín, which is located just 59.2 km east of Prague. A site in the
914-acre (365.6-hectare) Kolín-Ovčáry industrial zone was picked for the joint venture
production. The Citroën C1, Peugeot 107 and Toyota Aygo have been manufactured at
the plant, amounting to 300,000 units annually, of which 200,000 are for PSA and the
rest is for Toyota. To alter the limited brand image and reputation of Toyota products
relative to European competitors such as VW, PSA and Renault in the European markets,
Toyota had to establish an assembly plant in the centre of the CEE region (i.e., Czech
Republic) in cooperation with PSA. This Japanese-French consortium specialises in
customised car products, namely, inexpensive and small cars.
At the initial stages of the FDI decision-making procedure of the TPCA project, the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were short-listed. The negotiations took some
years and were very tough. The biggest contender was Poland due to an already existing
Toyota engine plant in Wałbrzych, a city in southern Poland. No French governmental
authorities or unions took part in the location selection process of the TPCA project
(Prague Tribune, July 11, 2002). Rather, a professional FDI organisation, CzechInvest,
played a leading role in winning this project. CzechInvest worked hard to realise the
project, creating a special team, which was led by Mr. Hruda (who much later became
CEO of CzechInvest). CzechInvest also coordinated preparatory works on the
Kolín-Ovčáry industrial zone, which became a strategic site. One interviewee from
CzechInvest explained that “winning the project would be impossible without
cooperation with the central government including the CzechInvest, regional
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governments (notably, Kolín town hall) and other subjects”.
The industrial zone at which the TPCA plant has been in operation today was
originally prepared for BMW, which had searched for a 500-acre site in CEE. However,
Leipzig, in the former East Germany, beat out the Czech Republic for the BMW’s new
project due to political pressures. This availability of large-scale land was consequential
for attracting the TPCA project to the Czech Republic, since it was expected to enable
the Japanese-French joint venture to make maximum use of scale economies.
Another vital reason for choosing the Czech Republic was to capitalise on its
comparative advantages in the quality of labour (JAMA, 2005). Jean-Martin Folz,
President of PSA, stressed that “the Czech Republic attracted us mainly by its
remarkable engineering tradition and high level of technical education. This is what we
were looking for” (CzechInvest, 2007). Lim (2003: 352) also states that the reason why
Kolín was chosen - despite the fear that increasing wage levels would have a
constraining effect on operational efficiency - was high labour productivity. This implies
that consideration was given to labour quality which would facilitate the effective
transfer of the Toyota Production System to the local operation of TPCA.
According to the company website (http://www.tpca.cz), there are five underlying
motives behind the location choice of TPCA: (1) strategic location in the centrality of
Europe; (2) short distance to key markets; (3) developed industry of production of car
parts; (4) connection to main traffic routes; (5) industrial tradition; (6) government
policies supporting investments. Complementing favourable government attitudes
toward inbound foreign capital, it was said that financial incentives including corporate
tax exemption for ten years and training grants (Lim, 2003: 352) and a promise of the
extension of the D11 motorway to access the Polish border via Prague (Prague Tribune,
July 4, 2004) had a significant impact on the final decision in favour of this location site.
The presence of a Japanese school in Prague was also of great relevance to Toyota’s
decision (Orihashi, 2006: 128). Interestingly, low labour costs were of minor relevance.
8.5.3 Human Resource Management
Toyota Motor Manufacturing Poland
In the initial phase of operation TMMP sent 25 Polish workers to Japan, where they
were trained for seven months at Toyota factories in Japan. Team leaders and group
leaders were also sent to the Toyota factories in the UK and France. They acted as key
drivers for transferring the Toyota Production System to the local operation in
Wałbrzych. Most of the 25 Polish workers who received OJT (on-the-job training) in
Japan are now group leaders. The group leaders are allocated to three chief tasks such as
engine production, engineering and maintenance. While it takes 15 years to become a
group leader in Japan, it takes only two years in Poland. There are three assistant
managers and 15 group leaders. Under the direction of each group leader, there are a
few chief leaders.
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Figure 8-15: Employment Growth of TMMP and TPCA
Source: Own illustration based on Toyota in the World (2005, 2007, 2008) and Toyo Keizai (2001, 2002,
2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007)
As regards the recruitment, Toyota Poland implemented three recruiting steps,
including resume screening and interviews. Toyota Poland hired 7-8 interpreters from
the University of Warsaw in order to aid local workers in understanding the Toyota
Production System. The company made significant contributions to the creation of job
opportunities in the local economy. The growing number of local employees is
remarkable, reaching the number of 1,989 by 2007 (see Figure 8-15). The average age
of local employees is under 30 years.
TMMP has no trouble hiring workers, because unemployment rates in
Wałbrzych are higher than 30 percent, so that a large pool of labour is guaranteed. This
large unemployment problem originates from the decay of the coal and mining industry.
Turnover rates are much lower than for other companies, accounting for two percent.
Some local employees who were working for a French automotive-related supplier,
Faurecia, located within the same Wałbrzych Economic Sub-Zone as TMMP, left the
company and started working for TMMP despite the fact that the French company
offered better remuneration because of job stability and fair treatment by Toyota
(Strzelczak, 2006: 75). With the purpose of rewarding hardworking local employees and
keeping turnover rates at a minimum, in December 2006, TMMP introduced a reward
system to provide local employees with a bonus for full attendance.
Communication within the internal organisation of the firm plays a central role
in reducing technical defects. In the case of TMMP, production managers and group
leaders meet every morning to discuss problems and solve them by brainstorming and
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sharing ideas before the start of the production operations. A Japanese production
manager stated that “local employees are motivated to actively propose what needs to be
improved. Moreover, local employees are very obedient and receptive to orders and
instructions about the Toyota Production System. Hence, it is easier to teach the Toyota
Production System to Polish workers than expected. This implies that a combination of
team work and labour quality have ensured high productivity and flexibility within the
TMMP factory.
The degree of delegation of managerial autonomy to local employees has been
relatively low. No major positions (president and head of HR, finance or marketing
departments) are occupied by local employees. However, TMMP has the plan to
increase the responsibilities of Poles, but this process may be gradual (Majek, 2005:
90).
Concerning the sense of unity, during my visit to Toyota Poland in March 2006,
I noticed that management and workers used the same cafeteria. There was also a
Japanese menu. It seems rare in the formal Polish culture that management and workers
use the same canteen, since relationships between the former and the latter are
hierarchical and allow for few personal interactions (Hardy, 2006). Furthermore, in
order to narrow the gap between workers and management, TMMP initiated various
social events such as EKIDEN competition and open offices. A Japanese production
manager stressed that “various social events within the organisation can generate a
high degree of commitments to the company and hence encourage local employees to
understand Toyota’s visions, identity and values”.
Toyota Peugeot Citroën Automobile
There are 30 expatriates from Toyota and 10 expatriates from PSA (Orihashi, 2006:
129). TPCA hired roughly 3,000 local staff in 2005. Of these 3,000 workers, there were
100 foreign workers, half of whom were Poles and half of whom were Slovaks (Czech
Business Weekly, October 29, 2007). The average age of local staff working for TPCA
is 27. This age distribution may imply that the company considers young staff as
important for a higher degree of adaptability and receptiveness to the Toyota Production
System. The share of female workers is also relatively high, accounting for 18 percent.
Rates of absenteeism were also high among employees. This problem was
caused by both the Czech social and health insurance systems and the demands of the
company itself (European Industrial Relations Observatory Online, 2007). In response
to this issue, which affected not only TPCA but also most Japanese firms, the Japanese
Chamber of Commerce in the Czech Republic lobbied the Czech government to revise
the domestic social welfare institutions by sending an official letter to Prime Minister
Vladimír Špidla (Prague Tribune, July 4, 2004).
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Table 8-6: Inter-firm Relationships of Toyota Keiretsu Group Companies in CEE
Country Start ofOperation Company name N Main customers Main products
CZ 2002 AISIN Europe Manufacturing Czech 61 TMUK, TMMF, TPCA, Renault Water pump, oil pump
CZ 2000 AISAN Bitron Czech 190 TPCA, Fiat, Renault Fuel pump
CZ 2002 AISAN Louny Czech 15 TPCA Throttle body
CZ 2001 Denso Manufacturing Czech 672 TPCA, European car assemblers Evaporator, HVAC
CZ 2001 TRCZ 400 TPCA, TMMF, Volvo, Ford Switch, shift lever, seat belt
CZ 2003 Toyoda-Koki Automotive Czech NA TPCA, European car assemblers Transmission parts
CZ 2001 Toyoda Gosei Czech 314 TMMF, TPCA, Ned Car, Magyar Suzuki Wheel, air bag module
CZ 2003 KYB Manufacturing Czech 210 TPCA Shock absorber
CZ 2001 Koito Czech 209 TPCA, TMMF, Renault, BMW, Audi Head lamp
CZ 2002 Koyo Steering Systems Czech 260 TPCA, TMUK, TMMF Power steering
CZ 2002 Futaba Czech 300 TMMF, TPCA, Ned Car, Magyar Suzuki Body parts
CZ 2004 ASMO Czech 240 Denso Motor for power wind
SLK 2000 Trim Leader 827 TMUK, TMMF, TPCA Seat parts
HUN 1997 Denso Manufacturing Hungary 1916 TMUK, TMMF, Isuzu Motor Polska, Ford,
Renault, VW
1800 bar supply pumps,
rails and injectors
HUN 2000 Taiho Corporation of Europe Kft 163 TMMF, TMUK, Delphi, Visteon, Honda UK Engine metal
Note : TMMP-Toyota Motor Manufacturing Poland, TMIP-Toyota Motor Industries Poland, TPCA-Toyota Peugeot Citroen Automobile Czech, TMUK-Toyota
Motor Manufacturing UK, TMMF-Toyota Motor Manufacturing France. N indicates the number of employees.
Source : Author’s illustration based on IRC (2005) Toyota Jidōsha no Sekai Senryaku Jittai Chōsa 2005 Nendo Ban and various company annual reports.
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Table 8-7: TPCA’s Network Relations with Major Western Parts Suppliers
Consistent with US operations (Reid et al. 1995), Toyota follows the traditional
recruitment policy to hire indigenous people who have had no experience working for
the automobile industry. This recruitment process indicates the company’s intention to
train them more efficiently without any resistance and negative past working practices.
Similarly to TMMP, Czech workers in the Toyota-Peugeot/Citroën consortium were also
sent to Toyota factories in the UK, France, Turkey and Japan to learn Toyota’s corporate
identity and lean production system. In 2004, the first team of over 700 employees spent
21,150 days for trainings abroad (TPCA, 2005: 9).
The transfer of managerial authority to local hands seems high. The management
structure of TPCA constitutes a Japanese president, three officers (one Czech, one
Japanese and one French) and five general managers (three Czech, one Japanese and
one French) (Žížalová, 2008: 10). Despite the advance of managerial localisation, the
lack of a potential labour force qualified for the management level remains an issue in
the Czech Republic. As regards this matter, Mr. Jiří Černý, vice president of production
at TPCA, was quoted in a recent Czech Business Weekly article (June 16, 2008) on the
difficulty of the automobile producers in finding quality human capital: “[The Czech
Republic] has neglected education for the technical professions and this is starting to
Supplier name Parts name Nationality
Faurecia Car exhaust systems France
MGI Coutier S.A. Washer systems France
Hella KG Hueck & Co. Horns Germany
Dura Automotive Systems Inc. Cable systems USA
Allevard Rejna Coil springs France
Paulstra SNC control arm France
Magna Donnelly Mirror USA
Arvinmeritor Inc. Window regulators USA
A Raymond Connectors USA
Rehau AG Moulding Germany
TI Automotive Ltd. Fuel tank UK
Lydall, Inc. Tape USA
Automotive Lighting Equips Lear lamps Germany
CF Gomma S.p.A. Weather stripping Italy
Lear Corp. Seating USA
CML Innovative Technologies Auto interior lighting USA
Siemens VDO Automotive Speedomeeters Germany
Valeo S.A. Air conditioning France
Peguform Bohemia k.s. Dashboards Czech
Robert Bosch GmbH Brake control systems Germany
Ficosa International Shift systems Spain
Source : IRC (2006: 119) Toyota Jidousha no Sekai Senryaku Jittai Chousa 2005.
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come back on us”.
8.5.4 External Linkages
Toyota Motor Manufacturing Poland
A large proportion of components are produced in-house (Majek, 2005: 77), while the
company is dependent on imported parts supplied from Japan, Hungary, the Czech
Republic, Germany, and South Africa. Particularly, imported parts from Japan account
for 20 percent. There are a number of Japanese suppliers and relational companies that
operate in Western Europe, mainly, in the UK, Germany, and France. In southern Poland,
a number of Toyota keiretsu suppliers and relational companies (Toyota Boshoku,
Toyota Tsūshō, Nifco, Fuji Seikō, Tokai Rubber Industries and Daicel Chemical
Industries) are located adjacent to TMMP in Wałbrzych and TMIP in Jelcz-Laskowice
(Sankei Shinbun, January 22, 2007).
To streamline the car parts procurement process, TMMP has introduced an
electronic kanban system since its operation and has thus achieved more efficient
inventory management (IRC, 2005: 114). The effective integration of Toyota’s group
suppliers into Toyota’s global production network was enabled by the electronic kanban
system, allowing Toyota to procure from various locations.
Toyota Europe Engineering & Maintenance SA has also invested over 2.6
million Euro in 2007 and has been in operation in the Wałbrzych Special Economic
Zone (WSEZ). According to the Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency
(http://www.paiz.gov.pl), three Toyota keiretsu companies have already been situated in
the Wałbrzych SEZ.
Toyota Peugeot Citroën Automobile
The organisational and managerial structure of the Japanese-French joint venture is
governed by the use of a mix of ownership advantages both firms possess. Toyota takes
charge of managing production methods and processes, while PSA plays a central role
in purchasing and logistics. This distinction of operational responsibilities has
implications for synergy effects and low transaction and coordination costs in the shared
ownership activity. It is Toyota that can take advantage of PSA’s good reputation; the
French company has been ranked as the second-largest carmaker in Europe. In 2005,
PSA group has dominated roughly 14 percent and 10 percent of the market share in
Western Europe and CEE, respectively (EBS, 2007). Toyota aimed to upgrade both
product image and reputation in Europe by virtue of the so-called “French effect”. The
rationale for Toyota’s team-up with PSA in the Czech Republic also lies in gaining
expertise in small car manufacturing from its French partner and to tap into the
European market.
Some keiretsu firms (e.g., Toyoda Gosei, Aisan and Aichi Steel in the Czech
Republic and Denso in Hungary) actively entered the European transition economies
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with the purpose to consolidate supplier-buyer relations with Western firms irrespective
of Toyota’s investments in Poland and the Czech Republic. For instance, the central
motive for Toyoda Gosei in the Czech Republic was to supply automobile components
to a joint venture, Nedcar, formed by Mitsubishi and Daimler Chrysler (JETRO, 2005).
Aisan invested in Louny, the Czech Republic, because of the reinforcement of network
relations with Renault (Tou, 2006). As seen above, Denso set up its factory in Hungary
to supply Isuzu in Tychy, Poland. In 2007 Aichi Steel penetrated the Czech Republic to
supply electromagnetic components (i.e., magfine) to a German firm, Bosch, and has
been in operation since January 2008. In contrast, other keiretsu firms such as Tokai
Rika entered the market because of Toyota (Lim, 2003).
The phenomenon that some Toyota keiretsu firms are active in developing
supplier-buyer linkages with Western firms in CEECs does not indicate that Toyota
group companies desire to be independent of the keiretsu leader or to become a Toyota
keiretsu breaker, but, rather, they intend to (1) maintain financial independence from the
parent; (2) pursue scale economies; and (3) accumulate managerial skills and expertise
from Western firms on their own. As pointed out by Toyota group top officials, it is
believed that strong competition within and beyond keiretsu actually results in
improving the overall competitiveness and unity of the Toyota keiretsu group (Nikkei
Sangyo Shinbun, November 11, 2003). On these grounds, the core corporate strategy of
Toyota keiretsu firms can be translated into the development of relational and strategic
linkages with Western firms on the basis of arm’s length transactions in the enlarged
Europe, following the view of the strategic network theory (Chen and Chen, 1998; Chen,
2003).
When considering location strategy, Toyota keiretsu suppliers have, in particular,
concentrated within a radius of 100 km from Kolín. The presence of an extensive
network with PSA’s suppliers as well as own keiretsu suppliers allows Toyota to procure
automobile components at lower prime costs and to sustain its price competitiveness in
the European automobile market. Hence, transaction costs to search for new suppliers
are curtailed through the prolific Toyota-PSA cooperation.
To date, local embeddedness of TPCA remains rather limited. TPCA locally
procures about 80 percent in volume and 50 percent in value of total components
required for the assembly (Orihashi, 2006: 130). As regards the linkage between TPCA
and local suppliers in the Czech Republic, the degree of local embeddedness remains
limited, since Japanese and Western suppliers that followed Toyota and PSA have
played a dominant role in boosting high local content rates. There is little doubt that
local suppliers seem to play a minor role in the sourcing strategy of TPCA, although the
TPCA joint project was supposed to promote technology transfer to the local economy.
There are many underlying reasons why the degree of local embeddedness in the Toyota
case is limited.
First, the company is in favour of inter-firm networks with Toyota-keiretsu
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members and Western suppliers who possess independent technological capabilities. As
a result, the effect of technology spillovers seems to be very limited (Žížalová, 2008:
13). Both Toyota and PSA have already cultivated global and regional networks of parts
and materials in Western Europe (Lim, 2003). Moreover, a number of technologically
competitive Western suppliers such as Bosch, Lear, and Siemens have operated across
CEE (see Table 8-7).
Second, indigenous suppliers have experienced difficulties meeting Toyota’s
strict supplier selection criteria, such as quality control, product innovation, product
engineering and inventory control. Lim (2003) also emphasises that the ability and
competence of indigenous suppliers to absorb the Toyota Production System and its
technological development remain weak.
Third, weak financial capabilities make it more difficult for indigenous suppliers
to become a Toyota supplier. The horizontal spillover of technology and managerial
expertise to local suppliers is unlikely to take place by way of collaborating with Toyota
because of bank loans with high interest rates (Lim, 2003: 354). Hence, many of them
do not have a desire to take risks by obtaining parts orders from Toyota.
Consistent with other foreign car manufacturers in CEE, TPCA has also
procured low value-added products from indigenous suppliers, while existing Japanese
and European suppliers in CEE are responsible for supplying high value-added and high
tech-oriented products. A wide range of Toyota’s sales, marketing and financial channels
across CEE, combined with its effective sourcing policy, enables the company to
increase its sales volume further in the enlarged Europe (see Table 8-8).
Table 8-8: Toyota’s Sales and Marketing Channels in CEE (as of 2005)
8.5.5 Corporate Performance
Toyota Motor Manufacturing Poland
TMMP has produced 134,222 manual transmissions (MTs) for Yaris in TMMF and
Country Company Name Start ofoperations
Number of
employees
Czech Republic Toyota Motor Czech spol.s.r.o. Jan. 1994 60
Hungary Toyota Motor Hungary Kft. Dec. 1991 53
Poland Toyota Motor Poland Co., Ltd. Jan. 1991 96
Slovenia Toyota Adria d.o.o. Nov. 1998 36
Czech Republic Toyota Financial Services Czech s.r.o. Jun. 2000 17
Hungary Toyota Financial Services Hungary Rt. Jul. 2002 10
Poland Toyota Bank Polska S.S. Mar. 2000 38
Slovakia Toyota Financial Services Slovakia s.r.o. Jan. 2005 4
Other companies
Marketing companies
Source : Toyota in the World (2005, 2006, 2007)
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Avensis in TMUK since the start of its operation. In 2004, Toyota Motors has
committed significant financial resources to the expansion of the TMMP factory in
order to supply MTs for Aigo manufactured in TPCA. The number of units of
production was predicted to increase from 250,000 to 550,000. As of today, TMMP has
been operating fairly successfully with a growth of its transmission production. The
increased capacity of TMMP has also contributed to improving Poland’s trade balance
deficits. This is because TMMP has produced MTs and exported them to TMUK and
TMMT since April 2002 and MTs and engines for the Aygo in TPCA since January
2005. The capitalisation of TMMP is 1.026 billion New Polish Zloty. The plant
achieved certification in October 2003, which means that all plants in operation in
Europe are now certified to meet the ISO 14001 quality certification (European
Environmental & Social Report, 2005). TMMP strives for waste reduction. For instance,
a large amount of lubricant oil used in the production process at TMMP is recycled and
reduction in oil wastes consequently totals up to 400 litres per month (European
Environmental & Social Report 2005). The expanded production size of TMMP is a
signal of the locational attractiveness of the Dolnoslaskie voivodship to other potential
investors. TMMP’s success seems likely to trigger a sequence of other foreign investors
such as LG, Toshiba and so forth.
Figure 8-16: TPCA’s Turnover (Unit: million Euro)
Source: Author’s illustration based on the TPCA’s website (http://www.tpca.cz)
Toyota Peugeot Citroën Automobile
The company produces 1,050 cars per day and 300,000 cars per annum (1/3 Toyota, 1/3
Peugeot 107 and 1/3 Citroën C1). The turnover of the TPCA project jumped from 600
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million Euros in 2005 to 1,926 million Euros in 2007 (see Figure 8-16). This may
reflect in the effective transfer of the three major principles of the Toyota Production
System to the production process of TPCA: (1) kaizen or continuous improvement, (2)
just-in-time, (3) jidōka or an automatic system to stop production processes if a problem
occurs). Despite domestic production, Toyota’s market share remains limited in the
Czech Republic, because 99 percent of the cars produced are exported abroad. There are
two major reasons, (1) the weak purchasing power of Czech consumers and (2) the
dominating market status of VW- Škoda. However, it is predicted that the EU
environmental institutional framework and the strong purchasing power of Western
Europeans would encourage the sales performance of energy-efficient compact cars of
TPCA to increase further (Czech Business Weekly, October 29, 2007).
Eighty percent of the volume of parts comes from the Czech Republic
(CzechInvest 2007; TPCA, 2007). TPCA sells a lot of cars to Western European
countries such as Germany, Italy, France and the UK (Czech Business Weekly, October
29, 2007). In particular, Italy is the largest sales destination to date, followed by France,
where Peugeot and Citroën enjoy their established reputation (Czech Business Weekly,
October 29, 2007). According to the CzechInvest, the TPCA project is predicted to
contribute to raising GDP growth for the country by 1.5 to 2 percent points in 2005.
When considering TPCA’s social engagement, the company received the ISO
14001 certificate: 2004 and the BAT (Best Available Techniques) certification was
awarded for its environmentally-friendly production technology (http://www.tpca.cz). In
order to raise the knowledge of environmental protection among the local community
members, the Toyota Schools for Sustainable Development (SSD) programme was
undertaken in the Czech Republic in 2003. Since the start of the operation, under a
“Partnership for Kolín region”, the Japanese-French consortium has distributed a large
amount of grants to selected projects in which local societal actors such as
municipalities and NGOs are involved. In order to raise the standard of local medical
systems to the Western standard, TPCA also sponsors the hospital in Kolín (Czech
Business Weekly, October 29, 2007).
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Table 8-9: Case Study Firms Location Strategy and Organisational Characteristics
Characteristics NSK-ISKRA Denso Hungary Sanyo Hungary TMMP/TPCA
1 Entry timing 1998 1997 1999 1999/2002
2 Location Kielce, Poland Székesfehérvár, Hungary Dorog, Hungary Wałbrzych, Poland
/Kolín, Czech Republic
3 Special economic
areas
No Székesfehérvár
industrial park
Dorog industrial park Wałbrzych SEZ/Kolín-
Ovčáry industrial zone
4 Subsidiary role Exporting to
Western Europe
Exporting to
Western Europe
Exporting to
Western Europe
Exporting to
Western Europe
5 FDI motives for
the initial FDI
Regional adaptation and
reorganization
Network relations with
Isuzu
Network relations with
Nokia
Regional adaptation and
reorganization/creation of
relational assets
6 Economic factors
influencing FDI
strategies
(1) historical business
relations
(1) labour quality; (2)
transportation costs
(1) geographical proximity to
Nokia
(1) strategic location/
(1)strategic location;
(2) labour quality
7 Institutions influencing
FDI strategies
Restrictive labour regulation
that distorted the post-
privatization restructuring
FDI incentives and
proactivity
FDI incentives and
proactivity
FDI incentives, Euro 5 and the
role of CzechInvest, local
content requirements
8 Corporate growth Steady Steady Steady Steady
9 Number of employees Large Large Large Large
10 Entry mode M&A WOS WOS WOS/JV
11 Ownership Majority ownership Complete ownership Complete ownership Complete ownership/
50-50 shared ownership
12 Nationality of top
management
Japanese Japanese Japanese Japanese
13 Technology transfer in-between Limited Limited Limited
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8.5.6 Summary
The Toyota case is illustrative of the fact that the impact of institutional settings such as
the introduction of Euro 5 has had a significant effect on Toyota’s internationalisation
strategy, coupled with an increased emphasis on the EU market and an aim for raising
corporate image and reputation in Europe. The strategy and characteristics of the market
entry of Toyota in European transition economies can be defined not only by the
replication of traditional hierarchical production arrangements but also by the creation
of production networks with Western suppliers. In order to reinforce its market position,
Toyota has specialised in the manufacture of diesel engines in Poland and of cheap and
small-sized vehicles in collaboration with PSA in the Czech Republic. Its subsidiaries
and associated companies have served the parent company and searched for new
external business arrangements. It seems evident that strong social commitments were
seen by both TMMP and TPCA to be of great significance to enhance the corporate
image and to increase local legitimacy as a good corporate citizen.
8.6 Conclusions
With the help of the case study method, the nature of FDI strategies adopted by
Japanese manufacturing firms and their operational consequence in CEE were
investigated. Four Japanese manufacturing firms were selected for this qualitative study:
(1) NSK-ISKRA; (2) Denso Hungary; (3) Sanyo Hungary; and (4) Toyota Motor
Manufacturing Poland/Toyota Peugeot Citroën Automobile. These cases were assessed
systematically on the basis of four strategic management aspects: (1) location strategy;
(2) human resource management; (3) external linkages; and (4) corporate performance.
This chapter revealed that there were multiple investment motives of the case
study firms. The case study firms cited that either the geographical reconfiguration of
their European cross-border production activities or the forging of network relations
with Western and Japanese customers were important determinants in their market entry.
Regarding location choice, FDI incentives granted by host country governments, the
welcoming of societal actors such as local communities, excellent transport
infrastructure and easy access to the Western European markets were considered as key
requirements in CEE. FDI incentives have played a dominant role in attracting the case
firms. With the exception of NSK-ISKRA, the case firms engage to a large extent in the
manufacture of environment-related products under the emergence of the European
environmental regulatory institutions (e.g., solar batteries for Sanyo Hungary, diesel
engines/small compact cars for TMMP/TPCA, and diesel common rail components for
Denso Hungary). As regards the impact of institutions on MNE activity in the CEE, the
NSK case exhibits that problematic labour regulations distorted the post-privatisation
restructuring. On the positive side of institutional forces, the reorganisation and new
development of Toyota’s supply chains was enabled by EU’s local content rules. The
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TPCA case illustrates the increased network linkages with Western suppliers in the
Czech Republic.
All of these case study firms have shown a steady improvement of corporate
performance over time. This suggests that the maintenance and development of labour
quality through continued efforts to offer various training programs are crucial. As the
case study firms target the Western European market, both increased production size
and performance growth with a steady pace lead to enhanced exports and contribute to
improved balance of payments. Somewhat surprisingly, EU membership did not directly
affect the allocation decisions of FDI of the case firms. Even though positive effects of
EU membership were not explicitly cited by the case firms in CEE, there is no doubt
that they receive various direct and indirect benefits: (1) removal of trade barriers
between the old EU members and new CEE-EU members; (2) the harmonisation of the
EU legislation; (3) access to the mega-market of roughly 500 million inhabitants; and
(4) development of transport infrastructure as a result of EU funds.
The impact of Japanese manufacturing FDI on regional economic development
seems great in employment creation and in the transfer of efficient production methods
to local employees (e.g., TMMP and TPCA). In contrast to expectations among
host-based policy makers, the development of local embeddeddness, though not easy to
detect, remains relatively limited. It takes local entrepreneurs much longer to become
‘multinationals’ in their own right, even if the local economies grow and their
institutional infrastructure is being developed. Hence, in order to keep the good
economic performance coupled with FDI inflows, host-based governments in CEE
should continuously strive to develop feasible policies aimed at connecting indigenous
firms with international production networks of foreign-owned firms and to upgrade
labour quality and entrepreneurial spirit as a whole. Otherwise, the phenomenon of ‘the
cathedral in the Central and Eastern European desert’ will remain; moreover, this
problem could even deteriorate in the future.
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9 CONCLUSIONS
9.1 Summary
The main goal of this study was to empirically examine how both economic and
non-economic forces affect the motivations and the corporate strategies of Japanese
MNEs in post-socialist European economies. It is noteworthy that the primary data used
for this dissertation was collected in the beginning of the year 2008 prior to the onset of
the financial crisis arising from the subprime loan problems in the United States. It
indicates that the empirical findings were not affected by the critical economic turmoil
confronted by Japanese MNEs in post-socialist European economies.
We must be aware that numerous research has tended to point to the relevance of
economic advantages such as market size and cheap factor endowments as the key FDI
factor in the CEEC region, while the topic of the impact of both institutional changes
and network relations (i.e., intra-firm, inter-firm, extra-firm networks) on the MNE
strategic behavior has substantially been neglected. In this thesis, emphasis is thus given
to conduct an investigation of the phenomenon of FDI from Japan in the CEE context
with mixed research methodology. Both quantitative and qualitative methods
complemented each other to enhance the justification of the results with reference to
Japanese MNEs’ activities in the region. Particularly, as explained in the introduction,
this dissertation endeavoured to answer the following research questions:
 How has the Japanese FDI position developed relative to European and US
counterparts in CEE?
 What are the geographic scope, sectoral distribution, entry timing and entry
mode of Japanese FDI in the European transition economies of CEE?
 What are the criteria governing the decision to invest in and to select a specific
location within the CEE region?
 How far do the dynamics of institutional transformation explain the wave of
foreign capital to the region? How do changes in institutional quality affect the
actions of Japanese manufacturing MNEs?
 What determines Japanese manufacturing firms’ location choices at a
sub-national regional level?
 What are the underlying factors in determining the organizational performance
of Japanese manufacturing MNEs?
To answer these questions, various types of qualitative and quantitative sources have
been used in a multi-method approach. One crucial contribution of this thesis is the
decomposition into their analytic components of the feature and strategic aspects of
Japanese MNEs in post-socialist European economies. Based on a synthesis of the
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results from each individual chapter, final conclusions can be drawn as follows:
Chapter 2 provided a basis for our understanding by outlining theoretical contributions
to the internationalisation of firms. From the late 1990s, Dunning’s OLI paradigm of the
multinational organization tends to substantially shift its emphasis to the importance of
both inter-firm alliances and institutions. For example, externalisation of transactions is
reappraised by Dunning (1997) to replace internalisation of transactions. Dunning also
highlighted the role of industrial clusters in generating synergetic effects for FDI
performance. Moreover, the notion of North’s institutions, which was neglected in
international business studies, was also incorporated into Dunning’s (2008) OLI
framework. Dunning’s latest eclectic paradigm has turned out to encompass a wide
range of theoretical concepts in efficiency and legitimacy considerations.
In Chapter 3, I illuminated the evolution of FDI inflows into individual countries in
absolute values and highlighted the cross-country variations in terms of (1) two
size-adjusted FDI indicators (e.g., GDP ratio and per capita), (2) the industrial
distribution and (3) the country of origin. By and large, Visegrád-4 accounts for roughly
70 percent of the inward FDI stock into the CEE region at the end of 2006. At the
country level, Poland has attracted the highest amount of FDI (US$103.6 billion),
followed by Hungary (US$81.8 billion), the Czech Republic (US$77.5 billion) and
Romania (US$41 billion). In sharp contrast, the nation states of the former Yugoslavia
have lagged behind other CEE countries considerably, because of the persistent
economic and political turmoil caused by two major ethnic wars. These descriptive
statistical data revealed a positive relationship of FDI stock to market potential and the
level of environmental and institutional stability. As regards the actual value of the
size-adjusted FDI, Estonia and Bulgaria achieved the two highest FDI performances
during the period 2003-2006, while Slovenia continued to encounter poor FDI
performance in spite of its relatively high GDP per capita, labour productivity and
institutional maturity. In this light, it is difficult to verify a linear association between
FDI and the aforementioned economic and institutional criteria. As regards the origin of
investors, the inbound FDI stock shows some positive association with cultural,
geographical and historical proximity between investing and invested countries. For
example, FDI from Nordic countries tends to concentrate in Baltic nation states. Asian
FDI seems likely to be negligible. In considering the industrial distribution of FDI
inflows in the region, Visegrád-4 succeeded in attracting FDI in the manufacturing
industry due to their long engineering tradition, compared to other CEECs.
Chapter 4 concentrated on the characteristics of Japanese FDI. This chapter explained
how, where, when and why Japanese investors penetrated the CEE market. The whole
history of Japanese investment in the region is relatively short. With the exception of a
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large-sized FDI project undertaken by Suzuki in Hungary investment in 1991, there was
no major investment identified during the 1990s. However, as various agreements were
concluded between the EU and some CEECs with reference to the eastern expansion of
European integration, the number of new entrants increased gradually after the turn of
the century. As regards the geographical scope, three of Visegrád-4 (Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland) have attracted the lion’s share of Japanese manufacturing FDI. For
many Japanese MNEs, a consolidation of network ties with Japanese and foreign
customers have been a dominant factor of the phenomenon of relocation towards the
CEECs, together with production cost advantages on the eastern European periphery.
Japanese MNEs attach the biggest strategic value to rather production than sales in CEE
and rationalize their global and regional sourcing strategy through reconfiguring
operational units within the territory of the newly enlarged EU. We found that the
criteria for location selection vary by country. The most persuasive argument in favour
of the Czech Republic and Hungary as a production site was geographical proximity to
customers as well as favourable government support, while labour costs were dominant
location criteria in Poland and Slovakia, for instance. With respect to Japanese managers’
perception of obstacles to their local operation, rigid labour markets and institutional
inefficiency seem likely to be threatening, although there is a significant cross-country
variation.
Chapter 5 explored the interaction between institutional changes and FDI inflows using
a quantitative (cross-section and time-series) method. I directed considerable attention
to variations in the advances of institutional development at a country level, because
economics often tends to underestimate the institutional aspect of economic events as
compared to market forces. It is found that MNEs have to pay relatively high
transaction costs in managing sales, marketing, and production units in those countries
with lower quality institutions. Particularly, it is significant that institutional changes
seem likely to influence the success or failure of economic development of individual
countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The empirical estimation demonstrated the
pattern and spread of FDI inflows with the use of OLS with PSCE. My research aim
was to seek to scrutinize the extent to which both economic and institutional forces play
a crucial role in changes in the scale of FDI inflows in the European transition
economies. Looking at the evidence drawn from this empirical investigation, economic
forces (GDP, misery index and trade openness) seem to be very critical. Second, FDI is
sensitive to the institutionalisation of FDI instruments, as measured by a binary dummy
variable of the presence of a FDI promotion agency. Third, continued efforts by
government to build market-supporting institutions tend to lead to an increase in FDI
inflows. Fourth, the enduring nature of past political ideologies tends to shape FDI
inflows. In sharp contrast to my prediction, EU membership shows not to provide any
significant impact on the pattern and spread of FDI inflows in CEE. This analysis
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allowed for clarifying more thorough analytical insights into the MNE activity in the
region and generates an opportunity for host-based policymakers to design appropriate
FDI policies.
Chapter 6 was a quantitative investigation of the location patterns of Japanese
manufacturing firms. This quantitative empirical examination was based on the analysis
of 205 Japanese manufacturing firms during the period from 1991 to 2006 in the
European transition economies at a sub-national regional level. The data set of MNEs
with a single source country (i.e., Japan) has also enabled us to avoid the complexity
deriving from the possible relations between the national identity of foreign MNEs and
economic and non-economic forces. This study evidenced that firms make location
choices based on considerations of economic and institutional advantages. Detailed
results are as follows. First, I found that economic forces are less important than
non-economic forces. Among the economic forces, area size exerts a significant effect
on Japanese manufacturing MNEs’ location choices. Second, institutionalisation of FDI
practices matters in attracting Japanese investors. Judging from this empirical finding,
the institutional hypothesis explains that institutional maturity that helps mitigate
transaction costs and market uncertainties tends to determine the location strategy of
Japanese manufacturing MNEs. Third, a firm-specific advantage, as measured by local
experience, is a critical factor in determining the locational distribution of Japanese
manufacturing MNEs. Fourth, the presence of Japanese nationality agglomeration not
only in the same industry but also in different industries has a strong impact on firm
location. Last but not least, the replication of Japanese keiretsu systems as a governance
mechanism influences Japanese manufacturing firms’ location choices within the CEE
context. These empirical results have policy implications for the European transition
economies: upgrading institutional infrastructure and agglomeration economies is one
pivotal prerequisite for luring foreign direct investment by MNEs of Asian countries
such as Japan and Korea.
Chapter 7 shows new analytical insights into the impact of economic and
non-economic forces on firm performance variance in the European transitional
economies. The data set was based on 55 Japanese manufacturing firms in the European
transition economies, which participated in the survey conducted in January 2008. This
survey analysis rested on managers’ perception of firm performance. First, the findings
support the hypothesis that stable labour market institutions are a necessary condition
for operating successfully. Second, the more economically and politically risky a
manager perceives a country to be, the better the performance a firm is expected to
achieve in terms of cost reduction. Although this surprising result is the opposite of my
prediction, evidence presented in this chapter supports the interpretation that changing
market environments in the CEE region may keep Japanese manufacturing firms ready
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to undertake more flexible marketing and production approaches in response to
emerging risks and thus contribute to better performance. Third, as regards firm-specific
advantages, both cost leadership and managerial expertise become highly relevant for
firm performance in two or more dimensions. It was found that there is a significant
positive relationship between the ability of the firms to bargain with the government for
their particular interests and cost reduction performance. Fourth, there is a strong
relationship between social capital and cost reduction performance. This result is the
first indication that the mechanism of interpersonal relationships with various political
and societal actors should not be ignored in the business studies of the European
transition economies. For managers involved in business activities in the CEE region, it
appears to be important to nurture a trusted tie with local stakeholders because they are
a source of timely, reliable and adequate information about regulatory infrastructure.
Concerning the role of parent-subsidiary relations in improving firm
performance, the less autonomy delegated to a subsidiary, the better cost reduction
performance the subsidiary can achieve. This sharply contrasts with the claims by some
studies (Luo, 2003; Kotabe and Wheiler, 1998) that autonomy is used as an effective
tool in enhancing local responsiveness. This is to say, the centralised control by the
headquarters with reference to resource allocation seems likely to improve firm
performance. In other words, it is reasonable to argue that localisation is not necessarily
an effective cost management tool in improving firm performance. It is important to
note that sense of unity in the human integration aspect has a significantly positive
relationship with three dimensions of performance measures: (1) overall operational
performance, (2) profitability and (3) sales growth. Although I failed in verifying the
direct impact of keiretsu systems on successful firm performance, the t-test showed the
statistically significant difference between keiretsu and non-keiretsu firms in sales
growth. Last but not least, late entrants are more satisfied with their overall operations
as compared to first movers. Drawing on this evidence, first-mover advantages cannot
necessarily be judged as a success factor in the context of Japanese manufacturing FDI
in CEE. Rather, one could tell prospective Japanese investors that the region remains
abundant opportunities.
Chapter 8 presented case histories of four major Japanese manufacturing companies
that operate in the European transition economies. Interestingly, the case histories
evidence that the underlying FDI motive is not explained by the EU’s discriminatory
trade policies against non-European producers that were major determinants in inducing
Japanese manufacturing FDI in Western Europe in the late 1980s and the early 1990s.
Rather, the case studies revealed that the underlying motive for a relocation of
production capacities is critically driven by the reorganisation of international
production and distribution networks and the forging of network relations with Western
and Japanese customers. The NSK case explicitly demonstrates that the vanishing
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locational attractiveness of the UK made the company feel compelled to strategically
reorganise its production networks taking into account the enlarged EU landscape.
Additionally, the NSK’s acquisition of ISKRA in Kielce was enabled by their long
historical business ties which lowered transaction and coordination costs inherent in
normal cross-border acquisitions in transition economies. Drawing justification from the
cases, it is important to note that institutional forces such as European environmental
regulations (e.g., Euro 5), financial and fiscal incentives, and receptiveness all tend to
influence FDI strategies. A limitation of the case studies of this research project is
undoubtedly the number of cases, so that it is not necessarily able to generalize the
causes and consequences of these case firms to other Japanese MNEs in the CEEC
region. However, a fair reliability and validity of the findings would be possible because
of the particular attention directed to the major FDI features and operational experience
of these four enterprises.
Figure 9-1: Concrete Measures of Future Operational Development (Unit: percent)
Source: JETRO (2007)
Note: N=46
9.2 Policy and Managerial Implications
Through the findings of the present study based on various types of quantitative and
qualitative sources, policy and managerial implications can be made. First, each host
government of CEE can increase FDI inflows by institutionalizing FDI policy
incentives. It is essential that the provision of FDI policy incentives will provide an
indicator of CEE’s preparedness to welcome FDI inflows. Given a heightened level of
competition for FDI at local, sub-regional and national levels, it could be more
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important for each post-socialist European country to implement coherent FDI
attraction policies designed to meet strategic goals of MNEs instead of merely giving
investment incentives. This argument is in line with Lim (2005: 74), who points out that
“host governments that intend to attain economic externalities from FDI will bolster
their chances of success by devising and promoting incentives that will advance the
strategic aims of potential investors”. Moreover, each host government should introduce
thorough FDI policy incentives fundamental to enable efficient transfer of cutting-edge
technology, know-how, and managerial expertise from MNEs to local firms or to create
strategic alliances between MNEs and institutions of higher education and local
research centers. These efforts by each host government, in turn, would lead to strong
backward linkages as a key to the long-term growth prospects of both MNEs and the
host country. Emphasis should also be given to the importance of offering environments
supportive to not only the low-end but also the high-end of the value-added chains of
MNEs, which leads to a long-term economic development for the host country. So far,
post-socialist European countries are unlikely to succeed in attracting high-tech
intensive investment projects by Japanese MNEs. According to JETRO’s survey (2007),
despite a consolidation of manufacturing activities by Japanese MNEs in the consumer
electronics, motor vehicle, and machine tool industries, the total number of R&D units
set up by Japanese MNEs in CEE totals only 10, as of the end of 2006. In addition, only
4.3 percent of the surveyed firms (N=46) cited that setting up R&D units in
post-socialist European economies is important in the future operation (see Figure 9-1).
Second, the present study shows that the pattern of FDI by Japanese
manufacturing MNEs in CEE is not a mere sign of exploiting production cost
advantages. Rather, it is more complex than expectation. This thesis notes that Japanese
MNEs are increasingly aware of the importance of the rationalisation of international
production and distribution networks in an enlarged Europe. As seen in the case-based
research of this thesis (e.g., the production network of Toyota-Peugeot Citroën),
regional networking of different operational units of MNEs across European borders is
aimed at gaining competitiveness, together with a consolidation of network
relationships with rivals. Through network-based strategies, firms are compensated for
greater uncertainties of investment and higher institutional hazards. A managerial lesson
is drawn from current evidence of this thesis. The firms should simultaneously consider
their firm-specific factors and country-specific factors (in particular, economic- and
institution-specific location factors) in the internationalization process in post-socialist
European countries. For the Japanese MNEs in the pre-entry phase, Japanese nationality
agglomeration, previous experience and keiretsu networks are the decisive factors in
influencing the location pattern of Japanese firms. Especially, current evidence from the
context of Japanese MNEs in CEE stresses that spatial proximity seems to facilitate
firms to acquire critical strategic information and enhance their political legitimacy as
well as their economic efficiency. In the post-entry phase, firm-specific proprietary
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resources such as cost leadership, managerial expertise and bargaining power are also at
the heart of organizational success. In addition, formal and informal contacts with local
stakeholders and the social climate inside a firm have to be developed in order to
achieve organizational performance. This thesis denotes that the careful examination of
internal resources inside the firm with inter-firm settings as well as with environmental
and institutional conditions of the host country enables potential investors to overcome
the liability of foreignness.
Third, policy makers of each government of CEECs should pay particular
attention to the importance of developing human capital, together with structural
reforms of labour markets. So far, a number of Japanese investors have already been
concerned about the rising trajectories of wages in CEECs. Moreover, as increased
competition makes prospective investors reluctant to enter, the existing investors are
continuously in a struggle to accommodate both rapid changes in environmental
conditions (e.g., labour shortage, high turnover problems) and negative legacies from
the past (e.g., ill-functioning social welfare systems). The empirical findings show that
the more stable labour market the better firm performance in the case of Japanese MNEs
in CEE. Even though an upward curve of wage levels in new EU-CEECs cannot be
avoided due to their improved standards of living and EU membership, CEECs should
be devoted to investing constantly in the education of their population to keep the
growth rate of labour productivity higher than that of labour cost. Thus, not only the
central governments but also the regional governments of the CEECs should therefore
continue to focus their attention on strengthening the value of created assets rather than
relying heavily on the ‘limited’ advantage of natural assets.
Lastly, although a number of major Japanese MNEs have been attracted to CEE
and Japanese MNEs’ perceptions of this region as an FDI destination have substantially
improved, the scale of Japanese FDI has still been limited, as compared to that of
Western counterparts. It means that psychic distance resulting from Japanese MNEs’
poor experiential knowledge of local markets and severe obstacles in the form of
structural and institutional features in CEE, together with inherenet cultural and
geographical distance, may continue to discourage Japanese investors to make the
decision to produce locally. To minimize this psychic distance, mutual learning and
understanding have to be nurtured through active dissemination of information among
and regular visits by business associations and academic groups from Asian and Central
and Eastern Europe. Prospective cultural activities and industrial cooperation between
the two regions seem to be a crucial policy instrument of promoting Asian FDI. The
organization of regular forums for sharing cultural and historical backgrounds of both
regions could also help ease psychic distance between them. The knowledge of
post-socialist European economies in Japan, and vice versa, should be improved by
student exchange programs, for instance. Therefore, the dynamics of the
internationalization process of Japanese MNEs would be revitalized not only by
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economic factors of host countries and strategic aspects of the firm but also by social
and cultural cooperation.
Although I have tried to present a comprehensive view of Japanese
manufacturing MNEs’ activities and their investment strategies through a multi-method
perspective, the data set used in this dissertation is rather limited. Evidence presented in
this thesis is thus not conclusive but suggestive. It also seems difficult to make firm
judgments since I have presented the results of MNEs from one single country in the
CEEC region without any comparative analysis and since the proliferation of Japanese
FDI in the region has just begun at the turn of the new millennium. However, I hope that
this dissertation will help scholars, business leaders and policy makers to gain a better
understanding of factors influencing Japanese manufacturing MNEs’ investment
strategies in an idiosyncratic set of dynamically changing environmental and
institutional situations, as they seek the strategic fit between local responsiveness and
global integration in the CEE region.
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現在、貴社が事業を展開しておられる中東欧の国をお答えください。
ポーランド チェコ ハンガリー スロバキア ルーマニア
（一般情報）
1. 本社の主要業務に関し、お答えください。
生産 販売 ロジスティックス 研究開発 サービス
2. 本社の海外拠点数はどれくらいございますか。
1 ２－４ ５－９ 10－19 20－49 50以上
3. 中東欧の拠点はどれくらいございますか。
1 ２－４ ５－９ 10－14 15－19 20以上
（子会社情報）
5. 貴社の中東欧子会社の属する業種をお答えください。
建設業 製造業 金属加工
製造業 機械 製造業 鉄鋼
製造業 電気・電子機器 製造業 その他
製造業 輸送用機器 卸売・小売業
製造業 化学 倉庫・運輸業
製造業 金属 金融・保険業
製造業 食品 サービス業
6. 中東欧進出の投資形態についてお答えください。
完全子会社 合弁 買収
7. 貴社の中東欧子会社の最高責任者の国籍をお答えください。
日本人 現地人 その他
8. 貴社の中東欧子会社の最高責任者は、中東欧に勤務される以前、同地域に関する業
務を本社/他の海外子会社にて行っていた経験がありましたか。
はい ない
9. 貴社の中東欧子会社の事業内容に関し、お答えください。
生産 販売 ロジスティックス 研究開発 サービス
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10. 最初の中東欧への進出は、いつ頃かお答えください。
1990年以前 1990－1994 1995－1999 2000－2004 2005年以降
11. 貴社の中東欧子会社の現地日本人駐在員数をお答えください。
0人 1－4人 5－9人 10－19人 20人以上
12. 貴社の中東欧子会社の現地従業員数をお答えください。
10人未満 10－99人 100－499人 500－999人 1000人以上
13. 中東欧子会社の本社への資金依存度についてお答えください。
0% 0%超－ 25%以下 25％超－ 50%以下 50%超－ 100%未満
100%
14. 本社の役員による中東欧子会社への訪問はどれくらいかお答えください。
月に一度 3ヶ月に一度 6ヶ月に一度 1年に一度 全くない
15. 貴社の中東欧子会社の事業満足度についてお答えください。
満足度
非常に
不満
やや
不満
普通
やや
満足
非常に
満足
全体的な
事業満足度
1 2 3 4 5
16. 貴社のオペレーション能力についてお答えください。
比較優位性
非常に
弱い
やや
弱い
普通
やや
強い
非常に
強い
コスト競争力 1 2 3 4 5
経営管理能力 1 2 3 4 5
人的資本の蓄積 1 2 3 4 5
現地政府との
交渉能力
1 2 3 4 5
17. 現在の中東欧子会社の事業環境についてお答えください。
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現地の事業環境
の変化
非常に懸念
している
少し懸念
している
普通
あまり懸念
していない
全く懸念
していない
人件費の上昇 1 2 3 4 5
他社との競争激化 1 2 3 4 5
不安定なマクロ経済 1 2 3 4 5
不透明な政治 1 2 3 4 5
ジョブホッピング 1 2 3 4 5
低い経済成長率 1 2 3 4 5
インフラの不整備度 1 2 3 4 5
現地政府による支援
が弱い
1 2 3 4 5
現地通貨の変動が
激しい
1 2 3 4 5
労使関係の悪化 1 2 3 4 5
労働力の確保 1 2 3 4 5
18. 貴社の中東欧子会社の事業達成度についてお答えください。
事業達成度
予想を
大きく
下回る
予想を
やや下回る
予想通りで
ある
予想をやや
上回る
予想を
大きく
上回る
コスト削減達成度 1 2 3 4 5
収益性達成度 1 2 3 4 5
売上高達成度 1 2 3 4 5
顧客拡大達成度 1 2 3 4 5
19. 貴社の中東欧子会社の現地事業決定権についてお答えください。
子会社の
決定権
完全に決定
できる
ほぼ決定で
きる
場合による
あまり決定
できない
完全に決定
できない
中長期計画 1 2 3 4 5
予算編成 1 2 3 4 5
設備投資の追加 1 2 3 4 5
組織変更 1 2 3 4 5
新規事業への参入 1 2 3 4 5
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20. 貴社の中東欧子会社の現地化の度合いをお答えください。
ローカリゼーション はい いいえ
現地従業員を日本の本社でトレーニングす
るシステムがある
現地社員に対し昇進制度がある
マーケティング戦略部門の
責任者は現地人である
財務会計部門の責任者は現地人である
人事部門の責任者は現地人である
21. 貴社の中東欧子会社の現地ネットワークについてお答えください。
現地ネットワーク
非常に
弱い
やや
弱い
普通
やや
強い
非常に
強い
現地中央政府との
コンタクト
1 2 3 4 5
現地地方政府との
コンタクト
1 2 3 4 5
現地コミュニティー
とのコンタクト
1 2 3 4 5
22. 貴社の中東欧子会社の現地従業員との情報共有化並びに一体感についてお答えく
ださい。
情報共有化 一体感
経営情報の交換、情報伝達を社内にて
活発に行っている。言語的コミュニケー
ションギャップは全くない
5 一体感を醸成するため、全従業員が共
有できる食堂、福利厚生施設、朝礼、
親睦行事、ユニフォームがある
5
情報の共有化には各種の工夫をして
いる。
4 5 の中でいくつか欠けているが、いくつ
かの工夫はある
4
特別な施策はないが、ミーティングでは
情報の共有化に努めている。
3 5の中で 1つはある。 3
言語的コミュニケーションギャップがあ
り、情報交換は消極的に行われている
2 親睦行事しかない 2
情報交換は全く行われていない 1 特別な施策は実施していない 1
この度は、大変ご多忙の中ご協力頂き、心より厚く御礼申し上げます。
